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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship activities in firms. Existing research examines aspects of governance and
entrepreneurship without any consideration of the links that may exist between these two drivers.
This study seeks to address this gap.
Practicing corporate entrepreneurship has become an important element to compete successfully in
today's competitive environment. However, an over emphasis of entrepreneurship could also lead
towards negative implications such as high risk as the outcome is unknown and involves an element
of uncertainty which could have negative implications on the company.
On the other hand, organisations are also required to practice robust corporate governance in
order to enhance greater transparency and accountability. Although the benefits of corporate
governance are well acknowledge, there is the potential for a tension to arise between these two
corporate imperatives; an organisation is required to practise governance and control whilst
simultaneously engaging in entrepreneurial activities. It is argued that by placing emphasis on
control and accountability, an organisation's entrepreneurial activities may be curbed. It is in this
context that the relationship of corporate governance and entrepreneurship is examined.
A mixed method approach (pragmatic) was employed for testing propositions, triangulating and
elaborating upon the research findings. Two qualitative studies were undertaken to ascertain the
nature of corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance, as they are generally perceived.
This, along with other evidence, enabled the development of a corporate entrepreneurship index
and a corporate governance index. A quantitative analysis was then undertaken, based on the FTSE
100 companies to ascertain the natureofany relationship between the two indices. Qualitative case
studies were then used through an interview process to gain a deeper understanding of the issues
involved.
Certain aspects of corporate governance control mechanisms such as board size, frequency of
board and sub-committee meetings were found to impact negatively on entrepreneurial activities
whilst others, such as dominance of institutional block holders had a positive impact. Also, it was
found linking annual bonuses to performance criteria exerts a positive effect on entrepreneurship.
These findings indicate that whilst certain aspects of governance may have negative implications
for entrepreneurship, others may impact positively. In addition, there are practices that an
organisation could implement that maypositively stimulate entrepreneurial activity and thus serve
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In recent years, with the internationalisation of cross-border businesses, growing
attention has been given to corporate entrepreneurship in large established
organisations. Many large organisations are looking for ways to reinvent or revitalise
their entrepreneurial roots in order to remain competitive in the business environment
(Cooper and Dunkelberg, 1986; Wright et al., 1992; Guth & Ginsberg, 1990; Zahra,
1995; Morris & Kuratko, 2002). Along with the importance of having entrepreneurial
skills, organisations are, as an implication of the Enron scandal, now also required to
practice robust corporate governance; a mandatory requirement by which organisations
must abide (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2005). To date, little research that
focuses on how these two drivers: corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship
interact appears to have been done. This present study is an attempt to fill that gap.
Following recent financial scandals such as Enron (cited above) there increasingly
exists a growing tension within the business environment, whereby companies are
expected to stay competitive whilst at the same time practising good governance that, it
is argued, enhances transparency and accountability. In the U.K, the Combined Code
provides guidance for good governance practice and listed companies are required to
comply with those rules and regulations. However, because organisations are required
to comply with the Combined Code it is argued (but with little evidence) that such rules
dampen the entrepreneurial activities that are crucial for the economic growth of
organisations (Taylor, 2001; Short; 1998; 2000). On the other hand, corporations
practising entrepreneurship need to be flexible, empower employees and provide them
with the freedom to perform their task without having the rigid, fixed rules and
regulations that could result in better governance.
The practice of corporate entrepreneurship has become a critical requirement for a
business to compete successfully in today's competitive environment. In addition,
entrepreneurship within an existing organisation has become an important element in
organisations and for economic development. This new emphasis on entrepreneurial
thinking developed during the emergence of the entrepreneurial economy of the 1980s
and 1990s. The pursuit of corporate entrepreneurship has arisen from a variety of
pressing problems including: increased global competition, continual downsizing of
organisations in pursuit of greater efficiency, dramatic changes in terms of innovations
and methods and improvements in the marketplace, perceived weaknesses in the
traditional methods of corporate management and the exodus of those innovative
minded employees who are disenchanted with bureaucratic organisation (Morris &
Kuratko, 2002). However, the more negative side of entrepreneurship is that, by
nature, it is an activity that involves risk. For example, giving employees the freedom
to innovate may involve the organisation breaking with its current practices. Since the
outcome is unknown, this change carries with it an element of uncertainty of outcome
and therefore risk. Any new venture involves the organisation in financial risk. If the
venture fails, money will be lost and this in turn could negatively affect the company's
stock value and bond ratings. This would have consequences for shareholders and
eventually other stakeholders including employees, suppliers and creditors (Morris &
Kuratko, 2002). One problem with unrestrained entrepreneurial decision and innovative
activity is that executives can never have the same utility, function as shareholders,
despite ingeniously crafted incentive packages citations, e.g. Holmstrom, Jensen and
Murphy. This means that, without strong governance, executives may tilt their
decisions towards those that suit their own utility and pockets.
After the collapse of Enron, World Com and other corporate giants, there have been
numerous changes made to corporate governance codes both in the U.K and elsewhere
in order to enforce better governance practices so as to ensure greater transparency and
accountability within organisations. Prior studies on corporate governance show
evidence that companies practising good corporate governance are positively associated
with firm performance. For example, Core et al., (1999) and Monks & Minow, (2001)
find that U.S companies with weaker corporate governance structures performed less
well than companies with stronger corporate governance structures. In addition, prior
studies have shown evidence that shareholders do value good corporate governance.
McKinsey (2000) conducted 3 separate surveys to discover how shareholders perceive
and value corporate governance in developed and emerging markets. Their report
indicates that three-quarters of the investors believe that board practices are at least as
important as financial performance when they evaluate companies for investment. The
McKinsey findings also indicate that investors are willing to pay a premium of 18% -
28% for a well-governed company.
Although the benefits of corporate governance are well acknowledged in literature,
there has also been an on going debate in recent years on the potential constraints of
corporate governance. For example, Taylor (2001) argues that the focus is too much on
control and ways of curbing executive decisions. He finds that board members should
be focusing less on corporate governance and more on the central task of the board i.e.
corporate entrepreneurship, which involves creating the conditions necessary for
corporate renewal and the removal of outmoded business approaches. Short et al.
(2000) find that criticism has been made on the corporate governance code of best
practice in the U.K starting with the Cadbury Report through to the latest Combined
Code where it is equally important to ensure that the twin goals of accountability and
enterprise are achieved. In addition, Young (1995) argues that there would be a trade
off between accountability and enterprise whereby having too much accountability
could stifle enterprise activity within an organisation.
Tricker (1984) and Keasey and Wright (1993) argue that corporate governance should
have two broad dimensions covering both the accountability and enterprise aspects of
an organisation. The first dimension focuses on monitoring management performance
and ensuring accountability of management to shareholders. Thus, there should be an
emphasis on the stewardship and accountability dimension of corporate governance.
On the other hand, the second dimension focuses on the need of governance structures
and processes to encompass a mechanism which motivates managerial behaviour
towards increasing the wealth of the business via enhanced enterprise. In summary,
good corporate governance is seen as having a mix of devices, mechanisms and
structures which provide control and accountability whilst promoting economic
enterprise and corporate performance (Short et al., 2000).
Currently, the literature contains only two published studies, both conducted by Zahra
(1996, 2000), which show the interdependence of corporate entrepreneurship and
corporate governance in the U.S context. Zahra's (1996) findings indicate that
executive ownership and long-term institutional shareholders are positively associated
with entrepreneurship. On the other hand, his findings also indicate that there is a
negative effect of outside directors' ownership and short-term institutional shareholders
on entrepreneurship. Later, Zahra (2000) conducted research on medium sized
companies and found that commitment to corporate entrepreneurship is high when the
executives own stock in the firm; the board, chair and chief executive officers are
different individuals the board is medium in size and outside directors own stock in the
company. However, his research was conducted prior to the implementation of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 that arose as a result of the Enron scandal. This thesis
investigates the relationship between corporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship in an organisation. Using the U.K FTSE 100 companies, this study
addresses the impact of corporate governance internal control mechanisms on
entrepreneurial activities within these companies and seeks to determine whether they
have been affected (adversely or otherwise) by the mandatory requirements of corporate
governance. This chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 presents the motivation
for examining the relationship between corporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship. Key research objectives and questions linking corporate governance
and corporate entrepreneurship are examined in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 states the key
contributions of the study. Section 1.5 sets forth the structure of this thesis and, finally,
Section 1.6 provides the chapter summary.
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY
The motivation for examining the issue of linking corporate governance and corporate,
entrepreneurship is discussed in this section. Primarily, the motivation stems from three
varying sources:
i) Revision of the Code of Best Practice in governance;
ii) Gaps between corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance internal control
mechanisms: boards of directors, ownership structures and remuneration structures;
iii) Methodological issues.
Revisions to Codes of Best Practice
There have been continuous revisions made on corporate governance starting from the
Cadbury Report in 1992, through to the latest revision of the Combined Code in July
2003. The fall of Enron initiated further changes in the U.K and elsewhere by forcing a
re-evaluation of corporate governance issues, such as the role of non-executive
directors. The Higgs Report (2003) dealt especially with the role and effectiveness of
non-execUtive directors when making its recommendations for changes to the
Combined Code. Recommendations were made to increase the proportion of non
executive directors on the board to at least half (50%) and for the provision of more apt
remuneration for non-executive directors. Also, emphasis was placed on establishing
stronger links between non-executive directors and shareholders. Another review,
commissioned by the U.K government in response to the Enron scandal, examined the
role of the audit committee and this resulted in the Smith Report (2003). The main
issue dealt with in this report concerned external auditors and the companies they audit
as well the role and responsibility of audit committees. The improvement made in these
areas provided one way of maintaining checks to ensure reliable and honest accounting.
Later, in July 2003, the Financial Reporting Council approved a new draft of the
Combined Code considered to be 'the biggest shake-up of boardroom culture in more
than a decade' (Tasell, 24 July 2003). It retained almost all the 50 recommendations
that were in the original Higgs report. The main reforms of this Code cover areas
relating to the following: at least half of the board of directors need to comprise of
independent non-executive directors; the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should not
become chairman of the company except for exceptional reasons; the chairman should
be independent; a senior independent director should be appointed and made available
to the company's shareholders; the board needs to undertake a formal and rigorous
evaluation of their performance in terms of its committees and individual directors;
institutional investors need to avoid "ticking the box" when assessing company
corporate governance; adopt rigorous, formal and transparent procedures when
recruiting new directors (Solomon & Solomon, 2004).
The government, within a short time span, framed three reports pressing for greater
accountability and transparency. This has raised concerns among researchers, but with
little evidence, that stringent rules and regulations could dampen entrepreneurial
activities which it is argued are essential for the economy and for the growth of an
organisation (Taylor, 2001; Short et al., 1998; 2000, O'Sullivan, 2000; Young, 1995;
Tricker, 1984; Keasey & Wright, 1983). To date, little research attention has focused
on the implications and impact of changes made to the corporate governance code of
best practice on enterprise activities, and this study attempts to address this issue.
Linking Corporate Governance Internal Control Mechanisms with Corporate
Entrepreneurship
Previous studies have indicated that entrepreneurial activities stimulate companies to
develop new business and this activity creates future revenue streams (Peterson &
Berger, 1971) and enhance the company's success by promoting product and process
innovation (Burgelman, 1983, 1991) which leads, in turn, to improvements in growth
and profitability. Empirical evidence has shown that effective corporate
entrepreneurship increases company performance by encouraging a firm's proactiveness
and willingness to take on risk and through pioneering the development of new
products, processes and services (Kuratko et al., 1990, Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Zahra et
al., 1998, Zahra & Pearce, 1994).
Similarly, evidence has shown that corporate governance is able to increase firms'
performance. There is growing academic evidence to indicate that there is a significant
statistical relationship between bad corporate governance and poor corporate financial
performance (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). Companies with weaker corporate
governance structures perform less well than companies with stronger corporate
governance (Core et al., 1999).
The above discussion indicates that corporate entrepreneurship and corporate
governance are both able to increase the performance level of the organisation.
However, organisations are required to comply with the Combined Code for better
governance and accountability is argued, but with little evidence, that such rules
dampen entrepreneurial activities that are crucial for both the economy and the growth
of an organisation. Firms practising entrepreneurship would require the organisation to
be flexible, empower employees by giving them the freedom to perform their tasks
without having rigid, stringent rules and regulations even though the latter may result in
better governance. This study predicts that rigidity in corporate governance is likely to
have an impact on the organisations from being entrepreneurial and the empirical and
non-empirical analysis shed light on whether this expectation is met.
Within the corporate governance literature, two broad types of governance mechanisms
are acknowledged, namely, external and internal. Recognising the importance of
external governance mechanisms (such as shareholders, government, policy makers) is
considered an important means of exercising monitoring and control generally.
However, there are few studies that have been conducted on internal governance
mechanisms that may serve to prevent any abuse of executive power whereby managers
seek to increase their own status, power and remuneration (Baumol, 1959; Williamson,
1963). Internal control mechanisms are required to reduce the potential for an abuse of
executive power and managerial discretion. Even so, it is crucial to strike an
appropriate balance between monitoring managers and providing them with the freedom
to carry out their duties since stringent monitoring and control could stifle a company's
entrepreneurial activity and prevent it from moving forward. Internal control
mechanisms are implemented by shareholders, the board of directors and through the
remuneration structure for executives. It is therefore important to examine whether and
to what extent these three internal control mechanisms have a relationship with
enterprise activities in large corporations in the context of whether prior results
conducted are robust across enterprise and governance conditions.
Methodological Issues
Prior research conducted by Zahra (1996; 2000) in the U.S to establish the link between
corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship indicated a lack of depth and
insufficient underlying detail due to the empirically based research methodology
employed. In addition, this is a relatively new area of research and the methodological
approach employed is considered inappropriate for gathering information. Furthermore,
Zahra did not collect information on corporate governance using the annual report of
the company as secondary data to gauge the level of governance in the company.
Instead he used databases from Compact Disclosure, Dun and Bradstreet's Reference
Book for Corporate Management (1991-1993) and Standard and Poor's Register of
Corporations, which may not provide accurate information on governance. Surveys
were distributed to gauge the entrepreneurial activities in the organisation, and this
provides only numerical figures and no information on the underlying issues of
corporate entrepreneurship activities in the company and the impact of governance. In
addition, Zahra's research pre-dates the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 and therefore could
not address the implications of the Act for entrepreneurial activities.
This research employs a different methodological approach to that of Zahra's (1996,
2000) to investigate this relatively new area that other researchers have not, as yet,
attempted to address. This study takes a pragmatic approach by combining quantitative
and qualitative research methods, taking account of their relative strengths and
weaknesses. Due to the limitations of both approaches, the mixed method is able to
utilise the strength of each method by using the triangulation techniques of involving
and reconciling the quantitative and qualitative data sources to improve the quality of
inferences (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). This approach, by soliciting information
through different sources, makes it possible to gain new insights and an in-depth
understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship. The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between
corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship. The overall strategy used in this
mixed method is a sequential one involving a three-phase study. The research begins
with an exploratory study using a qualitative approach where the findings obtained were
used to further crystallise the scope of the study. At the second stage, an index of
corporate governance was created to measure the governance practices that have been
disclosed by FTSE 100 companies in their annual reports. Simultaneously, the
Corporate Entrepreneurship Index adapted from Morris (1996) and Kuratko et al.
(1999) is used to measure the entrepreneurial level in the organisation. The purpose of
using these two indexes is to utilise the quantitative data and results to assist in the
interpretation of qualitative findings. The findings from the quantitative data are used to
select six companies in which to conduct in-depth interviews to obtain information on
the underlying issues that are considered to be pertinent to this new area of research.
The findings from these interviews are then used to conduct an interpretation of the
entire analysis and a conclusion is then drawn for this study. Amongst other things,
this study addresses this gap in methodology approach.
1.3 KEY RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS
As the preceding section suggests, corporate governance may have an impact on the
progress of enterprise development. This then raises issues on how internal control
mechanisms such as board of directors, ownership structure and remuneration structure
is able to prevent or stimulate entrepreneurial activities in the firm.
This study seeks to achieve the following research objectives:
i) To investigate the association between corporate governance on corporate
entrepreneurship activities among the FTSE 100 companies;
ii) To analyse the influence of board of directors on entrepreneurial activities in the
organisation;
iii) To examine the role of ownership structure in building an entrepreneurial spirit
within the organisation;
iv) To explore the impact of executive remuneration practices on stimulating
entrepreneurial activities within the firm.
Drawing upon the limited evidence in linking corporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship, the following sections distil four key research questions that are
relevant to these two new areas.
i) RQ1: Do corporate governance codes have an impact on the entrepreneurial
character of the organisation?
ii) RQ2: Does board structure have an impact on corporate entrepreneurship?
iii) RQ3: Does ownership structure have an impact on corporate entrepreneurship?
iv) RQ4: Does remuneration structure have an impact on stimulating enterprise
activities?
Development of Research Questions
As discussed in Section 1.2 above, researchers have voiced concern about the
continuous revisions and re-evaluations of the corporate governance code of practice in
the UK and elsewhere prior to and after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom. In the
UK, three reports were consecutively reviewed in 2003 starting with the Higgs Report,
followed by the Smith Report that addressed the role of non-executive directors, audit
committees and external auditors. Then followed a revision of the Combined Code
(July 2003) that, it is argued, has more rules and regulations that are stringent and
whereby it is mandatory for organisations to adhere in four main areas: board structure,
remuneration, accountability and audit and relations with their shareholders. This has
raised concern about whether such stringentpractices could have an impact on the firm.
There has been on going debate on corporate governance where it is considered crucial
to ensure that the twin goals of accountability and enterprise are viewed as being
equally important (Taylor, 2001; Short et al., 1998; 2000; O' Sullivan, 2000; Young,
1995; Ticker, 1984; Keasey & Wright, 1993). Rules and regulations that focus too
much on control could have an impact in terms of decision-making that in turn could
have implications for corporate performance. This issue suggests the following
research question:
RQ1: Do corporate governance codes have an impact on the entrepreneurial character
of the organisation?
Board of Directors
The role of the board is to promote the interests of shareholders and it is considered to
be the highest internal control unit (Jensen, 1993) covering aspects such as insider vs.
outsider directors, board size, and frequency of board/sub committee meetings.
Insiders vs. Outsiders
Prior studies have not provided any clear consensus as to whether having more insiders
on the board enhances shareholder wealth. Some studies have revealed that a more
active, independent board is created through increasing the representation of outside
directors (Parkinson, 1993; Blair; 1995). Outside directors enhance corporate checks
and balances and expand the base of expertise from which the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) could benefit (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Monks & Minow, 1995). These factors
could improve the board's performance and stimulate executives to pursue corporate
entrepreneurship (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
On the other hand, some researchers argue that insider dominance is positively
associated with the Research and Development (R&D) that stimulates innovation and
entrepreneurial activities within the firm (Baysinger et al., 1991, Hill & Snell, 1988).
Outsider dominance without links to the company will tend to exert limited influence on
corporate goals (Kosnik, 1987; Porter, 1992) and place greater emphasis on their
monitoring role at the expense of their decision-making and advisory role (Baysinger &
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Butler, 1985). In addition, outsiders could place emphasis on short-term performance
because they rely on a financial evaluation of the business due to their limited access to
the details of the firm's performance. It is important to bear in mind that there is still no
clear and proven evidence that more outsiders or insiders will lead to better governance
or hamper the entrepreneurial spirit of an organisation.
Board Size
Apart from the board composition, board size has also been indicated to influence
organisational entrepreneurial activities. Small boards are found to have the ability to
increase participation by directors and promote communication among board members
that encourage cohesion among directors in monitoring and evaluating the CEO
(Yermack, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000). However, there are conflicting arguments to
suggest that a small board size possesses a lack of expertise and diverse skills, crucial
elements for controlling and evaluating CEO initiatives; limited information processing
capabilities and an over emphasis on quantifiable quotas and short-term goals
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) that leads executives to overlook corporate
entrepreneurship (Zahra et al., 2000).
Also, some prior studies have indicated that larger boards possess directors from
various functional backgrounds, education and experience and can effectively serve to
connect the company to its competitive environment and provide information about the
domestic and international market (Kanter, 1986). However, it has also been argued
that, as board size increases, it is able to stimulate enterprise activities until a threshold
is reached. Beyond a certain point it will become dysfunctional and reduce corporate
entrepreneurship activities (Zahra et al., 2000). There is no clear consensus as to
whether large or small board size stimulates enterprise activities.
Frequent Meetings
According to the requirement of the Combined Code (2003) companies need to have
regular board/sub committee meetings for discharging duties. Prior research in respect
to frequent meetings usually focuses on the firm's performance. Frequency of board
meetings is considered to be an important way of improving the effectiveness of the
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board (Conger et al., 1998). On the other hand, there are researchers that consider
board meetings are not necessarily useful due to the limited time non-executives spend
with the company and consider that such time could be better utilised for a more
meaningful exchange of ideas with the management (Vafeas, 1999). Also, frequent
meetings involve managerial time and increase travel expenses, administrative support
requirements and directors' meeting fees (Evan et al., 2000) and this may affect
enterprise activities within the firm as resources are being channeled towards less
productive activities. There has been no prior study conducted to link frequency of
meetings with corporate entrepreneurship and this study seeks to address this shortfall.
Therefore, these three issues suggest the following research question:
RQ2: Does board structure have an impact on corporate entrepreneurship?
Ownership Structure
Agency theory suggests that corporate ownership of an organisation affects the
manager's willingness to take on board risk (Jones & Butler, 1992). There are two
aspects of ownership that could affect the manager's pursuit of corporate
entrepreneurship: ownership held by the firm's executives and ownership by a powerful
and vigilant institutional block holder.
Executive Ownership
Studies have indicated that to encourage executives to have greater commitment and to
support activities that create long-term value such as corporate entrepreneurship,
executiveownership ought to be provided (Jones & Butler, 1992). Lack of ownership is
considered to discourage executives from supporting corporateentrepreneurship as they
have to put their salaried position in jeopardy (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and tend to avoid
risk (Zahra et al., 2000) through focusing on an acceptable level of short-term
performance.
On the other hand, there are conflicting arguments suggesting that a large amount of
ownership ties a large amount of the executive's job performance in with the
performance of the company. This creates uncertainty in terms of income and thus
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makes it more likely that the executive will be risk averse, adopting short-term horizons
when appraising decisions and leading to a diminished effort (Lewellen et al., 1987;
Bruce and Buck, 1997), all of which in turn has a negative impact on enterprise
activities. There is a lack of consensus as to whether providing executives with
ownership will enhance entrepreneurial activities within a firm.
Institutional Blockholders
In recent years, institutional shareholders i.e. banks, pension funds, charitable
organisations, universities, insurance and investment companies are considered to be
powerful players within the corporate governance system. Their presence could
encourage the CEO to pursue risky long-term ventures (Meckling, 1976) such as
corporate entrepreneurship. Blockholders are well informed about the places in which
they hold stock and monitor CEO decision and commitment on entrepreneurial
activities (Baysinger et al., 1991). Also, there has been an increase in shareholder
activism by institutional shareholders (Solomon & Solomon, 2004) and this has the
effect of stimulating enterprise activities to take place within an organisation.
On the other hand, some researchers have indicated that there is a negative association
between institutional investors and R&D spending (Graves, 1998) since more attention
is paid to the short-term and bottom line rather than to enterprise activities. Institutional
blockholders are seen to have self-interest involvement which is not in line with the
interests of other shareholders. There is no clear consensus as to whether institutional
blockholders are seen to stimulate enterprise activities. These two issues suggest the
following research question:
RQ3: Does ownership structure have an impact on corporate entrepreneurship?
Executive Remuneration Structure
Employees are considered to be an important asset because they play such a vital role in
the progress and success of a company. Therefore, it is important to design a
remuneration structure that motivates employees to have a high level of commitment
towards the organisation i.e.: Executive Stock Option (ESO) and Annual Bonus.
13
Executive Stock Option
In recent years, the Executive Stock Option (ESO) and annual bonus have been the
object of increased attention by the media particularly in terms of their reward structure.
In the 1990s, offering ESO had become the norm among organisations as it was
believed to have a positive effect on the organisation's performance (Murphy, 1985;
Main et al., 1996) because it ties executive pay directly to a rise in the company's share
price (Taylor, 2001). On the other hand, there are researchers who have argued that the
ESO scheme could have a negative impact on the level of corporate dividends (Lambert
et al., 1989). This has raised concern that the scheme has been regarded as a standard
component of the remuneration package without its being related to any performance
criteria (Bruce & Buck, 1997). This tends to discourage the innovative effort that is
crucial for encouraging entrepreneurial activities in the organisation (Short et al., 2000).
Annual Bonus
Early attempts made by researchers indicated there is no clear link between pay and
performance (Lewellen, 1968; Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970). Rather, it is firm size that
is considered to be the major determinant of executive reward (Cosh, 1975; Meeks &
Whittington, 1975). Later studies have shown that there is a link between annual bonus
and performance by subdividing total pay into salary and annual bonus (Mc Knight,
1996). This suggests that by linking performance criteria it is possible to stimulate
enterprise activities.
On the other hand, there are researchers who are doubtful about the relationship
between performance and pay as to whether it is justified when based on performance
(Conyon & Leech, 1994) since it is awarded on a yearly basis and it is a short-term pay
component which might affect long-term investment (Kaplan & Norton, 1992,
Bushman et al., 1996) such as corporate entrepreneurship. These two issues suggest the
following research question:
RQ4: Does remuneration structure have an impact on corporate entrepreneurship?
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1.4 KEY RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
This research has made attempts to contribute in several ways such as to open up fresh
avenues for scholars across a spectrum of areas ranging from corporate strategy,
corporate entrepreneurship through to corporate governance. Practitioners also stand to
benefit from learning about those factors that could stimulate or inhibit enterprise
activities in their firm and this will contribute towards staying competitive in the
business environment. In particular, the potential usefulness of the present study stems
from the following.
Firstly, this study extends the present literature on corporate entrepreneurship that is
currently fragmented and relatively new but considered to be an important area for
consideration in today's competitive business environment.
Secondly, the study attempts to fill the gap in the corporate governance literature by
focusing attention on the increasing cost and resource implications of introducing the
code of best practice and compliance within the organisation (Solomon, 2005). It is
thus important to examine the impact of the mandatory requirement of governance
practices on enterprise activities. Generally, prior studies have ignored linking corporate
governance and corporate entrepreneurship and the impact of internal control
mechanisms i.e. board of directors, ownership and remuneration structure on enterprise
activities especially in the U.K context.
Thirdly, this study develops a Corporate Governance Index to measure the governance
level among companies. Attempts have been made to develop corporate governance
indices in most countries by consultants and academics i.e. Hoepner at the Max-Planck
Institute. However, this thesis attempts to develop its own index to ensure that there is a
better coverage in areas relating to ownership structure, board structure, board
committee and remuneration structure. In formulating the index the opinions of experts
in governance were taken to ensure it covered areas considered to be pertinent to the
measurement of governance practices.
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Fourthly, this study attempts to investigate the relationship between corporate
governance and corporate entrepreneurship which has not been sufficiently explored in
previous research.
In addition, this study contributes in terms of developing governance policies in the near
future for government agencies on issues pertaining to governance and enterprise
activities. It is important for a government to be aware of whether governance practices
could inhibit or stimulate companies from moving forward in today's competitive
business environment.
Finally, this study assists practitioners by highlighting those factors that could inhibit or
stimulate their companies to be more entrepreneurial, which is considered to be
pertinent in order to stay ahead of their rivals.
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
As advanced in Section 1.4, this thesis sets out to examine the impact of corporate
governance practices on entrepreneurial activities in the firm. The structure of the
thesis is as follows.
The study begins with a review of both the literature on corporate entrepreneurship
(Chapter 2) and the literature on corporate governance (Chapter 3). These chapters
provide a context and direction for the key research questions. Chapter 2 introduces the
definition of corporate entrepreneurship and highlights the reasons why organisations
are embracing this concept in their business. This is followed by a discussion on the role
of corporate entrepreneurship from the 1990s to the present. This chapter also focuses
on three key components that contribute to corporate entrepreneurship, namely the
individual, the job and the organisation and examines their various aspects, taking a
holistic approach.
Chapter 3 shifts the focus of attention to corporate governance and details the emergent
trends of corporate governance in the U.K and elsewhere. Also, a comparison of U.K
governance practices is made with those of Europe and the U.S. The key focus of the
study, namely internal control mechanisms, is highlighted and this covers three aspects:
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board of directors, ownership and remuneration structure. The section on the board of
directors examines the board structure, size and duality and the effect on the firm's
performance. For shareholders those aspects relating to individual, institutional and
blockholders and the implications for the organisation's performance are covered.
Finally, the section on remuneration structure reviews remuneration packages i.e.
salary, fees and bonuses, paid to executives. These packages have increasingly gained
attention from the media, shareholders and policy makers due to the excessive salaries
and benefits that executives are deemed to receive through Executive Stock Options
(ESOs) and Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs), both of which are considered in
Chapter 3.
Following a review, a link is developed between corporate entrepreneurship and
corporate governance. Chapter 4 deductively uses the literature to establish the link
between these two areas and formulates the conceptual framework for the study. The
study examines the relationship between corporate governance and entrepreneurial
activities in a firm. Consistent with the key research objectives, propositions for each
element of the internal control mechanisms as outlined in research questions 1 to 4 in
Section 1.3 above are developed
The research methodology for the study is explained in Chapter 5. This study has
rejected the option of selecting between the positivist and interpretivist paradigm with
regard to epistemology and methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Instead a pragmatic
viewpoint has been adopted using the mixed method approach combining quantitative
and qualitative techniques for collecting and analysing data. The survey approach (using
e-mail questionnaires) has been utilised to answer the 'what' questions followed by case
studies (using semi structured interviews) that yielded in-depth insights into the 'why'
and 'how' questions as well as triangulating the findings from quantitative analysis.
Concerns on the reliability and validity of the questionnaire are emphasized and the
process of pre-testing the questionnaire for survey and secondary data is detailed in this
chapter.
Chapter 6 presents the findings from the quantitative analysis of the survey
questionnaire and secondary data. First, the descriptive statistics related to the
Corporate Entrepreneurship Index are tabulated. This is then followed by conducting a
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descriptive analysis pertaining to corporate governance and entrepreneurship indexes.
Subsequently, this chapter examines the bivariate correlation analysis to test the
propositions that are developed in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 further presents the Scatter
Graph that plots the total score of corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship
for the 42 companies. The objective of developing the scatter plot is to select
companies for the interview session and this is discussed further in Chapter 8.
The two additional tests conducted: factor analysis and exploratory regression are
discussed in Chapter 7. The objective of conducting these two analyses was to explore
further the relationship between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship.
In addition, an analysis was conducted that relates the findings of the bivariate
correlation analysis and the regression findings with the research propositions.
Chapter 8 presents a qualitative commentary based on the analysis of the interview data.
Six interviews, four that are situated at the far end of the scatter graph and another two
companies that are situated closest to the centre point of the graph were selected for the
case studies. Analysis of the interview data yields insights into factors that influence
the answers in the three main areas of internal control mechanisms of corporate
governance as cited above.
Chapter 9 establishes the link between Chapters 6,7 and 8 by analysing the findings
from the qualitative results with the quantitative results and the scatter graph. This
chapter draws the result from the quantitative and qualitative approach together and this
is one of the strengths of utilising a mixed method approach.
Finally, Chapter 10 collates the implications of the theoretical and empirical results.
First, the objectives of the study and the methodology used for investigating the
research questions is reviewed. This is then followed by synthesizing the key results
from Chapters 6, 7 and 8 to draw conclusions and present the implications of these
findings. In addition, this chapter highlights the limitations of the present research
before concluding with suggestions for future research.
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1.6 CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter began with a discussion on the corporate governance mandatory
requirements that organisations must comply with. These requirements have placed
pressure on companies because they must abide by these mandatory requirements whilst
at the same time being entrepreneurial in order to stay' competitive in the business
environment. Limited research with respect to these two areas provides the starting
point and context within which to begin to test the relationship between corporate
governance and corporate entrepreneurship. The motivation for this study was provided
in Section 1.2. This was followed by a presentation of the research objectives and
research questions raised in this study. Six research contributions were discussed in





The literature on entrepreneurship is well established. The topic has been discussed
from a number of varying perspectives and has typically concentrated on new business
start-ups and small and medium-sized organisations. Increasingly, however, attention is
being given to entrepreneurship in large established organisations (Cooper and
Dunkelberg 1986, Wright et al. 1992, Guth and Ginsberg 1990, Zahra 1995). These
established organisations are seeking ways to reinvent and revitalize their
entrepreneurial roots with a view to reviving the innovation, speed and risk-taking that
once existed but which has now become eroded or lost over time by the organisation's
increased size, bureaucracy, complex processes and hierarchy.
Increasingly, business managers and academics are turning their attention to the practice
of entrepreneurship in recognition of the potential it possesses to create the conditions
necessary to promote innovation, a critical factor for success in today's competitive
business environment. Furthermore, entrepreneurship within existing organisations has
gained prominence in the study of economic development.
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the various definitions of both the
entrepreneur and corporate entrepreneurship. The distinction between entrepreneurship,
corporate entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship is examined in section 2.2. The role of
corporate entrepreneurship from the late 1990's to the present is considered in Section
2.3 and Section 2.4 looks into the reasons why large organisations are turning towards
corporate entrepreneurship as a means of promoting innovation. Section 2.5 examines
the internal factors involved in creating an entrepreneurial organisation and these
factors are categorised and looked at from the perspective of the individual, the job and
the organisation. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 DEFINING ENTREPRENEURSHIP, CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
AND INTRAPRENEURSHIP
Given that this thesis examines the relationship between corporate entrepreneurship and
corporate governance, this section discusses the related definitions of entrepreneurship,
corporate entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship. Broadly, entrepreneurship can be
categorized into two, namely independent entrepreneurship and corporate
entrepreneurship. Both of these forms of entrepreneurship require entrepreneurial skills
(characteristics of an entrepreneur).
Entrepreneurship
Although the term entrepreneur or entrepreneurship has been in use for more than two
centuries, there is still no universal definition. There are various views on who is an
entrepreneur. According to Chell et al., (1991) the problem of the identification of an
entrepreneur has been confounded by the fact that there is still no standard, universally
accepted definition of entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurship has often been equated with new venture creation and small business
management (Gibb, 1996) and the concept of owner management and self-employment.
A study conducted by Morris and Lewis (1993) on content analysis of key words and
phrases in definitions appearing in journals and text books on entrepreneurship,
revealed the most popular terms used were as follows: starting or creating new venture,
innovating or creating new combinations of resources, pursuing opportunity,
marshalling necessary resources, risk taking, profit seeking and creating value. Given
that most of the definitions relate to a single phenomenon, Stevenson et al. (1999)'s
definition seems to cover all aspects of the entrepreneurial phenomenon. They define
entrepreneurship as "the process of creating value by bringing together a unique
package of resources to exploit an opportunity". Timmons (1999) elaborates further on
entrepreneurship. He views entrepreneurship as the ability to create and build a vision
from practically nothing. It involves a human creative act, an application of energy to
initiate a novel concept or build an enterprise or venture rather than just watching or
analyzing. This vision requires a willingness to take calculated risks. Also, it includes
the ability to build a team with complementary skills and talents.
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Entrepreneur
The management and economic literature has developed several definitions of the
entrepreneur. However, a problem arises because these definitions rarely agree with
one another about the essential characteristics of the entrepreneur.
It was Cantillon who, in the eighteenth century, first defined the term "entrepreneur".
He concentrated on the role of the individual operating in business who is driven by a
desire for making a profit and for taking a risk by buying goods cheap in order to sell
them at a higher price. Also, Cantillon associates risk and uncertainty with the
administrative decision-making processes of entrepreneurs (Binks and Vale, 1990). A
century later, Jean Baptise Say, extended the definition of an entrepreneur to include
those individuals who utilise periods of change and uncertainty to reallocate resources
in order to maximise profit within any given, static market (Binks & Vale, 1990).
These early writings have shaped the interpretation of the entrepreneur as an individual
ownerof a priyate firm expecting to benefit direcjly^nmi theentrer^reneurial profits_of
their labours.
On the other hand, Carl Menger (1840 -1921) the founding father of the Austrian school
finds that the crucial role of the entrepreneur is in directing and redirecting resources in
a state of perpetual disequilibrium. He placed the production process within a
hierarchical structure whereby finished products are considered as low-level goods and
primary inputs removed from final production are considered higher order goods.
Within this context, entrepreneurs are considered as being of the highest order since
they determine the allocation of inputs for the lower orders and pattern of outputs
(Binks and Vale, 1990). Therefore, it is important for the entrepreneur to have the
information and ability to analyse successfully if resources are to be correctly allocated.
The entrepreneur is considered to possess the characteristics of a risk-bearer, leader and
alertness decision-taker which was emphasised by Menger's follower Friedrich Von
Wieser (1851-1926). Later, these same qualities were emphasised by Israel Kirzner in
terms of the alertness and superior perception of entrepreneurs that cause factors of
production to be reallocated towards an equilibrium condition. He finds that
equilibrium is never obtained in practice and emphasises the need to concentrate upon
the adjustment path, which the entrepreneur operates, rather than the equilibrium
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condition. Kirzner also argues that the ownership of capital is not necessary to provoke
its movement or change of application. He finds an entrepreneur is someone who is
creative. The possession of additional knowledge provides opportunities for creative
discoveries (Deakins & Freel, 2003). In this sense he moves away from the orthodoxy
of the Austrian tradition (Binks and Vale, 1990).
Defining an entrepreneur took on a different perspective in the twentieth century.
Shumpeter (1934) defined an entrepreneur as a person who carries out new
combinations, which may be in the form of new products, processes, markets,
organisational forms, or sources of supply. For Shumpeter entrepreneurship is the
process of carrying out new combinations. In contrast to Shumpeter (1934), Gartner
(1990) argues, "entrepreneurship is the creation of organisations". Gartner's definition
incorporates all aspects of the entrepreneurial phenomenon that is "the process of
creating value by bringing together a unique package of resources to exploit
opportunity." However, Gartner was careful to specify that this statement is not offered
as a definition but rather as "an attempt to change a long held and tenacious view point
in the entrepreneurship field towards what the entrepreneur does and not who the
entrepreneur is" (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999).
For most of the Twentieth Century, economists tended to concentrate on how markets
adjust to the impact of changes in external or internal factors. In the latter part of the
century, the emphasis shifted towards an examination of individuals and
entrepreneurship. Drucker (1985) in Innovation and Entrepreneurship argued that
entrepreneurship is not restricted to any one group of individuals. Entrepreneurs are not
born with a specific set of characteristics and it is possible for entrepreneurial behaviour
to be developed among the individuals of an existing business organisation so as to
provide a competitive advantage. He placed emphasis on the attitudinal approach
required to be effectively entrepreneurial, and the prospect of the reorientation of
orthodox managerial outlooks towards one that is proactive and opportunity driven
(Binks & Vale, 1990).
The definitions adopted by Casson (1982) and Drucker (1985) provide a contrast in the
context of an entrepreneur. Casson (1982) argues that the characteristics of a typical
successful entrepreneur are the ability to take risk, innovativeness, knowledge of how
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the market functions, manufacturing know-how, marketing skills, business management
skills and the ability to cooperate. Caird (1988) also provides a similar definition. He
finds that the desire to take on risk, the ability to identify business opportunities; the
ability to correct errors effectively and the ability to grasp profitable opportunities are
the characteristics of an entrepreneur .
Block & MacMillan (1993) argue that many organisations in seeking to be
entrepreneurial, would like to have their people take on greater risks. Successful
entrepreneurs keep their "eye on the ball and do not value risk for its own sake" and
work more diligently to reduce risk. Consistent with the authors cited above it is
evident that there is an element of risk involved for any entrepreneur who wants to
venture into any business.
In addition, the studies on entrepreneurship have two schools of thought, one is based
on the trait model and the other on contingency thinking. The trait model focuses on
why certain individuals start a firm and end up being successful and the contingency
model looks into the characteristics needed in entrepreneurship that are related with the
firm's environment and prevailing situations.
Littunen (2000) argues that McClelland's (1961) theory on the need to achieve and
Rotter's (1966) locus of control theory are most commonly applied in research on
entrepreneurship. McClelland argues that individuals who have a strong need to
achieve are problem solvers who set targets and strive to achieve these targets through
their own effort. These individuals will find their way to entrepreneurship and succeed
better than others as entrepreneurs. Rotter's theory argues that locus of control can be
either internal or external. Internal locus of control refers to control over one's own life
where the results of one's own actions are considered to be dependent on one's own
behaviour. On the other hand, external control refers to those attitudes which focus on
1 Risk can be divided into many types. Bird (1989) has divided risk into five types, four of theseare relevant to any
potential entrepreneur are economic risk, risk in social relations, risk in career development, plus psychological and
health risk
2 Personality characteristics are formed by the interplay between the individual and the environment. This means that
situations, experiences and changes in the individual's life play an important role in forming the personal
characteristics of an entrepreneur.
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the actions of other people or on fate, luck or chance. However, Vesala (1992)
criticised Rotter's hypothesis for its focus on the entrepreneur's belief in one's own
potential for influencing events. He finds that there are other relevant aspects that also
need to be analysed from the entrepreneurial viewpoint, including the belief in the
relation between one's own and other people's ability to influence events and the effect
of this relation on one's own achievements.
In contrast to Rotter, Levenson's (1981) application on locus of control has three
dimensions, which measure respectively an individual's belief in internal control, in
control by others or in control by chance or fate. Levenson's study looks at external
control in two different dimensions. His argument is that control by other people can be
seen as more predictable than, for example, chance, since a person possesses, at least
potentially, the ability to affect the outcome.
Block & MacMillan (1993) state that entrepreneurs are made and not born and point out
that no one has yet been able to predict who will or will not become a successful
entrepreneur. An entrepreneur's drive to pursue an opportunity is a combination of
many factors and attributes and the most important of these are motivation and attitude.
Furthermore childhood influences, role models and environment can all have an affect
on these attributes. Block and MacMillan also find that those with more talent will
clearly do better than those with less. Entrepreneurial ability can be directly influenced
by education, training and experience, which results in the accumulation of knowledge
and skills required to carry out all or part of the entrepreneurial process. Successful
entrepreneurs are identified as having some characteristics in common such as a high
energy level, great persistence, resourcefulness, desire and ability to be self-directed and
with a high need for autonomy.
These differing perspectives on the definition of an entrepreneur provide an insight into
what an entrepreneur is in terms of the characteristics and behaviours that make one
entrepreneur more successful than the other. In general, we can summarize an
entrepreneur as a person who decides to set up a business and is willing to take on a
greater than normal financial risk. During the initial start up of a firm, the important
characteristics an entrepreneur should possess are innovativeness and a willingness to
act (Tibbits 1979, Bird 1989). Innovativeness means that the entrepreneur possesses the
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creative ability to produce solutions for new situations. This may be linked to an
entrepreneur's ability gained through training and experience. Also, a willingness to act
is connected with the entrepreneur's training and the resources under his/her control.
All these factors shape the values and attitudes of an entrepreneur.
Corporate Entrepreneurship
Corporate Entrepreneurship describes entrepreneurial behaviour inside established
medium and large sized organisations. Related terms include organisational
entrepreneurship, intrapreneurship and corporate venturing.
Pinchot (1985) was the first to introduce the term intrapreneur (short for intracorporate
entrepreneur) and the term is now widely accepted to refer to the development of new
business within an existing corporation where the new venture is owned by the parent
company. Pinchot identified four forms of corporate entrepreneurship: corporate
venturing; intrapreneuring; organisational transformation and industry rule breaking.
Corporate venturing involves starting a business within a business, usually emanating
from a core competency or process. For example, a bank with a core competency in
transaction processing may turn this into a separate business and offer transaction
processing to other companies who require the mass processing of information.
Intrapreneurship involves attempts to take the mindset and behaviours that external
entrepreneurs possess and inculcate these characteristics into the employees within an
existing organisation. Siemens-Nixdorf a former subsidiary of Siemens AG, located in
Germany provides a good example of intrapreneuring3. Organisational transformation
is another variation of the corporate entrepreneurship concept, particularly if the
transformation results in the development of new business opportunities. This could be
effected by de-layering, cost cutting, re-engineering, downsizing and using the latest
technology - although these activities do not necessarily guarantee that the organisation
This company in 1995, embarked on a two-year process in creating corporate entrepreneurs out of 300
line managers. These entrepreneurs are then responsible for identifying and pursuing or encouraging the
pursuit of new business opportunities or innovations in current businesses
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will be able to capture new opportunities. Industry rule bending is another form of
transformation that focuses on changing the rules of competitive engagement .
In addition, Pinchot argued that sometimes companies may want every employee to
behave like an entrepreneur whereas the ideal would be to have a subset of managers
acting as corporate entrepreneurs. Companies should have their corporate entrepreneurs
identify and develop innovations within the business that could lead to substantial
growth, and create an environment where increased innovation and entrepreneurial
behaviour is evident.
According to Antoncic and Hisrich (2001) terms such as intrapreneurship, corporate
entrepreneurship, corporate venturing and internal corporate entrepreneurship have all
been used to describe the phenomenon of intrapreneurship. Many scholars and
practitioners have shown a keen interest in this area since the beginning of the 1980's
where the positive effect on performance and revitalization of firms was first
recognised. Intrapreneurship is not only important for large corporations but also for
small and medium sized enterprises. In their research intrapreneurship is viewed as a
process by which individuals inside an organisation are free to pursue opportunities
without having to pay due regard to costs and resources; by engaging in new activities
and by departing from customary practices they are free to pursue opportunities within
the organisation in a spirit of entrepreneurship. Intrapreneurship refers to the process
that goes on inside an existing firm, regardless of its size and leads not only to new
business but also to other innovative activities and orientations such as the development
of new products, services, technologies, administrative techniques, strategies and
competitive postures.
Burgelman (1983) has a similar opinion and defines corporate entrepreneurship as the
process by which firms engage in diversification through internal development. In this
context, diversification requires new resource combinations to extend the firm's
activities in areas umelated to or only slightly related to its present domain of
4For example Toyota changed the rules of the game in the automobile industry by producing low cost
automobiles with exceptionally high quality. This forced US and European auto manufacturers to follow
suit. Therefore, Toyota not only transformed itself but also helped to start a wholesale transformation of
the industry (Thornberry, 2001).
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competence. On the other hand, Biggadike (1979) describes corporate venturing as
"marketing a product or services that the parent company has not previously marketed
and that requires the parent company to obtain new equipment or new people or new
knowledge". The difference between these two definitions is in the degree of
restrictiveness. Burgelman restricts corporate entrepreneurship to diversification into
activities umelated or marginally related to a firm's area of competence and
Biggadike's perspective on venturing effort looks at the broader context.
The definition of corporate entrepreneurship put forward by Guth and Ginsberg (1990)
has become widely accepted. According to Guth and Ginsberg, corporate
entrepreneurship encompasses the birth of new businesses within existing businesses
and the transformation of an organisation through a renewal of key ideas. This
definition not only contains Biggadike's (corporate venturing) and Burgelman's
definitions on corporate entrepreneurship but also includes the idea of the new
organisation (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999).
Based on the differing perspectives of the various authors cited above on corporate
entrepreneurship, Sharma and Chrisman (1999) developed a terminology on corporate
entrepreneurship illustrated in the diagram below (Diagram 2.3.1). This diagram shows
that entrepreneurial activities can be divided into two categories: independent
entrepreneurship and corporate entrepreneurship. Independent entrepreneurship refers
to a process whereby an individual or group of individuals acts independently within an
existing organisation to create a new organisation. However, corporate
entrepreneurship refers to the process whereby an individual or a group of individuals
within an existing organisation create a new organisation or instigate renewal or
innovation within the organisation. In addition, Sharma and Chrisman looked at
corporate entrepreneurship in terms of corporate venturing and strategic renewal.
Strategic renewal refers to the corporate entrepreneurial effort that involves innovation
and results in significant changes to business organisation, corporate level strategy or
structure. On the other hand, corporate venturing refers to a corporate entrepreneurship
effort also involving innovation but which leads to the creation of new business within
the corporate organisation. The difference between these two approaches is that
corporate venmring involves the creation of a new business whereas strategic renewal
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leads to the reconfiguration of an existing business within a corporate setting.
Significantly, both of these approaches involve innovation.
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Source: Sharma and Chrisman (1999)
The concept of corporate entrepreneurship has been widely recognised in terms of its
benefits for the development of an organisation. There are many varied and differing
perspectives about what corporate entrepreneurship is. This study adopts the concept of
corporate entrepreneurship as the process whereby employees within an organisation
pursue opportunities to innovate new ventures, processes, products, technology,
administrative techniques and strategies within that organisation thereby helping it to
revitalise performance and gain a competitive edge.
In summary, there is no agreed definition of what constitutes an entrepreneur or
entrepreneurship. This study takes the following definition that an entrepreneur is a
person who carries out new combinations, which may be in the form of new products,
processes, markets, organisational forms, or sources of supply and willing to take on a
greater than normal financial risk. On the other hand, corporate entrepreneurship is a
term used to describe entrepreneurial behaviour inside established midsized and large
organisations. This is to gain competitive advantage by encouraging innovation at all
levels in the organisation.
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2.3 THE ROLE OF CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE LATE 1990s
AND 2000s
Since the 1990s to the present, corporate entrepreneurship has become acknowledged
for the important role it plays in an organisation with regard to sustaining its
competitive edge within the wider business environment. In the 1990s, several
researchers developed models on corporate entrepreneurship; Covin and Slevin (1991)
for example developed a conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm behaviour.
Homsby et al., (1993) formed an interactive model of the corporate entrepreneurship
process and later Morris et al., (1994) developed an integrative model of
entrepreneurship input and outcomes. These researchers argued that it is important (a)
that the organisation analyses the nature of entrepreneurship at different levels within
the firm and (b) is able to interrelate with the external environment.
The focus and emphasis on corporate entrepreneurship continues further in the 2000s
when Taylor (2001) emphasised that in today's challenging business environment it is
important for an organisation to create a company culture in which searching for new
business opportunities becomes the responsibility of not just one person or department
but everyone. This practice has been emphasised by the president and CEO of General
Electric who finds that given today's business environment it is not remotely possible to
predict outcomes. Therefore, it is important for a person to be agile and take advantage
of opportunities as they present themselves. This requires an organisation to be
entrepreneurial in order to stay competitive in the business world.
In addition, Sumantra Goshal and Christopher Bartlett from the London School of
Economics and the Harvard Business School respectively, considered that having
radical decentralisation (building smaller units) is a vital factor in the success of an
organisation (1997). Furthermore, havingentrepreneurial managers supported by boards
has brought important benefits to the organisation (Taylor, 2001). Goshal and Bartlett
found that within the International Service System (ISS) each of their subsidiaries is
structured as a separate legal entity with its own board of directors drawn from
company executives who are familiar with the operations of the company together with
outside experts who possess specialised knowledge and experience. The ISS board
meets on a quarterly basis and this is the main forum in which local business leaders can
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test their ideas, solicit advice and obtain approval for their strategic plans, operating
budget and capital expenditures. Likewise, company ABB has created a remarkable
board which comprises a similar structure for all its 1200 frontline companies. Creating
and empowering boards has had a positive impact on the organisation.
Also, Zahra et al, (2000) continues to emphasise what other researchers (Block & Mac
Millan, 1993, Vesper, 1984) have noted, namely that the organisation's venturing and
innovative activities helps the organisation in: i) acquiring new capabilities; ii) entering
into new businesses (either in domestic and foreign markets) and iii) in developing new
products, which in turn improves both the performance and growth of the organisation.
However, it is important to note here that the success of an organisation's innovation
and venmring capabilities is dependent on strong managerial support and the creation of
an organisational culture in which corporate entrepreneurship can flourish effectively
(Burgelman & Sayles, 1986, Covin & Slevin, 1991, Fujita, 1997, Kuratko et al., 1997).
Van der Zee and Strikwerda (2000) suggest that as companies try to build new
businesses and exploit new technologies in the new economy, there is likely to be a
move from an established shareholder and stakeholder model towards an
entrepreneurial model of corporate governance. They argue that the divisionalised firm
is now changing because in order to develop, manufacture and market new products and
services, the firm's business units and divisions must be broken down into their
constituent parts namely research and development laboratories, specialized factories,
distribution centres and sales units and treated as separate businesses (Taylor, 2001).
In those fields that are presently developing very rapidly such as e-business and
biotechnology, managers of operating units understand the new technologies and
markets. Taylor (2001) argues that it will be logical to organise the firm as "a network
of independent entrepreneur owners" which might take one of these three different
forms:
• The ownership of the operational unit wholly or in part is transferred to the
management of the operational unit and they buy their shares over a period of
time and remain linked to the parent company through an alliance, franchise or
preferred supplier contract.
• The parent company would retain the legal rights to the intellectual assets such
as copyrights, patent and database. The operational unit would pay royalties for
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the use of these property rights and dividends due are paid to the parent
company as a major shareholder.
• The parent company and executive board retains the responsibility of marketing
and market knowledge and the operating units are given responsibility for other
functions such as development, manufacturing, logistic and sales.
Also, Taylor (2001) stresses that these new organisational forms would make it easier
for companies to adapt to changes in the market. Practicing decentralisation of the firm
and sharing of ownership with entrepreneurial units requires a change in the "internal
corporate governance". 5 The adoption of this entrepreneurial model of the corporation
is also a recognition that, in the new economy, firms will operate in a network of
companies which make agreements between each other with regard to the development
of products, the use of brands, contracts, production, marketing and services. Also,
employees will play a crucial role as they provide a major source of competitive
advantage and managers will need to persuade their staff to become involved in
decision-making. Taylor finds that in some countries, namely the U.S, Britain and the
Commonwealth, the existence of employees' council and employee directors are not
new. Most progressive companies have taken steps to involve their employees in
decision-making at the shop floor level by forming self-managing work teams, quality
circles and idea programs. However, Taylor finds the aforementioned insufficient
citing that in Germany there is employee participation without ownership and in Anglo
Saxon countries6 there is ownership without participation.
2.4 THE REASONS FOR LARGE ORGANISATIONS TURNING TOWARDS
CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The previous three sections analysed the various definitions of an entrepreneur, looked
at those characteristics that define corporate entrepreneurship and examined the role of
corporate entrepreneurship in the late 1990's and 2000's. In this section, consideration
5Zee & Strikwerda define Internal Corporate Governance as "the division of task and role between
executive board and operational management; the delegation of task, resources and decision authorities;
the reservation of power and processes for planning and control, and the appointment, assessment and
remuneration of operational management".
6Refers to the Anglo American Model
32
is given to the reasons why large corporations are turning towards corporate
entrepreneurship.
Currently, many large organisations are embracing corporate entrepreneurship in order
that they might revive the continual innovation, growth and value creation that they
once had. However, many CEOs still find that their organisations have very few
entrepreneurial-minded employees (Thornberry, 2001). This phenomenon may be due
to the entrepreneurial employee's dislike of large company bureaucracy and office
politics which in turn might result in them leaving the organisation. However,
Thornberry argues that not all companies need to embrace the concept of corporate
entrepreneurship. Some companies manage by running their business in a planned,
effective and efficient manner. Others though, require an infusion of creativity
especially if they are operating in a rapidly changing and turbulent environment. In this
kind of environment it is important to spot an opportunity and put employees and
resources together quickly so as to effectively capture the opportunity.
Thornberry (2001) finds that corporate entrepreneurship is becoming the choice for
many large companies as they attempt to inculcate the entrepreneurial spirit within the
organisation. Also, corporate entrepreneurship acts as a powerful antidote for those
large companies lacking innovation and possessing stagnated top line growth and
inertia. These companies need to prepare themselves by building an organisation that
focuses on opportunity. In addition, Thornberry finds that when corporate
entrepreneurship works, it can work spectacularly and cites the example of a corporate
entrepreneur who succeeded in developing a $250 million business as a result of
attending one of his training programs.
Large, slow-moving and bureaucratic organisations that operate in an increasingly
turbulent environment need to have the most amount of entrepreneurial activity in the
organisation. These companies probably need to re-design themselves to be more
opportunity-focused in mind, body, vision and structure. For example, Siemens
Nixdorf became increasingly concerned when they realised that they had numerous
intelligent employees who were good at spotting new opportunities in the market place
but the company was too systematic, budget obsessed and bureaucratic to capture these
opportunities in a timely fashion. Kao (1989) finds that if a company is six months late
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in recognising a new high technology innovation, then it is probably already too late to
take advantage of it.
Prior studies have shown that corporate entrepreneurial behaviour has been initiated in
established organisations for several reasons; including to increase profitability (Zahra,
1991), for strategic renewal (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990), to foster innovativeness (Baden-
Fuller, 1995), to gain knowledge for future revenue streams (Mc Grath, Ventakaraman
& MacMillian, 1994) and for international success (Birkenshaw, 1997). Fostering
entrepreneurial attitudes and behaviours is necessary for firms of all sizes in order that
they may prosper and flourish in the competitive environment.
In summary, there are several reasons given by different researchers as to why large
organisations are adopting an entrepreneurial culture. One of the main reasons is to
ensure that their organisation will continue to grow in terms of new ideas and
innovation and gain the knowledge required for future revenue and international
success. All these factors can contribute to an increase in profitability for the
organisation and assist in sustaining its competitive edge.
2.5 INTERNAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN CREATING ENTREPRENEURIAL
ORGANISATIONS
It is argued here that companies need to utilise a holistic approach when creating an
entrepreneurial organisation, and this involves various elements at the individual, job
and organisational level. This research analyses the organisation in these three aspects
in order to gauge the intensity level of entrepreneurship within the organisation.
2.5.1 Individual Level
The first element is the individual level where new ideas are not generated or
implemented by organisations but come through the efforts of dedicated people.
Therefore, it is important to understand the entrepreneur's personality, motivation, skills
and level of experience. It is important for an entrepreneur to manage him or herself
effectively when (a) dealing with the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the
creation of an idea and (b) developing an entrepreneurial organisation. The following
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two sub-sections discuss two important elements of the entrepreneurial character:
personality and motivation.
A) Personality/ Characteristics
Personality is a combination of characteristics or qualities that form an individual's
distinctive character. Employees who are entrepreneurial tend to posses certain
characteristics, which can be distinguished from those of a regular employee.
According to Kuratko et al. (1993) the characteristics of corporate entrepreneurs tend to
be action-orientated and goal-orientated and willing to do whatever it takes to achieve
their objectives. This involves a combination of thinking and doing, planning and
working, vision and action. Coming up with new ideas is considered to be paramount.
As a result of this, corporate entrepreneurs often expect the impossible from themselves
and believe that a setback would not, ultimately, threaten the success of their venture.
They are considered to be self-determined goal setters who will go beyond the call of
duty to achieve their goals. If they face failure or setback, corporate entrepreneurs tend
to remain optimistic. They do not easily admit defeat, instead they view failure as a
temporary set back which needs to be dealt with and is not a reason to quit. In other
words their focus is on learning how they could have done things better. Dealing with
their own mistakes and failures helps them to avoid making the same mistake again and
this contributes to their ongoing success. In this situation managers must be prepared to
handle corporate entrepreneurs differently. The ability to understand the critical
differences in action, status, decision and problem solving will help managers to
develop procedures and policies that motivate rather than inhibit the development of an
entrepreneur.
Similarly, Pinchot (1985) identified the characteristics of an entrepreneur as requiring
freedom, access to corporate resources, goal orientation and self-motivation. Also, he
analysed the difference in characteristics between traditional managers, entrepreneurs
and intrapreneurs. Entrepreneurs are known to be self confident and courageous but are
cynical towards the system and believe they have the ability to outsmart it. In terms of
their attimde towards risk, they are moderate risk takers and generally not afraid of
being fired. They also do their own market research and are intuitive about market
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evaluation just like the entrepreneurs. In addition, intrapreneurs consider traditional
status as a 'joke' and instead they treasure symbols of freedom.
Timmons and his colleagues conducted a comprehensive review on the characteristics
of entrepreneurs based on 50 research studies (in Kao, 1989). These traits consist of:
• Total commitment, determination and perseverance;
• Drive to achieve and grow;
• Opportunity and goal orientation;
• Taking initiative and personal responsibility;
• Persistent towards problem solving;
• Realism and a sense of humour;
• Seeking and using feedback;
• Internal locus of control;
• Calculated risk-taking and risk seeking;
• Low need for status and power;
• Integrity and reliability.
Kuratko and Hodgetts (1998) argue that intrapreneurs are not necessarily inventors of
new products but they are people who can turn ideas or prototypes into profitable
realities. They tend to be the people behind a product or service and are team builders
with commitment and a strong drive to see ideas come into fruition. An intrapreneur is
sometimes described as "a dreamer who does", someone who tends to be action
orientated and moves quickly to get things done. They are known to be goal orientated,
and are willing to do whatever it takes to achieve their objectives; this is similar to
Timmons' perspective on entrepreneurs' traits.
Bhide (2000) examined traits and skills at two different levels as compared to other
researchers. He finds that a start up organisation requires different types of traits and
skills compared to a large and long established firm. Three traits predispose individuals
to adopt audacious goals, which include nature of ambition, willingness to take risks
and relationship to financial returns. Also, he identified traits that are required by large
firms in implementing long-term strategies and these comprise the ability to be
imaginative, creative synthesis, abstraction, constancy, inspiration and a willingness to
imitate and learn new skills.
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This study adopts Timmons' perspective on the characteristics of entrepreneurs, which
is similar to those of other researchers such as Kuratko et al., (1993, 1998), Pichot
(1985) and Bhide (2000).
B) Motivation
Motivation is one of the important elements required in driving an entrepreneurial
organisation. There are many different perspectives on motivating employees. Some
researchers find that by providing apparent rewards, employees will be willing to work
on new projects and in challenging teams. However, there are researchers who doubt
that rewards are the motivating source in creating an entrepreneurial organisation.
Instead they believe that allowing the innovator to be in charge of a new venture or
giving the corporate entrepreneur more discretionary time in which to work is the best
reward.
According to Sathe (1988), there are a number of areas that management needs to focus
on in order to control entrepreneurial behaviour successfully. Firstly, one has to
encourage entrepreneurial activity rather than make such activity mandatory. Sathe
finds that it is important for managers to use financial rewards and strong company
recognition rather than rules or strict procedures. Secondly he suggests that there should
be proper control of human resource policies such as adopting selected rotation where
managers are exposed to different but related territories. This helps managers to gain
sufficient knowledge on new venture development. The third factor is the
management's need to sustain commitment on entrepreneurial projects when there
could be failures but where such failures are then regarded as learning experiences. The
final element is to take a chance on people rather than indulge in over-analysis.
Analysis is important for judging the progression of projects but it should be supportive
rather than imposed.
Similarly, Kuratko & Hodgetts (1998) find that to create an entrepreneurial
organisation, one of the considerations that needs to be looked into is providing
employees with rewards such as bonus plans, stock incentive plans, employee stock-
option plans, profit sharing and employee ownership per se. This is because the best
employees would normally seek a greater sense of ownership towards the organisation.
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In addition, Kuratko & Hodgetts argue that in establishing the corporate entrepreneurial
organisation, companies need to provide the freedom and encouragement necessary for
intrapreneurs to develop their ideas. Policies need to be developed that will help
innovative employees to reach their full potential. However, there are top managers
who refuse to believe that entrepreneurial ideas can be nurtured and developed in their
environment. They find difficulty in implementing policies that would encourage such
freedom and unstructured activity.
In addition, to create the necessary climate for an entrepreneurial organisation several
elements need to be considered such as the presence of explicit goals, feedback systems,
positive reinforcement, an emphasis on individual responsibility and rewards based
upon results (Kuratko et al., 1993). However, it has been argued that giving monetary
rewards based upon results is not necessarily one of the best methods of reinforcement.
Instead giving employees more flexibility and freedom within which to perform their
tasks could be a better reward for those individuals who are more interested in shaping
their environment. For example, IBM developed its Fellow's Programme whereby it
annually screens its scientists and engineers so as to identify those who have made
outstanding contributions. They are given the status of IBM Fellow for five years and
free rein to follow their inclinations . In a similar vein, 3M rewards its scientists and
engineers by providing them with free time to pursue their own inclinations. However,
one of the obstacles that may occur in implementing such methods is that top managers
may not believe that entrepreneurial ideas can be developed in their department and in
addition they may find it difficult to implement policies that encourage freedom and
unstructured activity. The ability to understand these obstacles is critical in order to
gain support and foster excitement for new venture development and in removing
perceived obstacles and seeking alternative management actions.
Fama & Jensen (1983) discovered that the higher the equity stakes in the venture the
more the agent will bear uncertainty. They believe that there is a strong rationale for
stock option schemes and leverage buyouts to include employees at all levels in the firm
and not just the board members. It is important for organisational rewards and controls
7IBM also has a number of recognition programmes that draw attention to the accomplishments of
outstanding individuals and publicises these success stories through periodic ceremonies and internal
media coverage
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to be matched to structure if internal corporate entrepreneurship at all levels is to be
promoted. Similarly, Jones & Butler (1992) suggest firms need to pay large monetary
premiums that are directly tied to individual and group actions. As partners, successful
innovators should receive an equity stake in the corporation in proportion to the
increase in corporate profitability that is directly attributable to their actions. The size
of this proportion is a matter of internal negotiation. In addition, Greenberg (1982) &
Greenberg & Folger (1983) suggest that the equitable distribution of rewards and the
equity of procedures for determining rewards are both equally important in maintaining
long-term entrepreneurial behaviour. This is due to the finding that the length of time it
takes for many innovations to realize significant profits is not less than 4 years and
modally 5 to 10 years (Biggadike, 1979).
In strengthening this poin, Kuratko & Hornsby (2001) also find that one of the
dimensions that is frequently cited by many authors is the appropriate use of rewards
(Scanlan 1981, Souder 1981, Kanter 1985, Sathe 1985, Fry 1987, Block & Ornati 1987,
Sykes 1992, Barringer & Milkovich 1998). Also, the dimension on availability of
resources (including availability of time) and the availability for entrepreneurial activity
is another motivating factor for inculcating intrapreneurship among employees.
Employees must be able to perceive the availability of resources for their innovative
activities (Von Hippel 1977, Das & Teng 1997, Selvin & Covin, 1997).
Also, Block and Ornati (1987) conducted a study on the use of incentives for internal
entrepreneurs. Their findings indicate that more than 30% of the firms surveyed
compensated venture managers differently than their other managers and over half of all
respondents found that the variable bonuses needed to be based on return of investment
(ROI).
Later, Block and Mac Millian (1993) cited four possible types of incentives for internal
entrepreneurial behaviour. These incentives include:
• Equity and equity equivalents;
• Bonuses;
• Salary increases and promotions;
• Recognition systems and rewards.
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In summary, there are many different perspectives on how employees can be motivated
and it appears that both monetary and non-monetary rewards are equally important in
motivating employees. Employees should be given bonus, stock incentive plan and
profit sharing in order to build a strong sense of ownership towards the organisation.
As for non-monetary rewards, employees should be given more freedom to be in charge
of their projects, recognition and availability of resources in order to encourage
commitment among employees to handle their work or project more effectively and
efficiently.
2.5.2) JOB LEVEL
In this section the task that an individual undertakes in developing an entrepreneurial
organisation is discussed. The type of job an individual undertakes is determined by
that individual's personality or private vision. Also, it is shaped by the organisation's
strategy, as well as influenced by the external environment. The relevant task for an
entrepreneur is to generate new ideas or insights about new opportunities and then turn
those ideas into reality. As the entrepreneur develops an organisation to serve as an
appropriate lever for his or her vision, the nature and variety of tasks will change as the
organisation evolves and becomes more complex. This section discusses these factors
and is divided into four subsections: type/nature of job; responsibility; creative task and
inner/outer influences.
A) Type/ Nature of Job
One of the important criterion that an organisation needs to ensure when inculcating
intrapreneurship among their employees is the nature of the job that those employees
are required to perform. It is important for organisations to ensure that the type of job
the employees are given to perform enables them to develop their abilities and allows
them to think for themselves. Also, it is equally important for employees to feel that the
job they are performing is challenging and interesting enough for them to continue to
perform creatively and innovatively in their work.
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B) Responsibility
Employees also need to be given the freedom to perform their daily work. This can be
best illustrated by one of the U.S. healthcare management field companies, Acordia Inc.
Acordia employed the concept of decentralisation in the decision-making authority so
as to empower employees to regulate their own behaviour in order to enable a rapid and
creative response to market opportunities as they surfaced. This effect can be achieved
by practicing decentralisation of decision-making within the company and also by using
teams within the company to create incentives that induce superior performance among
individuals and teams for entrepreneurial actions (Kuratko et al., 2001).
C) Creative Task
It is important to provide employees with tasks that encourage creativity as this is
considered to be a crucial element for intrapreneurship. This can be done by grouping
employees according to skills that are required to innovate in ways that could satisfy
unique customer needs, rather than organising people on the basis of their functional
expertise (e.g. within marketing, production & finance) and is facilitated by the sharing
of tacit knowledge that becomes the foundation of product, process and administrative
innovations. In addition, it is important to group employees according to skill type
whereby employees can work more collaboratively rather than individually (Kuratko et.
al., 2001).
D) Inner/Outer Influences
Previous studies have indicated that there is a positive relationship between innovative
activities and dynamic environments (Miller and Friesen, 1984). According to
Khandwalla (1987) dynamic, opportunity-rich environments provide a good match with
entrepreneurial goals and policies to produce risk-taking and innovative directed
behaviour. In addition, Utterback (1994) finds that dynamic environments stimulate
firms to engage in entrepreneurial ventures in order to take advantage of emerging
market opportunities and to pre-empt industry rivals. In addition, Covin and Slevin
(1989) state that the environment plays a seminal role in entrepreneurship theory and
current research findings indicate that the "environment has a strong if not deterministic
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effect on entrepreneurial behaviour". Environmental conditions present information
about intrapreneurial opportunities to those in the organisation responsible for the
continued success and expansion of the business. Entrepreneurial organisations tend to
be sensitive to these events and perceive them as opportunities for pursuing innovative
ventures whereas less entrepreneurial organisations tend not to notice or act upon these
opportunities (Miller & Friesen, 1984).
Dynamic environments are likely to provide many precipitating events, as changing
conditions displace the existing bases for competitive advantages and generate searches
for innovative sources of advantage (Khandwalla, 1987, Miller & Friesen, 1984). On
the other hand, a static environment tends to reinforce existing sources of competitive
advantage and to provide few opportunities for innovative change (Miller & Friesen,
1983; Covin & Selvin, 1989).
The heterogeneous environment is also associated with corporate entrepreneurship.
According to Zahra (1991), these environments are characterised by multiple market
segments with diverse customer needs and characteristics. This diversity provides an
expanded scope and multiple opportunities for innovation which entrepreneurial firms
tend to exploit.
Also, studies have shown there is a correlation between a hostile environment and
corporate entrepreneurship (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Zahra, 1993; Zahra & Covin 1995).
The hostile environment is demonstrated as having a high level of rivalry existing
between industry competitors in a context that is characterized by high levels of
uncertainty and vulnerability to outside influences.
In summary, firms will pursue entrepreneurial ventures in all types of environments.
However, it appears to be highly concentrated in an environment that is dynamic,
heterogeneous and with hostile contexts (Covin & Slevin, 1990, Miller & Friesen,
1984). A dynamic and heterogeneous environment provides more opportunities for
entrepreneurial firms to exploit, whilst hostile conditions provide a strong incentive for
firms to pursue innovation as a source of competitive advantage. From the above
discussions it is clear that the environment can present either a great opportunity or a
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pressing need to recognise the precipitating events that trigger entrepreneurial
responses.
2.5.3) ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL
This section analyses entrepreneurship in a broader context in terms of creativity and
entrepreneurial activities that take place in an organisation. The three main areas
analysed below are general management skills, human skills and creative skills. Each
section is divided into several sub areas to discuss issues at the organisational level such
as structure, strategy, policies, system, leadership, culture, human resource
management, communication, innovation and technology. These factors can affect
significantly the nature of the creative and entrepreneurial environment of the
organisation. However, these factors can also limit or facilitate creativity and become
an increasing factor to contend with as the organisation evolves.
A) General Management Skills
There are three main skills required to inculcate entrepreneurial culture within an
organisation. One of these skills is a general management skill comprising the
structure, strategy, system and policies of the company. This section is divided into
four subsections - structure, strategies, system and policies.
i) Structure
The term strucmre describes the formal ways in which a company organises people and
tasks. An entrepreneurial organisation requires a structure but often it becomes a victim
of the types of structural arrangements created in non-entrepreneurial companies.
Structures are created to manage the existing demands of the business.
Entrepreneurship creates new enterprise and moves in new directions. It is found that
entrepreneurial efforts always challenge and often conflict with the structure that is
currently in place in an organisation. Kuratko et al., (1990) argues that organisational
structure is an important factor in encouraging middle managers to behave in an
entrepreneurial manner (Kuratko and Hornsby, 2001).
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Galbraith (1995) developed four major policy areas in designing the structure of an
organisation namely specialization, shape, distribution of power and
departmentalization. Specialization is concerned with the number and types of
specialties required in performing a task in an organisation. When there is more
specialization it means that a specific task will be performed better but the integration of
the task into a total outcome is more difficult. In creating an innovate environment,
organisations are required to be more specialized. Mourdoukoutas and Papadimitriou
(2002) offer a different perspective when they find job rotation to be a better way of
eliminating monotonous tasks since it allows employees to develop contextual
knowledge of the entire production process rather than knowledge of just a single task.
Also, it allows management to develop knowledge of the entire organisation, its
objectives, functions and operations.
The second policy concerns shape and can be defined as the number of people involved
in forming departments or areas at each hierarchical level. Galbraith (1995) argues that
flatter organisational structures are found to result in better communication and faster
decision-making. This can be seen in Acordia Inc. in the U.S where the organisation
maintains and develops small, highly entrepreneurial companies. This organisation
developed two levels of management and prevents Acordia's subsidiary from exceeding
200 employees, which has helped to reduce the company's operating cost. In addition,
flat organisational structures and sophisticated management information systems
stimulate the sharing of tacit knowledge among team members as well as between and
among new venture teams (Kuratko et al., 2001). Mourdoukoutas and Papadimitriou
(2002) have a similar opinion in stating that that the layer of middle managers would
separate top management from employees. Creating divisions separates one business
function from another e.g. product development from manufacturing and marketing,
and research from product development and this slows down the decision-making
process and creates a gap between producers and customers.
The third policy consists of distribution of power, which occurs vertically and
horizontally. Galbraith (1995) argues that vertical power is concentrated at the higher
levels of an organisation, suggesting that a more centralised structure or power can be
pushed down in an organisation where people at lower levels are empowered to make
decisions and have discretion over how resources are used. Decentralised structure
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encourages individual initiative, experimentation and innovation. Williamson and
Bhargava (1972) and Chandler (1977) argue that large complex organisations have not
only decentralized their decision-making but also provided autonomy of divisions.
On the other hand, departmentalisation involves forming employees into departments,
groups or areas when an organisation reaches a certain threshold size in terms of
employment. Galbraith (1995) argues that employees can be organised in a variety of
ways such as function, product lines, markets or customer segments, geographic regions
or workflow process. However, the appropriate structure of an organisation depends on
the competitive circumstances, strategy and resources of the firm (Morris & Kuratko,
2002).
There are many different opinions and arguments posited by researchers about which
structure contributes best towards the creation of an entrepreneurial organisation.
Different types of structures are required for accomplishing a particular outcome under
particular circumstances. Simple structures work well in small and rapidly growing
ventures operating in fragmented industries where competition is intense. Creating
innovative behaviour requires a high level of flexibility in terms of resource utilization
and time horizons. It is important to make quick decisions during the innovative
process and an organic structure is suitable and highly related to entrepreneurship.
There are four characteristics of an organic structure that facilitate the entrepreneurial
process. Firstly, it increases the level of autonomy, which encourages lower level
managers to propose and test more new ideas. Next, it increases discretionary control
over resources by lower level participants, which facilitates the championing of
innovative ideas. Thirdly, it encourages informal communication that facilitates
exchange of information and this encourages the generation of new ideas and more
effective project development and implementation. Lastly, it helps to increase
participation in the decision-making process regarding initiation and development of
new ventures and this increases the commitment of the organisation's members towards
innovative projects (Rusell, 1999). Findings have indicated that a lower level of
entrepreneurial intensity is likely to be found in a mechanistic structure. Selvin and
Covin (1990) argue that a combination of organic structure and an entrepreneurial
posture is associated with higher performance than an entrepreneurial posture combined
with a mechanistic posture.
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Research has shown simple structures increase speed and flexibility. There are a
number of new and untested structural designs appearing in contemporary organisations
(Pettigrew and Fenton 2000), which contribute towards creating an entrepreneurial
culture. These include network, cellular and virtual structures. The network structure
facilitates new knowledge development and allows firms to leverage their market
presence. It also entails a high degree of integration across formal boundaries between
organisations and units. This can be seen in the case of Ove Arup, a large global
engineering and consultancy firm (Pettigrew and Fenton 2000) .
The team base structure is designed around basic business processes by developing into
different types of teams. These teams operate almost as individual companies with a
high degree of operational freedom and responsibility for innovative product and
process development. Saab Training Systems is an example of a team based strucmre.
This organisation within the Saab unit provides computer aided training equipment for
military purposes (Pettigrew and Fenton 2000), and has adopted a new structure after
previously relying on a hierarchical, functional structure. One of the reasons for this
change is flexibility.
In today's competitive business environment, traditional organisational models built
around rigid hierarchies with clearly defined boundaries are no longer suitable for
entrepreneurial organisations. Instead the boundary-less structure has become a popular
way of developing an innovative organisation (Devanna and Tichy, 1990). This
approach enables employees to think beyond their traditional mindset, eliminates the
barriers that slow things down and create resistance towards change. Boundaries are
eliminated in many ways ranging from collaborative R&D efforts to the linking of two
organisations via an internet-based electronic data interchange. There are three
organisational designs that are considered effective in reducing boundaries and these are
the modular type, virtual type and barrier-free type. The modular and virtual types are
This organisation was formerly organised around fifty independent units reporting to a main board. The
groups were organised according to technical, business or geographic interest and were aligned into
networks and market networks. The specific objective in moving to this type of structure was to achieve
company wide innovations.
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well suited to reducing boundaries between firms (external). The barrier-free type
offers a means of reducing all organisational boundaries (both internal and external)
(Dess, Rasheed, McLaughlin and Priem, 1995).
Organisational designs that facilitate variety, change and speed are sources of
competitive advantage. Covin and Slevin (1990) find that a firm's entrepreneurial
behaviour correlates positively with the firm's performance when the organisational
structure has the following characteristics:
• Managers are allowed to freely vary their operating styles;
• Authority that is assigned based on expertise of the individual;
• Free adaptation of the organisation to changing circumstances;
• An emphasis on results rather than processes or procedures;
• Loose, informal controls with an emphasis on a norm of cooperation;
• Flexible on the job behaviour, shaped by requirements of the situations and
personality of the employee;
• Frequent use of group participation and group consensus;
• Open channels of communication with free flow of information.
In addition, a firm that exhibits low flexibility is rigid in administrative relations and
strictly adheres to bureaucratic practices. Management theorist Mary Parker Follet in
the 1920s emphasised the need to match an organic structure, considered to be a
proactive management style (Graham, 1995). It is important to have good
communication and free flow of information throughout the organisation for effective
market orientation. Also, Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) find that a firm's
rejuvenation requires not only an entrepreneurial management style but also a change to
a more flexible structure, which in turn can facilitate communication across functional
boundaries (in Weinstein, 1998).
There are many different perspectives on the type of organisational structure required to
create an entrepreneurial organisation. There is no standard or fixed structure for an
entrepreneurial organisation. Instead different types of structures are required for
accomplishing a particular outcome under particular circumstances. It is generally
found that simple structures increase speed and flexibility in making decisions. Organic
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structures enable quick decisions, provide autonomy and increase discretionary control
thus allowing organisations to seize opportunities as they come along. Also, team based
and boundary-less structures provide the freedom and flexibility required for employees
in creating innovative product and process development.
ii) Strategies
Strategy is an attempt to capture where the firm is heading and how it plans to get there.
It is able to create a sense of unity, or consistency of action, throughout the
organisation. When entrepreneurship is introduced into a strategy it helps firms to
achieve their goals.
A number of approaches can be undertaken in creating an entrepreneurial organisation.
It is believed that when an entrepreneurial organisation is created dramatic changes
occur within that organisation. Traditional methods of running the business need to be
put aside and new processes and procedures need be practiced. However, this creates
an uncomfortable environment for some people who will inevitably decide to leave
whilst others flourish in a system that encourages creativity, ingenuity, risk taking,
teamwork and informal networking. Nevertheless, this approach can increase
productivity and make the organisation more viable . For example, IBM underwent
dramatic changes in order to create a new IBM as a result of decentralisation of
authority and decision-making. The changes it underwent have turned some parts of
this corporate entity into a freestanding, independent and flatter organisation.
Kuratko et al., (1993) believe that the key to creating an entrepreneurial environment is
to develop and articulate a specific strategy for encouraging innovative activity and
develop a process that consists of four major components. The first component
involves an assessment of the current situation of the organisation. The second
component is to assess the current situation of the organisation by determining whether
there is a common understanding of innovation that the management wishes to achieve.
The next component identifies specific objectives for corporate entrepreneurial
strategies and the programmes that need to be achieved. The last component requires
9IBM in 1986 had 375,000 employees around the world. Its scientific and technical development was
carried out in 20 research laboratories with over 2,500 people and at 20 smaller centres.
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managers to understand the entrepreneurial thinking of its employees. Employees in the
beginning may be specialised in one area but once they have decided to start an
intraprise they have to learn about all areas of the business and this makes a corporate
entrepreneur become more of a generalist with multi-skills. However, the four
components involved in creating an entrepreneurial organisation cannot be implemented
for all types of businesses. Instead implementation will vary from one industry to
another in terms of steps and methods used. This can be seen from Kao's (1989) work
where he developed four categories of companies differentiated by creative and
entrepreneurial capacity. Category 1 companies are high in creative processes but low
in entrepreneurial resources. This category consists of think tanks or artist's
cooperatives, who are in the business of generating ideas without the responsibility of
having necessarily anything to do with their development or implementation. Category
2 firms possess a low level of creativity but high levels of entrepreneurship. These are
companies that are involved in existing businesses, for example franchising fast food
business in a relentless and opportunity driven manner. Whereas, category 3 involves
firms well endowed with both creative and entrepreneurial resources for example Lotus
Development Corporation and Lucas film, Ltd. Category 4 refers to companies that are
neither creative nor entrepreneurial for example mature bureaucracies like the postal
services.
Later, Kuratko and Hodgetts (1998) developed four critical steps necessary in the
creation of an intrapreneurial strategy, which is in line with Quinn's opinion:
• Develop the vision - corporate leaders need to share the vision of innovation that
they intend to achieve. Shared vision is a critical element for a strategy that
seeks higher achievement;
• Encourage innovation - corporations need to understand and develop innovation
as the key element in their strategy;
• Structure an intrapreneurial climate, which helps innovative-minded staff to
reach their full potential. Employees need to know the management's
commitment not only to its people but also towards innovative projects;
• Develop venture teams where the strength is focused on designing issues for
innovative activities. It is known to produce innovative results.
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Bhide (2000) has a different opinion in terms of crafting a strategy to venture into a new
opportunity for entrepreneurial organisations. He finds that new start-ups would have
different methods compared to large corporations. For new start-ups a comprehensive
and analytical approach is not suitable. He believes entrepreneurs lack time and money
to interview a representative cross section of potential customers. He finds that too
much analysis can be harmful because, by the time it is investigated fully, the
opportunity may no longer exist10. On the other hand, corporations cannot adopt the
same methods as entrepreneurs in a start up. This is because without a careful objective
review and oversight, investors would not readily give board and top managers of large
companies discretion over large sums of money. However, it is found that companies
vary in the security required for new initiatives and requirements for planning and
research. Flat organisations with fewer staff may evaluate initiatives relatively
expeditiously. Similarly, differences in administrative skill, culmre and levels of
internal trust may lead some companies to have less stringent demands for objective
evidence than others. Bhide argues that no matter how entrepreneurial a large company
might be, the threshold requirements for total profit, verifiable advantages, budgets,
milestones etc definitely exceed those of 'bootstrapped start-ups'.
Barringer and Bluedorn (1999) developed five strategic practices that contribute
towards corporate entrepreneurship intensity. First is scanning intensity, which helps
managers to cope with uncertainties. Next is planning flexibility, which allows firms to
adjust their strategic plans quickly to pursue opportunities and keep up with
environmental change. The third strategy is the planning horizon. The rationale for
having a planning horizon is that it should be long enough to permit planning for
expected changes in strategy and also short enough to make reasonably detailed plans
available. The fourth strategic practice is locus of planning which refers to the depth of
employee involvement in a firm's strategic planning activities. It is found that having a
deep locus of planning facilitates a high level of corporate entrepreneurship intensity as
it brings the customer closer, encourages the active participation of middle and lower
level managers and accommodates a diversity of viewpoints. The fifth contributing
factor is control attributes such as a control system to make sure that business strategies
10 He discovered this from interviews with founders of 100 companies on the 1989 Inc. "500" list of the
fastest growing private companies in United States and recent research on more than 100 other thriving
ventures by his MBA students shows that many successful entrepreneurs spend little time researching and
analysing.
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meet predetermined goals and objectives. The control system of entrepreneurial firms
must be able to stimulate innovation, proactiveness and risk taking in the organisation.
In addition, there have been ongoing debates among researchers on the adoption of
differentiation strategy and cost leadership strategy in businesses. Porter's (1980)
concept on generic strategies tends to link entrepreneurial activities with differentiation
strategy rather than low cost leadership strategy. He believes that to be successful
differentiators would rely on strong marketing abilities, creative flair, product
engineering skills and effective coordination across functional areas; whereas low-cost
leaders emphasise the tight cost controls, process engineering skills, efficient
distribution systems and structured sets of organisational responsibilities. This is in
contrast with the findings of Dess, Lumpkin and Covin (1997) that cost leadership
strategy contributes towards higher performance in firms rather than differentiation
strategy. Similarly, Zahra and Covin (1995) find that cost leadership is positively
associated with new product development. However, organisations could benefit more
by combining differentiation and cost leadership strategy together. By encouraging the
use of state-of-the-art technologies and the latest techniques for cost effective inventory
control and information system management, firms can address both efficient
productivity and quality enhancement issues. Organisations practicing core process
redesign, business process improvements and re-engineering not only exploit the latest
technologies and innovations but also are also able to dramatically enhance the firm's
cost position relative to its competitors.
Another strategy that organisations are adopting is to provide empowerment
autonomously to employees at the lower levels of the organisation. This not only
improves access to fresh ideas and first hand knowledge of customers but also reduces
costs induced by top-down methods of management (Kanter, 1983, 1985). Hence, firms
could use structural approaches such as system or process improvements and
organisational redesign to improve the strategic position of the organisation thus
enabling it to become more entrepreneurial.
Another important element in strategy, which contributes towards an entrepreneurial
organisation, is the practice of the decentralisation strategy as compared to
centralisation strategy. ADPs CEO Josh Weston, believes that his firm's long-term
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success is due to adopting the strategy of decentralisation, motivation and strong
cultural awareness.
The above discussion outlines the various perspectives on organisational strategy in
becoming entrepreneurial. It is important for an organisation to adopt the right strategy,
which would ensure the organisation's motive for being entrepreneurial is achieved.
Several strategies could be adopted such as decentralization, differentiation, cost
leadership, removal of boundaries and empowerment.
iii) System
System can be defined as the organised scheme or method practiced by organisations in
order to be effective and efficient. Entrepreneurial organisations should have a support
system that provides resources, autonomy and emotional support to entrepreneurs. For
example, Acordia maintained and developed a small, highly entrepreneurial, expense-
sensitive company by developing two levels of management and preventing the
company from exceeding 200 employees. These two important aspects in the
management system have helped to reduce the company's operating cost. In addition,
Acodia's sophisticated management systems have stimulated the sharing of tacit
knowledge amongst its team members as well as between and among the new venture
teams (Kuratko et al., 2001). These factors have contributed towards the success of
Acordia.
Hence, it is important for entrepreneurial organisations to have a support system, which
allows employees to grow and develop in the organisation.
iv) Policies
Policy is a course or principal action adopted or proposed by organisations for their
daily activities. Policies that create tight rules and regulations, create boundaries that
prevent people from looking at problems outside their immediate job. Instead,
employees need to be actively encouraged to look at the organisation from a broad
perspective. Organisations should avoid having standard operating procedures in the
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major parts of a job and reduce the dependence on narrow job description and rigid
performance standards (Kuratko et al., 1998).
Appropriate policies, practices and appraisal assist organisations to be innovative. These
factors encourage employees to generate innovative ideas and allow the company to
commercialise them. Therefore, organisations must be able to support innovative
behaviour by having appropriate personnel in post, management systems that support
change and through the development of a suitable climate. Without having appropriate
policies, organisations would be more performance orientated rather than innovation
orientated (Bridge et al., 1998).
In pursuing an entrepreneurial strategy, policy makers are restricted to three options in
order to manage the innovative process (Burgelmon and Sayres, 1986, Mintzberg,
1983):
• Designing an organisational context conducive to entrepreneurial initiatives, the
creation of structures and a culture that facilitates entrepreneurial behaviour;
• Providing a sense of overall direction for innovative initiatives through an
entrepreneurial vision;
• Ensuring that promising ventures receive necessary resources as they move through
the uncertain development processes.
Hence, it is crucial for an organisation to pursue being entrepreneurial by having
flexible rules and regulations that allow employees and the organisation to grow more
effectively.
B) Human Skills
In creating an organisation to pursue a particular opportunity an entrepreneur must be
able to work with and through people. By generating and communicating a vision of
what is possible, an entrepreneur can gather together, lead and inspire its employees.
Therefore, it is important to possess those human skills required to inculcate
entrepreneurship at the organisational level. This section is divided into four sub




Culture can be defined as an organisation's basic beliefs and assumptions about what
the company is about, how its members should behave and how it defines itself in
relation to its external environment (Cornwall and Perlman, 1990).
Every company has its own culture, which tends to differ along some key dimensions.
A culture is positive when it is in line with an organisation's vision, mission and
strategies and also when there is a fit between its culture and the competitive
environment. Thus, the more turbulent the environment, the more positive culture will
be built around entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurial potential of a positive, strong and
consistent culture is significant. Trapman and Morningstar (1989) conclude that
"organisational cultures can enhance and inspirit us as it can remove us from the boxes
and traps in which we exist, making our lives richer and giving meaning in our daily
tasks" (Morris and Kuratko, 2002).
It is important for entrepreneurial companies to have a vision and a sense of what they
are and what they want to be. Morris and Kuratko (2002) develop the characteristics of
an entrepreneurial culture, which is similar to Hisrich (1986) in certain aspects. The
characteristics are:
People and empowerment focused;
Value creation through innovation and change;
Attention to the basics;
Hands on management;
Doing the right thing;
Freedom to grow and fail;
Commitment and personal responsibility;
Emphasis on the future and a sense of urgency.
In 1990, Cornwall and Perlman developed components of an entrepreneurial culture,
which resemble, in certain aspects, those of Morris and Kuratko (2000). These
components are risk, earning respect, ethics of integrity, trust, credibility, people,
emotional commitment, work is fun, empowered leadership throughout the firm, value
54
wins, relentless attention to detail, people structure and process, effectiveness and
efficiency. Timmons (1999) perspective is similar to that of Hisrich (1986), Morris and
Kuratko (2002) and Cornwall and Perlman (1990) when considering certain aspects of
developing an entrepreneurial culture. These can be viewed in terms of:
• Clarity, being well organised;




• Esprit de corps.
In addition, most organisations are found to practice the values of individualism rather
than those of collectivism. It is found that there are positive and negative aspects to
both of these orientations. The individualism orientation may foster development of an
individual's self-confidence leading to a greater sense of personal responsibility, create
more of a competitive spirit and produce higher-risks, and break-through innovations.
However, there are disadvantages, such as it can produce selfishness, high levels of
stress and interpersonal conflict. Alternatively, the collectivism approach offers the
advantages of more harmonious relationships between individuals, greater synergies,
more social support resulting in a steady stream of incremental improvements and
moderate innovations. The negative side to this is that the team or group focus can
entail the loss of individual identity, leading to greater emotional dependency, a
tendency to free ride on the efforts of others, compromised rather than optimised
behaviour and group think where individuals are locked into a singular shared way of
viewing or approaching a problem (Morris and Kuratko, 2002). Based on the different
opinions on individualism vs. collectivism, it is generally believed that the ability of an
organisation to achieve sustained entrepreneurship is very much dependent upon
creating a balance between individualism and collectivism since both have advantages.
It is important for the organisation to match its appropriate values and culture to its
mission and vision.
Rusell and Rusell (1992) have empirically verified the connection between culture and
innovation by measuring the effects of norms and values on innovation outcomes. They
identified eight dimensions of culture that affect the intrapreneurship process such as:
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• Value for innovation as a practice and as a source of competitive advantage;
• Norms of encouraging creativity among organisational members;
• Norms of encouraging search for innovation opportunities from external sources;
• Norms that facilitate resource support for innovative ventures (championing norms);
' Norms supporting information-sharing between individuals and groups regardless of
organisational position;
• Norms that promote tolerance for failure when creative ideas or projects are not
successful;
• Norms that encourage the open-minded consideration of new ideas and projects;
• Norms that support the implementation of innovations regardless of the individual
or group's involvement in the development of the venture.
From the above discussion it is evident that culture plays a major factor in developing
an entrepreneurial organisation. The type of culture that an organisation adopts very
much depends on the organisation's strategy. It is important for an organisation to have
a culmre that allows employees the freedom to grow and be creative.
ii) Human Resources Management (HRM)
Another important aspect in creating an entrepreneurial organisation depends upon the
human resource management practices. Human resource management refers to tasks
that are associated with recruiting, training and developing, organising, motivating and
maintaining staff in an organisation. It was formerly known as personnel but today it is
better knownas human resources (HR) as it reflects a more comprehensive and strategic
perspective. This term specifically reflects the idea that organisational goals and
employees needs are mutually compatible if they are managed properly and employees
represent continuous investment on the part of the firm with continued returns (Morris
and Kuratko, 2002).
In general, human resources management is divided into five general categories: job
planning and design, recruitment and selection, training and development, employee
performance, compensation and rewards. It has become a means of achieving the
company's strategic direction. Human resource practices, which are associated with
recruitment, selection and training programmes ensure that employees possess the
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necessary characteristics required for effective organisational performance.
Performance appraisal, compensation and discipline programmes are designed to
provide appropriate behavioural cues and reinforcements to guide and motivate
behaviour associated with key company strategies.
HRM practices in creating an entrepreneurial organisation begin with planning and
overall job design. Creating innovation and risk taking behaviour is more consistent
with a long-term orientation and emphasis on formal planning with high employee
involvement (Brandt, 1986, Miller and Friesen, 1984). Also, job related tasks need to
be broadly designed allowing for more decision-making discretion. Greater emphasis
needs to be placed on results over processes or procedures (Mac Millian, Block and
Narasimha, 1986, Schuler, 1986). Jobs need to be less structured or constrained by
rigid organisational policies thus allowing employees the freedom to be more creative
(Morris and Trotter, 1990, Pearson, 1989 and Waterman, 1987).
Mourdoukoutas and Papadimitriou (2002) argued that job rotation and labour transfer is
one way of eliminating monotonous tasks and allows employees to develop contextual
knowledge of the entire organisation rather than knowledge of just a single task. This
enables employees to choose the task in which they could contribute most to the
company. Also, job rotation and labour transfer allows efficient and effective
integration of market and technical information for the improvement and development
of new products. In addition, it bridges the gap between customers. This can be seen in
Oracle Corporation and Cisco System where their engineers are dispatched to consumer
sites to bridge the gap between the laboratory and the market. They also stress group
work or teamwork when inculcating entrepreneurship in the organisation thus allowing
large corporations to recycle information and knowledge among their members,
reinforcing contextual and organisational knowledge. Teamwork is an important way
of developing new products, which require multiple sources of market and technical
information. However, teamwork has certain limitations especially for global teams
working with people from different countries who are confronted by cultural barriers
that may affect the effectiveness of teamwork.
Additionally, when creating an entrepreneurial organisation, employees need to be
recruited from external sources. There is a need to have a balance of external and
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internal sources of job candidates. Rapid environmental change and continuous product
innovation produces time pressures, variable job demands and requirements (Olian &
Rynes, 1984, Robert and Fusfeld, 1981), which in turn require the entrepreneurial
organisation to be less formalised in its selection criteria. Broad career paths and
multiple ladders provide exposure to more areas of the organisation and different ways
of thinking. This exposure enhances idea generation and problem solving and
encourages cooperative activities. Open selection procedure allows for more self-
selection entrepreneurial positions and hence better matches between entrepreneurial
requirements of the organisation and individual needs (Wanous, 1980).
In addition, training and development practices are one of the ways of promoting
entrepreneurial behaviour within an organisation. Changing job demands and the need
to keep abreast of the latest technologies requires continuous on-going training.
Therefore, there is a need to have training activities that are less structured or
standardised and more focused on individualised knowledge requirements (Hambrick
and Crozier, 1985, Kuratko, Montago and Hornsby, 1990, Schafer, 1990). Also, it is
important to include attitudinal components such as acceptance of change, willingness
to take risks and willingness to assume responsibility. The importance of teamwork and
shared achievements should be the central themes. Political skills also need to be taught
to prospective entrepreneurs and these include ways to obtain sponsors, build resource
networks and avoid any early publicity that may prove detrimental to new concepts and
ventures (Bird, 1989; Kanter 1983; Trapman and Morningstar, 1989).
Another aspect of human resource management is to conduct performance appraisals
whereby organisations are required to communicate the performance expectations to
their employees and to reinforce desired behaviour through appraisal and reward
practices. Both need to be designed around specific criteria. In fostering
entrepreneurship, performance evaluations and discretionary compensation is based on
long-term results and a balance between individual and group performance (Brandt,
1986; Pinchot, 1985; Balkin and Longman, 1988; Maidique, 1980; Morris, Allen and
Avilen, 1993 and Souder 1987). Also, it is important to have an appraisal and reward
system that reflects a tolerance of failure and offers some employment security.
Performance appraisals need to emphasise the end result rather than the methods used to
achieve results (Kuratko, Montago and Hornsby; 1990, Waterman, 1987; Mac Millian,
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Block and Narasimha, 1986; Schuler, 1986). Appraisals should be conducted at
intermittent and irregular intervals rather than at fixed intervals. They should be
tailored to the life cycle of the entrepreneurial project, as it requires time to evolve with
each one encountering a unique set of obstacles and with various projects typically at
different stages of development (Morris & Jones, 1993).
Also, financial and non-financial incentives are necessary tools for reinforcing risk
taking and persistence in implementing entrepreneurial concepts in an organisation
(Balkin and Logan, 1988; Corwall & Perlman, 1990). Individual incentives need to be
balanced by rewards linked to group performances over a longer period of time to
encourage cooperative interdependent behaviour (Kanter, 1983; Reich, 1987; Stewart,
1989). External pay equity and incentives such as stock options and profit sharing are
required to instill responsibility for innovation and achieving longer-term commitment
(Farr, 1976; Ellig, 1982; Block & Ornati, 1987; Schuler 1986). The responsibility for
designing the reward system needs to be decentralised or delegated to divisional or
department level. Acordia practices a compensation system that pays salaries to
employees that are comparable to those salaries paid for similar work in other sectors.
Each market average is a combination of base pay plus an annual incentive. The base
pay is established at the low end of the market range whereas the annual incentive is
positioned at the upper end of the range, which allows high performers to earn more.
Also, organisations have developed stock option plans, which are intended to act as a
long-term incentive and ownership opportunity for the employees in the company
(Kuratko et al., 2001).
In line with this, Mourdoukoutas and Papadimitrio (2002) argued that one of the
limitations on large companies becoming entrepreneurial is the incentive
incompatibility between management, employees and stockholders. They believe that
profit sharing institutions, cash based bonuses, employee stock ownership plans (ESOP)
and stock options would allow stakeholders, employees and management to share the
risk and rewards of the business together. This is proven in the Shaw group where in
2000 the management owned 37% of the outstanding shares, which resulted in a 312 %
growth in annual earnings per share. These incentives have attracted qualified
employees into the workforce and served to reinforce their loyalty. In addition, firms of
all types have found that stock options increase worker loyalty and improve morale.
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The above discussion outlines the various perspectives on how human resource
management plays an important role in implanting entrepreneurial culture within the
organisation by selecting the right employees and by developing, appraising and
rewarding them. Also, it is important to be adaptable to current changes in the business
environment thereby allowing the organisation to reap any opportunities that come
along.
iii) Leadership
A leader may be considered to be like a wise owl who takes an overview, reconciles
different perspectives, creates a cooperative climate and exercises authority to keep the
business on the right track. The role of leadership in an organisation is the
responsibility of top-level management. Therefore, it is important for top management
to support and educate employees concerning innovation and instill intrapreneurship
within the organisation (Quinn J.B, 1985; Hisrich & Peters, 1996; Skyes & Block,
1989; Sathe, 1989; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990; Damanpour, 1991; Kuratko et.al., 1993;
Peace, Kramer & Robbins, 1997).
Hisrich (1986) believes there are certain leadership characteristics that need to be
exhibited when developing an entrepreneurial culture such as the ability to understand
the business environment. In order for leaders to successfully establish a new business
venture, creativity and broad understanding of internal and external environments must
be present. Also, the leader must be a visionary who has a dream and will work against
all obstacles to achieve it. In addition, a leader must be flexible and create management
options and alternatives. He must also be able to encourage teamwork and use
multidisciplinary approaches. Likewise, the leader must possess the ability to
encourage open discussion, which leads to the establishment of a strong coalition of
supporters. It is equally important for leaders to be persistent as this allows for
successful commercialisation to take place.
The findings of Covin and Selvin (1991) indicate there are certain behavioural
tendencies exhibited among strategic managers in developing corporate
entrepreneurship culture such as:
• providing organisational and financial resources to entrepreneurial ventures;
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• engaging in proactive competition;
• supporting frequent innovation across a range of value-chain activities;
• creating and supporting organisational context structures and cultures that facilitate
intrapreneurial activities.
In addition, Zahra (1991) finds that to implant corporate entrepreneurship in an
organisation's projects requires making fundamental changes to the company's culture,
structure and management styles and any such changes create uncertainty. However it
is acknowledged that success cannot be achieved without strong support from senior
executives. Bridge et al., (1998) agree that a leader must assume the role of a change
agent at a time when new products are being introduced into the market together with
new management systems and reorganised working arrangements.
The upper level managers should support and acknowledge the importance of
entrepreneurial actions through their words and deeds. Supportive words are one thing
but seeing a leader behave and act entrepreneurially helps create employee commitment
to do the same and this provides a more significant effect (Kuratko et al., 2001).
In summary, leaders play an important role in creating an entrepreneurial organisation.
They act as a role model and provide the necessary financial and emotional support.
This in turn impacts on the employees making them potentially more committed and
productive in the organisation.
iv) Communication
Effective communication is one of the driving forces towards inculcating
intrapreneurship in an organisation. The findings of Astoncic and Hisrich (2001)
indicate that communication in an organisation is both positively and significantly
related to intrapreneurship.
Baden Fuller (1995) emphasises that a firm's rejuvenation requires not only an
entrepreneurial management style, but also a change to a flexible structure as this
facilitates communication across functional boundaries. Mourdoukoutas and
Papadimitriou (2002) agree that the removal of boundaries among divisions and
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between workers and top management would create an efficient and effective
communication strucmre through the use of hardware and software technologies.
Hardware technologies include information and telecommunications such as the
internet, intranet, groupware and teleconferencing equipment which allows large
corporations to connect one unit with another in order to communicate and share
important information. Soft technologies include job rotation and transfer, and working
teams, which allow members of the organisation to develop contextual organisational
knowledge so as to understand the overall production process and function of the
organisation. This is achieved by adopting and adapting new technology and
developing the multiple skills that are required for product development. Hardware
technologies allow employees in a large organisation to cyber communicate efficiently
and effectively with each other and with customers. The use of the net allows large
companies to launch electronic distribution and marketing channels, customise their
products, enter into new markets, cut inventory and transaction cost and speed product
development. However it has limitations in situations where competitors are easily able
to imitate the organisation's products.
In addition, good communications and the free flow of information allows effective
market orientation to take place in an organisation (a characteristic of high flexibility)
effectively. Also, to achieve necessary integration and potential synergy in a cross-
functional team requires effective communication. Such communication has been
proven necessary for marketing and technical synergy and is related to new product
success (Cooper, 1984, Souder, 1987, 1988). Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) argue that
internal communication affects the productivity of cross-functional teams as well as the
speed of accomplishing its task. As communication between functions is important for
most new product development, effective internal communication in cross-functional
teams is also critical in order to achieve synergy among functions (Bacon, Beckman,
Mowery & Wilson, 1994, Zirger & Maidique, 1990).
Grant (1996, 1997) has highlighted the role of formal and informal communication in
transferring knowledge and creating an entrepreneurial organisation. The insights or
knowledge gained in corporate entrepreneurship activities will not have much impact on
the organisation unless it is widely shared with other groups within the firm. For
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example, technical discovery will not have much effect on the firm's bottom line unless
it is shared and communicated to manufacturing and marketing functions.
The role of communication is crucial for sending the right signals and messages to
employees in developing an entrepreneurial organisation. Without proper
communication channels the organisation would suffer a great deal due to a
communication break down and this would fail to create the necessary entrepreneurial
climate.
C) Creativity Skills
Creativity skills imply generating new ideas and approaches. The creation of an
entrepreneurial organisation involves the ability to identify opportunities based on new
ideas and approaches and then turning these into something tangible. Organisations
performing outstandingly have always sought to mobilise these qualities. In this section
the innovation and technology that is required in creating an entrepreneurial
organisation is examined.
i) Innovation and Technology
Companies today acknowledge the need to innovate in order to stay competitive in the
business world. Innovation is one of the important vehicles in creating an
entrepreneurial organisation. Innovation may be described as a new way of doing
things, which can be in the form of process, technology, product or services. It occurs
in varying degrees, ranging from new to the world or services, to minor improvements
of new applications of an existing product or process. Innovation in process includes
changes and improvements to methods, which contribute towards an increase in
productivity by lowering costs and increasing demand. It represents departures from
the past, often breaking established rules and challenging traditional ways of thinking
and doing. In most firms corporate entrepreneurs break rules to accomplish innovations
(Morris and Kuratko, 2002). Many scholars find innovation is considered to be crucial
in order for firms to compete domestically and internally (Hitt et al., 1998; Ireland and
Hitt, 1999). Progressive innovation is considered to be predominant for innovating
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products or services while radical innovation opens up new markets. This in turn leads
to an increase in effective demand, which in turn increases investment and employment.
In line with this, Damanpour (1991) also finds that innovation includes..."the
generation development and implementation of new ideas and behaviours". Innovation
can be in the form of a new product or service, administrative system, or new plan or
programme pertaining to the members of the organisation. In the context of corporate
entrepreneurship Damanpour emphasises innovation where it is centred towards re-
energising and enhancing the ability of a firm to acquire innovative skills and
capabilities. Quinn (1995) a specialist in the field of innovation, discovered that there
are certain characteristics exhibited in those large corporations deemed to be successful
innovators.
• Atmosphere and Vision
Innovative companies have a clear vision of an innovative organisation and provide
the necessary support to sustain it. Employees not only know what is desired but why
and how it will be achieved;
• Orientation to the Market
Innovative companies tie their vision to the realities of the market place. Therefore, it
is important to keep a constant track of the current market conditions to ensure the
company will not be left behind compared to their competitors;
• Small Hat Organization
Most innovative companies keep their total organisation flat and project teams small.
Mourdoukoutas and Papadimitrio (2002) argue that layers of bureaucracy need to be
removed in order to create innovation that is able to penetrate into the market as early
as possible;
• Multiple Approaches
Innovative managers encourage the parallel development of several projects;
• Interactive Learning
In an innovative environment, learning and investigation of ideas cuts across
traditional functional lines in the organisation. This could be done effectively with
the latest technology such as computers, Internet etc;
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• Skunk works
Skunk works comprise of highly innovative enterprises that use groups that function
outside traditional lines of authority. This eliminates bureaucracy, permits rapid
turnaround and instills a high level of group identity and loyalty. This is done through
informal underground or internal networks that provide access to information and
resources outside the formal organisation. A great amount of trust is required to provide
employees with this kind of freedom11.
Morris and Kuratko (2002) find that many attempts have been made by researchers to
characterise the best practices of companies that are good at innovating and three
categories of firm have been developed namely, stars, seekers and spectators.
Companies that are categorisedas stars are high performing companies that successfully
integrate innovation and creativity in their business. Whereas, seekers are companies
that display a number of appropriate innovation practices but lack the required
performance and commitment towards innovation. Whilst spectators, although tending
to acknowledge the importance of innovation, provide little support for it.
Drucker (1985) argues that intrapreneurial management for large organisations does not
occur by chance. Instead, it has to be made to happen. Therefore, it requires a culture
that is receptive to innovation and willing to see change as an opportunity rather than a
threat. Also, it is important to have a systematic measurement of intrapreneurial and
innovatory performance as this helps organisations learn from their failures.
Furthermore, Drucker finds that intrapreneurial management needs to be structured,
staffed and remunerated appropriately to encourage innovation to take place more
rapidly in an organisation. Also, the findings of Lumpkin and Des (1996) indicate there
is a strong interrelationship between innovation and entrepreneurship. Therefore, an
entrepreneurial mindset is required in creating new businesses as well as rejuvenating
an existing one. A conclusion can be made that an important value-creating
entrepreneurial strategy is to invent new products and services and then to
commercialise them (Ireland et al., 2001).
ii Example Activision protect their creative designers from day-to-day business and organisational
pressures. This decision is based on the assumption that creativity is flourished in isolation from
"business-as-usual" attitudes
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Innovation is one of the important elements in ensuring a company continues to stay
competitive in the business world. Organisations that are seeking to be entrepreneurial
need to invest a substantial amount in research and development to ensure new
inventions are created.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
In summary, it can be seen that the literature on corporate entrepreneurship is well
established and encompasses a variety and range of differing viewpoints and
perspectives. This chapter began by introducing the various definitions of both the
entrepreneur and corporate entrepreneurship. The role of corporate entrepreneurship
from the 1990s to the present was discussed. The reasons why large organisations are
embracing the concept of corporate entrepreneurship was also examined. As explained
above, a holistic approach has been utilized in this study to focus on those aspects
inherent in three key components required for building corporate entrepreneurship
namely, the individual, the job and the organisation. The individual level is examined
in terms of the type of personality and motivation required to stimulate
entrepreneurilism in firms. On the other hand, the job level is analysed in terms of the
type and nature of the job, responsibility, creative tasks and inner/outer influences that
could stimulate entrepreneurial activities within an individual in the performance of
his/her job function. Lastly, the organisational level is subdivided into three main areas:
general management skills, human skills and creative skills that are essential in
encouraging entrepreneurship. General management skills analyses those aspects
relating to the structure, strategy, system and policies of a company in order to inculcate
an entrepreneurial culture within the company. Human skills cover issues pertaining to
culture, human resources management, leadership and communication in order to
inspire employees to be entrepreneurial. Lastly, creativity skills consist of innovation
and technology that generates new ideas and approaches which are pertinent in creating
an entrepreneurial organisation. This study utilises all these three levels to gauge the
entrepreneurial level in firms.
The following chapter shifts the focus to corporate governance and discusses the
importance to organisations of increasing their transparency and accountability levels




The previous chapter reviewed the prior studies on corporate entrepreneurship in large
organisations and looked into how an organisation could continue to stay competitive in
the business environment. Furthermore the reasons why large organisations are turning
towards corporate entrepreneurship and the internal factors involved in creating an
entrepreneurial organisation were discussed.
This chapter starts by discussing the organisational roots of corporate governance i.e
organisation structure and design before current governance issues were recognised as
important. Corporate governance, an area considered to be crucial in ensuring that
organisations adhere to certain rules and regulations to ensure greater levels of
transparency and accountability and thereby preventing fraud from taking place within
the firm. Also, there is a growing perception that a company will be able to benefit in
terms of greater efficiency in their organisation. Corporate governance can be built in a
variety of ways. One cannot unequivocally state that the use of or otherwise of any
particular instrument or instruments will create good or bad governance. Section 3.2
begins with a discussion on the organisational roots of corporate governance and this is
followed by a discussion of corporate governance in terms of its definition in section
3.3. Section 3.4 provides further discussion on the benefits and importance of
corporate governance. A discussion on corporate governance and firm performance is
made in Section 3.5. This is then followed by a discussion of principal agent theory,
myopic market model, stakeholder model and abuse of power paradigm as outlined in
section 3.6. Section 3.7 provides an analysis of corporate governance in the U.K and
elsewhere. Section 3.8 examines internal control mechanisms and contains three further
subsections that analyse previous studies on those internal control mechanisms that
enhance a company's performance; namely (1) ownership structure, (2) board of
directors, and (3) remuneration structure. Finally, section 3.9 presents an overview and
summary conclusion.
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3.2 THE ORGANISATIONAL ROOTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In recent years, corporate governance has become one of the most commonly used
concepts in the global business environment. It has raised the question as to whether
corporate governance is considered a vital component of a successful business or
whether it is another fad that will fade over time. The stage of development of
governance refers to the evolution of the economy, corporate structure or ownership
groups, all of which affect how corporate governance will develop and be
accommodated within a particular national setting (Mallin, 2004). Therefore,
understanding the structure and design of an organisation is necessary prior to the
discussion on the current issues on governance.
In neoclassical economics, the firm is portrayed as a "black box". Its function is to
behave as an entity that ensures that relevant marginal conditions are attained with
respect to inputs and outputs and as a result profits are maximized (Jensen and Meeting,
1976). Neoclassical theory makes no attempt to understand the structure and
organisational nature of the firm because they are irrelevant when analyzing profit
maximising conditions.
Berle and Means (1932) first observed the unrealistic nature of these assumptions
among U.S corporations. They are concerned with the issue of the separation of
ownership from control and argue that the owners of joint stock companies are merely
creating economic empires that provide the means through which managers can
excerise their power.
Mullin (2005) finds that the structure of an organisation is important whatever the size
of a firm. Smaller organisations are likely to have fewer problems in terms of structure.
With the increasing size of organisations there is a greater need for a careful design and
a purposeful form of organisation. There is a need to have formal organisational
structure, continual review of that structure to ensure that it is the most appropriate form
for a particular organisation. The objective of a structure is to provide (Mullin, 2005):
• Economic and efficient performance of the organisation and resource utilisation;
• Monitoring activities of the organisation;
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• Accountability for areas of work undertaken by groups and individual members
of the organisation;
• Co-ordination of different parts of the organisation and different areas of work;
• Flexibility in order to respond to future demands and developments and to adapt
to changing environmental influences and
• Social satisfaction of members working in the organisation.
According to Drucker (1989) having the correct design structure is crucial in
determining organisational performance. The structure of the organisation should be
designed to encourage the willing participation of members of the organisation and
effective organisational performance. Drucker states that:
"Good organisation structure does not by itselfproduce good performance. But a poor
organisation structure makes good performance impossible, no matter how good the
individual managers may be. To improve organisation structure... will therefore
always improve performance" (Druker, 1989: 223).
In addition, the structure of an organisation not only affects productivity and economic
efficiency but also the morale and job satisfaction of the workforce. Therefore, getting
the structure right is considered to be the first step towards organisation change. It
should be designed to encourage the willing participation of members of the
organisation and effective organisational performance (Mullin, 2005). The above
discussion outlines the importance of having proper organisational structures in an
organisation which could have an effect on its governance structures.
3.3 WHAT IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
Fifteen years ago, there was little academic interest in corporate governance and most
research tended to concentrate on either takeovers or shareholders from the viewpoints
of business, accounting, economics, finance, law and political science. Now corporate
governance is considered to be one of the most topical areas because many
organisations are becoming exposed to "unbridled greed, appalling management and
[are] deemed to possess inadequate governance". Therefore, corporate governance is
being implemented to ensure organisations are governed in a proper manner (Keasey et
al., 1997).
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There has been an ongoing debate on the definition of corporate governance. It has
faced criticism due to the ambiguous language and lack of understanding of the
definitions provided. Corporate governance is a broad concept used by regulators,
investors, accountants and boards of directors. It involves a set of principles adopted or
practised by organisations in order to ensure that there is corporate direction,
responsibility and accountability. Good governance strikes the proper balance between
enterprise and accountability (Charkham, 1994).
The U.K.'s Cadbury Report (1992) defines corporate governance as a system where
companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury Report, Para 2.5). However, this
definition has been criticised by Sternberg (2000) who finds that the definitions
specified by the U.K Cadbury Report (1992) and the Hampel Report (1998) are not
sufficient in depicting corporate governance as the system by which companies are
controlled and directed.
On the other hand, Tomkins (1998) defines corporate governance as an act of thinking
and acting by setting the parameters and establishing the values within which an
organisation's executive body and its entire staff are free to act. This includes adherence
to external regulations, codes of best practice and accounting standards, and the creation
of an environment within which internal management control systems and audit could
operate effectively (Tomkins, 1998).
Similarly, Levitt (1999) defines corporate governance as the link between the
company's management, directors and its financial reporting system. He points to the
regulatory position and expresses concern about financial reporting systems. On the
other hand, Monks and Minow (2001) offer a different perspective and define corporate
governance as the relationship that exists amongst various participants when
determining the direction and performance of corporations. They identified the primary
participants as the shareowners, management and boards of directors.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1999)
developed a broader definition of corporate governance stating that "it involves a set of
relationships between company's management, board, shareholders and stakeholders".
Corporate governance therefore provides a structure through which the objectives of the
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company are determined and set. Furthermore, it provides a means of attaining those
objectives and monitoring performance. Good corporate governance provides proper
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of
the company and shareholders alike and it enables the facilitation of effective
monitoring.
Keasey et al., (1997) suggest that, in its narrowest sense, corporate governance is
described as a formal system of accountability of senior management to shareholders;
and in its broadest terms, corporate governance includes the entire network of formal
and informal relations involving the corporate sector and the consequences for society
in general. However, Keasey and Wright (1993), Keasey et al., (1997) for the purposes
of their research incorporated the term of corporate governance as the structures,
process, cultures and systems that engender the successful operation of an organisation.
Similarly, Wheelan & Hunger (2000) define corporate governance as reflecting the
reality that a corporation is fundamentally governed by a board of directors overseeing
top management with the concurrence of stakeholders. This term refers to the
relationship that exists between these three groups in determining the direction and
performance of the corporation.
In summary, there are many different perspectives given by researchers on the
definition of corporate governance and these perspectives can be divided broadly into
two main categories - the micro level and the macro level. At the micro level, it is
defined as a set of relationships between a company's management with the board of
directors, shareholders and stakeholders. The macro level involves the entire network of
formal and informal relations involving the corporate sector and the consequences
towards society in general.
3.4 THE IMPORTANCE AND BENEFITS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Good corporate governance is able to create value for companies by maximising the
value to the shareholders through good corporate performance. Low (2002) developed
four crucial pillars that need to be entrenched in ensuring good governance practices in
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organisations: accountability, transparency, minority investor protection measures and
enforced regulation.
The first pillar of accountability stresses that the management is accountable to its
shareholders in that it must deploy the company's resources in the most efficient and
desirable manner without exercising any personal interest. By developing and nurturing
this sense of responsibility, a reliable system needs to be in place to monitor for any
oversights, i.e., by having an independent board of directors. A board of directors is
required to ensure that the management is fulfilling its role (Low, 2002). The second
pillar, transparency, is necessary for the existence of a fair market where information
should be made available to all players and the rules governing the market need to be
known to all. Also, timely and accurate disclosures need to be made on all relevant
matters regarding the company (Low, 2002). Merely having transparency and
accountability is not sufficient if minority investors are not treated fairly due to faulty
basic measures. Also, it is important to note that the corporate governance problem is a
world wide problem that does not only occur in countries practising the Anglo
American model but also in Asian countries. In most Asian countries, shareholder
activism is relatively low and investors invest on a short-term basis compared to
investors in the West that tend towards long-term investments in, for example, pension
funds, college endowments and life insurance funds. Finally there is a need to practise
enforcement by issuing penalties for non-compliance (Low, 2002). This last pillar can
only be implemented if the three earlier pillars of corporate governance are
implemented (Low, 2002).
One of the main reasons corporate governance is seen to be crucial in the U.K context is
partly due to a series of corporate scandals and unexpected corporate collapses in the
late 1980's and early 1990's such as Polly Peck and Robert Maxwell's Mirror Group.
This indicated that there had been a failure in the U.K system (Spira, 2001). Similarly,
Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand emerged from the
recent Asian economic crisis with a requirement for better accountability and this has
further increased the importance of good governance.
In addition, there are other examples, which indicate that there has been an increase in
the importance of corporate governance and a number of corporate governance
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principles have been published such as the California Public Employee Retirement
Scheme, Business Round Table and the UK's Hampel Report. Also, there has been an
increase in the number of important internationally accepted reports that serve to
provide a basis for discussion of best practice such as Cadbury Committee Report,
Greenbury Report, Hampel Report and OECD principles and Combined Code in
Europe. These reports and many others indicate that corporate governance has grown
significantly in importance in most jurisdictions.
In summary, corporate governance plays an important role in creating a corporate
culture of consciousness, transparency and openness. Corporate governance refers to a
combination of laws, rules, regulations, procedures and voluntary practices that enable
companies to maximise shareholders long-term value thus leading to increased
customer satisfaction, shareholder value and wealth. Also, the increased level of
government awareness has shifted the focus from the economic to the social sphere and
an environment has been created to ensure that there is greater transparency and
accountability. This practice needs to be integrated into the very existence of a
company (Low, 2002).
Benefits in practising Corporate Governance
Organisations can obtain several benefits by practising corporate governance. One of
the main benefits is that corporate governance helps to reduce risk by ensuring that the
personal objectives of the board and the company's strategic objectives are brought into
line with those of the stakeholder. Also, it helps to reduce the risk of fraud by providing
a mechanism to review risk and a framework for reviewing and assessing projects
(CEVIA, 2000).
In addition, corporate governance may help to stimulate performance as it emphasises
clear accountability and effective links between performance and rewards, which in turn
encourages organisations to improve their performance. Also, corporate governance
assists in improving access to capital markets by reducing the level of risk perceived by
outsiders, including investors. Furthermore, it can be seen as protecting shareholder's
rights, thus making it easier for companies to raise finance (CIMA, 2000).
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The marketability of goods and services is enhanced by creating confidence amongst
other stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers and partners in joint
ventures. Corporate governance also enables an increase in expertise on strategic
decision-making. This wider pool of knowledge and experience available in the board
through the inclusion of external members helps the board to identify opportunities
more readily. By practising corporate governance an organisation can demonstrate its
transparency and social accountability, thus helping to foster political support and
public confidence towards the organisation (CEVIA, 2000).
In summary, there are several benefits an organisation could obtain by practising
corporate governance such as a reduction in the risk of fraud and stimulating
performance whilst stressing accountability. These benefits effectively provide a link
between performance and rewards, enhancing the marketability of goods and services
whilst increasing confidence levels amongst stakeholders and shareholders towards the
organisation and increasing expertise of strategic decision-making.
Framework of Corporate Governance
Hermanson & Rittenberg (2003) developed a framework for corporate governance
which provides a clear understanding of the concept. This framework consists of the
key elements of organisational governance such as monitoring, risk management,
assurance, control, goals, accountability, recognition of stakeholders and stewardship.
This is shown in diagram 3.4.1 below which illustrates that governance processes deal
with the procedures utilised by the representatives of the organisation's stakeholders in
order to provide an oversight of the risk and control processes administered by
management. The monitoring of organisational risk and the assurance of controls
adequately mitigates those risks that would both contribute directly to the achievement
of organisational goals and the preservation of organisational value. These governance
activities are accountable to the organisation's stakeholders for effective stewardship.
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Diagram 3.4.1: Framework on Organisational Governance
Organisational Governance































Source: Hermanson & Rittenberg (2003)
In summary, corporate governance plays a crucial role in creating value to the company
by maximising value to the shareholder and by developing a corporate culture of
consciousness, transparency and openness. There are several benefits that can be
obtained by practising corporate governance, for example, it helps to improve access to
capital markets and enhances the marketability of goods and services by creating
confidence amongst stakeholders and it further helps to foster political support and
public confidence towards the organisation.
3.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
There has been an on-going debate on the relationship between governance and firm
performance. Scepticism still remains in many quarters, particularly among investors
who doubt the existence of a link between good governance and performance indicators
such as share price performance (Bradley, 2004). However, there is an increasing
amount of evidence suggesting that there is a link between good governance and firm
performance. Bradley (2004) cites a survey conducted in 2002 by the management
consultants McKinsey & Company in 2002 where opinions from institutional investors
in developing and developed economies were obtained. This study found that investors
would put corporate governance on a par with financial indicators when making
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investment decisions. In addition, the majority of investors are prepared to pay a
premium for companies that demonstrate high governance standards. Similar findings
were also indicated in a study conducted on 500 companies in 25 emerging economies
(CLSA, 2002) showing a strong correlation between good corporate governance with
share price levels, past stock returns and past accounting profitability. The study found
that stocks at the top end for corporate governance have been strong over-performers
over the past one to five years in 9 out of the 24 countries (Bradley, 2004).
Also, a link between corporate governance and performance was found in developed
economies. A study conducted in the U.S in 2001 (Gompers, Ishii of Harvard
University and Metrick, 2001) revealed a striking relationship between corporate
governance and stock returns and found evidence to suggest that an investment strategy
that bought firms with the strongest shareholders rights and sold those of the weakest
would earn an abnormal return of 8.5% per year. This link is also beginning to be
shown in Japan, the second largest capital market (Bradley, 2004).
In summary, there is an increasing amount of evidence to suggest that there may be a
positive link between corporate governance and a firm's performance.
3.6 THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARADIGMS
There are numerous theories that provide different insights into corporate governance
problems together with suggested solutions. These corporate control theories provide
the framework for most of the research on corporate governance. Blair (1995) identified
three major perspectives: i) principal agent theory, ii) market myopia model and iii)
stakeholder paradigm. Later Keasey et al (1997) included the fourth perspective, the
abuse of power paradigm. These analyses present different views on what is wrong or
perceived to be wrong with the system.
Principal Agent (P-A) Theory
The principal agent model, also known as the finance model, refers to the relationship
between principal (the owner or shareholder) and agent (a manager or director or
employee) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) this is considered to be the most popular theory
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of corporate governance. The principal hires an agent according to the agent's specific
talent, knowledge and capability to increase the value of the principal's asset. In
increasing the value of an asset, all or some of the principal's decision rights over the
asset need to be transferred to the agent for a particular period of time.
This theory assumes that the interest of principal (owner) and agent (managers) are not
aligned (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) because managers would want to maximise their
own wealth, power and prestige whilst at the same time trying to take care of their
reputation. On the other hand, shareholders would want to maximise the value of their
assets. This often raises a conflict of interest where managers are more interested in
increasing their power, influence or prestige without increasing the value of
shareholders' equity.
The principal agent model incurs cost to the economic system for monitoring and
bonding expenditures paid out to align the behaviour of the agent with the interest of the
owner (Keasey et al, 1997). According to Fama & Jensen (1983) the agency cost
includes the cost of structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of contracts among agents
with conflicting interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also suggest that agency cost
includes the value of output lost because a complete contract would outweigh its
benefits.
Hart (1995) finds that the presence of an agency problem and incomplete contracts of
agents is due to the high transaction costs associated with complete contracts that
provide the rationale for corporate governance. There are two kinds of managerial
failure that would keep agents from acting as the perfect agent for their shareholders:
i) Failure of managerial competence that relates to unwitting mistakes in the
discharge of managerial control;
ii) Failure of managerial integrity that relates to willful behaviour on the part of
managers that would impact negatively upon the value of a firm's assets.
In guarding against failures of either type, shareholders enact ratification, monitoring
and sanctioning mechanisms (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Boards of directors play a very
important role in the enactment of these mechanisms, having fiduciary responsibility to
77
shareholders and possessing the authority to monitor, ratify and sanction the decisions
of managers within the corporation.
One of the ways of resolving the problem that arises from the imperfect alignment of
interest is through contract. The agency theorist believes that the modern corporation is
a nexus of contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These contracts specify the agency
relationship between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents), between debt
holders (principals) and managers (agents) between shareholders (principals) and
directors (agent) and between directors (principals) and various board committees and
task groups (agents). These contracts can be in the form of implicit or explicit contract.
Agency theory is concerned with devising structural and behavioural measures that
minimise those inefficiencies in the contractual structure of the firm that arise from
imperfect alignment of interests between principals and agents. There are three
elements of the agency model of business relationship and these are: decision rights,
knowledge and incentives. Decision rights or rights to exercise control come in two
different types (Fama & Jensen, 1983) these are:
i) rights to initiate a decision and right to implement a decision;
ii) rights to ratify a decision, decision monitoring rights and sanctioning rights.
Also, knowledge is critical to the activities of the agent and this comes in two forms:
(Jensen & Meckling, 1992) general knowledge and specific knowledge. Lastly the
provision of incentives motivates an agent to act in one-way rather than another. These
three elements aid in understanding the potential problems and pitfalls of the modern
corporate form of how the organisation works. Failures of agency relationship occur
when managers do not have the right information to reach the optimal conclusion.
In the U.K, the ownership structure in companies is typically dispersed, and principals
are commonly uninformed. In contrast, the agent (i.e. executives) forms the nucleus of
a board that is small and well informed about the firm. The widely dispersed nature of
shareholders impedes effective monitoring and increases the incentive and likelihood
for individual shareholders to shirk (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). On the other hand, if
all information were to be communicated and changes were made according to every
individual shareholder before carrying out anything this would cause companies to be
78
unresponsive towards changing market conditions and function ineffectively.
Therefore, power and discretion need to be granted to executives of a company but the
fear exists that agents may operate on behalf of themselves and not the owners. This
raises the need for corporate governance mechanisms to enable the balance of control
between principal and agent which will be discussed in-depth in section 3.6.
The Myopic Market Model
Similar to the principal agency theory, the myopic market model subscribes to the
principle that the goal of the firm is to maximize the value of shareholder's wealth. The
myopic market model identifies short termism (bias against long-term focus) as the
central problem in the Anglo American corporate governance system (Charkham 1994).
It is argued that the capital market exerts undue pressure on a corporation's managers to
focus excessively on short-term stock price gain at the expense of long-term sustainable
growth and investments such as research and development. Supporters of this view
recommend reforms that will constrain the 'Wall Street Walk' (i.e. the exit option),
encourage shareholders to exercise their voting power, insulate managers from short-
term pressures, restrict the take-over and other factor markets and promote long-term
relationship investing. In addition, share prices are not considered to be a reliable guide
to the future value of the firm in the market and for corporate control, the threat of take
over is a source of distraction to executives (Keasey et al, 1997; Blair, 1995).
Stakeholder Model
The stakeholder model takes a fundamentally different position from other models.
This model suggests that the firm's objective is not solely shareholder wealth
maximization and furthermore that the goal of the firm should be extended to include
the maximization of the welfare of other stakeholders such as employees, creditors,
suppliers, customers and the community (Freeman, 1984; Pearce, 1992). According to
its proponents, stakeholders would have a long-term interest in the success of the firm
(March & Simon, 1958). Creditors have an interest in getting their loans repaid on
schedule, suppliers have an interest in securing fair prices and dependable buyers and
customers have a stake in getting value for money.
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Abuse of power paradigm
There has been a concern that an important problem with corporate governance systems
is that of too much power being in the hands of executives' management whereby some
of this power may be abused in pursuit of their own self interests (Keasey et al., 1997).
Managerial power has played a key role in shaping executive pay (Bebhuck & Fried,
2004). The pervasive role of managerial power explains the contemporary landscape of
executive compensation, including practices and patterns that puzzle the financial
economist. Also, Bebhuck & Fried (2005) found managerial influence over the design
of pay arrangements has produced considerabledistortions in these arguments, resulting
in cost to investors and the economy. This has lead to compensation schemes that
weaken managers' incentive to increase firm value and even create incentives that
reduces long-term firm value. Therefore, this has had a negative effect on shareholders,
industrial systems and society. Supporters of this view find that the current institutional
restraints on managerial behaviour, audit process and threat of takeovers are not able to
prevent corporate assets being used in ways dictated by managerial self interest.
Governance arrangements could be created to reflect principles of transparency,
representation and a division of responsibility. However, there would be a need for
periodic reforms of procedures to reflect evolving circumstances in the firms
themselves (Keasey et al, 2005).
Kay and Silberston (1995) reject the principal-agent theory that is considered as the
basis for control processes in a modern corporation. This is because most companies
may be dominated by a board that functions as a self-perpetuating oligarchy. In
addition, they find that one should not be surprised if self-serving behaviour and even
corruption is encouraged in such an environment. This has caused the advocates of
Anglo-American governance in firms that suffer from the abuse of executive power to
argue for statutory changes in governance. A series of changes were proposed by Kay
and Silberston to weaken what is seen as an entrenched position of senior corporate
elites, including a fixed four years term for chief executive officers, independent
nomination of non-executive directors and greater power for non-executive directors
(Kay and Silberston, 1995).
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In summary, the above discussion outlines the different corporate control theories:
principal agent theory, myopia market model, stakeholder model and the abuse of
power paradigm. The principal agent theory holds that the interests of the principal and
agent are not aligned because of a conflict of interests whereby managers wish to
increase their own wealth and shareholders wish to increase the value of their assets.
Also, different time horizons and risk attitudes of the agent and principal causes an
alignment between principal and agent. Therefore, this would incur costs to monitor
and to align the interests of both parties and one recognized way of resolving this
conflict is by using a contract. On the other hand, the market myopia model identifies
short termism as the central problem in the Anglo American Model whereby the capital
market exerts undue pressure on managers to focus on short-term stock gains. The
stakeholder model does not find the firm's objective to be shareholder wealth
maximization but rather the maximization of the welfare of other stakeholders. The
abuse of power paradigm finds that the corporate governance problem lies in the abuse
of power by corporate elites for their own self-interest.
3.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
In recent years, the governance of companies has been a subject of great interest due to
concern about the standards of accountability and financial reporting of U.K public
listed companies. Because of this concern, a number of reports from 1992 to the present
day have been published that are aimed at improving the standard of governance in the
country.
History of Governance in the U.K
In the late 1980's and early 1990's there was a high number of corporate scandals in the
U.K. Examples of fraud that took place in organisations include the collapse of Bank of
Credit & Commerce International (BCCI) and the City's institutions were criticized for
their failure to act against fraud within companies (Low 2002). Another scandal that
took place was in the Mirror group, controlled by Robert Maxwell, where more than
£400 million pounds of the company's pension fund went missing and was never
recovered (Low, 2002). This served to indicate that there had been a lack of
transparency and monitoring of systems within some companies. In addition, it
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demonstrated the lack of supervision generally over companies by any regulatory
authority and the traditional laissezfaire approach by regulators failed to prevent either
the collapse of BCCI or the activities of Robert Maxwell. As a result of these scandals,
self-regulation with the support of the U.K. government took measures to circumvent
these problems by developing committees, beginning with the Cadbury Report in 1992
until the latest review made by the Combined Code in July 2003 (Solomon & Solomon,
2004).
Differences between U.K Corporate Governance Practices and Those of Other
European Countries.
The past few years has seen the introduction or revision of corporate governance codes
and practices in a number of countries. Each encompasses different legal backgrounds,
cultures, political contexts, business forms and shared ownerships which influence the
formulation of governance practices (Mallin, 2004). The United Kingdom is considered
to be one of those countries which is different in terms of corporate governance and
ownership. Goergen & Renneboog (2001) argued that the difference could be seen in
three aspects. Firstly, a large number of U.K firms are listed on the stock exchange,
where the total market capitalisation of domestic listed companies amount to 81% of
GNP compared to German and Japanese firms, which amount to 14% and 37% of GNP
respectively. Also, U.K companies have to be publically listed at a much earlier stage,
after 14 years, compared to other countries such as Germany who list companies after
53 years (KPMG 2001/02).
Secondly, there is a separation of ownership and control in most of the British listed
companies. According to the Franksand Mayer (1995) report about 84% of the top 200
quotedU.K firms do nothave shareholders controlling more than a quarter of the voting
equity. Only 10% of the public listed companies in the U.K are majority owned
compared to 25% in Germany. Also, in the U.K it is found that the firm's directors are
the second largest group of shareholders after institutional investors who make up the
largest group. Similarly, Low (2002) finds that the ownership and control structure of
public listed companies in the U.K, in terms of shares held by institutional investors,
amounts to 70% of the listed equities and voting rights. This is considered to be one of
the effective methods of ensuring the highest standard of corporate governance.
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In addition, in terms of separating the roles of chairman and CEO, Frank et al., (2001)
argued that it has increased substantially in the U.K but 23% of companies still do not
separate the two roles. This makes them potentially liable to a serious failure to monitor
the board. One of the main problems faced by shareholders is the potential
expropriation by the management and the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and
Hampel reports all tried to reduce managerial power (Goergen & Rennebog, 2001).
Thirdly, it is found that the U.K is the only European country with an active market for
corporate control. It is found that there were 80 hostile takeover bids in the U.K
between 1981 to 1986 compared to only 3 hostile takeover bids in Germany since World
War II (Goergen & Renneboog, 2001).
In addition, a survey was conducted by KPMG (2001/02) on chairmen of the FTSE 350
companies to analyse the difference in practices of corporate governance among the
European countries. The findings indicate that the board in the U.K meets more
frequently than other European countries. The U.K board meetings are well attended
with 57% attended by all directors and 89% of the meetings attended by more than three
quarters of the board members. This is in contrast with countries namely Germany and
Switzerland where attendance by all directors at meetings was 82% (Germany) and 67%
(Switzerland).
In addition, directors in the U.K appear to have more international experience than other
European directors. Two thirds of directors on U.K boards have experience in
marketing and operational expertise abroad. In general the U.K board comprises
directors with an abundance of experience in finance, marketing and operations.
However, the survey finds that the U.K boards seem to be poorly represented in terms
of experience in technology/research and development (KPMG 2001/02).
U.K Corporate Governance in Comparison to the U.S
The collapse of Enron, WorldCom and other corporate giants has prompted the U.S
government to review its corporate governance practices in a more serious manner.
Initially, U.S governance was unusual in comparison to the U.K and other countries
since it possessed no definitive corporate governance code (Mallin, 2004). Instead there
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had been various state and federal developments in the area over a number of years.
The collapse of Enron caused the U.S to review its current regulation, the 1991 U.S
Federal Sentencing Guideline and develop new laws such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act
2002 (Hatcher, 2003).
There are several aspects of U.S practices in relation to corporate governance that differ
in comparison to the U.K in terms of the board structure and composition, shareholder
activism and remuneration structure. In respect to board structure and composition, it is
common practice in the U.S for the CEO to hold the position of Chairman on the
company's board and this contrasts with the U.K where stress is placed on splitting the
role of chairman and CEO. The U.S board of directors has been harshly criticised for
not attaining a balance of power and therefore reduces the board effectiveness. This has
been widely practised, as it is believed that the U.S board culture on duality would
discourage conflict (Solomon & Solomon, 2004).
In addition, it is typical for U.S board size to be large in comparison to the U.K. This
serves to reduce board effectiveness and statistical evidence has shown that corporate
performance and value were a decreasing function of board size (Yermack, 1996). The
Economist (2002) commented that some of the Sarbanes-Oxley rules imposed on bosses
and directors tend to be too cumbersome or prescriptive. Suggestions have been made
that it would be useful to increase the checks and balances on bosses and to adopt the
common European practices of separating the function of chairman and CEO (refer to
Appendix 3.5.1 for further illustration on the corporate governance in the U.S including
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002).
On the other hand, shareholder activism in the U.S seems to be far greater in
comparison to the U.K. It is found that the institutional shareholders in the U.S form
representative groups and present resolutions to company management far more
frequently. This is commonly practiced in the U.S but rarely in the U.K (Solomon &
Solomon, 2004).
In respect of remuneration, researchers have found that U.S pay packages have been
higher than executives in other parts of the world. Cheffins (2003) argues that the pay
packages of the U.S chief executives are far higher than in other countries such as the
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U.K, as remuneration is driven by a market-based structure that tends towards higher
executive pay structures
In summary, it is evident that the U.K governance structure is different and in some
ways unique in comparison to many other European countries and the U.S. Great efforts
have been made in improving corporate governance since 1992 beginning with the
Cadbury Report and continuing until the recent redraft on the Combined Code in July
2003.
3.6 INTERNAL CONTROL GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
In general, there are two broad types of governance mechanisms namely external and
internal governance measures. In the U.K, the market for corporate control is through
takeovers, mergers and labour markets and this is considered to be the primary external
governance mechanism. However, it is often argued that this forces managers to
concentrate on short-term performance rather than on the long-term perspective and this
is considered to be a weakness of the model (Caves, 1989).
Whilst acknowledging the importance of external governance mechanisms, considered
to be a valuable means of exercising monitoring and control, the increased focus in
academic literature as well as in the media on internal governance mechanisms and the
focus of this study has prevented the provision of any in depth discussion on external
measures. The focus of this study is on the internal measures utilised by companies in
ensuring effective monitoring and control.
The daily running of an organisation is assigned to the executives who have the ability
to exercise managerial discretion in utilising shareholder capital. This allows efficiency
to be achieved. However, one of the drawbacks that arises is that conflicting objectives
may occur and this is illustrated by the agency theory. Executive power may be abused
when managers seek to increase their own status, power and remuneration (Baumol,
1959, Williamson, 1963). Also, it may be due to the willfulness or mere misalignment
in terms of risk preference and time discounting between principal and agent.
Therefore, internal control mechanisms and monitoring are required to reduce the
potential for an abuse of executive power and managerial discretion. It is essential to
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strike an appropriate balance between monitoring managers and allowing them to carry
out functions since a high level of monitoring and control may inhibit companies from
moving forward. Internal control governance mechanisms are implemented by: (1)
shareholders, (2) the board of directors and (3) remuneration structure for executives.
These three internal control mechanisms form the main focus of this study.
3.6.1 Shareholder
This section analyses the role of shareholders in monitoring companies' activities.
Shareholders delegate authority to the board of directors who then appoint a
management team to control the organisation and to achieve the goals that have been
set. Investors are divided into three main categories: individual, institutional
shareholders and block shareholders.
i) Individual Shareholders
Individuals are considered to be the owner of a corporation if they have purchased
equity in an organisation. This allows them to have rights as individuals and as owners
of shares in a corporate entity. In addition, they have equal right to receive benefits in
terms of the profit sharing of the organisation.
In the U.K, individual equity ownership has decreased in percentage terms from 54% in
1963 to just 18% in 1993. The reason for this decline is the increasing dominance of
institutional shareholder (Short & Keasey, 1997). Financial institutions held 62% of
ordinary shares in 1993 and this percentage has more than doubled since 1963.
ii) Institutional Shareholders
In recent years, institutional investors have started to play an active role in company
activities. There has been a major growth among institutional shareholders especially in
the U.K and this is due to the growth in pension funds (Solomon & Solomon, 2004) and
to the increase in private retirement savings in the form of occupational or private
pension schemes and long-term life insurance or assurance. A large part of the growth
in institutional shareholding represents an indirect growth in equity investment by
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individuals where pensions and life insurance is a vehicle for long-term personal
savings. Pension funds are the largest form of institutional investor and U.K ordinary
shares make up over half of their total portfolio of assets (Short & Keasey, 1997).
The large institutional investors can play their role in providing a credible mechanism
for transmitting information to financial markets. This is because large institutional
investors are able to obtain private information from management and then to
disseminate that information to other shareholders (Gillian & Starks, 2001).
Institutional investors are motivated to monitor managers because the benefits of so
doing are perceived as outweighing the costs. Also, increasing the size of their
shareholding increases ownership concentration in stocks and this may, for a short time,
lower the trading price for that stock. In addition, institutional shareholders have the
ability to influence the actions of companies and this is due to the large amount of
shares they hold in the company (Solomon & Solomon, 2004).
The activism played by institutional shareholders depends on the type of institutional
shareholder they are. One of the problems institutional shareholders face is that
researchers have viewed institutional shareholders as a homogenous group. How active
the institutional shareholders are depends upon the type of institutional shareholder
group to which they belong. Zahra (1996) has divided institutional shareholders into
two groups based on their investment horizons. The first group includes mutual,
pension and retirement funds, which are large in number and where investments are
held for a long time. Managers of these funds have an interest in improving the
portfolios for long-term value and this encourages them to play an active role. This is in
contrast to the short-term institutional owners such as investment banks and private
funds. The fund managers of this group are evaluated every quarter and this promotes a
focus on short-term investment with a view to maximising their portfolio's annual
performance. If there is a decline in the stock price, fund managers liquidate their
investment rather than challenge the management. Similarly, Brickley et al., (1988)
developed a typology for different institutional owners consisting of three groups: (a)
pressure sensitive, (b) pressure resistant and (c) pressure indeterminate. Pressure
sensitive institutions would include insurance companies, banks and non-bank trusts.
These institutions usually have business relationships with the companies in which they
invest. The success of these institutions would very much depend on maintaining strong
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relationships with the companies in which they invest. Pressure sensitive institutions
may not use their ownership power to promote long-term strategic initiatives such as
corporate entrepreneurship. They are considered to be short-term institutional investors,
which are negatively associated with corporate entrepreneurship. As for the pressure
resistant institutions, they do not have close business relationships with firms in which
they hold stock and therefore are not susceptible to be influenced by managers. These
institutions would include public pension funds, mutual funds, foundations and
endowments, which are under pressure from their members to improve corporate
governance (Jacobs 1991, Roe 1994) and maximise the long-term value of their
holdings (Blair, 1995). The next type of institution is known as pressure indeterminate
and includes corporate pension funds, brokerage houses and investment counsellors.
These institutions would have some relationship with the firms in which they hold
stocks but the nature of these relationships is hard to define.
In addition, Charkham (1994) makes a distinction between institutional investing which
he labels as Type A and Type B (Table 3.6.1.1). The Type A fund manager places
emphasis on the long-term performance of a relatively small portfolio of companies.
On the other hand, Type B fund managers emphasise the short-term performance of a
relatively large portfolio of companies. The type of approach adopted by a particular
institution is dependent not only on the purpose of the investment but also on the
complex mixture of factors relating to the management of those funds such as
motivation and ability of the individual fund managers (Keasey et al., 1997). Pension
funds known as long-term investors would be most likely to adopt Type A. Fund
managers that are motivated by their reward strucmre would follow the Type B
approach.
Table 3.6.1.1: Charkham's Contrasting Stances of Institutional Investment Behaviour
Characteristic Type A TypeB
Portfolio make-up Concentration on fewer stocks Wide diversification
Stakes in companies Large Small
Communication with companies Close Superficial
Loyalty to companies High Virtually non-existent
Dealing activity Fewer dealings and less freedom
to deal due to high stake
Frequent dealing
Interest in corporate governance High Virtually non-existent
issues
Source: Keasey et al., (1997)
On the other hand, Gillan & Starks (2001) argued that the primary actors in corporate
governance systems are not institutional investors. Instead large block holders such as
individuals, family groups, lending institutions and other corporations are considered to
be the dominant players. They also suggest that over time institutional investors
increase the liquidity, volatility and price information on the financial markets in which
they participate. By so doing this helps to create better corporate governance structures
including effective monitoring (Solomon & Solomon, 2004).
In addition, there has been a rise in shareholder activism particularly amongst
institutional investors. This is due to the fact that shareholders believe that Boards of
Directors have failed in their duty and this creates a sense of dissatisfaction with the
performance of the Board. Therefore, given a situation where the interest of
shareholders is not taken into consideration they can either: sell their shares, hold their
shares and voice their dissatisfaction, or do nothing (Gillan & Starks 2001)
Gillan & Starks (2001) find that many authors have argued that the important role of
shareholders is to ameliorate agency problems by monitoring or taking control of the
corporation. Large investors have stronger incentives to monitor activities as they are
more likely to obtain benefits from their investment and their gains would cover the
cost. It is found that company performance improves after an activist investor purchases
a block of shares. This is because the presence of large shareholders is associated with
management turnovers which provide a monitoring function.
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In addition, Gillan & Starks (2001) argued that lending institutions have a monitoring
advantage. This is due to banks having favourable access to inside information and this
helps to reduce potential agency costs of debt financing. A study was conducted by
Kaplan & Minton (1994) on the appointment of former bank employees as members of
the board of directors in a Japanese firm and found that banks played an important role
in corporate governance in Japan.
iii) Blockholders
In recent years, ownership strucmre within the U.K has changed from being dispersed
to being more concentrated (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). Blockholders purchase large
amounts of shares in an organisation and can be either individuals, family groups,
pension funds, life insurance, unit trusts and investment trusts. However, there is no
standard definition on how to categorise a blockholder. Blockholders are seen to have a
positive impact on the company in terms of the influence they have on the organisation
in ensuring that the company is well managed. They take great interest in increasing the
performance of the company. Also, the large amount of shares they hold in the
company allows them to exercise their influence on the company. However, one of the
drawbacks of having family block shareholders is that they may, potentially, present
several challenges. If for example family issues such as in-fighting over succession;
personal rivalries and family jealousies are brought to the business then this may
amount to too much family involvement which, in turn, may have an adverse effect on
the performance of the company (Walt, Ingley & Diack, 2002).
In summary, shareholders play a crucial role in monitoring companies' activities
through activism that forces the management to be more transparent in their practices.
Also, block holders provide an effective monitoring role as they are seen to be dominant
players due to the large amount of shares they hold in the company which helps to
create a better corporate governance structure within an organisation.
3.6.2 Board of Directors
Every company needs to be spearheaded by an effective board that leads and controls
the company. The Combined Code (1998) in the U.K recommends that the board should
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have an agenda especially reserved for decision-making. All directors should bring
independent judgment to discussions on issues of strategy, performance, resources and
standards of conduct, and every director should receive appropriate training when
appointed to the board (KPMG, 2001/02).
Prior studies (Millstein and MacAvoy, 1995; Klein, 1998) find that there is a
relationship between the structure of a board and the performance of an organisation.
Boards of directors can be divided into three categories for analysis, these being the
board structure, board size and duality.
i) Board Structure
The board comprises of executives and non-executives who are either independent or
non-independent directors. Executive directors are responsible for the day-to-day
management of the organisation and for the business in aspects such as finance,
marketing, formulating and implementing corporate strategy. However, they are unable
to monitor or discipline the CEO. Therefore, non-executive directors need to play a role
in monitoring the actions of the CEO and executive directors to ensure that the
shareholders interests are well cared for (Weir & Laing, 2001). From the agency theory
perspective, the presence of independent non-executive directors on the board makes it
possible to reduce the potential for a conflict of interest between shareholders and
company management as they are seen to perform a monitoring function by introducing
an independent voice on the board (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). Effective monitoring
requires non-executives to be independent of the executive directors on the board. Non-
executives with many years of experience on the same board will become less effective
in monitoring as they build close relations with the executive directors. Some
researchers believe that having independent non-executive directors on the board
enables more effective monitoring which results in improved corporate performance. It
is interesting to compare two studies that were conducted on boards of directors by
Bhagat and Black (1998) and Millstein and MacAvoy (1999) who both looked at active
and independent boards but used different methodologies and reached different
conclusions. Bhagat and Black studied 928 large U.S public companies from 1985 to
1995 and found that there is no convincing evidence to prove that greater independence
results would create higher performance. However, there is some evidence that shows
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firms with supermajority independent boards perform worse than other firms do.
Supermajority independent boards refer to those which have one or two inside directors.
However, a study conducted by Millstein and MacAvoy in 1995 on 154 large firms
showed a reverse result when it was found that there was a statistically significant
relationship between active independent boards and superior corporate performance.
In addition, Millstein (1995) argued that some independent mechanism is required to
ensure management accountability. Recent surveys show that the boards of large U.S
corporations are both active and "independent". A study conducted by Perry (1999) in
Patterson Report 2002 on public companies in the U.S showed that boards now consist
of mainly independent directors with an average of two insiders and nearly all boards
are diversified with an increasing percentage of women and minority directors. On the
other hand, Klein (1998) found that there was a positive cross sectional association
between the percentage of insiders on boards of finance and investment committees and
firm performance metrics. The market explicitly acknowledges these phenomena by
rewarding firms whose boards significantly increase the percentage of insiders on either
committee. It is found that firms announcing a 15% increase in the inside director
representation on their board of finance committees would earn a 3-day abnormal stock
of 1.28 %. Therefore, this has a positive, short-term effect on the stock price.
There are two other U.K studies which did not find any relationship between the
proportion of non-executive directors and corporate performance. According to Weir
and Liang (2001), there could be a number of reasons why the expected positive
relationship between non-executive directors and performance is not supported by
empirical evidence. One of the reasons is that non-executive directors are only
employed on a part-time basis and are therefore likely to have other work commitments.
In addition, non-executive directors may lack the expertise necessary for understanding
highly technical business issues. Lastly, it could be that they do not have sufficient
information when they are called upon to make key decisions. Similarly, Hart (1995)
finds there are three reasons why non-executives do not fulfill their fiduciary duties.
Firstly, they may not have a significant financial interest in the firm as they have little to
gain from improvements in the firm's performance. Secondly, non-executives are
generally executives in other organisations, as a result of which they may have limited
time to monitor the management and would merely rely upon information provided by
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that management. This creates problems as managers have an interest in withholding
information in order to make themselves appear more costly to replace. Lastiy, non-
executives may be appointed at the management's request, which means they may feel
obliged to be loyal to the management that has appointed them. Bruce & Buck (1997)
find that the executive and non-executive director may operate in a tacitly collusive
relationship.
A survey was conducted by KPMG 2001/02 on corporate governance in Europe where
questionnaires were sent to the chairman of FTSE 350 companies. The findings
indicated that one third of the boards in U.K companies consist of non-executive
directors. 1% of these companies consist of a majority of non-executive directors who
are considered by the board to be independent. This is in line with the Combined Code
which recommends that non-executive directors should comprise not less than one third
of the board and must be free from any business or relationship which could interfere in
the exercising of their independent judgment. In addition, their findings indicate that the
boards in the U.K meet more frequently compared to other European countries.
The Higgs Report (2003) recommended that at least half the company's board should
comprise of independent non-executive directors, which has raised some controversy.
There has been on going debate on the relevance of non-executive directors versus
executive directors. Some leading figures in the City of London consider that non
executive directors can do more harm than good and their role should be abolished (The
Economist, 13 June 2002) (In Solomon & Solomon, 2004).
In addition, there is evidence suggesting that non-executive directors have a negative
impact on corporate financial performance. A study conducted by Agrawal and
Knoeber (1996) found that the presence of outside directors on U.S boards represents
one of seven mechanisms used to control the agency problem. This finding is not
encouraging evidence for the Higgs report. However, the roles of executive and non
executive directors are important in terms of skills. Therefore, having a balance of
executive and non-executive directors would be more effective. Mace (1986) states that
CEO considers that the most effective boards are those who have a balance of insiders
and outsiders. Having too great of proportion of insiders or outsiders could swing the
balance in the wrong direction (Alkhafaji, 1989).
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ii) Board size
There have been studies conducted on board size and one such study is by Yermack
(1996). He used Tobin's Q as an estimate of market valuation and the result showed that
there is an inverse relationship between board size and firm value. Companies with
small boards are found to exhibit more favorable values of financial ratios and provide
stronger CEO performance incentives through compensation and the threat of dismissal.
On the other hand, Dalton and Daily (2000) used the meta analysis technique, which
shows a different result in that larger boards are associated with better corporate
financial performance even when considering the nature of the firm and irrespective of
how financial performance is measured. The advantages of having larger boards
include:
• Leverage the advantages of board networks;
• Provide quality advice to the CEO otherwise unavailable from corporate staff;
• Address power relationships allowing the board to form coalitions that may
challenge CEOs;
• Promote diversity in terms of education, experience, attitudes and background;
• Bring exceptional local information to the board through high-ranking officers
on the board.
On the other hand, Zahra et al (2000) offer a different perspective on large size boards
when it was found that there would be an inverse relationship when the board size
increases beyond a certain point thereby rendering it dysfunctional (Zahra et al., 2000).
This is due to the problems that can occur such as communication breakdowns and the
decline in co-ordination amongst the directors that in turn can lead to slower decision
making. Also, large boards of directors tend to reduce agility and the capacity to react in
the face of complex reality (Pfeffer, 1992, O'Reilly, Caldwell & Barnett, 1989, Lipton
& Lorsh 1992, Yermack, 1996).
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iii) Duality Role and Performance
The role of the CEO is considered to be a full time position that involves the day-to-day
running of and the setting and implementation of corporate strategy. CEO is responsible
for the performance of the company. On the other hand, the position of chairman is
considered to be part time and the main responsibility is to ensure that the board
performs efficiently and effectively. This role requires the monitoring and evaluation of
the performance of the executive directors and CEO.
In the Cadbury Report, recommendations were made that the post of CEO and chairman
should be separated. Duality would create a stronger CEO power but there would be a
lack of monitoring of the board which in turn would have a negative impact on
corporate performance. Also, duality is a common feature in failed companies but is not
found in successful companies (Argenti, 1976, Slatter & Lovett 1999, Dalton & Daily,
1994).
On the other hand, there is evidence that shows that companies practicing duality would
perform better than those with separate leadership (Boyd, 1985; Donaldson & Davis,
1991) but Dalton et al., (1998) conclude that duality has no effect on company
performance. This indicates that in the U.S there is still no concrete evidence that shows
that duality has a negative or positive impact on performance. On the contrary, in the
U.K, there is a different perspective on duality where Dahya et al (1996) find that there
is a positive impact of separating these two roles. Their findings show that when an
announcement was made regarding splitting the role of chairman and CEO it had a
positive effect on share prices. In this aspect U.K corporate governance seems to be
more proactive than the U.S. However, there is still little empirical research to support
the view as to whether duality has a negative impact on performance.
The board of directors play a crucial role in monitoring and controlling a company to
ensure it is governed in a proper manner. Also, it is important for the board of directors
to possess the right composition of executive and non-executive directors, the
appropriate number of directors and not to have CEOs holding the position of chairman
to ensure that the effectiveness of the board is well maintained.
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3.6.3 Remuneration
Remuneration packages for executives are considered as one of the important aspects to
attract the best employee for a particular job. It is considered one of the ways to reduce
agency problems (Garen, 1994, Walsh and Steward, 1990, Hambrick and Snow, 1989)
whereby the interests of shareholder and management are aligned.
Formulating a remuneration policy should reflect the requirements to attract, retain and
motivate executives. Jensen and Meckling (1976), in their early work, found that
corporations provide compensation packages that attract and retain management talent
whilst balancing compensation with an expected increase in the shareholders wealth
which would result from management performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) have a
similar opinion when they found that compensation packages linking the welfare of
executives to shareholders' wealth, provides the motivation for executives to maximise
the firm's value. Also, financial rewards need to be seen in the context of the directors
other terms and conditions, the company's culture, its aims and objectives (Bruce &
Buck, 1997).
It is important to link rewards to performance. CIMA (2001) finds that remuneration
should be related to the performance of individuals, teams or to the organisation as a
whole. Bruce & Buck (1997) argued that the agency theory provides an appropriate
framework for understanding executive compensation and its relationship with the
firm's performance. The salaries of the most senior executives and other remuneration
packages arouse controversy especially if the increases are accompanied by weak
corporate performances.
Similarly, Ueng (2000) finds that the principal agent model of executive compensation
suggests that by tying pay to performance, shareholders ensure that corporate managers
attempt to maximise shareholders wealth. However, there are times when the interest of
the shareholder (principal) and the interest of managers (agents) are not congruent and
this creates agency costs for shareholders. Overall, like other governance mechanisms,
the impact of executive pay on a firm's performance is still unclear as there was a
mixed empirical result.
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In addition, examining the incentive structure of the CEO is one of the most exact ways
of determining the quality of governance in an organisation. From the perspective of the
market, placing valuations and institutional integrity are the methods used for
determining the level of a CEO's pay, considered to be critical for the future of the
corporation. If the market for executives is to be a good one, accurate information
about executive compensation must be made readily available. In addition, the market
for executives requires negotiation between independent parties (Monks, 2001).
The Combined Code (1998) recommended that in order to avoid a conflict of interests,
the board is required to set up a remuneration committee consisting of independent non
executive directors in order to make recommendations on the framework of executive
remuneration and to determine, on their behalf, the specific remuneration packages for
each of the executive directors. The board needs to form a remuneration committee,
which consists of mainly non-executive directors to control executive pay and
shareholders interests. This is because directors would face direct conflicts of interest
when setting their own remuneration. Also, there has been controversy regarding
director's pay in recent years and therefore, in the interest of the shareholders, this issue
must be dealt with satisfactorily if the integrity and reputation of the business is not to
be undermined (CIMA 2001). CIMA (2001) pointed out a number of best practice
points:
• Shareholders should be given voting rights on directors' remuneration;
• Full and transparent disclosure is essential for shareholders to make proper
assessment of rewards;
• Statements of policy on remuneration should be in the annual report and
accounts need to reflect principles of integrity, equity and affordability;
• Executive Directors' contracts need to be summarised in the annual report;
• Practice equity where the remuneration structure needs to reward efforts of staff
where a motivated rewarded workforce is a key component of company
performance.
• Bonuses awarded should be relevant, stretching and designed to enhance
business.
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However, questions have been raised about the effectiveness and independence of the
remuneration committee (Main & Johnston, 1992). Main & Johnston (1993) found that
there is a frequent practice whereby executive directors serve on the remuneration
committee in their own companies (Bruce & Buck, 1997). Normally the executive
remuneration packages comprise the following components (CIMA, 2001):
• Competitive basic flat salary;
• Annual performance incentive;
• Benefits in kind such as private health care, car etc;
• Golden Handshake;
• Share options.
Similarly, Bruce & Buck (1997) find that executive remuneration consists of three
elements: (i) Base pay; which comprises fee, salary and any bonuses; (ii) additional
benefits including perquisites, pension rights and compensation agreements and (iii)
share options offered to executive directors in their remuneration package. In addition,
long-term incentives are also considered to be part of the executive remuneration
package.
i) Salary, Fees and Bonuses
Currently, organisations are required by law to disclose the amount of salary, fees and
bonuses awarded to board members in the company. However, the amount of disclosure
made by companies is still very questionable. The amount of salary or fees paid to
boards of executives varies dependent on their duties and skills compared to the market
and job weight. Bonuses, which comprise an annual performance incentive paid to
executives, are calculated on the performance of the organisation against targets agreed
with the remuneration committee for the year. It is recognised that individual
performance is a material factor in the performance of the organisation as a whole and
needs to be rewarded effectively. Assumptions cannot be made that the employees will
continue to improve. Therefore, it is important to strike the right balance, having agreed
and robust measures in place and appraising performance against agreed evaluation and
criteria.
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Providing executives with compensation has the potential to realign management and
shareholder interests. However, it could lead to a dysfunctional attitude in a manager's
risk behaviour. This may occm when executive pay links the remuneration of
managers to the success of the firm and therefore exposes their managers to enormous
risk. These types of risk may include dismissal (Fredrickson et al., 1988, Hambrick and
Snow, 1989), decline in income (Fama, 1980) failure to secure subsequent employment
(Cannella et al, 1995), ostracism from elite peer groups and loss of reputation (Sutton
and Callahan, 1987).
In addition, recent studies suggest that when executive pay is not linked to performance
(Dobrzynski, 1992) there is a weak empirical relationship between changes in pay and
the firm's performance (Garen, 1994, Gomez Mejia, Tosi & Hinkin 1987, Jensen &
Murphy 1990, Murphy 1997). This can be seen in one of the earliest attempts made by
Lewellen (1968) and Lewellen and Huntsman (1970). Their findings indicate that
incorporating long-term remunerationinstruments has no effect on performance and pay
relationships. Alternatively, there are researchers who have found that the firm's size is
the major determinant of executive rewards and that profit is found to contribute
towards marginal improvement (Cosh, 1975, Meeks and Whittington, 1975). Also,
Gregg et al., (1993) detected a strong link between pay and growth but found that there
is no significant relationship between pay and performance. However, a contrasting
result was found in a longitudinal study conducted by Murphy (1985) on 461
individuals in seventy-two firms between 1964 to 1981; a more comprehensive pay
variable that included the value of stock option was used and the results indicated a
strong support for pay-performance and pay sales growth. The earlier research did not
use a very comprehensive measure of remuneration to explore the relationship between
total board remuneration and company performance. Also, Main et al., (1996) took this
approach and incorporated data on all Executive Stock Options (ESO) awards and
exercises for executives in the 59 of the FTSE 100 companies during the 1980s and
generated results that indicate a significantiy greater sensitivity of pay to performance.
This result holds not only for boards as a whole but also for the highest paid director
and chief executive. The result indicated that a 10% increase in shareholder wealth
results in an increase of 8.94% for the highest paid director and 7.2 % for a chief
executive (Bruce & Buck, 1997).
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Studies have also shown that boards of directors are less independent and this can result
in executive compensation linked to CEO over the board. A study conducted by
Sridharan (1996) investigates board composition as a measurement of CEO's influence
over the board. The result of this study suggests that a CEO's influence over the board
significantly affects the CEO's compensation. A CEO who has a strong influence over
the board of directors would get higher compensation compared with those who have
less influence.
Furthermore, there is also considerable evidence to show that the size of a firm has a
strong link with pay and performance. Ueng (2000) conducted a study to measure the
impact of a CEO s influence over matters of remuneration on the board of directors in
both large and small firms. The result indicated that the CEO's influence over the board
significantly affected CEO pay in large firms. However, this was not indicated for small
firms. Firm size is the primary factor in CEO pay within large firms. CEO pay for large
firms is a function of the CEO's influence over the board, firm size and firm
performance. Previous empirical studies also find a strong relationship between firm
size and executive pay. A Meta analysis conducted by Tosi, et al., (1996) finds that
firm size accounts for 54% of the variance in CEO pay. This is also consistent with the
findings of Baumol (1959) and Marris (1963), which showed that managers are
motivated to increase their corporate power, control, and perks based on the firm's size.
In addition, previous studies also find that the pay of a CEO is largely associated with
the firm's growth rate. Sridharan (1996) also finds that there is a positive relationship
between CEO pay and growth in sales.
Prior studies have also shown that interlocked companies have CEO's with higher
salaries compared to the non-interlocked firms (Hallock, 1997). This is seen in one
study on executive compensation conducted in the U.S on 10,000 directors from 700
major American corporations that found that 20% of the firms were interlocked where
at least one executive employee from 'firm A' sat on the board of 'firm B' and at least
one executive employee of 'firm B' served in 'firm A' (Ueng, 2000).
Drucker in Business Week (2002) addressed the issue that there is a growing gap
between the CEOs and the workers, which may serve to threaten the credibility of
leadership. He argued that no leader should earn 20 times more than the lowest paid
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employee; if the CEO takes too large a share of rewards it makes a mockery of the
contribution made by staff towards the success of the organisation.
In addition, criticisms have been made about the level of disclosure of the director's
remuneration. This can be seen in Conyon (2001) who provides a critical appraisal of
the March 2001 DTI disclosure proposal relating to boardroom pay in the U.K. He
argued that the new proposal on disclosure is still incomplete in terms of detail and
scope. He finds that, unlike the U.S, the economic impact of share option grants has not
been incorporated. He suggested that the U.S style of executive compensation
disclosure is desirable because their practices are more systematic and generally more
complete compared to the U.K.
ii) Executive Stock Option (ESO)
It is the general trend for today's organisations to offer the executive stock options in
order to create a greater sense of belonging towards the organisation. There are various
perspectives on stock options and its impact on the organisation. Ross (1973) and
Goven (1994) were the first to recognize executive compensation and its impact
towards the principal agency theory. Both have offered an appropriate and persuasive
framework for the study of executive compensation and its effect (Bruce & Buck,
1997). Also, this has reduced the principal agency conflict (agency cost) by aligning the
interest of the corporate principal and agent (Bruce & Buck, 1997).
One of the problems faced by ESO is that the disclosure rules in the U.K are less
stringent compared to other elements (Bruce & Buck, 1997). This presents difficulties
for interested parties, such as the shareholders, when viewing the practices of the
organisation. Executives who are granted share options have the right to buy shares at
some future date in the company at a price known as the "exercise price", as close to the
market price as possible at the time of the grant. The value of ESO would increase when
the market price increases above the exercise price. In the U.K, it is the practice only
after 3 years that the share option is eligible for exercise and it usually ends after 10
years (Bruce & Buck, 1997). In addition, share options that are approved by the Inland
Revenue are restricted to an option holding of four times the annual base remuneration
when options are valued in terms of exercise price (Bruce & Buck, 1997).
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In the 1990s, ESO gained popularity in the U.K. and it is now regarded as a standard
component reward in the executive remuneration packages. However, one of the
problems that it continues to face is over the disclosure level of the ESO schemes. This
is in line with Forker's (1992) argument, where he finds that there is a poor quality of
disclosed information on share option schemes, which could create opportunistic
behaviour among executives. The presence of audit committees or Non Executive
Directors (NED) has failed to realign the executive director's behaviour with its
shareholders. Later, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) made efforts to establish the code of best
practice in the operation of ESO schemes. This is an indication that there has been an
abuse of ESO schemes by the early adopters of such schemes (Bruce & Buck, 1997).
Another concern of ESO schemes is that it can provide executives with a vehicle for
opportunistic and self-serving behaviour (Forker, 1992; Bruce & Buck, 1997). Business
Week (2002) found that many boards spent too much time and energy on compensation
rather than assuring the integrity of the company's financial reporting systems. The
CEO of the Oracle Corporation exercised stock options just before the company issued
an earnings warning and this led to a record $706.1 million pay out in 2001. It was
revealed that the full board had met only 5 times and acted by written consent on three
occasions. The compensation committee however meets 24 times in formal sessions. It
is found that too many boards consist of current and former CEOs who have a vested
interest in maintaining and developing a system that is beneficial to them. Enron is an
apposite example of a system in crisis. Their executives were interested in stock option
wealth, opposed to outside advisers and had an uninvolved board. As a result, the
board's control was inadequate and failed to take account of the information that was
given to it (Solomon & Solomon, 2004).
In addition, Conyon et al., (1995) identified three key requirements that companies need
to practice: greater transparency of details of ESO award; enhanced independence of
remuneration committees and the establishment of an effective mechanism of regulatory
control.
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iii) Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIP)
In the mid 1990s, the long-term incentive plan became increasingly popular among
large U.K companies. There are various perspectives on the role of LTIPs and its
effectiveness. One of the important factors in the emergence of LTIPs was to align
managerial and shareholder interests and to develop a more robust pay performance
link.
Initially, ESO played a significant role in the reward system in the late 1980s and early
1990s to supplement the traditional base pay plus bonus reward system. However, one
of the setbacks of ESO was that it did not address governance concerns and offered
executives the prospect of significant rewards as a result of achieving "soft"
performance in a rising market (Bruce et al., 2001). Therefore, some of the self-serving
managers exploited the situation and obtained substantial gains and this captured the
attention of the media and other interested groups. This clearly indicates that in the late
1980s and early 1990s the government did not do very much to regulate and control the
ESO schemes (Bruce et al., 2001; Buck et al., 2003). Later, serious efforts were made
to increase the level of transparency with the existing self-regulation. The Cadbury
Committee (1992) started the effort and was later followed by the Greenbury and
Hampel Committees. One of the main criticisms made on ESO was that the share price
used as the determination of the award was considered to be a crude measure for
individual executive performance, especially when bull markets generated substantial
rewards irrespective of relative performance (Bruce et al., 2001; Buck et al., 2003).
Creating tighter controls on procedure and disclosure levels has limited the
opportunities available for abusing ESO schemes. As a result, firms started to explore
alternative forms of long-term incentiveplans which were neglected from the regulatory
perspective (Bruce et al., 1998). Large U.K companies started to undertake LTIPs
significantly from the mid 1990s. A study conducted by Bruce et al., in 1999 on UK
FTSE 350 companies using published documentation between September 1997 and
December 1998 and with a sample size of 309 companies found that 49.4% of these
companies had adopted at least one LTIP by end of 1998.
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There are two types of performance indicator used by companies practising LTIPs to
measure company performance: total shareholder returns (TSR) and earnings per share
(EPS). EPS is susceptible to a degree of manipulation in terms of the method of
calculation especially in situations where there are different classes of shares and rights
issues.
There are three bases of comparison used by LTIPs schemes. The first one used
achievement of a given real growth in the chosen performance yardstick; for example
earnings per share (EPS) must grow by RPI + n% where n is at the discretion of the
scheme designer. The second comparison relates to a firm's performance target to a
published market index or sector and the third comparison evaluates a firm's
performance against its peer group of companies. Another form of award offered in
majority schemes is in the form of conditional shares, cash and share combinations and,
very rarely, cash only.
Since the mid nineties, the practices of companies have remained uniform and most
employ in practice a three-year plan when offering LTIPs. However, the magnitude of
the LTIPs award varies considerably among companies. Most schemes offer potential
awards between 25% and 100% of salary. However, there are cases where the
maximum award exceeds 100% of the annual salary. It is important to note in terms of
comparing limits of award, that some firms employ discrete LTIPs, whereas others
operate an overlapping plan. Companies which operate an overlapping plan could be
eligible for a total of LTIPs related remuneration of 300% of annual salary by
simultaneously participating in a 3 year plan with a 100% limit each year (Bruce et al.,
2001).
In summary, it is important for organisations to possess a remuneration structure that is
able to align the interest of shareholder and management. A remuneration committee is
formed to control executive pay and shareholder interests by ensuring that there is no
conflict of interest in designing executive remuneration. Executive remuneration
consists of a base salary, annual bonuses and additional benefits such as ESO and
LTIPs, which has raised great concern about the excessive amount of salary and
benefits given to them. Therefore, it is important for organisations to link compensation
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received with company performance in order to ensure that the interest of the
shareholders and management are aligned.
It is essential for companies to be transparent and accountable in their practices so as to
be viewed as a well-governed organisation. The three main internal control
mechanisms namely board of directors, shareholders and remuneration structure are
required to play a crucial role in reducing the abuse of executive powers by monitoring
and controlling the organisation effectively.
3.7 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter examined the definition of corporate governance, different corporate
control theories: principal agent theory, myopic market model, stakeholder model and
abuse of power paradigm. Also the importance and benefits of practising corporate
governance was discussed. In addition the emergence of corporate governance in the
U.K and elsewhere was outlined. A comparison of U.K corporate governance practices
with other European countries and the U.S was reviewed. This chapter focused on the
internal control mechanisms of corporate governance that cover three main areas:
ownership structure, board of directors and remuneration strucmre. These three internal
control mechanisms form the focus of this study by establishing the link with corporate
entrepreneurship. In light of the evidence presented in this and the preceding chapter,
the next chapter develops propositions related to the impact of corporate governance on
entrepreneurial activities in the organisation. Chapter 4 establishes the link between
corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance with the proposition development
of the study.
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The previous two chapters provided a comprehensive discussion of prior studies on
corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance respectively. In Chapter 2, the
definition and importance of corporate entrepreneurship and the internal factors
involved in creating an entrepreneurial organisation were discussed. Chapter 3 on the
other hand, focused on the role and requirements of corporate governance, in particular
its relationship with the company's management, board of directors and shareholders
This chapter draws together the literature from chapters 2 and 3 and analyses the
relationship between corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance. The
structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 discusses whether there is a link
between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship. This is then followed in
Section 4.3 which discusses the relationship between corporate governance and
entrepreneurial activities in an organisation. This section is divided into three sub
sections that analyse the relationship that exists between corporate governance internal
control mechanisms namely (1) ownership structure, (2) board of directors and (3)
remuneration structure and corporate entrepreneurship and is followed by proposition
development. Finally Section 4.4 comprises a summary overview and conclusion.
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4.2CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
In recent years, the practice of corporate entrepreneurship has gained increasing
attention among managers and academics, as it possesses the ability to foster
innovation; a factor considered crucial for businesses in today's competitive
environment. Entrepreneurship within an existing organisation has become an
important element in organisations and in economic development. This phenomenon is
evident via the activities of large companies when seeking ways to reinvent and
revitalize the entrepreneurial roots they once had but which have now become eroded
due to size, bureaucracy, complex processes and hierarchical factors (Cooper and
Dunkelberg, 1986; Wright et al., 1992; Guth & Ginsberg, 1990; Zahra, 1995).
However, there is also the potentially negative side to corporate entrepreneurship
whereby a potentially destructive element resides within the energetic drive of
successful entrepreneurs (Morris & Kuratko, 2002). In most new ventures, the
individual or corporation puts a significant amount of financial resources at stake. The
money or resources that have been invested will, in all likelihood, be lost if the venture
fails. The financial risk is greater when non-retrievable assets are invested in an
innovative concept. In a corporate context, a highly visible failure can affect stock
value and bond ratings (Morris & Kuratko, 2002).
With the internationalization of business and in consideration of recent financial crises,
companies are expected to stay competitive (and possess entrepreneurial skills) whilst at
the same time practising good governance; the latter, it is argued, contributes towards
enhanced transparency and accountability. In the U.K, the Combined Code provides
guidance for good governance practice and companies listed on the London Stock
Exchange are required to comply within those rules. Prior studies (Baysinger & Butler,
1985; Weisbasch, 1988; Brickley et al., 1988; Rosentein & Whyatt, 1990; Coughlan &
Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al., 1988) in the area of corporate governance argue and
provide evidence that those companies with good governance practice tend to perform
better than those without good practice. However, there is a growing body of literature,
albeit providing limited evidence (e.g. Short et al., 1998; 2000; O' Sullivan, 2000;
Young, 1995; Tricker, 1984; Keasey & Wright, 1993) voicing concerns on the potential
negative impact of excessive controls via governance rules on entrepreneurial activities.
It is against this backdrop that this chapter investigates the issue of whether there is
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relationship between good corporate governance structures / practices and corporate
entrepreneurship.
Taylor (2001) argues that the governance rules excessively focus on control and ways to
curb executive decision-making and that this ultimately leads to a negative impact on
corporate performance. In addition, Taylor stresses that the focus ought to be on
corporate entrepreneurship rather than governance rules since entrepreneurship involves
the creation of the conditions necessary for corporate renewal by eliminating outdated
business approaches. Similar, concerns (but with slight variations) were raised by Short
et al., (1998, 2000), Young (1995), Tricker (1984), and Keasey and Wright (1993).
Short et al., (2000) point out that there is a need to ensure the twin goals of
accountability and enterprise are viewed as equally important. Young (1995) argues
that organisations are usually faced with trade-offs between accountability and
enterprise. He also states that excessive accountability is likely to stifle an
organisation's entrepreneurial activity. Some authors (e.g. Tricker, 1984 and Keasey
and Wright, 1993) argue that in order to strike a balance between accountability and
enterprise, the corporate governance system should have two broad dimensions
covering both aspects of an organisation. The first dimension needs to focus on
monitoring management performance and ensuring accountability of management to
shareholders. This means that there should be an emphasis on the stewardship and
accountability dimension of corporate governance. On the other hand, the second
dimension focuses on the need for governance structures and processes that encompass
a mechanism, which motivates managerial behaviour towards increasing the wealth of
the business via enhanced enterprise. Thus, good corporate governance is seen as
possessing a mix of devices, mechanisms and structures, which provide control and
accountability whilst promoting economic enterprise and corporate performance (Short
etal., 2000).
Financial scandals of the 1980's, such as Polly Peck and Maxwell and Mirror Group
paved the way for a series of explicit governance improvements from the very first
formal attempt in the Cadbury Code of 1992, followed by the Greenbury Report 1995,
Hampel Report 1998, Turnbull Report 1999, Higgs Report 2003, and the Smith Report
2003. Although all these attempts were made to help companies and institutional
investors improve corporate governance, various criticisms were made regarding the
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corporate governance code of best practice especially with regard to highlighting the
need to ensure that the twin goals of accountability and enterprise are achieved with
equal importance (Short et al., 2000).
Cadbury Report 1992
The UK CadburyReport (1992) took the stance that accountability to shareholders was
the primary concern of corporate governance and furthermore represented the first
attempt to formalize corporate governance best practice in a written document (Short et
al., 2000). This report places emphasis upon improved information, continued self-
regulation, more independent boards and strengthening the independence of auditors to
improve accountability. The report (para 1.5)argues that compliance to the code would
ensure that companies strike the right balance between meeting the expected standards
of corporate governance and retaining the essential "spirit of enterprise" acknowledged
as being a crucial element for corporate growth and success. The report was widely
criticized because it was deemed that the code was too prescriptive and focused too
much on the monitoring andcontrol aspects of governance at the expense of enterprise
(Spira, 2001; Short et al., 2000).
Also, Lawrence (1994) found that some aspects of the report represented "a
bureaucratic response that may not be effective but will be costly" (Short et al., 2000).
In addition, Young (1995) argued that the Cadbury Report resulted in boards
participating in an exercise of "following the form rather than the substance which is
often ticking boxes rather than doing anything meaningful". Given the various
comments outlined above, there is a suggestion that trade-offs existed between
accountability and enterprise, in that too much accountability suppresses enterprise
activity.
Greenbury Report 1995
The second governance reform, the Greenbury Report (1995) provided even more
stringent requirements than the Cadbury Code with respect to remuneration committees.
The use of a remuneration committee as recommended by the Cadbury report was
alleged to haye led to excessive directors remuneration payouts which were not
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commensurate with their performance (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). In response to
these concerns, the Greenbury report emphasised that the committee should consist
entirely of independent Non Executive Directors (NED) and prescribed the inclusion of
three independent NEDs on the board. The report also required comprehensive
disclosure of all components of the remuneration of individuals named directors and a
policy statement on setting directors remuneration. This enormous amount of
remuneration disclosure was argued to have created clear evidence that both the
Cadbury and the Greenbury codes have increased bureaucracy and the burden on
companies without providing any real benefits to shareholders (Short et al., 2000).
Hampel Report 1998
The Hampel Report was formulated in response to criticisms that were made of the
Cadbury and Greenbury Reports. The Hampel Report found that accountability by
public companies is essential; however the great emphasis placed on it has affected
business prosperity, considered as being the most important indicator of corporate
performance. This report explicitly stresses the need for a balance between business
prosperity and accountability. In particular, the report highlights that although good
governance requires rules and regulations, it is important that these rules are based on
broad principles so that it is flexible rather than prescriptive. Hence, the report led to
the formation of the Combined Code consisting of eighteen principles of corporate
governance divided into four distinctive categories: board of directors, directors'
remuneration, shareholders and accountability and audit (Short et al., 2000). Even
given the good intentions of the report, Spira (2001) and Bruce (1998) argue that
commentators viewed these changes as cosmetic and the tone of the report still seems to
suggest, although not empirically proven, that governance and accountability do not
improve entrepreneurial activity. Bruce (1998) continued to emphasise that
accountability systems can potentially impede enterprise.
Turnbull Report 1999
The Turnbull Report specifically addressed the issue of internal control being one
provision of the Combined Code. The Combined Code requires that directors review
and report on the effectiveness of their internal control systems. The Turnbull Report
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argued that the role of internal control is to manage risk appropriately rather than to
eliminate it (Short et al, 2000). The aim is to develop a practical and robust guidance
that companies can tailor to their own circumstances. This report took a further step by
moving away from the ticking box mentality when it made clear that it views internal
control and risk management as essential in ensuring that the company performs to the
best of its ability. However, the set back of this report was that the implementation of
its recommendation was expected to place additional responsibility on the Non
Executive Directors (NED) members of the audit committee particularly in respect of
non-financial risk such as that relating to technical, market and environmental aspects
of the business (Short et al., 2000) and as such was seen as likely to face the allegation
of increasing the burdens on business (Short et al., 2000).
The Higgs Report 2003
The collapse of large corporations such as Enron and WorldCom in the US spurred the
U.K and other countries into re-evaluating corporate governance issues such as the role
and effectiveness of non-executive directors. In these cases, the non-executive
directors were argued to be ineffective in the performance of their roles as monitors of
the company's executive directors. The Higgs report (2003) dealt specifically with this
issue when it recommended that (a) a larger proportion of non-executive directors sit on
the boards (at least half) and also (b) more appropriate remuneration for non-executive
directors.
Smith Report 2003
In consideration of the corporate scandals since 2000 and in accompaniment with the
Higgs Report, the Smith Report aimed to address the role of audit committees and their
relationship with external auditors. In the cases of Enron and WorldCom, the internal
and external auditors and the audit committees were ineffective in discharging their
duties in monitoring the company directors. The report highlights the need for better
improvement in this area, as it is the only means of keeping a check in producing
reliable and honest accounts (Solomon and Solomon, 2004).
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Revision of Combined Code July 2003
Both the Higgs and the Smith 2003 report led to a revision of the Combined Code and
the Financial Reporting Council approved it in July 2003. The code is argued to
possess more stringent rules and regulations since it is mandatory for the organisation to
adhere in four main areas: the board structure, remuneration, accountability and audit
and relations with their shareholders. The main revision made on the code was on the
total number of non-executives on the board which was raised to 50% of Non
Executives. This has also raised concern over whether such stringent practice would
further stifle entrepreneurial activities taking place in the organisation, as more time and
effort would be required to abide with this new regulation. In addition, there has been
an on going debate about whether having a higher number of non-executives would
further increase the performance level of the company. Also, there is evidence which
shows that higher NED participation could further hamper the entrepreneurial activities
in the organisation, and this will be discussed in greater depth in section 4.4.
The U.S Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002
The most recent financial scandals of Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing have
caused a significant impact not only on U.S public listed companies but also foreign
companies such as the U.K companies that are listed in NYSE. This led the U.S to
review their current legislation namely the 1991 U.S Federal Sentencing Guideline in
developing new laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. This act seeks to
strengthen the external auditor independence and to strengthen the company's audit
committee. It is a requirement for listed companies to have an audit committee
comprised of independent members and to disclose whether it has at least one audit
committee financial expert on its audit committee (Mallin, 2004). In addition, it
mandates significant changes for insider trading policies, Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) reporting and financial document control, retention and destruction.
One of the initial mostpublicised aspects of the Sarbanes Oxley Act is the requirement
for CEOs and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) to certify the quarterly and annual
reports filed on forms 10-Q, 10-K and 20-F whether it has been fully complied with
acceptable securities laws and presented a fair picture of the financial situation of the
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company. If a company failed in disclosing true information that does not comply with
the requirement there would be a fine up to $1 million or imprisonment of up to ten
years or both. Companies in the U.S and abroad have criticized this as being too
onerous and costly (Solomon, 2005). Companies have complained that the rule forces
them to freeze hiring and reduce research and development budgets. Solomon (2005)
argued that companies have expressed concern about the cost of U.S legislation,
including internal control rules and further caused some to de-list their shares from the
U.S market. This was mainly due to the internal control rule of the Act in Section 404
that requires companies in their annual report to assess whether adequate controls are in
place to prevent accounting mistakes or fraud and have their external auditor attest to
those controls. The Financial Executives International in a recent study estimated that
the cost for corporations that are required to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley rule
would be $3 million on average (Solomon, 2005). This Act requires large amounts of
resource and time to be spent on compliance which could affect enterprise activities that
organisations need to be focusing on to sustain their business in the competitive
business environment. This has also raised concern about whether such stringent
practice would further stifle entrepreneurial activities to take place in the organisation,
as more time and effort would be required to abide by these new regulations.
Using data from the US and Germany, O' Sullivan (2000) presented a critique of
agency theory by constructing a theoretical framework which explicitly focused on
entrepreneurial activity by incorporating the impact of innovation. It was argued that
reliance on the market for corporate control as a governance mechanism hinders
enterprise. In O'Sullivan's view, innovation, which is fundamental for entrepreneurial
activity is driven by three linked factors: financial commitment, organisational
integration and insider control and furthermore, that these three features are variable
and dynamic. For O'Sullivan, the organisational and financial requirements of
innovation vary across business activity as well as with the emergence of new
competitive challenges over time. Therefore, it is argued that expectation should not be
there, that governance institutions that are supported by innovation in one activity and
era would be an appropriate basis for the generation of higher quality, lower cost
products in another activity and era. Furthermore, it was considered that particular
types of organisational integration, financial commitment and insider control may once
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be instituted either to promote or constrain innovative business enterprise depending on
the business activity and the competitive environment (O' Sullivan, 2000, pp. 398).
To date, most studies on corporate entrepreneurship have focused on factor,
characteristics, challenges and building a model of corporate entrepreneurship whilst
studies on corporate governance tend to concentrate on ownership, board of directors,
remuneration and audit committees. However, only a few studies have attempted to
link together the two disciplines of entrepreneurship and corporate governance. This
study addresses this short-fall by extending the existing theory and examining this
unexplored relationship with an analysis of the role of the board of directors and the
ownership and remuneration systems that impact on the entrepreneurial activities of an
organisation. The remaining sections relate each of the three corporate governance
structures: board of directors' composition, ownership structure and remuneration
system with corporate entrepreneurship.
4.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
ENREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES IN AN ORGANISATION
In recent years, there has been a need for organisations to revitalize their established
ways of operating in order to be able to compete effectively in a dynamic and global
economy. To meet this need researchers have identified the relationship between
corporate growth and development (Burgelman, 1985; Burgelman & Sayles, 1986;
Pinchot, 1985) and the firm's ability to maximize profitability over time (Greiner, 1972;
Kamien & Schwartz, 1983). Hence, this has generated increased interest on the
potential possessed by corporate entrepreneurship to increase the organisation's
performance and enable successful renewal. Early studies conducted by Peterson and
Berger (1971) argued that entrepreneurial activities help companies to develop new
business that can create a revenue stream. Later, Burgelman (1983, 1991) found that
corporate entrepreneurship activities enhanced a company's success by promoting
product and process innovation. This in turn leads organisations to improve
organisational growth and profitability but is dependent upon the company's
competitive environment and its impact, which may increase over time (Brazeal, 1993;
Kanter, 1985; Zahra, 1991; 1993a; 1993b; Zahra & Covin, 1995).
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In addition, there is an extensive amount of empirical evidence showing that good
corporate entrepreneurship is able to improve company performance by increasing a
firm's proactiveness and willingness to take risks by pioneering the development of new
products, processes and services (Kuratko et al., 1990; Lumpkin & Des, 1996; Zahra et
al., 1998; Zahra & Pearce, 1994).
There are two main ways in which to increase the corporate entrepreneurship level;
through internal and external factors. The internal factors can be divided into three
levels: individual, organisation and job and have been discussed previously in Chapter
2, Section 2.5. The external factors that can influence corporate entrepreneurship in an
organisation include technology, economic, competitive, market, resources, customer,
regulatory, and global environment (Morris & Kuratko, 2002).
On the other hand, there is also evidence that shows that good corporate governance is
able to increase a firm's performance. The influences of external and internal corporate
governance mechanisms are found to affect the performance level of the organisation.
The internal control mechanisms such as the role of the board of directors, ownership
concentration and executive remuneration and compensation have been widely debated
particularly concerning their ability to influence corporate performance. There is
growing academic evidence to indicate that there is a significant statistical relationship
between bad corporate governance and poor corporate financial performance (Solomon
& Solomon, 2004). Research conducted by Core et al., (1999) indicated that U.S
companies with weaker corporate governance structures performed less well than
companies with stronger corporate governance structures. Similarly Lens, an American
investment institution, established a fund organised by Monks and Minow who
conducted an experiment in 2001 to link corporate governance and corporate
performance in its approach to institutional investment. The firm invested in companies
that had weak corporate governance structures, such as Sears and Eastman Kodak.
Shareholder activism was used extensively in these companies to force them to improve
their internal corporate governance and this resulted in a substantial increase in share
valuation (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). According to Solomon & Solomon (2004)
Lens had recently joined forces with a major institutional investor to set up a similar
fund in the European market and this also resulted in substantial excess returns.
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The above discussion shows that good corporate entrepreneurship and corporate
governance may be associated with an increase in the performance levels of an
organisation. Previous studies found that good corporate governance increases the level
of performance in the organisation (Baysinger & Butler, 1985, Weisbach, 1988,
Brickley et al., 1988, Rosentein & Whyatt, 1990, Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Warner et
al., 1988) and likewise, good corporate entrepreneurship is positively related to an
organisation's performance (Kuratko & Morris, 2002; Kuratko et al., 1999; Covin &
Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). However, because organisations are required to
comply with the Combined Code rules and regulations for better governance and
accountability, it is argued (but with little evidence) that such rules dampen the
entrepreneurial activities which, it is claimed, are crucial for the economy and the
growth of an organisation (Taylor, 2001; Short; 1998; 2000). Corporations practising
entrepreneurship require the organisation to be flexible, empower employees and
provide them with the freedom to perform their tasks without having the rigid, fixed
rules and regulations, the latter of which may be the result of better governance.
Leading on from the above discussion, the following main proposition of this study is
posited below.
Main Proposition (a): There is a relationship between corporate governance and
entrepreneurial activity in organisations.
Main Proposition (b): There is no relationship between corporate governance and
entrepreneurial activity in organisations
The following three subsections focus on the three main structures of corporate
governance internal control mechanisms namely, board of directors, shareholders and
remuneration and their impact on the entrepreneurial activities of an organisation.
4.3.1 The Relationship between the Board of Directors and Corporate
Entrepreneurship
Within the literature on corporate governance, it is acknowledged that for a company to
be successful it must be well governed and the proper functioning of an effective board
of directors should be central to good governance. The board is entrusted to protect and
promote the interest of shareholders and is the organisation's highest internal control
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unit (Jensen, 1993). Studies in the area of governance argue that the structure and
composition of the board determines the conduct of the director and this in turn affects
the firm's performance.
To encourage corporate entrepreneurship in an organisation requires that the board of
directors play an active role. There are various opinions about how the role of insider
and outsider board of directors, size and frequency of board and sub committee
meetings may all affect the building of an entrepreneurial organisation and,
furthermore, how they may all come into conflict with the recommendations made for
good governance.
i) Insider vs. Outsider Board ofDirectors
It is generally argued from the agency perspective that the presence of independent non
executive directors (NED) will help to reduce the potential conflict of interest between
shareholders and management, in that the NEDs act as an independent voice and
monitoring device to the boardroom. Therefore, theoretically, as the number of NEDs
increases, then managerial actions can be more closely monitored.
Contrary toagency theory, there are alternative theories that argue that more NEDs may
adversely affect the long-term survival of the firm, which is central to the objective of
corporate entrepreneurship. In fact, prior studies do not provide a clear consensus as to
whether more NEDs enhance shareholders wealth andfinancial performance.
Likewise, within corporate entrepreneurship literature, there are different perspectives
on the role of the board in developing corporate entrepreneurship in an organisation.
Daily & Dalton (1992) found that it is important to have an active and independent
board to align the interest ofmanagers and shareholders and this can be achieved by
increasing the representation of outside directors. Introducing a higher ratio of outside
directors on to the board can expand the base of expertise from which the CEO can
benefit, strengthen the system, create corporate checks and balances and increase
directors' independence. Zahra & Pearce (1989) also found that it is possible to
improve the board's ability to effectively perform its control function and, at the same
time, encourage executives to pursue corporate entrepreneurship. This is because the
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non-executive directors are deemed to have a lower conflict of interest since their
careers are not dependent on the CEO (Monks & Minow, 1995). In addition, Parkinson
(1993) argued that outside directors have the ability to objectively assess the managers'
performance, as they themselves are not closely involved in the operations of the
organisation. Non-executives are seen to make a more impartial critique towards the
management of an organisation (Blair, 1995). Also, they are able to prevent managerial
abuse and protect shareholders interests. The NED also helps to provide constraint over
investment in unproductive R&D projects (Jensen, 1993).
On the contrary, other researchers (e.g. Baysinger et al., 1991; Hill & Snell, 1988) have
argued that insider dominance on the board is positively associated with R&D spending
which maybe indicative of corporate innovation. This is consistent with Porter's (1992)
perception that outsider dominance on the board with no other links with the company
will exert limited influence on corporate goals. This is because outside directors have
limited time and/or ability to absorb the vast amounts of information required to
understand the company's internal operation. Similarly, Kosnik (1987) recognized that
outside directors with limited stock ownership in the company maybe likely to take a
back seat and enjoy the benefits but have little incentive to monitor the chief executive
and promote entrepreneurial activities.
In addition, Baysinger & Butler (1985) argued that boards dominated by outside
directors may harm shareholder interests by placing too much emphasis on their
monitoring role at the expense of their decision-making and advisory roles. Similarly,
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) discovered that outside directors may potentially have
a negative impact on corporate entrepreneurship by focusing on short-term
performance. It was found that outside directors tend to rely on a financial evaluation
of the business and do not generally have access to the detailed, specific information
which is necessary in order to evaluate the longer-term strategic performance of the
firm. In addition, Hoskinsson et al., (1995) argued that outside directors tended to
favour expansion into new markets via external means such as acquisition as these
means are better suited to an evaluation using financial criteria (Short et al., 2000).
Zahra (1996) also found a negative relationship between the ratio of outsiders on the
board and the number of measures of entrepreneurial performance used such as
innovation, venturing and renewal factor.
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Also, insider directors who actively participate in strategic processes can more reliably
assess the merits of entrepreneurial projects than those outsiders who are not closely
involved in a strategy formulation that relies heavily on financial controls, which in turn
serve to lower the level of corporateentrepreneurship (Short et al., 2000). Zahra (1991)
noted that inside directors are responsible for creating the administrative structures and
organisational culture that is important for corporate entrepreneurship to take place in
the organisation. Furthermore, insiders are believed to be more capable than outsiders
in achieving multifunctional coordination and promoting intensive interdepartmental
communication (Hill & Snell, 1988; Zahra 1996). Similarly, Hill and Snell (1988) and
Baysinger et al., (1991) found a positive relationship between the ratio of insider
directors and R&D intensity at the individual firm level.
The above discussion outlines the various perspectives on corporate entrepreneurship
and corporate governance and draws together some of the general conflicting
arguments, in particular concerning the proportion of executive to non-executive
directors. Although it is theoretically argued within corporate governance literature that
increasing the number of non-executive directors will lead to a more independent and
effective board (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), it is also equallyargued
within the literature that this may dampen the entrepreneurial spirit of an organisation.
It is also argued that dominance of insiders on the board will encourage entrepreneurial
activities in the organisation because insiders are considered to have a better
understanding of the company in terms of administration, strategy formulation and the
importance of building a corporate culture in the organisation. It is important to bear in
mind here that, to date, there is no clear and proven evidence that more outsiders will
lead to better governance or dampen the entrepreneurial spirit of an organisation. To
date, Zahra (1998, 2000) is the only published study and finds a negative relationship
between these two variables. Zahra's study was conducted in the U.S, an environment
arguably different from the U.K. For example, a survey conducted by Stuart (1998)
discovered that 78% of company directors in the U.S S&P 500 are outsiders while in the
U.K FTSE 350 the proportion of outsiders on the board approximates 33.33% (KPMG,
2001). Given that the average proportion of NEDs in the U.S is much greater than in
the U.K, it is possible that the negative relationship found in Zahra's study might not
hold in the U.K.
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This thesis addresses and investigates theconflictingissue of whether a high proportion
of outsider directors have an impact on the entrepreneurial spirit of an organisation.
The following proposition is stated as:
Pla: There is a relationship between the ratio of outsiders on the board andthe level of
corporate entrepreneurship.
Plb: There is no relationship between the ratio of outsiders on the board and the level
ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
ii) Outside Director Ownership
Although the previous subsection argued that there maybe a relationship between
outside directors and corporate entrepreneurship, some authors argued that outside
directors can also play a crucial role in inculcating entrepreneurial activities if these
directors hold some percentage of shares in the organisation. This argument is
supported by Porter (1992) and Meyer (1998) who believe that one of the reasons why
outside directors are unable to monitor executives is because they do not have a sense of
belonging to the company due to no, or a lack of, share ownership in the company.
Increasing outside directors' stock ownership would enable them to be more actively
involved in monitoring management and ensuring an effective alignment between the
interests of executives and shareholders. Such a form of ownership would create a
greater sense of belonging towards the company. Given that outside directors will be
interested in increasing their own wealth via share ownership; this will encourage these
directors to be more attentive to the firm's strategic moves to ensure a strong
commitment towards creating value for shareholders (Johnson et al., 1993). Zahra
(1996), who conducted a U.S study, argued and found a relationship between outside
director ownership and corporate entrepreneurship. Zahra et al., (2000) believed that
the active involvement of outside directors would help to improve the knowledge
regardingthe company's strategy and corporate entrepreneurship activities.
Contrary to the above rationale, outside directors with shareholdings may no longer be
considered independent as they may be more interested in wealth accumulation rather
than acting in the interest of the shareholders and this may, in turn, be ineffective in
playing a monitoring role on the rest of the board. Increasing the outside directors'
ownership may make them become more focused on increasing the short-term
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performance of the organisation and obtaining higher dividends rather than focusing on
building an entrepreneurial organisation, which is considered to be a long-term effort.
Some researchers (Porter, 1992; Meyer, 1998; Zahra et al, 1996, 2000) have found that
providing outside board of directors with ownership may reduce the negative
relationship between the proportion of outside directors and corporate entrepreneurship;
it will builda greater sense of belonging towards the organisation, which willencourage
them to be more long-term focused in building a more entrepreneurial organisation. On
the other hand, providing outside directors with ownership may increase the negative
relationship between the proportion of outside directors and entrepreneurship as it
reduces their level of independence and this would induce them to be more short-term
focused; increasing their wealth rather than focusing on shareholder interests and
building the organisation to being more entrepreneurial.
Drawing on the arguments from the above discussion it is argued that outside directors
with ownership are expected to create an impact on entrepreneurial activities.
Proposition 2 is stated as follows:
P2a: There is a relationship between the presence of outside board of directors with
ownership and the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
P2b: There is no relationship between the presence of outside board of directors with
ownership and the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
iii) Board Size
Zahra et al., (2000) argued that apart from the board composition, the size of the board
also influences the organisation's entrepreneurial activities, in that the board size was
argued to affect the directors' abilities to process information on corporate
entrepreneurship. Smaller boards have the ability to increase directors' participation
and promote frequent communication with the company's senior executives. This sort
of environment encourages cohesion among directors in monitoring and evaluating
CEOs, and thus constraining potential managerial opportunism (Zahra et al., 2000;
Yermack, 1996). However, it was also argued that when a board was too small, it
lacked expertise and skill diversity, an important element for effective control and/or
evaluation over CEO's initiatives. Because smaller boards tended to have limited
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information processing capabilities, it was inclined to over emphasise financial controls
and encouraged the use of quantifiable quotas and short-term goals to help the board
monitor management actions (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990), and this in turn led
executives to overlook corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra et al., 2000).
As the board size grows, it would also be expected that the board's collective
experience and skills would also grow and thus encourage the board to become more
active in the entrepreneurship activities engaged by the organisation. Kanter (1986)
found that larger boards usually had directors with various functional backgrounds,
education and experiences, which would be conducive for entrepreneurial activities to
take place in an organisation. In addition, larger boards could also effectively connect
the company to its competitive environment and give the firm information about its
domestic and international market.
It was also argued that as the board size increased it would increase corporate
entrepreneurship until a threshold was reached. Beyond a certain point the increase in
the size of the board could become dysfunctional and would reduce corporate
entrepreneurial activities (Zahra et al., 2000). This would be due to problems that could
occur such as communication breakdown, which would lead to a decline in coordination
among directors, thus causing the decision-making process to slow down, all of which
would reduce the level of corporate entrepreneurship in the organisation. Also, a large
board of directors tends to reduce agility and capacity of reaction in the face of complex
business situations (Pfeffer, 1972; O'Reilly, Caldwell & Barnett, 1989; Lipton & Lorsh,
1992; Yermack, 1996). Jensen (1993) discovered that large size boards of directors
may not be able to operate effectively due to coordination and process problems that
outweigh the advantages of having a large number of people to draw on. Furthermore,
evidence from a number of countries generally found there was an inverse relationship
between a firm's performance and board size (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998;
Canyon & Peck, 1998).
Thus, some researchers found that having a larger board size might decrease the level
of corporate entrepreneurship in the organisation. On the other hand, some researchers
argue that reducing board size may increase or decrease the level of corporate
entrepreneurship. Drawing on these two conflicting positions, it is argued that there is a
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relationship between board size and corporate entrepreneurship activities. Therefore,
proposition 3 is stated as:
P3a: There is a relationship between board size and corporate entrepreneurship level
in the organisation.
P3b: There is no relationship between board size and corporate entrepreneurship level
in the organisation.
iv) Frequency ofboardand sub committee meetings
The Combined Code (2003) emphasised the need for boards and sub committees to
meet regularly in discharging their duties effectively. However, there are many
different perspectives on how regularly the board and its committees need to meet to
delegate their tasks more effectively.
Prior research has been conducted to link the frequency of board meetings with the
firm's performance. One view recognized that board meetings are beneficial to
shareholders. Lipton &Lorsh (1992) found that the most widely shared problem among
directors was the lack of time to carry out duties. Similarly, conducting frequent board
meetings was an important resource in improving the effectiveness of a board (Conger
et al., 1998), which may lead towards higher-level entrepreneurial activities in the
organisation. These researchers' opinion have provided clear implications that directors
of boards who meet more frequently are more likely to perform their duties in
accordance with shareholders' interests.
On the other hand, frequent board meetings are not necessarily useful because the
limited time the outside directors spend together could be used for a meaningful
exchange of ideas between themselves orwith management (Vafeas, 1999). This would
include entrepreneurial activities which are a crucial element in ensuring companies
would be more progressive compared to their competitors. Furthermore, meetings
usually absorb more routine tasks, which limit opportunities for outside directors to
exercise meaningful control over management (Vafeas, 1999). Jensen (1993) suggested
that boards are relatively inactive and are normally forced to maintain higher activity
levels in the presence of problems. Therefore, this would suggest that board and
committee meetings serve as a firefighting device rather than a proactive measure
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(Vafeas, 1999). Vafeas (1999) argued that the consequences of an increased number of
board meetings was still unclear due to limited research in this area and strongly
believed that increased board activity leads toward poor corporate performance. Hence,
this may provide negative implications for entrepreneurial activities, as less time would
be spent on more productive activities in the organisation.
In addition, the frequency of board meetings is related to corporate governance and
ownership characteristics, which is in line with contracting and agency theory (Vafeas,
1999). Therefore, a board that meets more frequently would be valued less by the
market, a finding that is driven by share price decline due to higher meeting
frequencies. Findings revealed companies that indicated abnormally high frequency of
meetings indicated improvements in operating performance. Companies that obtained
performance improvements are most significant for firms experiencing poor prior
performance and firms not engaged in corporate control transactions. This is in line with
Jensen's (1993) argument that boards of well functioning firms should be relatively
inactive and exhibit few conflicts.
Also, conducting frequent meetings generates additional cost, which includes
managerial time, travel expenses, administrative support and directors' meeting fees
(Evans et al., 2002) which may effect entrepreneurial activities in the organisation as
resources are being channeled towards less productive activities.
Drawing on the arguments from the above, it is argued that having more frequent
meetings would increase board activity which results in more time for directors to
confer, set strategy and monitor management which may help to increase
entrepreneurial activities in the organisation. On the other hand, frequent meetings
increase costs and are therefore, less valued by the market and may lead to a decline in
the share price. Furthermore, frequent meetings mean that less time is spent on more
productive activities and this may impede entrepreneurial activities. So far there is no
published study that finds a negative relationship between these two variables. This
thesis addresses and investigates these conflicting issues as to whether conducting too
frequent board and sub committee meetings will have an impact in building an
entrepreneurial organisation. The following two propositions are stated as follows:
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P4a: There is a relationship between the frequency of board meetings and
entrepreneurial activities.
P4b: There is no relationship between the frequency of board meetings and
entrepreneurial activities.
P5a: There is a relationship between the frequency of board committee meetings and
entrepreneurial activities.
P5b: There is no relationship between the frequency of board committee meetings and
entrepreneurial activities.
4.3.2 The Relationship between Corporate Ownership and Corporate
Entrepreneurship
Central to the agency theory and the issue of corporate governance in large
organisations is the perception of a separation of ownership and control where
shareholdings in large organisations tend to be so diffuse and small to the extent that
shareholders possess neither the incentives nor ability to effectively monitor managerial
behaviour. Bearle and Means (1932) argued that because of the diffused ownership
structure, shareholders were unable to exercise control over managers, providing them
with the opportunity to pursue their own interests at the expense of the shareholders. In
recent times, however the once characterised ownership structure as dispersed has
become more concentrated via the emergence of a relatively small number of
institutional investors.
Agency theory suggests that corporate ownership and governance systems can affect
managers' willingness to take risks (Jones & Butler, 1992). The type of ownership
determines a company's relationship with shareholders and its investment horizons.
Having major shareholders is one way to monitor executive decision and ensure
attention is given towards corporate entrepreneurship. Agency theory suggests that
there are two major aspects that can influence managers to pursue corporate
entrepreneurship: ownership by firms' executives and ownership by powerful and
vigilant shareholders (Jones & Butler, 1992).
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/) Executive Ownership
In today's competitive business it is important for a company to inculcate a sense of
belonging in order to create a long-term commitment towards the organisation. Bryant
(1997) made a criticism that senior executives have over emphasized short-term
performance and there was a lack of support towards long-term value creating activities
such as corporate entrepreneurship. One of the reasons was due to a lack of ownership
being practised in the companies they managed (Wright et al., 1996). This would
encourage executives to behave opportunistically by supporting projects that would
increase their own wealth and further ensure their job security. Also, as executive
compensation was usually based on short-term financial performance, executives may
have had little incentive to promote corporate entrepreneurship when they had low
ownership stakes in the organisation (Malatesta & Walling, 1988).
In addition, Fama and Jensen (1983) noted that a lack of ownership would discourage
executives from supporting corporate entrepreneurship, as they would have to put their
salaried position in jeopardy. Also, executives would have to increase their personal
cost, as they would have to masternew skills and manage new uncertainties, whichmay
raise executives' anxieties about corporate entrepreneurship. There was a possibility
that executives might lose their job when their firm performed badly. Poorly
performing firms increased the power of the market for corporate control, which would
raise executives' employment risk (Zahra, 2000). In avoiding risk, executives may have
focused on maintaining an acceptable level of short-term performance. By having short-
term perspectives, executives would withhold investment towards new entrepreneurial
activities and overlook new business opportunities, which would enhance the
performance of the organisation on a long-term basis. Therefore, the provision of
executive ownership may encourage them to be more long-term focused which would
help to build corporate entrepreneurship activities in the organisation (Jones & Butler,
1992).
On the other hand, there are negative implications of providing large amounts of
ownership to executives when it would tie large parts of their job performance to the
performance of the company and this would create uncertainty in terms of their income
and encourage them to be risk averse. Also, Lewellen et al., (1987) argued that there
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existed the potential for differential propensities for exposure to risk, different time
horizons and different attitudes to work. They argued that the behaviour of executives
whose remuneration was predominantly independent of corporate performance (and
shareholder wealth) may be characterised by greater risk-aversion, shorter time horizons
in appraising decisions and diminished effort.
In addition, increasing ownership stakes in the company was believed to encourage
managers to be more short-term focused in terms of increasing an organisation's
performance rather than focusing on the long-term aspect, which is building an
entrepreneurial organisation. This was caused by tying a large amount of the executive
remuneration to the performance of an organisation, causing executives to become more
focused in improving the financial performance of the company rather than towards
corporate entrepreneurship, which would be a long-term effort. Furthermore, the annual
appraisal system, which emphasised performance, would provide greater pressure on
the executives to improve the bottom line of the company rather than focusing on
entrepreneurial activities where the result of these efforts could only be seen after
several years.
Drawing on the above, it is suggested that providing ownership to executives may
increase their sense of belonging towards the organisation and encourages them to be
more focused on the long-term in order to increase corporate entrepreneurship levels in
the organisation. However, this effect of ownership will be reduced if too high an
equity is provided to them. This is because executives will have a tendency to become
more risk averse and short-term focused in order to increase the profits of the
organisation rather than being focused on the long-term. Thus, what is expected there
maybe a relationship between entrepreneurial activities and providing too high an
executive ownership. This thesis addresses and investigates this conflicting issue as to
whether providing large amounts of executive ownership might have an impact in
building an entrepreneurial organisation. Therefore, the following proposition is stated
as:
P6a: There is a relationship between executive ownership and the level of corporate
entrepreneurship.




In ensuring effective corporate governance, apart from the board of directors,
shareholders - especially institutional investors - are also expected to play an important
role. Jensen & Meckling (1976) argued that the presence of major powerful
shareholders would encourage CEOs to pursue risky long-term ventures such as
corporate entrepreneurship. One group of powerful shareholders is the institutional
shareholders who are considered to exert a major influence on corporate governance
systems. Institutional investors include banks, pension funds, charitable organisations,
universities, insurance and investment companies (Blair, 1995). However, there are
conflicting opinions as to whether institutional owners would be able to influence
corporate entrepreneurship positively. Baysinger et al., (1991) suggested that
institutional owners would influence corporate entrepreneurship positively because they
are known to be well informed compared to other shareholders especially in places
where they hold stock and would not dispose of their holding with a significant loss.
Also, institutional shareholders would have a major incentive to monitor a CEO's
decisions and commitment towards corporate entrepreneurship.
Furthermore, greater emphasis has been placed by Taylor (2000) on institutional
holders. He forecasts that in the 21st century boards of directors will face more
challenging demands because of the increased activism of shareholders. Shareholders
will become increasingly more powerful as the equity culture grows. An increase in
activism by institutional owners may mean that they are able to encourage corporate
entrepreneurship to take place in an organisation. However, there has also been
conflicting debate between institutional shareholders and indicators of long-term value
creation (Bushee, 1998) where Graves (1998) in his findings indicated there was a
negative relationship between institutional investors and R&D spending. This indicates
that institutional holders pay more attention to short-term and bottom line profits rather
than to entrepreneurial activities which are a long-term effort. On the other hand,
Wright (1996) recognized that institutional shareholders had a positive effect on
corporate risk-taking for firms with growth opportunities, which was essential for
entrepreneurship.
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Institutional block holders were seen to play a significant role in increasing the
corporate entrepreneurship level in the organisation where they would take great
interest in increasing the performance of the company, as they own a large amount of
shares in the company, which would allow them to exercise their influence on the
company. Some researchers believe that large stock holdings empower, if not compel,
them to promote long-term value creation activities (Lowenstein, 1988, Hansen & Hill,
1991, Roe, 1994, Smith, 1996). On the other hand, institutional block holders are also
seen to have a negative impact in terms of too much self-interest involvement, which
may not be in the interests of other shareholders or to the long-term benefit of the
organisation. Thus, this thesis addresses and investigates this conflicting but interesting
issue of whether a high dominance of institutional block holders would have an impact
on corporate entrepreneurship. The following proposition is stated as:
P7a: There is a relationship between a predominance of institutional block holders and
the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
P7b: There is no relationship between a predominance of institutional block holders
and the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
4.3.3 The Relationship between the Remuneration Structure and Corporate
Entrepreneurship
The earlier two sub-sections discussed how ownership and boards of directors could
influence entrepreneurial activities to take place in an organisation. This section
analyses the role of the remuneration structure in inculcating corporate entrepreneurship
in organisations. Employees are considered to be the most important asset in an
organisation and they play a crucial role in ensuring the success of the organisation.
Therefore, it is important to create a remuneration strucmre that would constantly
motivate employees to continue to have a high commitment level towards the
organisation, which is considered to be one of the driving forces in creating an
entrepreneurial organisation.
There has been on going debate as to how executives are able to increase
entrepreneurial activities in an organisation. Some researchers have found that
executives were viewed as being more interested in improving the company's short-
term performance rather than maximising long-term value in the organisation (Jacob,
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1991; Zahra et al., 2000). This would engender executives having more opportunistic
behaviour by supporting projects that would increase their own wealth (Wright et al.,
1996) and discourage them from supporting corporate entrepreneurship activities, which
would be a long-term effort (Zahra et al., 2000). Short et al., (2000) suggested that
remuneration packages should be formulated in such a way that it would be possible to
enhance a director's incentives and attempt to reduce the reluctance of directors to
undertake risky activities.
As observed above, remuneration packages consist of three elements, the first element
comprises of base pay, which includes fee, salary and any bonuses. The second element
would be additional benefits which include perquisites, pension rights and
compensation agreements and the last element would be executive stock options and
LTIPs that are offered to executive directors in the company.
To encourage corporate entrepreneurship in an organisation requires the remuneration
structure to be formulated in a way that is able to motivate corporate entrepreneurship in
a company. There are various opinions on how Executive Stock Option (ESO) and
annual bonuses may affect the building of an entrepreneurial organistion and these may
be in conflict with recommendations of good governance.
i) Executive Stock Options (ESO)
Since the 1980s in the U.K, Executive Stock Option (ESO) has become a normal pay
component for organisations wishing to promote a greater sense of belonging towards
the organisation. This approach is considered to increase the organisation's
performance. Encouraging employees to be entrepreneurial by providing them with a
stake in the company may create a greater sense of commitment towards the
organisation. Jenkin & Seiler (1990) found that one of the ways to encourage
managerial support for corporate entrepreneurship was to increase managers' ownership
stakes in the company. They believed that increasing executive ownership would make
an executive's wealth more dependent upon their company's long-term performance.
Hence, this would give executives the incentive to pursue long-term projects. This was
in line with the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) where it was suggested that
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managerial support for corporate entrepreneurship would increase when the interests of
owner and managers were more closely aligned.
In addition, providing stock ownership may empower managers to initiate and
champion corporate entrepreneurship activities such as innovation and venturing
(Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Zahra et al., 2000). These initiatives may help to
increase the long-term value of the firm. Therefore, it was important to closely align
executives and shareholders wealth which would increase the pursuit of innovation and
domestic and international ventures.
On the other hand, Coughlan and Schmidt argued that there was a positive relationship
between the real rate of change in an executive salary plus bonus and stock price
performance. However, their result failed to identify the significant relationship
between sales growth and performance. A longitudinal study conducted by Murphy
(1985) on 461 individuals in 72 firms between 1964 to 1981 used a much more
comprehensive pay variable (including the value of stock options) and the results
indicated strong support for pay performance and sales growth. The earlier research has
not employed a very comprehensive measure of remuneration to explore the
relationship between total board remuneration and company performance. However,
Main et al., (1996) took this step where they incorporated data on all ESO awards and
exercises for executive in 59 of the largest U.K companies during the 1980s, which
generated results that indicated a significantly greater sensitivity of pay to performance.
This result held not only for boards as a whole but also for the highest paid director and
chief executive where the result indicated a 10% increase in shareholder wealth could
increase 8.94% for the highest paid director and 7.2% for chief executives (Bruce &
Buck, 1997).
Taylor (2001) believed that providing executives with incentives on share options
would tie senior managers' future pay directly to their success in raising the companies
share prices. Due to these incentives managers began to follow the investment bankers'
approach whereby they restructured their operations, divested or closed under-
performing businesses, introduced major cost-reduction programmes, closed older
factories and outsourced any activities which suppliers could carry out at a lower cost.
This approach allowed many companies to become successful.
131
On the other hand, Lambert et al., (1989) argued that there could be a negative impact
of ESO schemes on the level of corporate dividends. They used a sample of 221 large
U.S firms and a dividend expectation model and found a significant decline in dividend
levels following ESO scheme inception (Bruce & Buck, 1997).
In addition, Bruce & Buck (1997) raised concerns over the type of performance related
remuneration awarded to directors particularly ESO, which seemed to be regarded as a
standard component of the remuneration package where stock option was automatically
awarded. As a result of concern over the ESO, the Greenbury Report (1995)
recommended the introduction of the Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP), which involved
awarding shares subject to specific company targets. However, this scheme raised
concerns in terms of the lack of stringent performance targets adopted by companies
and the complexity of schemes adopted which caused difficulties for shareholders
attempting to assess the cost of such schemes. Furthermore, an incentive which was
contractual and bureaucratic tended to be unfriendly towards innovation efforts, which
was crucial for encouraging entrepreneurship in the organisation (Short et al., 2000).
Also, Short et al., (2000) found that firms that were improving the correlation between
performance and remuneration probably resulted in companies adopting remuneration
packages which did not provide incentives for directors to undertake risky actions,
which might have had a negative implication on encouraging entrepreneurial activities
in the organisation.
Similarly, Bruce and Buck (1997) discovered that the behaviour of executives whose
remuneration was predominantly independent of corporate performance and shareholder
wealth was possibly characterised in terms of facing greater risk aversion, shorter time
horizons in appraising decisions and diminished effort (Bruce & Buck, 1997).
In addition, Jacob (1991) recognized that careerism and short-term based reward
systems might discourage executives from pursing corporate entrepreneurship. This
was due to executives not being able to diversify their risk as investors can and some
entrepreneurial activities involve a high probability of failure which could affect the
company's short-term performance and lower executive compensation. Furthermore,
entrepreneurial failures could damage the executives' reputation and increase their risk
of unemployment, which may induce managerial risk aversion (Zahra, 1996).
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Based upon the above conflicting issues of ESO on corporate entrepreneurship
activities, there are some researchers who believe that ESO may create a greater sense
of belonging towards an organisation, which might increase corporate entrepreneurship
activities in the organisation. On the other hand, there are researchers who disagree that
ESO is able to increase corporate entrepreneurship whose remuneration was
predominantly independent of corporate performance and shareholder wealth was
possibly characterised in terms of facing greater risk aversion. This thesis investigates
this conflicting issue as to whether offering ESO would have a relationship with
corporate entrepreneurship. The following proposition is stated as:
P8a: There is a relationship between offering Executive Stock Options (ESO) and
corporate entrepreneurial activities.
P8b: There is no relationship between offering Executive Stock Options (ESO) and
corporate entrepreneurial activities.
ii) Annual Bonus
Annual bonuses are awarded to executives with the intention of motivating them to
perform better and to align their interests with those of shareholders. In the late 1970s
only 8% of companies were found to award annual bonuses to their top executives but
by the 1990s almost all companies had some form of annual bonus scheme for their
executives (Conyon et al., 1995).
Later the Combined Code (July, 2003) emphasised the need for remuneration
committees to consider whether their directors were eligible to receive annual bonuses
and whether bonuses should be based upon performance conditions that were relevant
and designed to enhance shareholder value. Various attempts have been made by
researchers to investigate the relationship between pay elements and performance.
Early attempts indicated there was no clear link between pay and performance. This
can be seen in one of the earliest attempt made by Lewellen (1968) and Lewellen and
Huntsman (1970). Their findings indicated that performance and pay relationship had
no effect when incorporated as a long-term remuneration instrument. Furthermore,
there are researchers who found that firm size, as the major determinant of executive
reward and profit, contributed towards marginal improvement (Cosh, 1975, Meeks and
Whittington, 1975).
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Later, McKnight's (1996) study subdivided total pay into salary and annual bonuses and
findings indicated there was a link between annual bonus awards and performance.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1996) showed that relative performance evaluation might have
implications for managers' competitive behaviour. This provides an indication that
through linking performance criteria with the award of an annual bonus it is possible to
motivate executives to venture into entrepreneurial activities.
On the other hand, researchers have expressed doubts about the relationship between
performance and pay, on whether executive pay awards were justified based on their
firm's performance (Conyon and Leech, 1994). They further stressed that boards were
generally failing in their attempt to design remuneration structure schemes which
properly aligned the interest of the executives with those of the shareholders (Gregg et
al., 1993). Annual bonuses are normally awarded on a yearly basis and are known to be
a short-term pay component that may affect inculcating corporate entrepreneurship in
the organisation which is a long-term effort. Furthermore, annual bonuses that are
based on financial results have been criticized for promoting an over emphasis on short-
term accounting returns and discouraging long-term investments (Kaplan and Norton
1992, Bushman et al., 1996) such as corporate entrepreneurship.
Based upon the above conflicting issues on the annual bonus, there are some researchers
who believe that annual bonuses are able to motivate executives to increase corporate
entrepreneurship activities in the organisation. On the other hand, there are researchers
who find that offering annual bonuses may encourage executives to be short-term
focused since they would be more interested in increasing the profit levels of the
organisation which provide a negative impact on corporate entrepreneurship and this is
a long-term effort. So far there is no published study that has investigated the
relationship between these two variables. Therefore, this thesis investigates this
conflicting issue as to whether offering annual bonuses would have an impact towards
corporate entrepreneurship. The following proposition is stated as:
P9a: There is a relationship between the use of performance criteria in awarding
annual bonuses to executives and entrepreneurial activities.
P9b: There is no relationship between the use of performance criteria in awarding
annual bonuses to executives and entrepreneurial activities.
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Table 4.3.3.1: The Relationship between Corporate Governance Internal Control
Mechanisms and Corporate Entrepreneurship Activities





Insider > Outsider Directors
Outside Director Ownership
Large Board Size
Frequency of Board Committee Meetings
Frequency of Sub Committee Meetings
Relationship & No Relationship
Relationship & No Relationship
Relationship & No Relationship
Relationship & No Relationship
Relationship & No Relationship
Shareholders
Large Amount of Executive Ownership
Dominance of Institutional Block holders
Relationship & No Relationship
Relationship & No Relationship
Remuneration Structure
Offering Executive Stock Options (ESO)
Use of Performance Criteria in Awarding
Annual Bonus
Relationship & No Relationship
Relationship & No Relationship
Table 4.3.3.1 above shows the overall relationship between internal corporate
governance mechanisms and corporate entrepreneurship. Five pairs of propositions are
tested on the board of directors, which consist of: insider vs. outsider directors, stock
ownership by outside director, large board size and frequency of board and sub
committee meetings. On the other hand, the ownership section consists of two pairs of
propositions, which test executive ownership and institutional block holders. The
remuneration section analyses two pairs of propositions, which consist of Executive
Stock Ownership (ESO) and Annual Bonus.
4.4 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, a conceptual framework for investigating the relationship between
internal corporate governance mechanisms and corporate entrepreneurship has been
established. As outlined in the preceding sections, a review of the literature on internal
corporate governance mechanisms: board of directors, ownership strucmre and
remuneration structure and its influence on enterprise activities in an organisation is
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covered. This chapter developed ten pairs of research propositions for the study. The
first pair of the proposition analyses the relationship between corporate
entrepreneurship and corporate governance. Five pairs of the propositions relate to the
board structure and composition, two pairs of propositions cover ownership strucmre
and the remaining two pairs cover remuneration structure. The following chapter
establishes the research methodology for testing these propositions.
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND
PRELIMINARY STUDY ANALYSIS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous three chapters discussed respectively the literature relating to corporate
entrepreneurship, corporate governance and the link between these two disciplines.
This chapter sets forth the methodology adopted in the conduct of this research. It
addresses those issues that have fundamental implications for the validity, as well as
reliability, of any potential findings. Rather than selecting between positivist and
interpretivist paradigms with regard to epistemology and methods, this research adopts
a pragmatic viewpoint which uses a mixed method approach that combines quantitative
and qualitative techniques for collecting and analysing data.
The research design comprised of three phases (based upon Creswell, 2003): Phase I
conducted an exploratory study to determine the level of understanding and viewpoints
on issues relating to corporate entrepreneurship. Phase II entailed quantitative data
collection through a questionnaire survey and secondary data. This phase was
important in terms of testing propositions and examining the statistical relationship
between corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance. Phase III involved
qualitative case studies conducted through in-depth interviews with six companies that
were selected using a scatter graph. These were conducted with a view to triangulating
the findings.
In this chapter, the design of the survey, secondary data and case studies is explained.
The strucmre of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the research philosophy
and epistemology adopted in this study. Section 5.3 examines the different approaches
of the research methods i.e. the quantitative and qualitative approach. Section 5.4
explains why the pragmatic mixed method has been adopted. Section 5.5 describes the
research design and strategy employed. Section 5.6 outlines the research instruments
used for the quantitative and qualitative methods. Section 5.7 discusses the
questionnaire development, interview design and development, and particular attention
is paid towards reliability and validity in the questionnaire designand questionnaire pre-
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testing and development. Section 5.8 describes the data collection process and unit of
analysis in respect of survey, secondary data and interviews. Finally, section 5.9
provides a summary overview of this chapter.
5.2 THE PHILOSOPHY AND EPISTEMOLOGY UNDERPINNING THE
RESEARCH
There has been ongoing debate in the social sciences regarding appropriate research
methodologies. In general, there are two main paradigms in research, known as
positivist and non-positivist approach (phenomenological). The debate about which
paradigm needs to be adopted revolves around the fact that each paradigm has its
strengths and limitations. King et al, (1994) have argued that neither side of the debate
is better than the other regardless of the research problem addressed. Newman and
Benz (1998) argued that at present, research practices lay somewhere on a continuum
between the two, where qualitative methods were frequently used at the beginning
points of research as foundational strategies and these were often then followed by
quantitative methodologies. The choice of which paradigm is appropriate for the
research is mainly determined by the nature of the research problem and shaped by the
researcher's assumptions (Hussey & Hussey, 1997).
The positivist paradigm is also known as traditional, experimental, empiricist and
quantitative. The origins of this paradigm date back to the nineteenth century during
the period of the French philosopher, August Comte. There are several other well-
known scholars of this paradigm including Durkheim, Weber and Marx (Creswell,
2003). This approach argues that the world is external and objective. The positivists
suggested there are certain laws that found both social and natural worlds in a sequence
of cause and effect, and believed in causality in the explanation of any phenomena.
Causality explains the relationship between cause and effect and integrates these
variables into a theory. In this paradigm, the observer is considered to be an
independent entity in social sciences. It is believed that the researcher can remain
distant from the research, in terms of their own values which might distort their
objectivity. Researchers that adhere to this paradigm operationalise the research
concepts to be measured and large samples are being taken. This research approach is
known as the quantitative approach and is based on a numerical measurement of a
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specific aspect of phenomena. The aim of this approach is to seek a general description
or to test causal hypotheses (Hollis, 1994).
Esterberg (2002) argued that the positivist approach believes that knowledge is created
by deductive logic; i.e. finding ways to operationalise and test theories. However, this
approach is criticised on the grounds that it would be impossible to separate researchers
from their social contexts and social sciences cannot be understood without examining
the perceptions of the researcher's own activities (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). Hughes
(1990) argued that a deductive argument cannot logically work if the expressions used
shift in their meaning according to circumstances and occasions. He found that the
hypothetical deductive model of explanation was not a useful method for the social
sciences to follow because arguably it is more concerned with discovery than with
explanation. In addition, it has been criticised on the grounds that the researcher should
remain separate from what is being researched. Hussey and Hussey (1997) argued that
it was impossible to separate the researcher from their social contexts and therefore
social context could not be understood without examining the perception of the
researcher's own activities.
In the 1950s, the positivism paradigm was discredited as a philosophy of science
(Howe, 1988; Philips, 1990; Reichardt & Rallis, 1994) due to the dissatisfaction with
the "axioms" of positivism especially in regards to ontology, epistemology and
axiology, which gave rise to post-positivism. The positivist believed that there was a
single reality (ontology), the relationship between the knower and known was
independent (epistemology) and also that the inquiry was value free (axiology). In
contrast the post-positivist believed that the researcher could construct the nature of
reality (ontology) and the value-ladenness of inquiry was influenced by the
investigators (axiology). In addition, the post positivist believed that the research was
also influenced by the theory or hypotheses or framework that the investigator used
(epistemology). These post positivist tenets are currently shared by both qualitative and
quantitative oriented researchers due to their common understanding of the "namre of
reality" and the conduct of social behavioural research in the second half of the
twentieth century (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p.8). The best-known scholars of post
positivism were Hanson (1958) and Popper (1959) who managed to gain widespread
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credibility among the social science community due to these previously stated tenets
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).
On the other hand, the non-positivist (phenomenological) paradigm considers the world
to be socially constructed and subjective. This paradigm encompasses the constructivist
approach, interpretative approach, postmodern perspective and it is commonly known
as the qualitative approach. The constructivist or interpretivist believed that to
understand the world of meaning one must be able to interpret it. The inquirer must
elucidate the process of meaning and clarify what and how meanings were embodied in
the language and actions of social actors (Love et al., 2002, p. 301). Guba and Lincoln
(1994) argued that post modernism suggested that the world was constituted by "our
shared language and we can only know the world through the particular forms of
discourse that our language(s) can create" (Love et al., 2002, p. 298). Based on these
different approaches that exist within the phenomenological paradigm, this paradigm in
general relies on personal views, experiences and subjectivity in understanding human
actions and behaviour. The observer is considered part of what is being observed and
science is driven by human interest when it deals with objects outside the human mind,
whereas social science deals with human action and behaviour. Researchers of this
paradigm use multiple methods to establish different views of the phenomena. Smaller
samples are taken to investigate in-depth or over time, and the research approach used is
known as qualitative. Even though this approach might utilize a small number of cases,
qualitative research studies generally generate a large amount of information. This is
due to its emphasis on the subjective aspect of human activity and focuses on the
meaning rather than the measurement of social phenomena. King et al., (1994) found
that it sought not only the meanings of action but also the reasons for the social action.
Generally, the phenomenologist seeks to discover or uncover propositions compared to
the positivist who seeks verification or proof of propositions.
However, the non-positivist paradigm has also received some criticism because of its
emphasis on the context bound nature of the research which does not allow for
generalisation and conclusion to take place. In addition, it is not able to provide a
reasonable estimation of the degree of uncertainty of the researcher's inferences (King
et al., 1994). This could impact on the reliability of the data and conclusion of the
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research. Table 5.2.1 summarizes the differences between the positivist and non-
positivist paradigms in conducting research.
Table 5.2.1: Positivism vs. Non-Positivism
ASSUMPTIONS POSITIVISM NON-POSITIVISM
The nature of reality
(Ontology)




Knower can stand outside
of what is to be known.
The knower and known are
interdependent.
Role that values play in
understanding the world
(Axiological)
Values can be suspended in
order to understand.




Generalisation can be made
at one time and place to
other times and places.
It is only possible to have a
tentative explanation for
one time and place.
Research contribution to
knowledge
Seeks verification or proofs
of proposition.
Seeks to discover or
uncover a proposition.
Research approach Quantitative (deductive) Qualitative (inductive)
Source: Compiled by author
Recently, there has been growing agreement among social and behavioural scientists
concerning the basic assumptions that underlie the philosophical orientation of
pragmatism. The pragmatist tries to counter the incompatibility of the paradigm war by
drawing liberally from both quantitative and qualitative assumptions. This approach is
not committed to any one system of philosophy and reality. Pragmatism derives from
the work of Pierce, James Mead and Dewey (Cherryholmes, 1992) and recent writers
include Creswell (1994), Greene and Caracelli (1997), Morgan (1998), Morse (1991),
Newman & Benz (1998), Patton (1990), Reichardt & Rallis (1994) and Tashakkori &
Teddlie (1998). The pragmatist considers truth to be "what works" rather than the
search for meta-physical truths. Creswell (1994) argued that in pragmatism a false
dichotomy exists between qualitative and quantitative approaches and researchers
should make efficient use of both paradigms (simultaneously if necessary) to
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understand social phenomena. This was, in essence, the basis of the approach referred
to as triangulation.
In addition, Brewer and Hunter (1989) also shared a similar opinion stating that:
However, the pragmatism of employing multiple research methods to study the same
general problem byposing differentspecific questions has some pragmatic implications
for social theory. Rather than being wed to a particular theoretical style... and its most
compatible method, one might instead combine methods that would encourage or even
require integration of different theoretical perspectives to interpret the data. (Brewer
and Hunter, 1989: 74)
Drawing from the above discussion on the two main philosophies, this study combines
the two paradigms taking into account their strengths and weaknesses, thereby taking
the pragmatic approach. It ceases to be independent whilst leaning more towards the
non-positivist paradigm. The aim of this research is to develop a theoretical framework,
which shows the relationship between corporate entrepreneurship and corporate
governance. In order to develop this relationship, a link must be created between these
two areas to analyse whether corporate governance inhibits entrepreneurial activities in
the organisation; this area has not been previously explored. By solely using the
positivist approach, it would not be feasible to obtain in-depth information in this new
area. Therefore, by combining the positivist and non-positivist paradigm it will be
possible to compensate for the drawbacks of either methodology. In addition, the
mixed method is considered to be more effective in terms of answering research
questions compared to quantitative and qualitative methods and therefore this approach
is considered to be the most appropriate method for this particular research.
In summary, this study adopts the pragmatic approach because of its possibility to
compensate for the drawbacks of the positivist and non-positivist paradigm.
Furthermore, this area of study is relatively new and insufficiently explored and the
pragmatic approach is considered to be the most appropriate way of drawing the
underlying issues together to answer the research questions of the study. By solely
being wed into one particular research paradigm, (positivist or non positivist) it would
not be able to provide the breadth and depth of information in this new area that is being
researched.
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5.3 QUALITATIVE VS. QUANTITATIVE METHOD
The above section discussed the different paradigms of research used by the social
scientists in their research work and provided a discussion on the pragmatic approach
which has been adopted this study. In this section an analysis will be made of the two
different research methodologies: the quantitative and qualitative approaches.
Quantitative Approach
Quantitative research emphasises measuring variables and testing hypotheses that
would be linked to general causal explanations (Bryman & Bell, 2003). This approach
tends to be more concerned with issues of design measurement and sampling because of
its deductive approach which requires detailed planning prior to data collection and
analysis. Also, the procedures used in quantitative methods are standard and replicable
(Neuman, 2000). The analysis of this method uses statistics, tables or charts and
discusses how they relate to the hypotheses (Neuman, 2000).
However, one of the drawbacks of the quantitative approach is that it "idolises numbers
and emphasises precision but it is not particularly useful in revealing the meanings that
people ascribe to particular events or activities, nor is it well suited to understanding
complicated organisational processes in context" (Neuman, 2000). Also, it is unable to
reveal the underlying details and depth in the area researched (Miles and Huberman,
1994). Often, the quantitative research approach has been criticized for failing to
incorporate a broad range of information, such as unstructured responses in the analysis.
Even when data is collected, it is often reduced to simple categories through
quantification.
Qualitative Approach
The qualitative approach places great importance on the issues of "richness, texture and
feeling of raw data because of its inductive approach which emphasises developing
insights and generalisations from the data collection" (Neuman, 2000). Neuman (2000)
argued that qualitative researchers tend to use transcendent perspectives, which applied
"logic in practice" and which follow a non-linear path. They emphasise conducting
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detailed examinations of cases that arise in the natural flow of social life and try to
present authentic interpretations that are sensitive to the specific social historical
context. Furthermore, their research procedures are particular and replication of the
research method is rare compared to the quantitative approach (Neuman, 2000; Bryman
& Bell, 2003).
There are three kinds of qualitative data, which can take the form of interviews,
observation and data (Patton, 2002). The first type of data is interviews, which employ
open-ended questions and probing methods to gather in-depth responses about people's
experiences, perceptions, opinions, feelings and knowledge. The second type of
qualitative data involves fieldwork descriptions of activities behaviour, action,
conversations, interaction, organisational, or any other aspects of observable human
experience. Lastly, the third type of qualitative data is in the form of data, consisting of
field notes that provide rich and detailed descriptions of the context within which
observations were made. These documents include written material from organisations,
program records, official publication and reports (Patton, 2002).
However, criticisms have also been made regarding qualitative research because it tends
to be stronger on long descriptive narratives rather than on statistical categorizing
events or activities and this has raised the problem of reliability (Kirk and Miller, 1986;
Silverman, 2000). Furthermore, tape recording and transcribing people's activities
reduces the reliability of the interpretation of transcripts due to the inability to record
trivial but often crucial pauses and overlaps (Silverman, 2000). In addition, qualitative
researchers are criticized for their selectivity in reporting the results and for not
providing alternative perspectives on how to increase the credibility of findings. Also,
it tends to express personal opinions instead of accurately reflecting the perspectives of
the informants. Silverman (2000) criticized qualitative research in terms of how sound
qualitative explanations were made which could create the problem of "anecdotalism".
This is revealed in how research reports sometimes tend to describe a particular
phenomenon withoutmaking any attempt to analyse the less clear or contradictory data.
These doubts on the reliability and validity of qualitative research have led many
quantitative researchers to underestimate its value. Table 5.3.1 below summarizes the
strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative approaches.
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In summary, the above discussion indicates that both methods possess strengths and
weaknesses for conducting research. In response to this recognition, a combination
approach has been selected for this study, which allows for the various strengths of each
approach to be capitalised to offset the weaknesses of both approaches (Bryman & Bell,
2003).




• Able to produce generalisations.
• Procedures used are standard and
capable of replication.
• Able to use statistics, tables and
charts in relating to hypotheses.
• Able to obtain rich raw data.
• Able to use a transcendent
perspective that applies logic
in practice and follow a
nonlinear path.
• Able to provide in-depth
details and underlying issues
of the researched area.
WEAKNESS • Unable to reveal meanings
ascribed to particular events or
activities.
• Unable to understand complicated
processes.
• Unable to reveal underlying detail
and depth.
• Unable to conduct
generalisation.
• Procedures not replicable.
• Raises the problem of
reliability and validity.
Source: Compiled by author
5.4 THE MIXED METHOD APPROACH
The previous section discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the quantitative and
qualitative methods. This section considers the mixed method approach, which is to be
utilised as the research methodology of the study.
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The mixed method combines both the quantitative and qualitative approaches in
conducting research, which is also known as the triangulation method. The
triangulation method allows the use of multiple measures and methods to overcome the
inherent weaknesses of a single measurement instrument. Eisenhardt (1989) described
triangulation as a series of methods that aid data capture and which can be used to
substantiate hypotheses and constructs. The history behind this method stems from the
evolution in psychology and in the multi-trait-multi-method matrix developed by
Campbell and Fiske (1959) in converging or triangulating different quantitative and
qualitative data sources (Jick, 1979), and this expanded the reasons and procedures for
mixing methods (Creswell, 2002).
On the other hand, Denzin (1978) distinguished triangulation in four ways:
• Data triangulation - data collected at different times or from different sources;
• Investigator triangulation - different researchers independently collect and
analyse data of the same phenomena and ultimately compare results;
• Method triangulation - multiple methods of data collection and analysis are
used;
• Inter disciplinary - research process formed by using other disciplines.
The mixed research method was considered to be very efficient in answering research
questions compared to the quantitative and qualitative approach when used in isolation
(Creswell, 2003). One of the strengths in conducting data analysis in mixed method
research is the series of steps taken to check the validity of both the quantitative data
and accuracy of the qualitative findings. Also, the results from one method can help
develop or inform the other method (Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989). Furthermore,
by using a mixed method approach at different stages of research, any bias that exists in
any single method can neutralise or remove the biases of other methods (Creswell,
2003). In addition, the mixed method design can be used to generalize findings to a
population and develop detailed views of the meaning of a phenomenon or concept for
individuals. Therefore, in this situation the advantages of collecting close-ended
quantitative data and the open-ended qualitative data by conducting interviews proved
to be advantageous to better understand the research problem (Creswell, 2002).
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According to Creswell (1994), there are three models for combining research designs: i)
two phase design, ii) dominant less dominant and iii) mixed methodology. In a two-
phase design the researcher proposes to conduct a qualitative phase of study and a
separate quantitative phase of study. The advantage of conducting this approach is that
it enables the researcher to present thoroughly the paradigm assumptions behind each
phase. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that the researcher might not
discern the connection between the two phases. On the other hand, the less dominant
design allows the researcher to present the study within a single dominant paradigm
with one small component of the overall study drawn from the alternative paradigm.
The advantage of this approach is that it presents a consistent paradigm picture in the
study and still gathers limited information to probe in detail one aspect of the study.
The disadvantage of this paradigm is that the qualitative purist would argue that this
approach was misusing the qualitative paradigm because the central assumptions of the
study would not be able to link or match with the qualitative data collection procedure.
The third model, mixed methodology design represents the highest degree of mixing
paradigms of the three designs. The researcher mixes aspects of the qualitative and
quantitative paradigm or many methodological steps in the design. The strength of this
approach is that it has the advantage of both qualitative and quantitative paradigms.
However, the down-side is that it requires a sufficient knowledge of using both
paradigms to provide the necessary link between them and this approach might not be
acceptable to some as it requires the researcher to convey a combination of paradigms
which may prove to be unfamiliar (Creswell, 1994, pp. 177-178).
Morse (1991) suggested that methodological triangulation can occur between
qualitative and quantitative approaches in two ways: simultaneous or sequential
triangulation. The sequential procedure seeks to elaborate the findings of one method
with another method for exploratory purposes and this is then followed by a quantitative
method. This might begin with a qualitative method for exploratory purposes which is
then followed by a quantitative method with a large sample in order for researchers to
generalize results to a population. Alternatively, it could begin with a quantitative
method followed by a qualitative method which involves detailed exploration with a
few individuals or cases. On the other hand, the simultaneous procedure converges
quantitative and qualitative data to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research
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problem. The researcher collects both forms of data at the same time and then
integrates the information in the interpretation of the overall results. Therefore, with
data collected in phases either the quantitative or qualitative method could come first
and this would very much depend on the intent of the researcher (Creswell, 2003).
This study has adopted the sequential strategy, according to Creswell (2003), as this
approach seems to be the most straightforward method when compared to the six major
mixed method approaches as outlined above. The sequential approach involves the
collection and analysis of quantitative data followed by the collection and analysis of
qualitative data. In this study priority was given to the qualitative data and the two
methods were integrated during the interpretation phase of the study (see diagram 5.5.1
below). The purpose of the sequential design is to use the qualitative results to assist in
explaining and interpreting the findings of the quantitative study in further detail
(Creswell, 2002, p. 215). This approach can prove useful when unexpected results arise
from a quantitative study (Morse, 1991).
5.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND STRATEGY
The earlier sections in this chapter discuss the research paradigm and mixed method
that are adopted in this study. This section discusses the research strategy using the
sequential approach, which involves three phases (Creswell, 2003). Phase one begins
with an exploratory study to determine the scope of the study. In the next phase, the
quantitative approach is used to measure and analyse the relationship between corporate
governance and corporate entrepreneurship using survey and secondary data. Lastly,
the third phase utilises the qualitative approach by interviewing individuals to obtain the
underlying details that the quantitative approach on its own is unable to do. Diagram
5.5.1 below shows all the three phases that are involved in conducting this research












Phase One - Exploratory Study
This research begins with an exploratory study conducted among a total of 39 selected
government agencies, organisations and academics on the concept of corporate
entrepreneurship. The main objective of this exploratory study was to obtain their
perception of corporate entrepreneurship and to determine the understanding and
familiarity level of this concept. This exploratory study compared the findings within
the existing literature on corporate entrepreneurship and analysed whether there existed
a gap in knowledge that needed to be addressed. In addition, this phase was used to
reshape the research questions and to crystallize the scope of study for the next phase.
Four questions were designed to obtain the perspective of the respondents on corporate
entrepreneurship. Prior to data collection an outside perspective was obtained from the
Regional Manager, Bank of England to evaluate and validate the questionnaires. The
questions were found to be appropriate in soliciting the understanding and familiarity
level of the respondents on the concept of corporate entrepreneurship. The exploratory
study obtained a high response rate of 72% (28 respondents). The result of the first
question is as follows: the convention is that abbreviations are explained at the
beginning of tables e.g. C = cited by authors and NC = not cited by authors
Question 1: Ifsomeone were to ask you to describe an entrepreneurial organisation
what are thefirst three (3) characteristics that would spring to mind?





Innovative & creative 12 15 C
Risk-taking 10 12.5 C
Embracing change, agile & ability
to cope with uncertainty. Accepts
new ideas.
10 12.5 c
Sense of direction, foresight &




energetic, self belief & willing to
make a difference
8 10 c
Opportunistic 7 9 c
Applauds failure, rule breaking,




Growth & profitable 3 4 NC
Places importance on customers &
is market driven
3 4 C
High level of skilled & creative
employees, good management &
invests in employees
3 4 NC






Flat strucmre 2 3 C
Externally focused - linked into
network & cutting edge
1 1 NC
Proactive 1 1 C
Surfing the edge of chaos 1 1 NC
Total 79 100% C - cited by
authors
NC - not cited by
authors
Table 5.5.2: Variables Cited by Previous Authors: Characteristics of an
Entrepreneurial Organisation
Variables cited in previous literature Author
Innovation & creative Miller 1983, Khandwalla 1977, Covin &
Slevin 1991, Kuratko et al 2001, Kanter
et al 2001
Risk taking Covin & Slevin 1991, Miller 1983
Sense of direction, foresight & vision highly
motivated & focus on success
Kuratko et al, 1993, Pinchot 1985,
Kuratko & Hodgetts 1998 & Kao 1989
Ready to seize opportunities Covin & Slevin 1991, Kuratko et al 2001
Proactive Kuratko et al 1993, Covin & Slevin 1991,
Miller 1983
Flat structure Kuratko et al 1993
Places importance on customers & market
driven
Kuratko et al 1993,2001
Dynamic, ambition, patience, energetic, self
belief & willing to make a difference
Pinchot 1985, Kuratko& Hodgetts 1998
& Bhide 2000
The finding for Question 1 was that innovation and creativity was most frequently cited
by respondents as the characteristics of an entrepreneurial organisation. This revealed
that respondents were aware that an entrepreneurial organisation is highly associated
with being innovative and creative. Also, it was discovered that out of the 16
characteristics (variables), 56% had previously been cited by researchers. This is an
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indication that respondents are seemingly familiar with the characteristics inherent
within an entrepreneurial organisation.
However, there were variables that were found to be unsuitable for consideration as
characteristics of an entrepreneurial organisation and which can, more appropriately, be
considered as factors that would encourage entrepreneurial behavior namely: applauds
failure, rule breaking, empowerment and a relaxed approach of management; high level
of skilled and creative employees; good management and investment in employees;
good working environment and unbureaucratic; communication and information
systems; externally focused, networking; cutting edge and surfing the edge of chaos.
Whereas, the variable on growth and profitability is considered to be one of the benefits
received from being entrepreneurial Table 5.5.1 and Table 5.5.2 provides details of each
of the variables and whether it has been previously cited by researchers.
The second question is as follows and the results are presented in Tables 5.5.3 and
5.5.4:
Question 2: What, in your opinion, are the three (3) main benefits obtainedfrom being
entrepreneurial?
Table 5.5.3: Benefits of an Entrepreneurial Organisation
Benefits Frequency (%) Cited by
researchers
Profit making & growth 12 16 C
First to market new product whilst still young
& obtain opportunities
10 14 C
Fast to respond & change (flexible) 10 14 NC
Commitment, motivated, fulfilled, dynamic &
progressive attimde among staff
8 11 NC
Ahead of competitors & long term survival 8 11 C
Create better work atmosphere & attract good
Employees
6 8 NC
Customer satisfaction & loyalty 4 5 NC
Strong business cultural drive 3 4 NC
Able to broaden its boundaries, generate new
wealth & jobs
3 4 C
New market pricing identified & market
Know-how
2 3 NC
Clearly defined goals & vision 2 3 NC




Challenges the status quo 1 NC
Innovation 1 C
Capital in waiting turned into new capital 1 NC
Increase the organisation's reputation 1 NC
Lack of bureaucracy 1 NN
Total number 74 100 C - cited by
authors
NC - not cited
by
authors
Table 5.5.4: Variables Cited by Previous Authors: Benefits of an Entrepreneurial
Organisation
Variables cited in previous literature Author
Profit making & growth Greiner 1972, Kamien & Schwartz
1983, Zahra 1991, Covin & Slevin 1991
First to market new product whilst still
young & obtain opportunities
Zahra 1993
Ahead of competitors & long term survival Covin & Slevin 1991, Rusell 1999,
Brinkinshaw 1993
Innovation Baden & Fuller 1995
Organisation able to broaden its boundaries
to create new wealth
Guth & Ginsberg 1990
In Question 2, the most frequently cited variable by respondents was found to be profit
making and growth. Also, it was identified that out of the 16 variables cited only 5
(31%) were selected. It is interesting to discover that there are other benefits for the
organisation of being entrepreneurial such as customer satisfaction, ability to broaden
its boundaries, generate new wealth and jobs, seeing the bigger picture throughout the
organisation, increasing the organisation's reputation and lack of bureaucracy.
The third question is as follows and the results are presented in Table 5.5.5 and 5.5.6.
Question 3: In your view, what are the three (3) factors that would most assist an
organisation to be entrepreneurial ?
Table 5.5.5: Factors that Assist the Organisation to Be Entrepreneurial
Factors Frequency (%) Cited by
researchers
Leadership 11 14 C
Culmre that fosters creativity 7 9 C
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Employees dynamic, ambitious & willing to
grab opportunities, openness, inquisitiveness
& a "can do" philosophy
7 9 C
Freedom to make decisions, empowerment,
how staff are managed & provided with
training
8 10 c
Development funding, R & D & resources 6 8 c
Communication 4 5 c
Break organisation into smaller parts/groups,
decentralisation
4 5 c
Clear & shared vision of what they are trying
to achieve & challenging objectives
4 5 c
Risk taking 3 4 c
Absence of formal procedures 3 4 c
Encouragement & rewards 3 4 c
Strong team 3 5 c
Support to interpret an idea 2 3 c
Innovative product/services 2 3 c
Partnership with customers & suppliers 2 3 NC
Highly organised & flexible working approach NC
Less government regulation NC
Evidence that it works NC





Competitor analysis & market research c
Sales & marketing experience c
Encourage staff to be shareholders c





Table 5.5.6: Variables Cited by Previous Authors: Factors Assisting an
Organisation To Be Entrepreneurial
Variables cited in previous
literature
Author
Leadership Quinn 1985, Kuratko & Hodgett 1998, Covin &
Slevin 1996, Hisrich & Peters 1986, Mac Millan,
Block & Narasimha 1986, Sykes & Block 1989,
Sathe 1989, Stevenson & Jarillo 1990,
Damanpour 1991, Kuratko et al 1993, Peace,
Kramer & Robbins 1977




& willing to grab opportunities,
openness, inquisitiveness & "can
do" philosophy
Bhide 2000, Khandwalla 1987, Miller & Frisen
1980, 1984, Covin & Slevin 1989
Freedom to make decisions,
empowerment, how staff are
managed & provide training
Bonoma 1986, MacMillan, Block & Narasimha
1986, Schuler 1986, Champbell et al 1970,
Hambrick & Crozier 1985, Kuratko, Hornsby &
Montagno 1990
Development funding, R & D &
resources
Covin & Slevin 1991, Von Hippel 1997, Souder
1981, Kanter 1985, Sathe 1985, Sykes 1986,
Hisrich & Peters 1986, Burgelman & Sayles
1986, Katz & Gratner 1988, Sykes & Block 1989,
Damanpour 1991, Stopford & Baden Fuller 1994,
Das & Teng 1997, Slevin & Covin 1997
Communication Graham 1995, Barrett & Weinstein 1998,
Kuratko et al 2001, Staford & Baden Fuller 1990
Break organisation into smaller
parts/groups, decentralization
Kuratko et al 2001, Kuratko & Hodgetts 1998,
Kuratko, Duane & Hornsby 2001, Nully 1993,
Weston 1992
Clear & shared vision of what
the organization is trying to
achieve & challenging objectives
Hornsby et al 1993, Kuratko & Hodgetts 1998,
Quinn 1985
Risk taking Bhide 2000, Hornsby et al 1993, Lumpkin & Des
1996, Pinchot 1985, Karagozogolu & Brown
1998, Miles & Arnold 1991, Dean 1993, Zahra
1991
Absence of formal procedures Kuratko, Hornsby & Montagno 1990
Encouragement & rewards Scanian 1981, Souder 1981, Kanter 1985, Fry
1987, Block &Orhati 1987
Strong team Kuratko & Hodgetts 1998, Kuratko, Duane &
Hornsby 2001
Support to interpret an idea Kuratko & Hodgetts 1998, Lumpkin & Dess 1996
Innovative product/services Olian & Rynes 1984, Robert & Fusfeld 1981,
Burgelman, Kosnik & Van de Pol 1998, Covin &
Miles 1999, Schollhammer 1992
Highly organised & flexible
working approach
Bonoma 1986, Mac Millan, Block & Narasimha
1986, Schuler 1986, Moris & Trotter 1990,
Pearson 1989, Waterman 1987
Tolerate failure De Chambeay & Shays 1984, Kuratko, Montagno
& Hornsby 1990, Kuratko & Hodgetts 1998,
Lawler 1984, Pinchot 1985, Schuler 1986, Sathe
1988
Competitor analysis & market
research
Slater & Nawer 1998, Pinchot 1985
Sales & marketing experience Barret & Weinstein 1998
Encourage staff to be
shareholders
Farr 1976, Ellig 1982, Block & Ornati 1987,
Schuler 1986
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The findings for Question 3 revealed that leadership had the highest score of 14% in
terms of the factors required to stimulate entrepreneurial activities in the firm. This
shows leadership plays a very crucial role in encouraging entrepreneurial activities to
take place in the organisation. Also, it is interesting to discover that out of the 24
variables, 79% (19 variables) have been cited by researchers. This shows that the
respondents are aware of what makes an organisation entrepreneurial. However, there
are two variables, which have not been cited previously that are found to be a
contributing factor in building an entrepreneurial organisation: better ability to manage
short-term rather than in long-term, and partnership with customers and suppliers.
The fourth question is as follows, and the results are shown in Tables 5.5.7 and 5.5.8.
Question 4: Similarly, what are the (3) most significant challenges/constraints to the
development ofan entrepreneurial culture?
Table 5.5.7: Constraints In Developing an Entrepreneurial Organisation
Challenges/ Constraint Frequency (%) Cited by
researches
Wrong set of employees, lack of motivational
staff, inability to train staff, wrong set of
employees, wrong attitude & complacency, lack
of creative talent & inward looking
13 20 C
Fixed operations & management style 9 14 C
Insufficient resources 7 10 c
Risk aversion 6 9 c
Organisational culture - blaming 6 9 c
Resistance to change 5 8 c
Lack of networking & external support 3 5 NC
No cohesive objective & vision 3 5 C
Bureaucracy & office politics 3 5 C
Conflict between control & innovation 2 3 C
Poor leadership 2 3 C
Lack of time & pressure to fire fight 2 3 C
Fixed pricing models 1 1 NC
Analysis paralysis 1 1 C
Task oriented 1 1 NC
Lack of creating awareness on entrepreneurship
by family
1 1 NC
Sales & marketing know how 1 1 NC
A balance between old & new activities 1 1 NC
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Table 5.5.8: Variables Cited by Previous Authors: Constraints in Developing an
Entrepreneurial Culture
Variables cited in previous literature Author
Fixed operations & management style Morris 1998
Insufficient resources Morris & Kuratko 2002
Risk aversion Morris 1998, Morris & Kuratko 2002
Organisational culture - blaming Morris 1998
Resistance to change Morris 1998, Morris & Kuratko 2002
Wrong set of employees, lack of
motivated staff, in-ability to train staff,
Wrong attitude & complacency, Lack of
creative talent & inward looking
Morris 1998, Morris & Kuratko 2002
No cohesive objective & vision Morris 1998
Conflict between control & innovation Morris 1998
Bureaucracy & office politics Morris & Kuratko 2002
Poor leadership Morris 1998
Lack of time & pressure to fire fight Morris & Kuratko 2002
Analysis paralysis Morris 1998, Morris & Kuratko 2002
Question 4 investigates the constraints involved in developing an entrepreneurial
organisation and indicates that having the wrong set of employees, lack of motivated
staff, inability to train staff, wrong attitude, complacency and being inward looking had
the highest response and has been most frequently cited by respondents (20%).
Employees are considered to be the most important asset in building an entrepreneurial
organisation. Having the wrong set of employees can greatly affect the performance of
the organisation. Also it is interesting to discover that out of the 18 variables,
researchers have cited 78% of these variables (14 variables). There are variables which
had not been cited before but were found to be a contributing factor: lack of networking
and external support, having a fixed pricing model, task oriented and sales and
marketing know how.
The findings from this preliminary study indicated that the government agencies,
academics and organisations substantially shared similar views on what constituted an
entrepreneurial organisation within the existing literature of corporate entrepreneurship.
More interestingly the survey finds that, as highlighted by some of the respondents,
some less cited characteristics, benefits, factors and constraints appeared to be equally
important in creating a successful entrepreneurial company. Based on these initial
findings the scope of smdy was refined by linking corporate entrepreneurship with
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corporate governance, which, it was identified, had not been sufficiently explored by
other researchers.
Phase Two - Quantitative Method
The second phase of this study used the quantitative approach to measure the
entrepreneurial and governance levels of the companies. Two indexes were developed
to measure the corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance levels of the FTSE
100 companies. The corporate entrepreneurship index was adapted from the previous
measurements developed by Morris (1996) and Kuratko et al. (1999) to measure the
level of entrepreneurial activities in the organisations. Also, references was made to the
research of Moerloose (2000) to include additional questions in the area of new product
and service innovation with the intention of ensuring that there would be a
comprehensive coverage in this aspect. After designing the questions for the Corporate
Entrepreneurship Index, opinions from experts in the industry were obtained to validate
the index, and this aspect is discussed in greater depth in Section 5.7. After seeking the
opinions of experts, these questions were further improvised before distributing to the
FTSE 100 companies.
Concurrently, companies that responded to the survey questionnaire were also measured
in terms of their governance level by using the Corporate Governance Index. This index
used secondary data from annual reports to gauge the governance level of the
companies. In developing the Corporate Governance Index, references were made to the
several governance reports: Combined Code July 2003, Cadbury Report and Hampel
Report. After formulating this index, opinions from the experts were obtained in the
area of governance to evaluate and validate the instrument, and this is discussed further
in Section 5.7. The data collected from both indexes was then analysed using the
quantitative approach and this is discussed in Chapter 6. The findings from this phase
were then utilised to categorize companies into four quadrants in order to select the
companies for which case studies would be conducted in the next phase.
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Phase Three - Qualitative Method
In this phase, the qualitative approach is used to ascertain consistent patterns in the
results identified earlier as well as to elaborate the quantitative findings. The selection
of six companies for the case studies is based upon the development of a scatter graph
that selects 4 companies situated at the extreme ends and 2 in the centre. The findings
of this stage were conducted to triangulate the quantitative findings and to obtain the
underlying details, where the quantitative approach was unable to do so. This phase
begins by conducting semi structured face-to-face interviews with 6 companies to
obtain further information on the underlying issues from the quantitative findings. This
is followed by an analysis and interpretation of the entire study. At the end of this
phase a conclusion will be drawn by drawing the quantitative and qualitative findings
together. Diagram 5.5.2 shows in detail the three phases involved in the design and








































































































































































































































































































































































































































The previous section discussed the research design and strategy undertaken in this study
and this section now looks in detail at the three different instruments used for data
generation and data collection: survey, secondary data and face-to-face interviews











The survey method provides breadth to the results compared to the qualitative study
which provides depth to the smdy. This method is considered to be the positivist
approach in conducting research in the social sciences. Conducting surveys provides
the researcher with information that is inherently statistical in nature (Groves, 1996). In
general, surveys are used for asking respondents about their beliefs, opinions,
characteristics and past and present behaviour (Neuman, 2000). One of the problems in
conducting surveys is that they are often carried out without sufficient design and
planning or on the basis of no design at all (Oppenheim, 2000). It is important for
researchers to realise that the design of a survey besides requiring a certain amount of
technical knowledge is a prolonged and arduous intellectual exercise in the course of
which researchers are continuously trying to clarify their minds and goals (Oppenheim,
2000, p. 7). Therefore, as the research takes shape, the researcher undergoes a number
of subtle changes as a consequence of greater clarity of thought and this may require a
new and better design of survey that, in turn, leads to a better specification for the
instruments of measurement.
In conducting this research, there were several approaches that were considered
including using questionnaire interviews by telephone but this was found to be
impractical because of the length of the survey and the number of options available for
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the respondent to answer. Also, the interviewer would not be able to observe the non
verbal responses of the respondents and the interviewee could also block the call
(Sekaran, 2000). Another approach considered was the mail survey which seemed to
offer many advantages to the market research, including wider distribution, less
distribution bias, better likelihood of generating a thoughtful reply, no interview bias
and cost savings (Cavusgil and Elvey-Kirk, 1998). However, the negative side of a
mailed questionnaire is that it usually tends to have a low response rate and it is not
possible to be certain that the data obtained is not biased because the non-respondents
may have had different views compared to those who have responded.
The current Internet and online communication has provided an additional means for
researchers to conduct their research. There are several advantages to using the Internet
for distributing questionnaires; such as it tends to be more economical in terms of time
and money compared to using telephone or mailed questionnaires (Dill, 2000; Bryman
& Bell, 2003). Also, it can potentially reach a larger number of people very easily and
the distance does not cause any problems as the research participant needs only to be
accessible by computer and it does not matter whether he or she is in the same building
as the researcher or across the world. Most importantly the data can be collected and
collated very quickly (Hewson et al., 2003; Dill, 2000; Bryman & Bell, 2003). On the
other hand, there are several disadvantages in using this approach as recipients might
view the questionnaire as just another nuisance or junk mail; the lack of 'personal
touch' owing to lack of rapport between interviewer and interviewee to pick up auditory
cues and it raises concerns among research participants about confidentiality of replies
due to the wide spread anxiety about fraud and hackers (Hewson et al., 2003; Dill,
2000; Bryman & Bell, 2003). Nevertheless, this approach has been found to possess
more advantages compared to the mailed and telephone questionnaires. Therefore, this
approach was adopted when conducting the survey and was found to be the most
convenient, economical and fastest way of distributing the questionnaires.
There are two approaches to conducting e-mail surveys and these can take the form of
an embedded or an attached questionnaire. The embedded questionnaire has the
questions in the body of the e-mail and there is an introduction to the questionnaire
followed by a marking that partitions the introduction from the questionnaire itself
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). On the other hand, an attached questionnaire has the
161
questionnaire as an attachment to the e-mail. This study adopted the attached
questionnaire option as this was deemed to look better, be easier to complete, clearer in
appearance and better organised compared to the embedded format that appeared to be











There has been a trend in these recent years towards using secondary data in the form of
written documents to conduct research in the field of social sciences. This study
employs this instrument as part of the data collection process. The are several forms of
document analysis which includes studying excerpts, quotations or entire passages from
organisations, clinics or program's records, memorandum and correspondence, official
publication and reports, personal diaries and open-ended written responses to
questionnaires and surveys (Patton, 2002). The advantages of adopting this method is
that researchers lacking in financial funding can make financial savings by eliminating
the time required for travelling to conduct data collection since an established database
from which to extract information already exists. However, the drawbacks of using
secondary data as the sole source of information occurs when the data might become
obsolete or is not able to meet the specific needs of a particular situation or setting
(Sekaran, 2000).
This study uses annual reports produced by the FTSE 100 companies, which represents
quality data that has been widely used amongst economists for many years for trend
analysis and which is now being used more extensively in other disciplines of social
sciences. In addition, it is a mandatory requirement for organisations to disclose their
governance practices in annual reports for perusal by shareholders and stakeholders.
Due to the reasons stated above, this approach has been selected as one of the most















The case study approach conducts an in-depth study of cases which has been considered
as part of the data collection process of this smdy. It is an empirical inquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context when the
boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident. Case study is
considered to be one of several ways of doing social science research other than
experiments, survey and analysis of archival information. In conducting case studies,
there are various methods that can be employed which include interviews, participant
observation and field studies (Hamel, 1992). Case studies are considered to be the
most preferred strategy when "how" and "why" questions are being posed, when the
investigator has little control over events and when the focus is on a contemporary
phenomenon with some real-life context (Yin, 1994). As a research endeavour, the case
study is able to contribute towards the knowledge of individual, organisational, social
and political phenomena. Also, it is a common research strategy in psychology,
sociology, political science, business, social work and planning (Yin, 1983; 1994).
The purpose of using case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social
phenomena. It allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful
characteristics of real-life events such as individual life cycle, organisational and
managerial processes, international relations and maturation of industries. However,
there has been a common misconception that research strategies should be arrayed
hierarchically where case studies were appropriate for the exploratory phase of an
investigation. On the other hand, survey and histories were appropriate for descriptive
phase and experiments were the only way of doing explanatory or causal inquires. This
hierarchical view reinforced the idea that case studies have an exploratory tool and
cannot be used to describe or test propositions (Piatt, 1992). On the contrary, the
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pluralistic had a different and more appropriate view where each strategy can be used
for all purposes: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. There may be exploratory
case studies, descriptive case studies or explanatory case studies (Yin, 1981). In
selecting this, there are three conditions that need to be considered: the type of research
question posed; the extent of control an investigator has over actual behaviour events
and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. The first
condition covers on the research questions that are being addressed. A basic
categorisation scheme for the type of questions is: who, what, where, how and why. If
the research questions focus mainly on "what" questions, then it is a justifiable rationale
for conducting an exploratory study. In identifying such outcomes a survey or archival
strategies would be more appropriate in identifying such outcomes. In contrast, the
"how" and "why" questions are more explanatory and appropriate to use case studies.
The second and third condition on the extent of control over behavioural events and the
degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events finds that a case study
is a preferred approach in examining contemporary events and where relevant
behaviours cannot be manipulated (Yin, 1994).
One of the weaknesses of using case studies is that it has been stereotyped as a weak
social science method. Investigators conducting research using this method are
regarded as having insufficient precision (quantification), objectivity and rigor (Yin,
1994). One of the problems could be due to people having confused case study
teaching with case study research. In every case study, it is crucial for the investigator
to work hard to report all evidences fairly and bias can also take place in conducting
experiments and in other uses of research strategies such as designing questionnaires for
survey. Also, another common concern about case studies is that they provide little
basis for scientific generalisation. In this sense, a case study is similar to an experiment
where it does not represent a sample and the investigator's goal is to expand and
generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to generalize statistically (Yin,
1994).
Case studies are considered to take too long and the result is massive and unreadable
documents. This may be due to how case studies were done in the past but not
necessarily the way case studies must be done in the future. There are alternative ways
of writing case studies where traditional, lengthy narrative can be avoided (Yin, 1994).
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This study has adopted the case study approach, where six companies were interviewed
to obtain the underlying issues by using the "why" and "how. Six cases were selected
for the case studies. As Burns (2000) pointed out, "multi-case studies are advantageous
in that the evidence can be compelling". This set of cases was selected through the
development of the scatter graph which provided a way of selecting 4 companies that
are situated at the extreme ends and 2 located closest to the centre point, which brought
in a total of 6 companies to be interviewed.
Face-to-Face Interviews
This case study approach uses face-to-face interviews as part of the data collection
process with a view to triangulating the quantitative findings. Interviews are considered
to be a widely used technique for conducting systematic social inquiry and have been
extensively used by researchers from various fields. Janesick (1998, p.30) defined
interviews, as "a meeting of two persons to exchange information and ideas through
questions, responses, resulting in communication and joint construction of meaning
about a particular topic". The widely accepted definition in most research method texts
defines an interview as a conversation between two individuals, the interviewer and
interviewee (Esterberg, 2002).
In general, there are three types of interviews: structured, semi-structured and
unstructured. Structured interviews are mostly used for survey research, telephone
interviews, market research and political polling. It employs a sequence of questions
and the pace of the interview tends to be pre-established. Bechhofer (1994) found that
structured interviews define situations in advance and do not allow the researcher to
follow up further on any interesting ideas (Burgess, 1982). The strength of structured
interviews is that it allows the researcher to gain a great deal of control over the
interview process. However, qualitative scholars find that this can be a drawback
because structured interviews grant too much control to the interviewee and issues that
might be considered important to the interviewer may be overlooked. Also, criticisms
have been made of structured interviews where interviewees tend to give responses that
they thought the interviewer would want to hear which is known as "social desirability
bias" (Esterberg, 2002).
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On the other hand, semi-structured interviews, also known as in-depth interviews, are
less rigid than structured interviews. This type of interview falls in-between these
extremes, which enables the participant to take any direction he or she wants and does
not presume the answer (Seidmen, 1998). Qualitative researchers prefer to choose
semi-structured or unstructured interviews to obtain greater insight into the lives of their
research participants. The objective of semi-structured interviews is to explore a
particular topic more openly by allowing interviewees to express their opinions and
ideas in their own words. Patton (1990) argued that it is not possible to observe
everything we wish to know therefore, by interviewing people it is possible to
understand what life is like from the perspective of another. The strength of semi-
structured questions tends to move the interviewer beyond his/her own experiences,
ideas and ability towards an understanding of the other person's point of view
(Esterberg, 2002). This approach is particularly useful for exploring a topic in detail or
in constructing a theory.
The least structured interviews are the unstructured interviews that are often conducted
in a field setting and the questions posed to the interviewees tend to be more
spontaneous and free flowing with topics arising from the situation or behaviour at hand
(Esterberg, 2002). The interviewer does not have a set of questions prepared in
advance; instead the questions arise more naturally. Compared to all types of
interviews the unstructured interviews tend to be the most "real life conversation"
(Esterberg, 2002). The strength of conducting unstructured interviews is that it provides
greater breadth when compared to other types of interview. However, one of the
drawbacks is that if it is not managed well enough the interviewer might not be able to
get out of the interviewee what he or she is looking for. Also, unstructured interviews
consume more time in comparison to the other two interview methods.
Drawing from the above discussion on the different types of interview methods, this
study adopts the semi-structured interview which is considered the most appropriate
method for exploring further the research questions raised. It is able to provide depth
and underlying information. The main theme of these semi-structured interviews is to
work along with the survey and secondary data approach in examining further the
propositions that have been developed. It is concerned with trying to understand how
people in the organisations think and feel about the topics of concern as identified in the
research.
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As mentioned earlier, while the questionnaire data was intended to elicit answers to
'what' questions, answers to 'why' and 'how' questions necessitated face-to-face
interviews. Therefore, the key questions are specified whilst at the same time
consideration is given to seeking clarification and elaboration on the answers. The
purpose of conducting the semi-structured interviews is to explore further the findings
obtained using the quantitative approach. This was especially so in view of the relative
novelty of the research topic.
5.7 QUESTION AND INTERVIEW DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
This section outlines the design and development of the three key research instruments:
the survey questionnaire and the list of questions for secondary data and interviews
respectively. Sub-section 5.7.1 describes the design and development of the survey
questionnaire. This is then followed by a description of the design of the questions for
secondary data in section 5.7.2. Lastly, sub-section 5.7.3 discusses the design of
qualitative interview questions.
5.7.1 Questionnaire Design and Development (Corporate Entrepreneurship Index)
This section reviews the design and development of the questionnaire for the Corporate
Entrepreneurship Index. The questions for the Corporate Entrepreneurship Index were
adapted from Morris (1996) and Kuratko et al., (1999). Both of these indexes were
utilised as each index possesses its own strengths and weakness. The Performance
Index (EPI) developed by Morris (1996) is used to measure the entrepreneurial level of
the organisation. The items in the EPI questionnaire captured the degree and frequency
of entrepreneurship as well as the underlying dimensions of innovativeness, risk taking
and proactiveness. Various studies in which these measures have been employed have
reported more than satisfactory statistics for their reliability and validity (Morris and
Sexton, 1996). EPI was considered to be a powerful assessment tool that captured the
degree and frequency of entrepreneurship in the organisation (Morris and Kuratko,
2002) and a 5-point Likert scale was used to measure the level of entrepreneurial
activities in the organisation. However, the drawback of this index is that it covered
only limited dimensions such as innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking.
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The development of an entrepreneurial organisation needed to be conducted in a holistic
manner that includes the individual, the organisational and the job level. Therefore,
additional factors and variables have been included in the Corporate Entrepreneurship
Index adapted from the Corporate Entrepreneurship Assessment Instrument (CEAI)
developed by Kuratko et al., (1999) and these include management support,
organisation boundaries, reward system, resources and the job. Also, reference was
made using the Moerloose (2000) research to include additional questions in the section
regarding new product and service innovations to ensure there would be a more
comprehensive coverage in this aspect.
The survey questionnaire comprises eight main sections: Company Orientation, New
Product/Service/Process Innovation, Management Support, Work Discretion, Risk
Taking, Rewards/Reinforcement, Resources & Time Availability and Organisational
Boundaries. The first section is divided into two components: Company Characteristics
and Decision-Making. Company Characteristics includes questions designed to
investigate the perception of employees on new products / services introduced by their
companies in comparison to their competitors, top management philosophy and risk
taking. The second component on decision-making investigates the perception of
employees in terms of top-level decision-making, the ability to search for opportunities,
rapid growth and ability to make bold decisions and compromise on the conflicting
demands of stakeholders.
Section two consists of three sub-areas: product, service and process innovation. The
first sub-section covers product innovation and investigates the percentage of new
product ranges, R&D, product improvements/revision and product development. The
service innovation covered in the second sub-section contains questions pertaining to
new service introduction, and improvement on the existing services to the market.
Lastly, the third sub-section on new process introduction focuses on the new methods
and operational processes used by companies compared to their major competitors.
The third section focuses on management support and investigates the perception of
employees on the support provided by management when developing new ideas,
providing discretion in decision-making and promoting staff for their new and
innovative ideas. Section four investigates work discretion in terms of the degree of
168
decision-making provided to employees in performing their work. The approach taken
by companies in providing feedback on work matters, opportunities provided for
creativity and the degree of freedom given to employees in terms of decision-making is
also investigated.
Section five of the questionnaire investigates the perception of executives concerning
calculated risk and the support given by organisations for risk taking. Questions
pertaining to rewards and reinforcement are covered in section six of the questionnaire.
This section focuses on the perception of employees in terms of the amount of support
provided by their superiors in performing their tasks. Also, it investigates whether the
reward system is based on performance criteria and the degree of responsibility and
recognition given to employees. Section seven examines whether sufficient resources
and time have been provided for new projects. Lastly, section eight on organisational
boundaries investigates the standard operating procedures or practices in performing
tasks and the hierarchical strucmre of the organisation.
After objectively defining the key variables of the survey it was important to ensure that
the questionnaire based on these measures was well formulated. Oppenheim (2000)
argued that a poorly designed survey fails to provide accurate answers to the questions
under investigation. This leaves too many loopholes in the conclusion, permits little
generalisation, and produces too much irrelevant information that results in a waste of
resources.
The key concerns in questionnaire design relate to the reliability and validity of
measurements (Sudman & Bradbura, 1982; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). This is
important in order for the generalisation of the findings to be enhanced (Creswell, 1994;
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Reliability refers to the consistency of the accuracy of
the measurement in producing the sameresults when used over and over again. One
of the ways to evaluate reliability is thatit should be repeatable over time producing the
same results (test-retest reliability) across a range of items (internal consistency
reliability) and across different observers (inter-observer reliability). This would then
be able to indicate the results of a measurement accurately to represent the true
'magnitude' and 'quality' of a construct (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Easterby-Smith
etal., 1991).
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Reliability, on its own, was insufficient for the questionnaire design and validity had to
be considered. Validity refers to how far the questions measure what they aresupposed
to measure (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Oppenhiem, 2000). This is important to avoid
item non-response and measurement error (Oppenheim, 2000). Non-response refers to
a refusal to answer one or a number of questions in the questionnaire and measurement
error is the refusal to answer by providing a wrong or distorted answer.
There were several types of validity, one of which is the contentvalidity which seeks to
establish that the items or questions are a well-balanced sample of the content domain
(Oppenhiem, 2000). The construct validity shows the degree to which the test measures
the construct. Since the construct is not able to observe directly, a valid measure of the
construct should therefore meet the following conditions: the degree to which the
measurement results are correlated with other measures of the same construct that are
theoretically related to it (convergent validity); and the degree to which measurement
outcome should be uncorrelated with measures of construct that were notexpected to be
related to the construct under measurement (discriminant validity). However, if such a
comparison is made it is crucial to ensure that the criteria that are chosen are
appropriate (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).
Determining the direct measurement of the validity of questions in social and
behavioural research is often difficult as most of the attributes in social and behavioural
research are not directly observable (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Therefore, it is not
possible to observe the direct correspondence between variables and their obtained
measures. What the instrument looks like (face validity) is not a good index of what it
truly measured (construct validity). In fact the less a research instrument manifests
what it is intended to measure the less obtrusive it is, hence the smaller the probability
that the respondents will react to their awareness of the researcher's questions.
Therefore, there are indirect ways to ensure that the validity and reliability is resorted
to. As a first step, consideration was given to revision and preliminary development
once the set of questions was assembled. The questions and procedures involved with
the design of the questionnaire were pre-tested. The following section details the pre
testing of the questionnaire and is followed by a description of the variable measures.
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Questionnaire Pre-testing
Conducting questionnaire pre-testing was considered to be essential for the timely
detection and hence revision of inherent problems (Oppenhiem, 2000). The
questionnaire went through several iterations and pre-testing before it was ready to be
distributed to the companies. The questionnaire was pre-tested in two stages. As a
preliminary pre-test, in April 2004, the opinion of an academic expert in the field of
entrepreneurship and innovation was obtained to ensure that the coverage and content of
the questionnaire was appropriate and sufficient. Several adjustments and additional
questions were made to ensure the coverage of questions was sufficient.
Next, experts' judgment of the degree to which the instrument seemed to measure what
it was intended to measure was particularly essential for ensuring content validity
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Thejudgmental validation has been used for determining
the validity of the instrument that measures the level of corporate entrepreneurship.
Therefore, the questionnaires were distributed to industry experts to obtain their opinion
on the content of the questionnaire. A judgmental sample (Tull and Albaum, 1973) of
experts from 3 large companies in the U.K was selected to obtain the practitioners
views on the questionnaire. The selection of experts was based on careful choice. For
instance experts from 2 large companies were obtained and another expert from the
Confederation of British Industries (CBI) was also considered over the month May-
June 2004. This was to ensure that the coverage of the questions were suitable and
appropriate for the large organisations that comprise the FTSE 100 companies.
Efforts at questionnaire pre-testing and development suggested that several changes to
the basic content and design of the questionnaire were required. In accordance with the
feedback, the questionnaire was revised over the month of June 2004. Table 5.7.1.1
below summarizes the comments and suggestion made by the industry experts. In this
table, the questions that are in 'bold' type were the suggestions made by the industrialist
and changes have been made to the questions. Key improvements were made to
individual question content, response format and questionnaire layout and length
(Webb, 2000):
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i) Individual Question Content
The language of the questions was ensured to be of the type and level that managers
from large corporations would readily understand. In designing the questions, double-
barreled questions containing two questions in one were avoided as they cause
ambiguity (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982). The questions were phrased in a manner so
that the questionnaire did not appear to be suggesting that respondents knew the answer
(Webb, 2000).
Since the questionnaire for corporate entrepreneurship was adapted from two main
questionnaires: Morris (1996) and Kuratko et al., (1999) it was not necessary to produce
one from scratch. At the same time however, the existing set of questions was unlikely
to cover all aspects of corporate entrepreneurship. Therefore, based on the comments of
academic and industry experts, new questions were framed in the area of product,
services and process innovation to ensure better coverage in this aspect.
ii) Response Format
The research design used a combination of open and closed questions (Oppenheim,
2000). Open questions were used to gain numerical information, e.g. actual percentage
of turnover spent on R and D, Bell, 1993). Most of the questionnaire used a closed
response format using pre-determined categories for recording responses (Sudman &
Bradburn, 1982; Webb, 2000). The open questions were found unsuitable for
measuring the corporate entrepreneurship level and also possessed the problem of
respondents giving non-valid, irrelevant or vague answers. Therefore, closed questions
from what empirical evidence suggested, would produce more usable data. To ensure
the validity of closed questions various steps were taken, e.g. categories in pre-coded
questions were pre-defined and printed in the questionnaire with places for respondents
to tick their answers.
Measures for the corporate entrepreneurship level had been formulated by defining the
topic to be rated as well as the categories to be used for making the ratings. The Likert
scale was used to measure entrepreneurial level. A criticism of the Likert scale stems
from the difficulty of sensibly comparing different respondents' rankings. On the other
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hand, Likert scales are the most common type of scales used among researchers. The
advantage of using Likert scales is that the reliability tends to be good because the range
of answers permitted to respondents is often higher than other rating scales
(Oppenhiem, 2000). The respondents were instructed to express their degree of
agreement or disagreement along a 5-point scale (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982).
Anything below the 5-point scale was argued to be insufficient and reduced the
reliability and validity of rating data.
iii) Questionnaire Layout and Length
The questions were arranged in accordance with the funnel sequence where the first
sectionbegins with general questions and specific questions were asked in the following
sections (Oppenhiem, 2000). Starting with relatively easy and straightforward
questions helps to get the respondents into the survey. Questions that required a great
deal of thought or sensitivity were reserved for the middle and later sections (Fowler,
2002).
In order to avoid respondent anticipation, as well as to make the questionnaire more
interesting, question formats were varied (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982). The
questionnaire began with a brief introductory note indicating the focus of study.
Instructions for directing the return of the questionnaire were set forth in the e-mail
letter which explained the purpose of the study and how the respondents could return
the questionnaire.
The question headings were broken into 8 parts beginning with a short instruction on
how to answer the questions. For each of the 8 parts the heading was emboldened and
the sub-sections were italicized to provide a clear distinction between the main section
and sub-sections. At the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to fill in their
contact details with a thank you note for the respondents' time and attention.
In addition, an attempt was made to limit the questionnaire length (Sudman &
Bradburn, 1992). This was highlighted at the pre-testwith experts commenting that the
questionnaire was rather lengthy and required more of the respondents' time. Questions
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that were repetitive were omitted (Sudman & Bradburn, 1992) and the length of the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This sub-section outlines the measures of the variable on the basis of measuring the
level of corporate entrepreneurship in an organisation. Some of the variables were
composed of more than one dimension, each of which had to be incorporated to ensure
full coverage of indicators that needed to be built into the corporate entrepreneurship
index. There are 8 main variables covering the main dimensions of corporate
entrepreneurship.
In all, there were 60 questions covering the 8 main dimensions to measure the level of
entrepreneurship in the organisation: Company Orientation - 14 questions; New
Product/ Services/Process Innovation - 14 questions; Management Support - 5
questions; Work Discretion - 5 questions; Risk Taking - 4 questions;
Rewards/Reinforcement - 6 questions; Resource & Time Availability - 6 questions and
Organisational Boundaries - 6 questions (refer appendix 5.7.1 for Corporate
Entrepreneurship Index). Table 5.7.1.2 summarizes the measures of the key variables
outlined on page 184.
Company Orientation
Company Orientation was used as the first part of the questionnaire to measure the level
of corporate entrepreneurship. This has been used in a number of prior empirical
studies (Miller and Friesen, 1983; Covin & Slevin, 1989; Ginsberg, 1985; Miles & Paul,
1987; Shaeffer, 1990) though each has used a slightly different means in measuring the
variable. This variable measured at a 5-point response scale the level of agreement or
disagreement with a series of statements that characterized the extent to which company
philosophy and top-level decision-making was innovative, risk taking and proactive
(Morris & Sexton, 1996).
It is important to know the overall orientation within the company in terms of
product/services and idea development in comparison to the competitors. Also, it was
crucial to integrate entrepreneurship throughout the entire organisation, rather than
merely viewing entrepreneurship as a discrete activity or event or behaviour (Morris &
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Kuratko, 2002). This would then be able to capture the essence of what an organisation
was about and how it operated.
New Product/Services/Process Innovation
The new product, services and process innovation has been used as the second main
variable to measure the intensity level of corporate entrepreneurship in an organisation
and this was adapted from Morris (1996). This variable has also been emphasised by
Covin & Slevin (1991) in their entrepreneurial posture model that focuses on the
frequency and nature of product innovation as one of the defining behaviours. It is
important that the organisation possesses systems that are designed for flexibility and
take advantage of the opportunities that arise in instances where entrepreneurial
managers are mindfully tracking the product/market life cycle and opportunities (Morris
& Kuratko, 2002).
This section of the questionnaire was divided into 3 sub-sections: Product, Services and
Process innovation. The first subsection assessed the frequency of entrepreneurship and
individual questions included that required the respondents to report the percentage of
new product and R&D spent over the last 2 years. Also, the respondents were required
to state the degree of new production and product improvement developed by the
company using the summated rating scale. The second sub-section, also employed the
summated rating scale, measured the level of new services and improvements made by
the organisation. Lastly, using the same approach, the respondents were required to
reveal the level of operational processes introduced by the firm. Respondents were
asked to skip any sub-sections that did not apply to their firm.
In addition, it was crucial for companies to create and manage their portfolio of
innovations. Evidence suggests, for instance, that new-to-the world products accounted
for about 10% of corporate innovation activity, new lines for 20%, line extension for
26% and product revision 26%. The key factor was that organisations needed to have
the right balance across projects to ensure the company was progressive in all aspects
(Morris & Kuratko, 2002).
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Management Support
The measure for management support was adapted from Kuratko et al., (1999). A
review of management support discussed in Chapter 2 emphasised that the role of
leadership in an organisation is very much the domain of the top management. It is
important for top management to support and educate employees concerning innovation
and to instill intrapreneurship in the organisation (Quinn, 1985; Hisrich & Peter, 1996;
Skyes & Block, 1989; Sathe, 1989; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990; Damanpour, 1991;
Kuratko et al., 1993; Peace et al., 1997). There has to be a willingness of managers to
facilitate entrepreneurial projects by providing the necessary supportive environment
that stimulate enterprise activities within the firm such as work delegation, staff
promotion, flexibility and freedom to subordinates in generating ideas. Top managers
directly influence new business creation in corporate divisions by their action and
behaviour (Sathe, 2003).
This section of the questionnaire consisted of 5 questions that covered aspects
pertaining to the support given by management in terms of idea generation, delegation
of authority in making decisions, flexibility, freedom and staff promotions to
employees. The level of management support was measured using the 5-point
summated rating scale.
Work Discretion
Work discretion was included in the fourth section of the questionnaire to measure the
corporate entrepreneurship level of the firm. This section consisted of 5 questions
measuring the work freedom and creativity given to employees in performing their day-
to-day work. The summated rating scales were also used to measure the degree of work
discretion that was provided to the employees.
Providing work discretion was considered to be a crucial element to inculcate
entrepreneurial spirit among employees in terms of the nature of the job that they are
required to perform. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is crucial for organisations to ensure
the type of job the employees are given allows them to develop their abilities and think
for themselves. It has to be challenging and interesting enough for them to look
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forward to performing their work creatively and innovatively. Providing employees
with tasks that stimulate their creativity is considered paramount for entrepreneurship.
Risk Taking
Risk taking is a necessary element for entrepreneurship to take place in an organisation.
It involves the willingness of the firm to pursue opportunities that could have a
reasonable likelihood of producing losses or significant performance discrepancies
(Morris & Kuratko, 2002). Several researchers include this element as being one of the
measures that evaluates the intensity level of entrepreneurship in the company
(Cornwall & Perlman, 1990; Covin & Slevin, 1991; Hornsby et al., 1993; Morris &
Sexton, 1994). 4 questions were formulated to measure the level of risk taking that the
company undertakes. It covered aspects on whether the company considered risk taking
as being a positive attribute and on calculated risk. The summated rating scale was
used to measure the level of risk taking that the firm has undertaken. It was crucial for
the company's management to show a willingness to take risk and a tolerance for failure
should it occur (Morris & Kuratko, 2002).
Reward/Reinforcement
Reward/reinforcement is considered to be one of the critical elements to stimulate
enterprise activities within the firm. Financial and non-financial incentives are
necessary tools to reinforce risk taking and persistence in implementing entrepreneurial
concepts in an organisation (Balkin & Logan, 1988; Cornwall & Perlman, 1990). In
order for the reward/reinforcement system to be effective it has to consider goals,
feedback, emphasis on individual responsibility and rewards based on results (Kuratko
et al., 1999). Several researchers have found this element to be crucial in stimulating
corporate entrepreneurship (Hornsby et al., 1993; Kuratko et al., 1999; Scanlon, 1985;
Souder, 1981; Kanter, 1985; Sathe, 1985; Fry, 1987; Block & Ornati, 1987; Sykes,
1992).
This variable consisted of 6 questions that measured the level of reward /reinforcement
systems implemented in the company. It covered aspects relating to recognition, level
of responsibility and criteria used in rewarding employees.
180
Resource and Time Availability
The seventh main variable included resource and time availability given to employees
in the organisation as a means of encouraging them to be entrepreneurial. It is essential
for companies to provide the necessary resources, financial and physical that facilitate
innovation (Morris & Kuratko, 2002). Employees need to perceive the availability of
these resources for entrepreneurial activities. Several researchers have argued the
importance of this element (Von Hippel, 1977; Souder, 1981; Sathe, 1985; Kanter,
1985; Sykes, 1986; Hisrich & Peters, 1986; Katz & Gartner, 1988; Sykes & Block;
1989, Damanpour, 1991; Slevin & Covin, 1997) to stimulate entrepreneurial activities
within the firm.
This variable consisted of 6 questions designed to measure the availability of resources
and time in an organisation. It covered aspects pertaining to financial resources and
time availability given to people in the organisation.
Organisational Boundaries/ Structure
Lastly, organisational boundaries/structure was considered to be one of the important
elements to be included for measuring the intensity level of corporate entrepreneurship.
An entrepreneurial firm requires a structure but often it becomes the victim of types of
structural arrangements created in companies. Many different researchers included
structure as one of the contributing factors towards an entrepreneurial organisation
(Souder, 1981; Burgelman, 1983; Sathe, 1985; Hisrich & Peters, 1986; Sykes, 1986;
Hornsby et al., 1993; Morris & Kuratko, 2002). This variable consisted of 6 questions
that measured the degree of boundaries the organisation allows employees in which to
perform their tasks. It covered aspects pertaining to standard operating procedures,
hierarchical structure and job structure.
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Table 5.7.1.2: Variable Measures: Corporate Entrepreneurship Index
VARIABLE MEASURE ORIGIN OF
MEASURE
1) Company Orientation
i) Company Characteristics: Summated Rating Scale Adapted from Morris
In terms of rate new product (1996)
/service, generating ideas &
top management philosophy;
ii) Top Level Decision-Making: Summated Rating Scale Adapted from Morris





New product innovation; Percentage of new Adapted from Morris
product last 2 years (1996)
Product range R&D; Percentage of R&D
spent last 2 years
Newly Developed
Product Improvements & Summated Rating Scale Newly Developed
Development; referred Moerloose
ii) Service Innovation: (2000)
New Service Introduction & Summated Rating Scale
Improvements; Adapted from Morris
iii) Process Innovation: (1996)
Process improvements & Summated Rating Scale
New Methods Adapted from Morris
(1996)
3) Management Support:
Support & Encouragement Summated Rating Scale Adapted from Kuratko
given by top management in et al., (1999)
developing ideas.
4) Work Discretion:
Work freedom & opportunity Summated Rating Scale Adapted from Kuratko
given to be creative. etal., (1999)
5) Risk Taking:
Risk taking as a positive Summated Rating Scale Adapted from Kuratko
attribute and calculated risk. etal., (1999)
6) Reward/Reinforcement:
Recognition, level of Summated Rating Scale Adapted from Kuratko
responsibility and criteria used etal., (1999)
in rewarding employees.
7) Resources & Time
Availability: Summated Rating Scale Adapted from Kuratko
Financial resources and time etal., (1999)




hierarchical structure and job
structure
Summated Rating Scale Adapted from Kuratko
etal., (1999)
5.7.2 Question Design & Development (Corporate Governance Index)
The Corporate Governance Index has been formulated using secondary data from
annual reports to measure the level of governance practiced by organisations. There has
been resistance in developing a Corporate Governance Index to measure the level of
governance practices in a company due to its complex nature. However, this study
attempts to address this gap by developing an index to measure the governance practice
of the FTSE100 companies. The Corporate Governance Index was developed through
several processes to ensure the reliability and validity of the index.
This section discusses the first stage of developing the Corporate Governance Index and
obtaining feedback from experts in the area of governance. This is followed by the
second stage that involves the development of the question and variable measures.
Stage One: Feedback from Experts
Initially, the Corporate Governance Index consisted of 30 questions covering issues
pertaining to ownership structure, board structure, board committees and remuneration.
Before embarking on the secondary data collection, outside perspectives were obtained
to view the Corporate Governance Index in terms of the reliability and validity of the
instrument. Three main groups of experts were selected to represent the areas of
remuneration, board and institutional shareholders:
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Table 5.7.2.1: List of Companies Interviewed
Area Name of Companies Agreed / disagreed to
be interviewed
Remuneration New Bridge Street Consultant (NBSC)






Egon Zehnder International (PRO:
NED)










The Institute for Enterprise and Innovation, Nottingham University Business School
sent letters to six companies. Follow-ups were made by telephone calls to fix
appointments for the interview sessions. NAPF and PIRC declined to have the interview
session due to their tight schedules. However, PIRC suggested that the Universities
Superannuation Scheme (USS) would be a better organisation to provide assistance on
this matter. Therefore, five companies agreed to an interview session:
1) New Bridge Street Consultant;
2) Hermes Pensions Management (telephone interview);
3) Egon Zehnder International (PRO: NED);
4) Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS);
5) Association of British Insurers (ABI).
These five companies were selected for their expertise in the area of corporate
governance. Each of these companies has a strong knowledge of corporate governance
and they are expert in either remuneration, board of directors or institutional
shareholders. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) is the trade body for insurance
companies with around 400 members accounting for almost 97% of the worldwide
business of UK insurance companies. ABI provides leadership on issues affecting the
industry's future and image, it shapes and influences decisions made by the
government, regulator and other public authorities within and outside the U.K, in order
to benefit the industry collectively and communicate on its behalf to the media and
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other stakeholders. ABI takes an active part in issues surrounding corporate governance
and socially responsible investment.
The Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) is the principal pension fund for more
than 300 UK universities and other education and research institutions. It is considered
to be the third largest UK pension fund and also takes an active role in issues relating to
corporate governance and is considered to be a shareholder activist. Whereas, Egon
Zehnder International (PRO NED) is considered to be one of the world's foremost
business consulting firms. They conduct projects in every functional area, including
general and financial management, sales and marketing, operations, R&D, as well as
senior executive levels, including the Board of Directors. They also handle the
recruitment of non-executive directors to the board and advise on issues pertaining to
governance to the board of directors.
New Bridge Street Consultants is a market leader in advising on remuneration strategy
for companies. They focus on four major areas: executive remuneration, short and long-
term executive incentive plan, employee share schemes and pensions and they advise
organisations on issues relating to corporate governance in formulating their
remuneration packages. Based on their expertise, these companies were interviewed to
provide feedback on the Corporate Governance Index. Three companies were
interviewed on 17/03/04 and one company on the 19/03/04. A telephone interview was
held with HERMES on 7/04/04. After seeking their opinion, the number of questions
rose to 32 to ensure that there would be better coverage on issues pertaining to internal
control mechanisms. Two additional questions were added into the Corporate
Governance Index to ensure a more comprehensive coverage in the area of board
structure. Table 5.7.2.2 below provides the verbatim comments and feedback that was
given by the experts on the index.
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Stage Two: Question Development and Variable Measures
The feedback obtained from experts was used in refining further the Corporate
Governance Index. The annual reports for the year 2003 were used to gather the
necessary data to measure the corporate governance level of the companies (see
appendix 5.7.2 for the Corporate Governance Index).
Corporate Governance Index Measurement
The Corporate Governance Index was developed based on 4 main areas namely,
ownership structure, board structure, board committees and remuneration.
A) Ownership Structure
This section consisted of 4 questions that related to shares held by block holders,
executives and non-executives.
Ql: What is the percentage ofshares held by block holders?
This question was posed based on evidence showing that companies having a higher
number of institutional shareholders have increased shareholder activism in the
company and this creates the pressure to become more transparent in their practices,
which then leads to enhanced corporate governance levels within the company.
Institutional investors represent a powerful corporate governance mechanism in
monitoring company management and their influence on company management can be
substantial and can be used to align management interests with shareholder groups
(Solomon & Solomon, 2004, Stapledon, 1996). Agrawal & Knober (1996) argued that
the involvement of institutional investors can have a positive effect on corporate
financial performance. Institutional investors have the ability to take advantage of
economies of scale and diversification (Diamond, 1984). Their presence as
shareholders can create a divorce between ownership and control, whereas their
increasing involvement in companies and concentration provides a means of monitoring
management and solving agency problems. Based on these reasons, a higher score was
placed on companies having a higher number of block holders. A maximum score of 3
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points was given to companies possessing more than 50% block holders as this figure
showed that the majority of the company was owned by block holders which was an
indication of higher shareholder activism being practiced in the company. The point
decreased to 2 for companies that were owned by block holders ranging from 26-50%
and 1 point was given for companies that were possessed by block holders ranging from
0% to 25%.
Q2: What is the percentage ofshares held by a single largest block holder?
A reverse score was given to companies that possessed a single block holder who
owned a large amount of shares in a company. If a single block holder owns a large
amount of shares in the company it is be possible to control the company for their own
benefit and disregard the interests of other, smaller, holders and this is considered to be
an example of bad corporate governance. Also, Solomon & Solomon (2004) found that
a high ownership concentration can have negative implications such as the ability to
access privileged information, which creates an information asymmetry between
themselves and smaller shareholders. Therefore, companies that possess a single block
holder that owned the least amount of shares ranging from 1% to 25% were given the
highest score of 3. Followed by two point score for a single block holder who owned
shares ranging from 26% to 50% in a company. Above 50% the score decreased even
further to 1 point.
Q3: Whatpercentage ofshares held by directors?
Offering shares to executives is one way of creating a greater sense of belonging
towards the organisation, which leads to a long-term commitment towards the
organisation (Jones & Butler, 1992). Also, this encourages executives to behave
opportunistically by supporting projects that will increase their own wealth and further
ensure job security (Wright et al., 1996). Companies that offer directors a certain
amount of shares in the company are aligning the interests of executives with
shareholders. Therefore, companies that have their executives owning a lesser amount
of shares is given a higher score where a score of 2 is given for executives owing less
than 5% shares and a score of 1 was given for possessing shares above 5%.
190
Q4: What is thepercentage ofshares held by non-executive directors?
Research findings have indicated that one of the reasons why outside directors were
unable to monitor executives was due to a lack of any sense of belonging towards the
organisation as they were not offered shares in the company (Porter, 1992; Meyer,
1998). Increasing outside directors' stock ownership would make them more actively
involved in monitoring management and this would also align the interests of non-
executives and shareholders. Therefore, a score of 2 was given to companies that
offered shares between 1% to 5% and a score of 1 for offering shares above 5% level.
Board Structure
Every company needs to be spearheaded by an effective board, which leads and controls
the company. The Combined Code (2003) requires that every company should fulfill
this requirement. Five questions were posed in this section to measure the governance
level in the company.
Q5: What is the total number ofdirectors sitting on the board?
Generally, it is argued that board size is negatively associated with entrepreneurship
(Pfeffer, 1972; O'Reilly, Caldwell & Barnett, 1989; Lipton & Lorsh, 1992; Yermack,
1996). There are evidences from a number of countries that found there was an inverse
relationship between firm's performance and board size (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et
al., 1998; Canyon & Peck, 1998). However, there are strong contending arguments for
boards of small and large sizes. Thus, the variable board size is measured using two
methods: 1) as a continuous variable 2) as a categorical variable. It is argued that the
continuous approach is able to provide a better statiscal result for a linear relationship
Pallant (2001). The categorical approach was used based on the Combined Code which
recommended that the board should not be too large otherwise it would be unwieldy.
The board should be of sufficient size, balance of skills and experience. According to
Jensen (1993) board sizes needto be limited to seven or eight, a larger boardbeing less
effective in controlling the CEO. Similarly, Lipton & Lorsh (1992) favored a small
board of a maximum of eight or nine members. Too small a number of directors were
considered to be less effective and efficient as the board would lack members with
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sufficient skills and knowledge in handling board matters (Dalton & Daily, 2000).
Therefore, a score of 2 was given to companies that possessed less than six members.
The score increased to 3 for companies that possessed between seven to twelve
members. Previous literature also indicates that too large a board size causes the board
to be dysfunctional (Zahra et al., 2000). Large boards of directors tend to reduce speed
of response and capacity to act in the face of a difficult business situation (Pfeffer,
1992; O'Reilly et al., 1989; Lipton & Lorsh, 1992; Yermack, 1996). Therefore,
companies that possessed more than twelve members were given the least score, which
was 1 point.
Q6: What is the percentage (%) of board seats held by independent non-executive
directors?
The board comprises of executive and non-executive directors who were either
independent or non-independent. Independent directors have the role of monitoring the
actions of the CEO and executive directors in ensuring that the shareholders interests
are well taken care of (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Weir & Laing, 2001). Also, they play a
role in reducing the conflict of interest between shareholders and company management
by introducing an independent voice on the board (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). In
addition, by having independent non-executives, the board is monitored more
effectively which results in improved corporate performance and prevents non
executive directors from manipulating their position by gaining complete control over
their own remuneration packages and securing their jobs (Morck et al., 1988). The
Combined Code (July, 2003) required that at least half of the board members, excluding
the chairman, comprise of non-executive directors who are held by the board to be
independent. Board seats that were held above 50% by independent non-executive
directors were given a score of 2 and a 1 point score was given to boards that held
below 50%.
Q7: Is there a senior independent non-executive on the board?
The Combined Code (July, 2003) requires companies to possess a senior independent
non-executive director on the board. The role of a senior independent director is to
provide an independent view on corporate strategy, performance, resources,
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appointments and standard of conduct. The senior independent director should be made
available to shareholders if there are any concerns among the shareholders. A 1-point
score was given to companies that possessed a senior independent non-executive
director and a zero score for companies that did not.
Q8: How many times does the board meetper year?
The board needs to meet regularly to discharge its duties effectively (Combined Code,
2003). The more often the board meets, the more it is considered to be effective and
efficient in performing its task compared to boards that meet less often. It is the
requirement of the Combined Code that companies disclose in their annual reports how
frequently the board has met during the year. Based on these reasons a score of 3 was
given to companies that held more than 12 meetings per year. Boards that met between
7 to 12 times in a year were given a score of 2 and board that met less than 7 times was
given a score of 1.
Q9: Is there a provision for training and development for non-executive directors and
chairman?
The non-executive and executive directors are both members of the board and possess
the same legal duties and objectives. However, the amount of time devoted to the
company's affairs is significantly less for a non-executive director and the detailed
knowledge and experience of a company's affairs would generally be less than an
executive director's. In order to create a dynamic learning board (Garratt, 1996) that
has a lively approach conducive to goodcorporate governance, directors are encouraged
to attend training courses. This recommendation came from the Cadbury Report, which
later was reaffirmed by the Hampel Report. The Hampel Report & Combined Code
highlighted the necessity of training for directors on relevant new laws, regulations and
evolving business risks (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). Therefore, a 1 point score was




The corporate governance policy from the Cadbury Committee (1992) onwards placed
great emphasis on proposing that boards set up sub-committees to focus on specific
aspects of governance which had been identified as problematic; namely financial
reporting quality, directors' remuneration and board appointments. Therefore,
companies are required to form sub-committees such as audit, remuneration and
nomination committees to address these issues. This section contained 9 questions.
10) What is the percentage of the remuneration committee seats held by non-executive
directors?
The issue of directors' remuneration came to the public's attention because of the large
pay rises and share option grants awarded to directors of the privatised utilities (Spira &
Bender, 2004). This led to the formation of the remuneration committee in determining
director's remuneration. The Greenbury Committee recommended that the
remuneration committee should comprise of non-executive directors to set remuneration
packages which would attract, retain and motivate directors (Greenbury, 1995). The
provisions of the Greenbury report were later incorporated, with some amendments,
into both the Hampel (1998) and Combined Codes. The Combined Code (July, 2003)
requires at least three of the remuneration committee members be non-executive
directors. Therefore, a score of 2 was given to companies that possess more than 75%
of remuneration committee seats held by non-executive directors and a score of 1 for
less than 75%.
11) How many times does the remuneration committee meet in a year?
The Higgs report required that the remuneration committee report the frequency of
meetings held and attended by members in the annual report. Committees that met
more regularly were considered as being more active and efficient. A higher score was
given to companies that met more regularly where a maximum score of 3 was given to
companies that met 8 to 10 times per year. The score reduced to 2 for companies that
met between 5 to 7 times and 1 point score was given to companies that met 2 to 4
times in a year.
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12) What is the percentage of the audit committee seats held by non-executive
directors?
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was great concern about corporate control and
accountability due to a series of corporate scandals and unexpected corporate collapses
(Spira, 2001). Therefore, companies were urged to set up audit committees to
circumvent potential problems. It was arguably the most important sub-committee
(Mallin, 2004). The role of the audit committee was to review the scope and outcome
of the audit and try to ensure that the objectivity of the auditors was maintained. The
Combined Code (July, 2003) required the board to establish an audit committee of at
least three members and all the members are required to be non-executives. By having
independent non-executives in the committee they were in the position to ask
appropriate questions, which provided assurance that the audit committee was
functioning properly (Spira, 2002). Similar to the remuneration committee a score of 2
was given to companies that possessed more than 75% of their audit committee seats
held by non-executive directors and a score of 1 for less than 75%.
13) Is there an induction and on going training given to the audit committee?
The Smith Report (2003) required that audit committees should conduct induction and
on going training programmes to its members in order to keep them abreast of the
principals and development of financial reporting and company law. A score of 1 was
given to companies that offered training programmes to their members and a zero score
for non-provision.
14) How many times does the audit committee meet in a year?
It was the requirement of the Smith Report (2003) that audit committees meet at least
three times in a year. The report encouraged the committee to meet as regularly as
possible. Therefore, a score of 3 points was given to companies that met between 8 to
10 times in a year. The score reduced to 2 for companies that met 5 to 7 times and a 1
point score was given for companies that met only 2 to 4 times in a year.
195
15) Is there a nomination committee?
In the past, directors were often appointed on the basis of personal connections (Mallin,
2004). This resulted in boards not having a balance of independent non-executive
directors. The Combined Code (2003) advocated that there should be a formal, rigorous
and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors and therefore the
nomination committee was set up for board appointments and to make
recommendations to the board. The role of the nomination committee is to evaluate the
existing balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the board and to utilise this
information when preparing a candidate profile for new appointments. Also, the Higgs
report (2003) suggested that boards needed to form a nomination committee, which is
considered to be good governance practice. Therefore, a score of 1 was given to
companies that possess a nomination committee and a zero score for not forming the
committee.
16) How many times does the nomination committee meet in a year?
The Higgsreport (2003) recommended the nomination committee shouldmeet regularly
to review the structure, size and composition of the board and make necessary
recommendations to the board with regard to any changes. Therefore, a maximum score
of 3 was given to nomination committees that met 5 to 6 times in a year. The score
reduced to 2 for nomination committees that met 3 to 4 times and 1 score was given to
companies that met 1 to 2 times in a year.
17) Does the CEO chair any of these committees ?
The Combined Code (July, 2003) recommended that the composition of board
committees should consist of entirely non-executive directors. This question was posed
to discover whether the CEO chaired any of these committees, which could influence
the decision-making process of the committee. A score of 1 was given to companies
that did not have their CEO chairing any of the board committees and a zero score for
companies that practised otherwise.
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18) Does the CEO attend any ofthese committees' meetings?
Also, the Combined Code (July, 2003) did not encourage the CEOs to attend any of the
committee meetings, as this could influence the decision making of the committee.
Therefore, companies that did not have their CEO attending any of the sub committee
meetings were given a score of one.
Remuneration
In recent years, there has been great attention given to issues pertaining to directors'
remuneration by the media, shareholders and policy makers due to the excessive
amount of salary and benefits they receive. The section focused on four main areas
relating to remuneration: directors' salary, Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP), Executive
Stock Option (ESO) and annual bonus. This section contained 4 questions.
19) What is the average salary paid to an executive director?
Directors receive a base salary in accordance with the terms of their contract. This
element is not related either to the performance of the company nor to the performance
of the individual director. Instead the amount is based on the size of the company, the
industry sector, experience of the individual director and the level of base salary in
similar companies (Mallin, 2004). Recently many companies were seen to be paying
large salaries to their directors and this is considered as not aligning the interests of
shareholders and management. The gap between executives' pay and workers on the
factory floor has widened in the past 20 years (Economist, 15 November, 2002).
Therefore, a lower score was given to companies that paid large amounts of salaries to
their executives. Companies paying an average salary below £467,500 to their directors
were given the highest score of 4. Followed by companies that paid salaries between
the ranges of £467,501 to £596,000 were given a score of 3 and salaries ranging from
£596,001 to £749,500 were given a score of 2. Executive directors that earned salaries
above £749,500 were given the lowest score that was 1 (this range was designed using
the quartile method to divide the average salaries of the executives into four levels).
197
20) What sum is paid to the highestpaid director?
This question was posed to determine whether there was a huge difference between the
highest paid directors compared to an average paid executive. A huge salary disparity
among employees was considered to be bad practice as this could serve to have negative
implications for the company. Therefore, companies that provided their highest paid
director a salary above 50% in comparison to an average paid executive were given a
score of 1 and a score of 2 was given to companies that paid less than 50%.
21) Is there an external advisor appointed with respect to evaluation of executive
remuneration scheme?
The Combined Code (July, 2003) requires companies to disclose whether they have
appointed any external advisors to evaluate their executive remuneration scheme. Also,
the Department of Trade and Industry published the Directors Remuneration Report
Regulations 2002, which required companies to disclose the name of any consultants to
the remuneration committee including whether they had been appointed independently
(Mallin, 2004). This was to encourage companies to become more transparent with
their practices to their shareholders. A score of 1 was given to companies that
appointed an external advisor.
22) Is there a long-term incentiveplan (LTIP)for executive employees?
Since the 1990s, the long-term incentive plan (LTIP) has become increasingly popular
among the large U.K companies. One of the important factors in the emergence of
LTIP was to align managerial and shareholder interests and to develop a more robust
pay performance link. The Combined Code (July, 2003) encouraged companies to
practice LTIP among their executive employees as compared to share options schemes.
One point was given to companies that practiced LTIP.
23) What performance criteria are used in awarding LTIP?
Previous research indicated that directors have been awarded shares that are not linked
to the director's performance. Ezzamel & Watson (1997) argued that the effectiveness
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of the remuneration committee in linking CEO pay to performance was limited.
Therefore, it was important for organisations to design their directors' compensation
correctly, which helps to ensure it is aligned together. Canyon & Mallin (1997)
highlighted that compensation received by senior management should be linked to
company performance for incentive reasons. The Combined Code encourages
companies to use performance criteria in awarding their executives. Currently, the two
most popular criteria used in awarding LTIP are earnings per share (EPS) or total
shareholder return (TSR) and some companies use both measures. Companies that use
both measures were given a higher score of 3, as it was an indication that a more
rigorous approach had been used in awarding LTIP compared to companies that use
only one type of performance criteria. A score of 2 was given to companies that used
TSR which was market-based compared to EPS which was accounting based. EPS was
susceptible to a degree of manipulation in terms of methods of calculation employed
(Bruce et al., 2001; Buck et al., 2003) and therefore a score of 1 was given to companies
that used it as a performance indicator.
24) Which comparative group benchmark is used to evaluate the company's LTIP
performance criteria?
There were three main comparative benchmarks used in evaluating a company's LTIP
performance criteria such as peer group, market index and growth based on a chosen
performance yardstick. The first evaluates the firm's performance against a peer group
of companies, selected individually and the selection of the peer group was
discretionary. The second benchmark related the firm's performance target to a
published market index. The third form of comparator required eligibility for some
award to be contingent in terms of the achievement of a given real growth in the chosen
performance yardstick (Bruce et al., 2001; Buck et al., 2003). Companies that used all
three benchmarks were given the highest score of 3, as this was an indication that a
more rigorous approach had been used in evaluating the company's LTIP. Whereas
companies that used two different types of benchmark were given a score of 2 and a
score of 1 was given to companies that used only one type of benchmark.
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25) Does the company disclose the name ofpeer group companies ?
Companies have wide discretion in selecting their peer group companies. The process
involved in constructing a peer group is rarely transparent and the disclosure level of
peer group details is therefore not similar across companies (Bruce et al., 2001).
Companies that disclosed the name of peer group companies were considered to be
more transparent about their practices compared to companies that did not. A score of 1
was given to companies that disclosed this information.
26) If yes does the company provide reasonsfor selecting those companies?
In selecting peer groups, companies had the ability to construct a portfolio of
traditionally weak performing or strong performing peer groups, which would have
quite different implications for the achievement of performance targets and not many
companies would reveal this type of information (Bruce et al., 2001). Companies that
provided reasons for selecting peer group companies were seen to be more transparent
within their practices. A score of 1 was given to companies that provided this
information.
27) Is share option considered part of the executive remuneration package?
The share option scheme has been popular among companies since the late 1980s and
early 1990s to supplement the traditional base pay plus bonus reward system (Bruce et
al., 2001). One of the purposes of offering options is to align the interests of
shareholders and executives. Therefore, a score of 1 was given to companies that
offered share option schemes to their executives.
28) Does the company provide any performance hurdles before share options are
awarded to executives ?
One of the problems faced in offering share options to executives was the distinct lack
of information provided by companies in terms of the performance criteria used in
awarding share options to executives. Forker (1992) found there was poor quality of
disclosed information in share option schemes, which creates opportunistic behaviour
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among executives. In response to this, the Association of British Insurers (ABI)
emphasized the need for performance targets to take prominence by requiring that the
award, under ESO schemes, should be subject to genuine improvements in corporate
performance measured against a relevant comparator (Bruce et al., 2001; Buck et al.,
2003,). Also, the Combined Code (July, 2003) emphasised the need for companies to
provide challenging performance criteria before awarding share options to their
executives. Companies that provided performance hurdles before awarding share
options to their executives were given a score of 1.
29) Are different grants ofoptions separately disclosed?
Every year executives may be offered options depending on the company's policy and
performance. Companies that disclosed different grants that had been awarded to their
executives in the past years were considered to be more transparent with their practices.
A score of 1 point was given to companies that provided this information.
30) Is there any annual bonus award given to executive directors?
In the late 70s, only 8% of companies awarded annual bonuses to their top executives
and by the 1990s almost all the companies had some form of annual bonus scheme for
their executives (Conyon et al., 1995). Annual bonuses are given to executives to
motivate them to perform better and to align their interests with the shareholders.
Companies that awarded bonuses to their executive directors were given a score of 1.
31) Does the company publish detailed criteriafor granting annual bonuses?
The Combined Code (July, 2003) emphasised the need for remuneration committees to
consider whether their directors were eligible to receive annual bonuses and stated that
it should be based on performance conditions that are relevant and designed to enhance
the shareholder value. McKnight's (1996) study subdivided total pay into salary and
annual bonus and the findings indicated there was a link between annual bonus and
performance. Companies that disclosed detailed criteria for granting bonuses were
given 1 point as it was seen to align the interestbetween shareholders and management.
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32) What is the maximum bonus paid to eligible executive directors ?
In recent years, companies were seen to be paying extra large bonuses to their directors,
which was found not to align the interests of shareholders and management. Conyon et
al., (1995) findings indicated that the amount of salary plus bonus from 1980 to 1993
had risen to 336%. This created great concern among shareholders and stakeholders.
Because of this concern, the Combined Code (July, 2003) required that companies must
reveal the maximum amount of bonus that was paid to executive directors. Companies
that paid bonuses above 100% are given 1 point score and companies that paid between
the ranges of 50% to 100% were given 2 points. A maximum score of 3 was given to
companies that paid bonuses less than 50% of the annual salary.
5.7.3 Interview Design
As mentioned above in section 5.5, it was decided to conduct semi-structured interviews
within the framework of a case study approach with a sample of cases selected from the
population of FTSE 100 companies. An interview schedule was prepared towards this
end (Table 5.7.3.1). Although respondents had the flexibility to answer questions, prior
specification of key questions was important to keep the interviewees focused and at the
same time provided a structure of comparability across cases (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Without having such a focus it would be easy to be overwhelmed by the volume of data.
A set of 11 questions was framed. As summarized in Table 5.7.3.1, these questions
emphasized the 'why' and 'what' aspects of three main components of Corporate
Governance Internal Control Mechanisms: Board Structure and Composition,
Ownership Structure and Remuneration Strucmre. As mentioned earlier, the purpose of
the interviews was to discover the underlying impact of corporate governance on
enterprise activities within the firm.
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Table 5.7.3.1: Interview Schedule for the Case Studies
Questions Nature of Question
1. In your experience does corporate governance inhibit
organisations from being entrepreneurial?
If yes or no why?
Why
Board Composition & Structure
2. In your opinion would having a ratio of non-executives on
the board have a negative impact on corporate
entrepreneurship?
If yes or no why?
Why
3. In your opinion would providing ownership to non-
executives help to reduce the negative impact on corporate
entrepreneurship?
If yes or no why?
If yes, what sort of impact
Why
What
4. Does board size have an impact on the entrepreneurial
activities in the organisation?
If yes or no why?
Why
5. In your opinion can having too frequent board meetings
decrease or increase entrepreneurial activities in an
organisation?
If yes or no why?
Why
6. In your opinion do board committees need to have very
frequent meetings?
If yes or no why?
Why
7. Can the frequency of meetings have an impact on the
productivity level of the organization?
If yes or no why?
Why
Ownership Structure
8. Does the dominance of Institutional block holders in an
organisation have a positive impact on corporate
entrepreneurship?
If yes or no why?
Why
9. In your opinion can large amounts of executive ownership
diminish the spirit of building an entrepreneurial
organisation?
If yes or no why?
Why
Remuneration Structure
10. In your opinion do executive stock options reduce or
increase corporate entrepreneurship activities?
If increase or decrease why?
Why
11. In your opinion would applying performance criteria in
awarding annual bonuses be able to increase entrepreneurial
activities in the organisation?




The data collection process was conducted in June 2004 to March 2005. This entailed
the sending out of the e-mail questionnaire, the collection and checking of returns, as
well as conducting follow-up interviews for case studies. The data through
questionnaires were collected over the period June to September 2004, followed by
interviews from February to March 2005.
The following sections describe the unit of analysis, sample selection, issues of access
and data collection for both questionnaire and interviews:
5.8.1 Unit of Analysis
The Northcote Website: http://www.northcote.co.uk, an online directory of public listed
companies in the U.K was used to identify the population of the FTSE 100 companies.
Listing 100 top companies in the country, the latest version (2004) at the time of the
research was used to obtain their addresses and contact numbers. This online website
keeps updating the list of companies that fall into categories of FTSE 100, FTSE 250
and FTSE 350 based upon their performance. The group of FTSE 100 companies had
been selected due to there being an existing gap among the top companies, which had
not been addressed by other researchers as to whether entrepreneurial activities in these
companies had been affected due to the mandatory requirement of corporate
governance.
Six cases were selected for the case studies. As Burns (2000) pointed out, "multi-case
studies are advantageous in that the evidence can be compelling". This set of cases was
selected through the development of the scatter graph which provided a way of
selecting 4 companies that are situated at the extreme ends and 2 located closest to the
centre point, which brought in a total of 6 companies to be interviewed. It has been
widely recognised that qualitative researchers seldom have any strict requirements for
the representation of a sample (Finch & Masori, 1999). There has been no universally
agreed size of sample for qualitative research (Kvale, 1996). The case studies were
used primarily for triangulating the quantitative results. The purpose of selecting
companies from different quadrants was to analyse the similarities and differences of
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opinion on issues pertaining to corporate governance with corporate entrepreneurship.
Also, they were useful in providing some insights into the detailed aspects of corporate
governance on enterprise activities within firms.
For both the survey and case studies, single respondents were taken to be representative
of the firm. The individuals who responded to the survey questionnaire were again
approached to obtain their opinion on aspects relating to corporate governance and
corporate entrepreneurship. High-level managers and directors were chosen as
appropriate (Bliss, 1999). These individuals oversee the company's management,
conduct strategy planning andpossess the overall information about the firm. This type
of individual was considered to be in the best position to gauge the entrepreneurial level
of the company. Individuals were selected on the basis that they possessed the overall
knowledge and experience about corporate development and corporate governance.
They were the key decision-makers responsible for formulating decisions and planning
courses of action. Therefore, they are more likely to be motivated to spend time
thinking about the relevant issues (Foddy, 1996) and hence providing information that
was not available from secondary sources.
On the other hand, the sample size for the secondary data to measure the corporate
governance level was very much based upon the response rate of the survey
questionnaire. Companies that responded to the survey questionnaire were then
analysed on their governance levels using their annual reports from year 2003.
5.8.2 Access
A number of ways were used to gain respondents' co-operation and motivate them to
respond (Oppenheim, 1992) and in identifying the most appropriate person within the
firm that wouldbe able to participate in answering the questionnaire. Firstly, telephone
calls were made as a preliminary notification to the companies in explaining about the
research project and to identify the most appropriate person prior to e-mailing the
questionnaires. The telephone calls were made to the company's Public Relations
Manager to determine who was the most appropriate person in the corporation able to
participate in answering the questionnaires according to his/her best knowledge. This
strategy was utilised with the intention of maximising the response rate. Also, this
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approach helped to identify a contact person within the firm who then could be referred
back to in order to obtain any further information about the organisation. After locating
the most appropriate person within the firm, e-mails were then sent that contained a
cover letter stating the research objectives and requesting participation. This was
designed and attached as a file with the e-mail and questionnaires (Bell, 1993; Cohen
and Manion, 1994; Oppenhiem; 1992). A similar letter was also e-mailed to each of the
case study participants.
Although the cover page of the questionnaire contained an introductory statement to
indicate the purpose of the study (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982), it was considered
important that respondents understood and accepted the aims of the smdy and hence,
willingly imparted information (Foddy, 1993). Also, it was crucial to seek legitimate
access to avoid bias to non-response (Oppenhiem, 1992).
Respondents were promised anonymity in terms of revealing information as their name
and contact numbers would not be revealed publicly. This helped to gain their trust and
confidence in terms of revealing information. In addition, to obtain the requested
information as legitimate and to garner respondent trust (Foddy, 1996), it was essential
to promise confidentiality to the respondents. Oppenhiem (1992) argued that it is
crucial for all surveys to be treated as confidential in the sense that only researchers
have access to them and steps were taken to ensure that no information about
identifiable persons or organisations was published without permission. Both the
survey and case study respondents were also promised a copy of the results in due
course (Cohen & Manion, 1994). Also, the respondents were provided with a named
contact in the event of a query and finally the letter ended with a note of thanks
(Sudman and Bradburn, 1982).
There being no interviewer to provide additional information, the length of the cover
letter in the e-mail questionnaire might be longer than the introduction to a personal
interview (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982). However, the length of the cover letter was
limited to one page in order to prevent respondents from skimming and ignoring it
completely. The letter used the official letterhead of the University of Nottingham
Institute for Enterprise and Innovation as a channel in building contacts and network
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with the organisations. This was expected to be significant in securing widespread co
operation (Oppenheim, 1992).
5.8.3 Data Collection through Questionnaires
The questionnaires were sent by e-mail in June 2004. According to Armstrong &
Overton (1977) non-response could be kept to under 30% in most cases if appropriate
procedmes were followed. The low response rate was overcome without too much
difficulty by sending reminders through e-mail. The reminder letters were shown to be
most productive in comparison to all methods used in connection with maximizing
response rate (Cohen & Manion, 1994; Kanuk & Berenson, 1975). After the reminder
letter was e-mailed, respondents were personally contacted by telephone. Attempts
were made to get in touch with those who had not responded in the first round. There
were several FTSE 100 companies that were unavailable due to their busy schedule and
some refused to respond. Their unavailability or refusal to take part was found to be in
no way related to the subject matter of the survey (Oppenhiem, 1992). Instead, it was
classed as situational, where some respondents, for example, were too busy to be
involved in a particular project, while some were travelling or considered to be in their
busiest period of the year.
5.8.4 Data Collection through Secondary Data
After conducting the survey questionnaire, the data collection was made on annual
reports, year 2003, for the FTSE 100 companies that responded to the questionnaire.
The data collection process was conducted simultaneously with the survey
questionnaire in order to conduct the data collection process more efficiently and
effectively. The process started in June and carried on until September 2004. Using
information from annual reports was considered as multiple sources of obtaining data
which was an important way of triangulating information and improving the reliability
of the data and findings (Burns, 2000).
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5.8.5 Data Collection through Case Studies using Interviews
Subsequent to data collection through questionnaires and secondary data, it was decided
to conduct follow-up interviews in February - March 2005. This entailed personal visits
to each of the six FTSE 100 companies situated in different locations such as London,
Bristol, Scotland and Nottingham. Prior to this, telephone calls were made to fix the
interview sessions with the same individuals that had participated in the questionnaire.
The reason for going back to the same individuals was because previous contact
facilitated easier access and cooperation in obtaining an interview session with these
individuals. Furthermore, it would be interesting to seek clarification and elaboration
on the issues that were answered earlier by the same individuals. However, there were
two individuals who participated in the survey questionnaire who had left the company
and therefore the department manager identified someone else with a similar
background and knowledge to participate in the interview session. Prior to this, letters
were sent out to these companies by the Institute for Enterprise and Innovation of
Nottingham University Business School explaining about the research project and the
purpose of conducting the interview session.
The interviews were conducted in the headquarters of the selected FTSE 100
companies. In order to allow a free flow of information, an attempt was made to
establish a rapport with the respondents by recapitulating the significance of the
research at the start of the interview. The respondents were encouraged to provide
answers and amplify comments (Burns, 2000). The probing for comparable and
codeable answers was another technique thatwas employed. As more respondents were
interviewed the similarities and differences in responses were traced. The same line of
reasoning was pursued in the following interviews with a view to obtaining an overall
picture. All respondents permitted the conversations to be tape-recorded. This helped
greatly in concentrating on the conversation and facilitated the assimilation of a large
mass of data. This was seen to be crucial in a situation where a number of interviews
were conducted over a short span of time. Some notes were also taken.
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5.9 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has revealed details of the research methodology employed in this study.
As mentioned earlier, this study has rejected choosing between the positivist and
interpretivist paradigm with regard to epistemology and methods (Tashakkori &
Teddlie, 1998). Instead the pragmatist viewpoint has been adopted and hence, the mixed
methods approach combining quantitative and qualitative techniques for collecting and
analysing data. Accordingly, Chapter 5 explains the design of the survey questionnaire,
secondary data and case studies. A description of the research methods and instruments
was followed by a discussion of questionnaire and interview schedule design. Concerns
about the reliability and validity of questionnaire design was emphasised, and the
process of questionnaire pre-testing was detailed, as were the measures of the constructs
used in the questionnaire to measure the level of corporate entrepreneurship in the
organisation. Also, questions were formulated for collecting information from
secondary data i.e. annual company reports to measure the governance level practices in
the company and this was also pre-tested to measure the validity and to ensure the
validity and reliability of the instrument. Finally, the data collection process with
respect to survey, secondary and case studies was explained.
The following chapters present the results obtained from analyses of the quantitative
and qualitative data. Chapter 6 summarises the main findings of the descriptive,
bivariate analysis and the development of a scatter graph to plot the score of the 42
companies in terms of their entrepreneurial and governance level and select companies
for the interview sessions. Chapter 7 presents additional analysis conducted to examine
the relationship between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship i.e.
factor analysis and exploratory regressions. Chapter 8 comments on the insights gained
from the case studies.
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6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS: PART I
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the findings from a quantitative analysis of the survey and secondary
data using descriptive and correlation analysis are presented. This builds on the
feedback sessions obtained on the questionnaires pertaining to Corporate
Entrepreneurship and Corporate Governance Indexes and the reliability and validity
checks of the questionnaires as detailed in Chapter 5.
Section 6.2 below provides descriptive statistics of the sample size for corporate
entrepreneurship and this is then divided into two subsections. Sub section 6.2.1
discusses in further detail the descriptiveanalysis for corporate entrepreneurship and is
followed by corporate governance in sub section 6.2.2. Section 6.3 presents the
bivariate correlation results on the relationship between corporate governance and
corporate entrepreneurship. Section 6.4 develops the scatter graph to select companies
for the purpose of case studies. Finally, section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The aim of this studyis to investigate the impact of Corporate Governance on Corporate
Entrepreneurship, analyse the role of boards of directors in respect of entrepreneurial
activities, investigate the impact of ownership dominance on corporate entrepreneurship
and explore the relationship between the remuneration structure and entrepreneurial
activities in an organisation. Given that the two main constructs are Corporate
Entrepreneurship and Corporate Governance, this section provides a descriptive
analysis of these variables. Thefirst partof this section describes the population, sample
size, response and usable rate of the study. The next section discusses the descriptive
statistics of corporate entrepreneurshipfollowed by corporate governance.
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Table 6.2.1: Response Rate of the Study
Population Size FTSE 100
Response rate 42 companies (42%)
Usable rate 100 % (after omitting 2 questions)
This smdy selected the FTSE 100 companies because of the complexity and competitive
nature of these businesses that face the pressures involved in being highly
entrepreneurial together with the mandatory requirement to practise corporate
governance. Questionnaires were e-mailed to these companies in June 2004. Lasting
three weeks, the first phase of the survey resulted in only 12% returns. One of the ways
to increase the response rate effectively was to send reminder letters (Cohen & Manion,
Kanuk & Berenson, 1975). Reminder letters were e-mailed, followed by personally
contacting the respondents by telephone. The process of contacting and reminding the
companies lasted another few weeks, until September 2004 and resulted in another 30%
return which in total came up to 42% response rate.
The FTSE 100 consists of service and non-service companies. This study had a
response rate of 26 service companies (62% of the total number of respondents) and 16
non-service companies (38%). However, only 56.25% of the respondents from the non-
service sector answered questions 15 and 16, which relate to the percentage of new
products and percentage of R&D spent over the last 2 years. There could be several
reasons why the respondents did not answer these two questions: inability to understand
the questions, issues of confidentiality, inability to remember or lack of awareness of
the company situation relating to these matters. Therefore, these two questions have
been omitted to increase the usable rate (table 6.2.1) to 100%.
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics: Corporate Entrepreneurship Index
This section presents the summary statistics of the key variables used for the study on
corporate entrepreneurship which comprises company orientation,
product/service/process innovation, management support, work discretion, risk taking,
reward/reinforcement, resource and time availability, and organisational boundaries.
These eight main variables are used to measure the total corporate entrepreneurialism
level in an organisation. Two different levels are formed to compare the result for each
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main variable and sub variables: Overall Entrepreneurial Level (OEL) and Individual
Entrepreneurial Level (IEL). The IEL is developed, by dividing the total score obtained
by each of the main variables into four quartiles. On the other hand, OEL is derived by
dividing the total entrepreneurship score into four quartiles and these levels will be used
in each of the main and sub variables. The purpose of using an individual and overall
level is to compare and benchmark the score obtained by each of the main and sub
variables to discover whether there are any similarities and differences in terms of
entrepreneurialism by using these 2 levels.
The total entrepreneurial level of the 42 companies obtained a mean score of 66% with
a standard deviation of 5.6% (Table 6.2.1.1). The histogram, Graph 6.2 below displays
the spread of the score ranging from 55% to 80% (graph 6.2). Using the quartile
method the scores have been divided according to 25%, 50% and 75%. At 25% the
score cut off point has been indicated at 62; 50% of the score point starts from 65.5 and
at 75% the score point begins at 70 (table 6.2.1.2). Based on this approach the scores
have been divided into four categories to distinguish those companies that possessed the
highest, upper-medium, lower-medium and lowest entrepreneurial level. These four
levels were used to develop the overall entrepreneurial level (OEL) for each variable.
Companies that obtained a score of below 62% were categorized to be at the lowest
entrepreneurial level, companies that scored between 62% and 66% were considered to
be entrepreneurial at lower-medium level, a score between 67% to 70% was categorized
as upper-medium level and companies that achieved above 70% were considered to be
highly entrepreneurial.
The total entrepreneurship score indicated that 9 companies (19%) were categorized as
highly entrepreneurial with a score of above 70%. Twelve companies (29%) obtained a
score ranging 67% to 70%, which was considered to be entrepreneurial at upper-
medium level (29%), 13 companies were considered to be entrepreneurial at lower-
medium level with the score ranging from 62% to 66% and 8 companies (19%)
obtained a score of below 62%, which was considered to be entrepreneurial at the
lowest level (table 6.2.1.3). The average entrepreneurial level for the 42 companies was
categorized at the lower-medium level (Table 6.2.1.16). This result indicated that half
of the 42 companies (50%) possessed lower medium level and below which revealed
that a large proportion of the companies were low entrepreneurially. It has been
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anticipated that FTSE 100 companies would be highly entrepreneurial in order to
compete with their rivals, which was not revealed in these findings.
Table 6.2.1.1: Descriptive Statistics: Corporate Entrepreneurship Index
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
Total Entrepreneurial Level 42 55 80 65.98 5.620
Level Co Characteristic 42 45 83 66.73 8.221
Level Co Dec Making 42 50 77 65.57 6.575
Level Company Orientation 42 51 77 66.05 6.349
Level New Product
Innovation
25 46 91 61.40 9.933
Level New Service
Innovation
32 20 100 66.09 17.261
Level New Process
Innovation
40 40 100 67.00 19.507
Level Management Support 42 44 92 65.71 12.498
Level Work Discretion 42 44 92 72.86 10.731
Level Risk Taking 42 40 90 63.93 11.715
Level Reward/Reinforcement 42 57 97 77.48 8.682
Level Resources & Time
Availability
42 40 83 59.23 10.833
Level Organisational
Boundaries
42 40 83 58.29 9.751





iStcl. Dev. = 5.(52
J^l = -42






Table 6.2.1.3: Entrepreneurial Level
Score Companies Percent Overall Entrepreneurial Level
Below 62% 8 19 Lowest Level
62% - 66% 13 31 Lower-Medium Level
61% - 70% 12 29 Upper-Medium Level
Above 70% 9 21 Highest Level
Total 42 100
Company Orientation
The first main variable, company orientation, was divided into two sub components:
company characteristics and decision-making. Company characteristics investigated
the perception of employees on new products/services introduced by their companies
compared to their competitors, top management philosophy and risk taking. This
variable obtained an average score of 67% with a standard deviation of 8.2% (Table
6.2.1.1 above). The range of scores varied between 45% and 83%. Table 6.2.1.4 shows
using DEL, 7 companies (17%) attained the highest score in terms of company
characteristics but it revealed twice as many by using OEL (14 companies: 33%). 11
companies (26%) were categorized at upper medium level, which indicated an almost
similar result'as using OEL (10 companies: 26%). Fourteen companies (33%) were
categorized at lower-medium level using IEL and only 8 companies (19%) fell under
this category using OEL. Both levels indicated similar results at the lowest level (10
companies: 24%). The average score for company characteristics could be categorized
at lower-medium level using IEL but it was placed at upper medium level by using OEL
(Table 6.2.1.16).
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In summary, at individual levels company characteristics were classified at lower levels
as compared to the overall level. It has been anticipated that FTSE 100 companies
would have a high score in terms of company orientation in order to be classified as a
highly entrepreneurial company in order to stay competitive in the business
environment. However, this was not indicated at an individual level but at an overall
level, this variable indicates a rather high-level in terms of company orientation. This
can be seen in that one third of the total number of companies (14 companies) was
classified at the highest level using OEL, as compared with only 7 companies when
using IEL. This showed that by using an overall measure, more companies were
classified as being highly entrepreneurial.
Table 6.2.1.4: The OEL and IEL on Company Characteristics
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
Level (OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Company > 70%: Highest Level 14 (33%) >73%: Highest Level 7 (17%)
Characteristi 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 10 (24%) 73%-69%: Upper-Medium 11(26%)
-c 67%-62%: Lower-Medium 8 (19%) 68%-62%: Lower-Medium 14 (33%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 10 (24%) Below 62%: Lowest Level 10 (24%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42(100%)
The second sub component on decision-making investigated the perception of
employees in terms of top-level decision-making ability to search out opportunities,
rapid growth and ability to make bold decisions and compromise the conflicting
demands of stakeholders. This variable had an average score of 65% with a standard
deviation of 6.5%. The range of score for this variable varied between 50% and 77%
(Table 6.2.1.1 above). Table 6.2.1.5 below shows that seven companies (17%) were
categorized at the highest level using IEL and OEL. In addition, this result revealed 10
companies (24%) fell under the category of upper-medium level using IEL and OEL.
19 companies (45%) were categorized at lower-medium level using IEL but only 12
companies (29%) are indicated using OEL. 6 companies (14%) were considered to be
at the lowest level using IEL but twice as many were revealed using OEL (30%). The
average score on decision-making was categorized at the lower-medium level using
both levels (Table 6.2.1.16). In summary, it was anticipated that the top 100 companies
would attain a high score on decision-making, as they are required to be agile and
possess the ability to make bold decisions in order to reap the benefits of the
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opportunities that arise and to stay competitive in the business environment. However,
the result revealed it was only at lower-medium level.
Table 6.2.1.5: The OEL and IEL on Decision Making
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Level Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
(OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Decision >70%: Highest Level 7 (17%) >70%: Highest Level 7 (17%)
Making 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 10 (24%) 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 10(24%)
67%-62%: Lower-Medium 12 (29%) 67%-60%: Lower-Medium 19 (45%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 13 (30%) Below 60%: Lowest Level 6 (14%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
The combinations of these two constiments developed the variable on company
orientation, which obtained an average score of 66% with a standard deviation of 6.3%.
The range of score varied from 51% to 71%. Table 6.2.1.6 indicates 10 companies
(24%) were categorized at the highest level using IEL and OEL. It was found that 7
companies (17%) were categorized at upper-medium level using IEL and OEL. In
addition, results in table 6.2.1.6 reveal that 15 companies (35%) were categorized at
lower medium level using IEL and OEL. Both levels indicated a similar number of
companies at the lowest level (10 companies: 24%). The average score on company
orientation was categorized at lower-medium level using both levels (Table 6.2.1.16).
In summary, in today's challengingbusiness environment one would expect companies
to be highly entrepreneurial and possess the ability to make bold decisions in order to
stay competitive. However, the result seemed to indicate otherwise for the 42
companies.
Table 6.2.1.6: The OEL and IEL on Company Orientation
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
Level (OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Company > 70%: Highest Level 10 (24%) >70: Highest Level 10 (24%)
Orientation 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 7 (17%) 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 7 (17%)
67%-62%: Lower-Medium 15(35%) 67%-63%: Lower-Medium 15 (35%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 10 (24%) Below 63%: Lowest Level 10 (24%)
Total 42 100%) Total 42 (100%)
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New Product /Service / Process Innovation
The second main variable consisted of three sub areas: product, service and process
innovation. Product innovation investigated the percentage of new product range,
R&D, product improvements or revision and product development. This variable had a
lower mean score of 61% with a standard deviation of 10% (Table 6.2.1.1) compared to
the variables on decision-making and company characteristics. The range of score
varied between 46% and 91%. Table 6.2.1.7 shows that 6 companies (24%) were
categorized to be at the highest-level using IEL for product innovation, which revealed
an almost similar result as using OEL (4 companies: 16%). 5 companies (20%) were
placed at upper-medium level using IEL and only 2 companies (8%) fell under this
category using OEL. There are 9 companies (36%) that fell under the category of
lower-medium level using IEL and only 5 companies were categorized at this level
using OEL. 56% of companies (14 companies) were categorized as being at the lowest
level using OEL but only 20% (5 companies) fell under this category using IEL (Table
6.2.1.7). The mean score for new product innovation was categorized at the lowest
level using OEL but it was placed at the upper-medium level using DBL (table 6.2.1.16).
This indicated that product innovation level among the 42 companies was placed at a
higher level by analysing at an individual level compared to the overall level. In
summary, it was anticipated that the top 100 companies would place a greater emphasis
on product innovation in order to stay competitive in the business environment. This
was not indicated using an overall level, but it was confirmed at an individual level.
Table 6.2.1.7: The OEL and IEL on Product Innovation
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
Level (OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Product > 70%: Highest Level 4 (16%) >65%: Highest Level 6 (24%)
Innovation 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 2 (8%) 65%-61%: Upper-Medium 5 (20%)
67%-62%: Lower-Medium 5 (20%) 60%-57%: Lower-Medium 9 (36%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 14 (56%) Below 57%: Lowest Level 5 (20%)
Total 25 (100%) Total 25 (100%)
On the other hand, service innovation investigates new service introduction and
improvement on existing services to the market. This variable had an average score of
66% (which was similar to the variable on decision-making) with a standard deviation
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of 17%. It had the broadest range compared to the other variables, which was between
20% and 100%. The results in table 6.2.1.8 revealed 7 companies (22%) obtained the
highest score for service innovation using ffiL and 10 companies (31%) were indicated
using OEL. In addition, 9 companies were categorized at the upper-medium level by
using EEL but it revealed only half as many (4 companies: 13%) using OEL. Thirteen
companies (41%) were categorized at lower-medium level using IEL and only 2
companies (6%) were placed at this level using OEL. It was found that 50% of the
companies (16 companies) were classified at the lowest level using OEL but only 9% (3
companies) fell under this category using IEL. The average score of this variable was
categorized at the upper-medium level (Table 6.2.1.16) using both levels. In summary,
companies are required to improve their services in order to provide customer
satisfaction and to stay ahead of their competitors and the results indicated that
emphasis was given to this aspect at an individual and overall level.
Table 6.2.1.8: The OEL and IEL on Service Innovation
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
Level (OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Service > 70%: Highest Level 10 (50%) >80%: Highest Level 7 (22%)
Innovation 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 4 (6%) 80%-64%: Upper-Medium 9 (28%)
67%-62%: Lower-Medium 2 (13%) 63%-55%: Lower-Medium 13 (41%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 16 (30%) Below 55%: Lowest Level 3 (9%)
Total 32 (100%) Total 32 (100%)
The variable for new process introduction investigated new methods and operational
processes used by companies in comparison with their major competitors. This variable
revealed an average score of 67% with a standard deviation of 19% (Table 6.2.1.1).
The range of score varied between 40% and 100%. The findings indicated that 6
companies were categorized at the highest level using JEL but it revealed more than
twice the number of companies (16) using OEL. 10 companies (25 %) were placed at
the upper-medium level using IEL but none were indicated using OEL. It was found
40% of the companies (16) were categorized at the lower-medium level using IEL but
none were revealed using OEL. 60% of the companies were classified at the lowest
level using OEL and only 20% (8 companies) fell under this category using EEL (Table
6.2.1.9). The average score for process innovation was categorized at the upper-
medium level (Table 6.1.2.16) using both levels (IEL and OEL). In summary,
companies needed to continuously improve on their processes in order to become more
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efficient and productive compared to their competitors. The results revealed that a large
proportion of the 42 companies seem to emphasize this aspect, which was to be
expected among the top 100 companies.
Table 6.2.1.9: The OEL and IEL on Process Innovation
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
Level (OEL) &% Level (DEL) &%
Process > 70%: Highest Level 7 (17%) >73%: Highest Level 7 (17%)
Innovation 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 18 (43%) 73%-69%: Upper-Medium 10(26%)
67%-62%: Lower-Medium 4 (10%) 68%-62%: Lower-Medium 19 (33%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 13 (30%) Below 62%: Lowest Level 6 (24%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
Management Support
The variable on management support investigated the perception of employees on the
support given by management in developing new ideas, providing discretion in
decision-making and promoting staff for their new and innovative ideas. This variable
had an average score of 66% with a standard deviation of 12%, which was rather similar
to the process innovation variable (Table 6.2.1.1). The range of score varied between
44% and 92%. The findings revealed that 9 companies (21%) were categorized at the
highest level using EEL whereas 13 companies (31%) fell under this category using
OEL. 10 companies (24 percent) were at the upper-medium level using IEL but
indicated half of this figure (6 companies) using OEL. 15 companies (36%) were
categorized at the lower-medium level using IEL and half were indicated using OEL.
19% of the companies were at the lowest level using EEL but had twice as many
companies (16 in total or 38%) using OEL (table 6.2.10). The average score for
management support could be categorized at the upper-medium level (Table 6.2.1.16)
using IEL but it was placed at the lower-medium level using OEL. In summary, it was
crucial for employees to obtain continuous support from their top management in order
to develop new ideas and to stay competitive. However, using the overall measure, this
result was not borne out, whereas using the individual level it was.
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Table 6.2.1.10: The OEL and IEL on Management Support
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
Level (OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Management > 70%: Highest Level 13 (31%) >72: Highest Level 9 (21%)
Support 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 6 (14%) 72%-65%: Upper-Medium 10(24%)
67%-62%: Lower-Medium 7 (17%) 64%-56%: Lower-Medium 15 (36%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 16 (38%) Below 56%: Lowest Level 8 (19%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
Work Discretion
The variable on work discretion investigated the degree of decision-making given to
employees in performing their work. Also, it investigated the approach used by
companies in providing feedback on work matters, opportunities provided for creativity
and the degree of freedom given to employees in decision-making. This variable
revealed an average score of 73% with a standard deviation of 10% (Table 6.2.1.1).
Similar to management support this variable revealed a range score of 44% and 92%.
The findings indicated that 60% of the companies (25 companies) were categorized at
the highest level for work discretion using OEL and 19% (8 companies) using IEL. 13
companies (31%) fell into the upper-medium level using ffiL but only 8 companies
(19%) were categorized at this level using OEL. It was found that 12 companies (29%)
were categorized at the lower-medium level using IEL but it revealed less than 3 times
the number (4 companies) using OEL. 9 companies (21%) were placed at the lowest
level using IEL but only 5 companies (12%) were at this level using OEL (Table
6.2.1.11). The mean score for work discretion was categorized at the highest level
using OEL (Table 6.2.1.16) and placed at the upper-medium level using IEL. In
summary, the findings seemed to indicate that at both levels (IEL & OEL) the 42
companies placed great emphasis on work discretion in encouraging their employees to
be high performers, which was one of the crucial elements in developing an
entrepreneurial organisation.
Table 6.2.1.11: The OEL and IEL on Work Discretion
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Level Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
(OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Work > 70%: Highest Level 25 (60%) >80%: Highest Level 8 (19%)
Discretion 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 8 (19%) 80%-75%: Upper-Medium 13(31%)
67%-62%: Lower-Medium 4 (9%) 74%-68%: Lower-Medium 12 (29%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 5 (12%) Below 68%: Lowest Level 9 (21%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
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Risk taking
The variable on risk taking investigated the perception of employees on calculated risk
and support given by an organisation on risk taking. This variable had an average score
of 63% with a standard deviation of 11% (Table 6.2.1.1). Similar to the variable on
work discretion and management support, this variable ranged between 40% and 90%.
The findings revealed that 5 companies (12%) were categorized at the highest level in
terms of risk taking using IEL and it indicated twice as many (12 companies) using
OEL. 9 companies were categorized to be at the upper-medium level using IEL and
only 2 companies (5%) were indicatedusing OEL. 22 companies (52%) were placed at
the lower-medium level using EEL and 8 companies (19%) were placed at this level
using OEL. Nearly 50% of the companies were classified at the lowest level using OEL
and only 14% were revealed using IEL (table 6.4.1.12). The average score for risk
taking could be categorized at the lower-medium level (Table 6.2.1.16) using both
levels. In summary it was anticipated that FTSE 100 companies would place great
emphasis on risk taking due to the nature of their business, which required them to be
high-risk takers to compete in the business environment. However, the results seemed
to reveal that these companies were lacking in this aspect.
Table 6.2.1.12: The OEL and IEL on Risk Taking
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Level Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
(OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Risk > 70%: Highest Level 12 (28%) >75%: Highest Level 5 (12%)
Taking 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 2 (5%) 75%-66%: Upper-Medium 9 (22%)
67%-62%: Lower-Medium 8 (19%) 65%-55%: Lower-Medium 22 (52%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 20 (30%) Below 55%: Lowest Level 6 (14%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
Reward/ Reinforcement
The variable on reward/reinforcement investigated the perception of employees in terms
of the amount of support provided by their superior in performing their tasks. Also, it
investigated whether the reward system was based on performance, the degree of
responsibility and recognition given to employees. This variable had an average score
of 77% with a standarddeviation of 8.7% (Table6.2.1.1). It had the narrowest range of
score compared to other variables, which was between 57% and 97%. The result
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revealed 74% of the companies (31 companies) were placed at the highest level for
reward and reinforcement by using OEL and only 19% of the companies (8 companies)
fell into this category using IEL. In addition, the findings indicated that 15 companies
were categorized at the upper-medium level using IEL and only 9 companies were
placed at this level using OEL. 11 companies (26%) were categorized at the lower-
medium level using IEL and none using OEL. 8 companies (19%) were categorized at
the lowest level using IEL and only two companies (5%) fell under this level using OEL
(Table 6.2.1.13). The mean score for reward/reinforcement was classified at the highest
level using OEL but placed at the lowest level using JEL (Table 6.2.1.16). In summary,
the overall level seemed to provide an interesting indication that the 42 companies
favoured reward/reinforcement in encouraging their employees to be entrepreneurial but
this was not indicated at an individual level.
Table 6.2.1.13: The OEL and IEL on Reward Reinforcement
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
Level (OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Reward > 70%: Highest Level 31(74%) >80%: Highest Level 8 (19%)
Reinforceme 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 9 (21%) 80: Upper-Medium Level 15(36%)
-nt 67%-62%: Lower-Medium 0 (0%) 79%-70%: Lower-Medium 11(26%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 2 (5%) Below 70%: Lowest Level 8 (19%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
Resource & Time Availability
The variable on resource and time availability investigated whether sufficient resources
and time were provided for new projects. This variable had an average score of 59%
with a standard deviation of 11% (Table 6.2.1.1) and revealed a range of scores between
40% and 83%. The findings indicated that 7 companies were categorized at the highest
level for resource and time availability using IEL, which was almost similar as using
OEL (6 companies: 14%). 12 companies (29%) were classified at the upper-medium
level using EEL and 7 companies (17%) were categorized at this level using OEL. 4
companies (10%) were categorized at the lower-medium level using OEL whilst this
increased 4 times more using IEL (16 companies: 38%). 59% of the companies (25
companies) were categorized at the lowest level using OEL and only 7 companies
(17%) were placed under this category using IEL (table 6.4.1.14). The mean score for
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resource and time availability was categorized at the lowest level (Table 6.2.1.16) using
OEL but it was placed at the upper-medium level using IEL. In summary, it was
expected that the top 100 companies would be able to provide sufficient resources and
time to their employees due to the size and financial stability that they possessed.
However, the overall result seemed to indicate that a large proportion of the 42
companies (60%) did not provide this to their employees but indicated otherwise
(upper-medium) at the individual level.
Table 6.2.1.14: The OEL and IEL on Resource & Time Availability
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
Level (OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Resource & > 70%: Highest Level 6(14%) >73%: Highest Level 7 (16%)
Time 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 7 (17%) 73%-69%: Upper-Medium 12(29%)
Availability 67%-62%: Lower-Medium 4 (10%) 68%-62%: Lower-Medium 16 (38%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 25 (59%) Below 62%: Lowest Level 7 (17%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
Organisational Boundaries
Finally, the organisational boundaries variables investigated the organisations standard
operating procedures or practices in performing task and their structure. This variable
revealed an average score of 58% with a standard deviation of 9.7% (Table 6.2.1.1).
Similar to the variable on resources and time availability this variable ranged between
40% and 83%. The result indicated 10 companies (24%) were placed at the highest
level using IEL for organisationalboundaries and only 4 companies (10%) were placed
at this level using OEL. In addition, 7 companies were classified at the upper-medium
level using IEL where a similar number of companies were also indicated using OEL (6
companies: 14%). It was found 50% of the companies (21 in total) were categorized at
the lower-medium level using IEL and 12% of the companies (5) fell under this
category using OEL. More than half of the companies (64%: 27 companies) were
classified at the lowest level using OEL but only 10% (4 companies) were placed at this
level using IEL (Table 6.2.1.15). The average score for this variable could be classified
at the lowest level (Table 6.2.1.16) using OEL but it was placed at upper-medium level
using IEL. In summary, companies face great pressure to be flexible in today's
challenging business environment and need to possess lean structures in order to stay
competitive. This result seemed to indicate that a large proportion (65%) of the
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companies potentially possessed rigid operating procedures using the overall level but it
revealed otherwise using an individual level.
Table 6.2.1.15: The OEL and EEL on Organisational Boundaries
Variable Overall Entrepreneurial Frequency Individual Entrepreneurial Frequency
Level (OEL) &% Level (IEL) &%
Organisation > 70%: Highest Level 4 (10%) >64%: Highest Level 10 (24%)
Boundaries 70%-68%: Upper-Medium 6 (14%) 64%-58%: Upper-Medium 7 (16%)
67%-62%: Lower-Medium 5 (12%) 57%-50%: Lower-Medium 21 (50%)
< 62%: Lowest Level 27 (64%) Below 50%: Lowest Level 4 (10%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
In summary, the total corporate entrepreneurial level of the 42 companies revealed an
average score of 68%, which was categorized at lower-medium level. All the 8 key
variables obtained a rather low standard deviation from the mean ranging between 5%
to 19%. The mean score obtained for each of these variables ranged from 57% to 77%.
On average 2 variables (work discretion and reward/reinforcement) were categorized at
the highest level using overall level. The overall level (OEL) indicated five variables
were classified at the upper-medium level (company characteristics, service innovation,
process innovation, management support and risk taking), 2 variables fell under the
category of the lower-medium level (company orientation and decision making) and 3
variables were at the lowest level (product innovation, resource and time availability
and organisational boundaries). On the other hand, the individual level (IEL) did not
categorize any variable to be at the highest level but 8 variables were classified at the
upper-medium level (product innovation, service innovation, process innovation,
management support, work discretion, risk taking, reward/reinforcement, resource &
time availability and organisational boundaries) and 4 variables were at the lower-
medium level (company orientation, company characteristics, decision making, and
reward reinforcement). The overall level seemed to indicate that the 42 companies
placed great importance on work discretion and reward reinforcement in encouraging
their employees to be entrepreneurial, but these two variables were placed at the lower
level using the individual level. Also, the overall level indicatedcompanies placed low
importance on product innovation, resources and time availability and organisational
boundaries and these factors had been anticipated to be of a high importance among the
top 100 companies but at an individual level it was placed at a higher level.
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Management Support 66% Upper-Medium Level Upper-Medium Level
Work Discretion 73% Highest Level Upper-Medium Level
Risk Taking 64% Upper-Medium Level Upper-Medium Level
Reward/Reinforcement 77% Highest Level Lower-Medium Level
Resource & Time
Availability
59% Lowest Level Upper-Medium Level
Organisational
Boundaries
58% Lowest Level Upper-Medium Level
Entrepreneurial Level 66% Lower-Medium Level
6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics: Corporate Governance
The previous section discussed the descriptive statistics of Corporate Entrepreneurship.
This section presents the descriptive statistics of Corporate Governance. Initially, 32
variables were developed to measure the corporate governance level of the FTSEIOO
companies. However, after the post data collection process 12 variables were omitted,
as a clear variation among companies was not evident in terms of their governance
practices. This first section presents the descriptive statistics of the 32 variables. The
second section analyses the 20 variables that were used in measuring the governance
level of the companies.
Companies that participated in the corporate entrepreneurship survey were also
investigated in terms of their governance levels using secondary data from annual
reports. At the first stage, 32 variables were developed for corporate governance and
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classified into four main areas: Ownership structure, Board Structure, Board
Committees and Remuneration structure
Ownership Structure
The variable in the ownership structure investigated four main areas: the percentage of
shares held by block holders, shares held by the single largest block holder, the amount
of shares held by directors and non-executive directors. The results revealed the
percentage of shares held by block holders on average was 21% with a standard
deviation of 21% (Table 6.2.2.1). The range varied between 0% and 98%. On the other
hand, the single largest block holder held an average share of 10% with a standard
deviation of 11%. The range varied between 0% and 63%.
In addition, the average percentage of shares offered to directors was 2.9% with a
standard deviation of 8.6%. The percentage of shares varied from 0% to 47%. As for
non-executive directors the average percentage of shares held by them was 0.73% with
a standard deviation of 1.9%. The amount of shares held by them varied from 0% to
10%.
Table 6.2.2.1: Descriptive Statistics: Ownership Structure/Board Structure /Board
Committees/Remuneration Strucmre
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
% Shares Held By Block holders 42 0 98 21.12 21.151
% Shares Held By A Single
largest Block holders
42 0 63 10.35 11.682
% Shares Held By Directors 42 0 47 2.94 8.580
% Shares Held By Non-
Executive Directors
42 0 10 0.73 0.1991
Board Size 42 6 18 11.98 2.700
% Board held by Independent
Non-Exec Director
42 31 82 52.04 10.939
Number of Board Meetings 41 4 24 9.59 3.521
% of Remuneration Committee
held by Non-Exec
42 67 100 97.21 7.977
Number of Remuneration
Committee Meetings
30 2 10 5.43 2.300
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% of Audit Committee Held By
Non-Exec
42 67 100 97.73 7.336
Number of AC meetings 37 2 8 4.30 1.412
Number of Nomination
Committee meetings
25 0 6 3.04 1.791
Average Executive Director Salary 42 186000 874928 413165.29 157746.530
Highest Amt Paid Director 42 200000 1307200 653988.38 259467.632
Maximum Exe Directors Bonus 41 25 200 91.03 39.702
Board Structure
The board structure investigated the number of directors sitting on the board, percentage
of board seats held by independent non-executive directors, existence of senior
independent non-executives, how frequently the board met per year and provision for
training and development for non-executive directors and chairman.
The total number of directors sitting on the board obtained an average score of 12
members with a standard deviation of 2.7 (table 6.2.2.1). The range varied from 6 to 18
members on the board. On the other hand, the percentage of board seats held by
independent non-executive directors obtained an average score of 52% with the
standard deviation of 10%. The board seat held by them varied from 31% to 82% (table
6.2.2.1).
In terms of senior independent non-executive directors, the descriptive statistics in table
6.2.2.2 indicated that 88.1% of the companies possessed a senior independent non
executive director on the board. The board met on average 10 times per year with a
standard deviation of 3.5. The range varied from 4 to 24 meetings per year (table
6.2.2.1). Also, the result indicated that 71% of the non-executives directors and
chairmen were provided with training and development (table 6.2.2.1).
Board Committees
The board committee consisted of three sub committees namely the remuneration
committee, audit committee and nomination committee. This study investigated the
remuneration committee in terms of the proportion of seats held by non-executives and
the number of meetings held per year. As for audit committees it analysed the
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proportion of seats held by non-executive directors, induction or on-going training
provided to audit committee members and the number of times the committee meets per
year. The nomination committee investigated the existence of the committee and the
number of meetings held per year. Also, this section analyses whether the CEO chairs
and attends any of the board committee meetings.
The result revealed on average that 97% (with a standard deviation of 8%) of the
remuneration committees' members were non-executive directors (Table 6.2.2.1). This
committee possessed non-executive directors ranging from 67% to 100%. An average
of 5 meetings were held per year with a standard deviation of 2.3 and the range of
meetings varied from 2 to 10 meetings per year (table 6.2.2.1 above).
Similar results were revealed for the audit committee in terms of their non-executive
directors (97%) with a standard deviation of 7.3%. The percentage of non-executive
directors varied from 67% to 100%. An average of 4 meetings were held with a
standard deviation of 1.4 (table 6.2.2.1 above) and the range varied from 2 to 8
meetings per year. Also, the result (table 6.2.2.2 below) revealed only 10% of the audit
committee members were provided with induction or on-going training.
Also, all 42 companies possessed a nomination committee (table 6.2.2.2). This
committee held an average of 3 meetings per year (with a standard deviation of 1.7) and
the range varied from 0 to 6 meetings per year (table 6.2.2.1).
In addition, the results revealed that 98% of the CEO's did not chair any of the board
committee meetings but 88% of them did attend board committee meetings. This
provided an indication that the CEOs of the 42 companies were highly likely to exert
some form of influence on the decision-making process of the committees. The
presence of the CEO in the board committee meeting is likely to affect the decision
making of the committee to be more in favour towards him.
Remuneration
This section investigated 14 aspects of the remuneration scheme provided to executive
directors: average salary paid to executive director; highest paid director; existence of
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external adviser on remuneration schemes; existence of LTIP for executives;
performance criteria awarding LTIP; comparative groups for benchmarking LTIP;
disclosure of peer group companies; reasons in selecting the companies, existence of
share option, performance hurdles in awarding share options; disclosure of different
share option grants; existence of annual bonus awards; disclosure of criteria used in
granting annual bonus and maximum bonus paid to executive directors.
The results revealed that executive directors received an average salary of £413,000
with a standard deviation of £158,000. Their salary ranged from £186,000 to £874,928
(table 6.2.2.1). On the other hand, the highest paid director received an average salary
of £654,000 with a standard deviation of £259,000. Their salary ranged from £200,000
to £1,307,200 (Table 6.2.2.1). Also, the findings revealed that 91% of the companies
had appointed an external advisor to evaluate the director's remuneration scheme (Table
6.2.2.2).
Table 6.2.2.2: Frequency: Board Structure/Board Committees/Remuneration Structure
Variable Frequency Percent




















Nomination Committee Existence Yes 42 100.00




















































LTIP Criteria Benchmark None 4 9.5
Market Index 2 4.8
Growth Based 1 2.4
Performance
Market Index + 4 9.5
Peer Group
Peer Group + 12 28.6
Growth Based
Performance








Peer Group Companies Disclosure No 23 54.8
Yes 19 45.2
Total 42 100.0
Reasons Stated for Selecting Peer Group No 34 81.0
Companies Yes 8 19.0
Total 42 100.0








Performance Hurdle before Awarding Share No 5 11.9
Options Yes 37 88.1
Total 42 100.0
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Annual Bonus for Exec Directors Yes 42 100.0









Table 6.2.2.2 shows the descriptive statistic for Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP). The
LTIP became a popular way to incentivise executives from the 1990sonwards replacing
ESO. The results here indicated that LTIP was widely used with 90.5% of the
companies providing LTIP to their executive directors. There were several performance
criteria used by companies in awarding LTIP (table 6.2.2.2) where 11.9 % used
Earnings Per Share (EPS), 52.4% used Total Shareholder Return (TSR), 23.8% used
both measures (TSR andEPS), 2.4% used other measures and 9.5% did not practice any
LTIP. The findings revealed that TSR has become a popular performance criterion in
awarding LTIP. There were different types of comparative group benchmarks used in
evaluating the company's LTIP. The data revealed 4.8% of the companies used market
index, 2.4% used selected growth based on a chosen performance yardstick, 9.5%
utilized the market index and peer group, 29.3% used both peer group and growthbased
on a chosen performance yardstick, 28.6% used the market index and growth based on
performance and 16.7% utilized all three criteria as benchmarks (table 6.2.2.2). In
terms of revealing information of their peer group companies only 45% of the
companies disclosed the name of their peer group companies and only 19% of the
companies revealed the reasons for selecting their peer group companies (table 6.2.2.2).
This provided an indication that there was still a lack of disclosure among FTSE 100
companies in providing additional information on the selection of peer group companies
to their shareholders.
Share Options have been popular among companies since the late 1980s and early
1990s. The results revealed 98% of the companies still considered share options as part
of their executive remuneration package scheme (Table: 6.2.2.2). This provided an
indication that share options have again become a popular way to incentivise
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executives. In addition, the findings indicated that 88% of the companies used
performance hurdles before awarding share options to their executives and only 71% of
these companies disclosed different share option grants that have been awarded to their
executives in the previous years. This provided an indication that there are FTSE 100
companies still failing to disclose the number of grants that have been awarded to their
executives in the past years. This shows the transparency level among these companies
are still lacking.
Table 6.2.2.2 shows the descriptive statistics for annual bonuses where the results
revealed that all companies paid bonuses to their executive directors. This indicated
that it was a standard norm for FTSE 100 companies to offer bonuses as part of their
executive compensation package. However, only 33% of these companies published
detailed criteria used for granting an annual bonus to their directors (table 6.2.2.2).
Executives were offeredan average maximum bonus of 91% of their annual salary with
a high standard deviation of 40%. The amount varied from 25% to 200% (table
6.2.2.1). This seemed to indicate that a large proportion of the FTSE 100 companies
offeredlarge amounts of bonuses to their executives annually without being transparent
on the criteria used in awarding annual bonuses to executives.
Descriptive Statistics: Corporate Governance Index
The first part of this section discussed the descriptive statistics of the 32 variables of the
42 companies who provided responses to the corporate entrepreneurship surveys in
terms of their governance practices. However, after the post data collection process 12
variables were omitted, as it was not showing a clear variation among companies in
terms of their governance practices. Table 6.2.2.3 provides the reason to why the 12
variables have been omitted.
Table 6.2.2.3: Corporate Governance Index: - Reasons for Omittingthe Questions
Corporate Governance Index
Ownership Structure
Q3: Percentage of shares held by directors?
Reasons for Omitting the Questions
Most companies offered shares ranging 0%
to 3.1% - did not provide any variance
among companies on governance practices.
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Q4: What is percentage of shares held by non
executive directors?
Board Structure
Q10: What is the percentage of the
remuneration committee seats held by
non-executive directors?
Q12: What is the percentage of audit
committee seats held by non-executive
directors?
Q13: Is there induction and on-going training
given to audit committee?
Q15: Is there a nomination committee?
Q17: Does the CEO chair any of these
committees?
Remuneration Structure
Q21: Is there an external advisor appointed
with respect to evaluation of executive
remuneration scheme?
Q22: Is there a long-term incentive plan
(LTIP) for employees?
Q27: Is share option considered part of the
remuneration package?
Q28: Does the company provide any
performance hurdles before share
options are awarded to executives?
Q30: Is there any annual bonus award given to
executive directors?
» On average companies offered shares to non-
executives ranging from 0% to 0.07% - did
-not provide any variation among companies.
90% of remuneration committees held by
non-executives - lack of variation among
companies on governance practices
90% of audit committees held by non-
executives - lack of variation among
companies on governance practices.
Only 4.8% companies provided training to
audit members - lack of variation among
companies on governance practices.
All companies possessed a nomination
committee - no variation among companies
on governance practices.
None of the companies had their CEO
chairing any board committees - did not
provide any variation on governance
practices.
• 90% of the companies disclosed this
information - did not create much variation
among companies on governance practices.
• 90% of the companies practiced LTIP - did
not create much variation on governance
practices.
• 98% of the companies practiced share
options schemes - did not create any
variation on governance practices.
• 90% of the companies provided performance
hurdles in awarding share options - did not
provide much variation on governance
practices.
• All companies awarded annual bonus - did
not provide any variation on governance
practices.
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the 20 variables that were used in
measuring the governance levels of the companies. Two different levels were formed to
compare the result for each main variable: Overall Governance Level (OGL) and
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Individual Governance Level (IGL). The IGL was developed by dividing the total score
obtained by each of the main variables into four quartiles. The OEL was derived from
the total governance score, which was again divided into four quartiles. The purpose of
using an individual and overall level was to compare and benchmark the score obtained
by each of the main and sub variables as to whether there were any similarities and
differences using these 2 different levels.
After the data collection, two variables were used in measuring ownership structure:
percentage of shares held by block holders and percentage of shares held by a single
largestblock holder. Two questions under ownership structure were omittedas they did
not provide any variation on governance practices (table 6.2.2.3 provides detail
reasons). Five variables were used in measuring the board structure which consisted of:
total number of directors sitting on the board, percentage of board seats held by
independent non-executives, the presence of senior independent non-executives on the
board, how frequently the boardmet per year and provision of training and development
for non-executive directors and the chairman. Initially, the board committee consisted
of 9 variables but after the data collection process 5 variables were eliminated as they
did not show clear variation on governance practices (table 6.2.2.3 provides detail
reasons). The 4 variables used in measuring the board committee consist of: how
frequently the remuneration, audit andnomination committees conducted theirmeetings
in one year and whether the CEO was present at any of the committee meetings.
The remuneration structure section initially consisted of 14 variables but 5 questions
were omitted as they did not show any variation among companies in terms of
governance practices (table 6.2.2.3 provides detail reasons). The 9 remaining variables
consisted of: average salary paid to an executive director, salary of the highest paid
director, performance criteria used in awarding LTIP, comparative group benchmark
used to evaluate the company's LTIP performance criteria, disclosure of the name of
peer group companies, reasons provided in selecting peer group companies, disclosure
of different grants offered to executives, disclosure of detailed criteria usedfor granting
annual bonuses and the maximum bonus paid to eligible executive directors.
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Corporate Governance Level
The findings revealed the average governance level of the 42 companies was 61% with
a standard deviation of 8.6% (table 6.2.2.4). The histogram graph 6.2.2 displays the
spread of score ranging from 38% to 78% (Graph 6.2.2). Similarly with the Corporate
Entrepreneurship Index the quartile method was used to divide the scores according to
25%, 50% and 75% to develop an Overall Governance Level (OGL). At 25%, the score
cut off point was indicated at 56. The 50% score point started from 60 and at 75% the
score point began at 67.5 (table 6.2.2.4). Based on this approach the scores were
divided into four categories to distinguish companies that possessed the highest, upper-
medium, lower-medium and lowest governance levels. 10 companies (24%) obtained a
score of above 68%, which was categorized as the highest governance level. 13
companies (31%) obtained a score ranging from 60% to 68% classified as the upper-
medium governance level, 10 companies (21%) obtained a score ranging from 50% to
56% categorized as the lower-medium level and 9 companies (21%) obtained a score
below 56% considered as the lowest governance level (table 6.2.2.6). The total average
governance level of the 42 companies was categorized at upper-medium level which
indicated that the governance level of these companies was at a rather high level. These
four levels (OEL) were used to benchmark the distribution of scores obtained by each of
the main variables developed using the Individual Governance Level (IGL).
Table 6.2.2.4: Total Corporate Governance Level
N Minimum Maximurr Mean Std. Deviation
Level of Governance
42 38 78 60.93 8.668







Table 6.2.2.6: Total Governance Level
Score Companies Percentage Level of Governance
Below 56% 9 21 Lowest Level
56% - 59% 10 24 Lower-Medium Level
60% - 68% 13 31 Upper-Medium Level
Above 68% 10 24 Highest
Total 42 100.00
Graph 6.2.2: Total Corporate Governance Level
Histogram
40 50 6D 70
Level of Governance
Mean = GD.93
Std. Dev. - 8.6S8
M = 42
Ownership Structure
The ownership structure consisted of 2 variables, namely shares held by block holders
and single largest block holder to measure the governance levels of the companies.
Having a higher number of institutional shareholders in a company provides an
indication that there would be a higher level of shareholder activism, as this would
create greater pressure among companies to be more transparent with their governance
practices. The findings in table 6.2.2.11 revealed that 31 companies (73.8%) possessed
block holders ranging from 0% to 25%, which was considered to be at a low level. 8
companies (19%) possessed block holders ranging from 26% to 50% considered to be at
the medium level, and only 3 companies (7.1%) possessed block holders owning shares
above 50%, which was categorized at a high level. The result revealed that a large
proportion (74%) of the 42 companies did not possess large percentages of block
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holders in their companies and this indicated that the ownership structure of these
companies seemed to be more dispersed rather than concentrated.
A reverse score was allocated for companies that possessed a single block holder who
owned a large amount of shares in a company. This was because companies that were
owned by a single large block holder would be able to control the company for its own
benefit and disregard the interests of smaller holders. The findings indicated that 35
companies (83.3 %) had their single largest block holder owning shares ranging from
1% to 25%, which was categorized as good governance practice and 3 companies
(7.1%) had their single largest block holder owning shares ranging from 26% to 50%
and only 1 company (2.4%) had shares above 50% (table 6.2.2.11). There were 3
companies (7.1%) that did not possess any single largest block holder in their company.
The findings seemed to reveal that a large proportion (83%) of the 42 companies did not
possess a single largest block holder who owned a large number of shares and this was a
positive indication in terms of governance practices in these companies.
The total score on ownership structure was derived from the above two variables which
obtained an average score of 67% with a standard deviation of 15.9% (table 6.2.2.12).
This indicated that the governance level in terms of ownership structure on average was
considered to be at a medium level. Therefore, this revealed that there was more
concentrated ownership and less of block holder which may indicate there was less of
shareholder activism and less control towards the company. The range of scores varied
from 17% to 100%. The findings in table 6.2.2.7 indicated that at an Individual
Governance Level (IGL) only 1 company (2%) was placed at the highest level and 8
companies (19%) were categorized at this level using OGL. 7 companies (17%)
attained upper-medium level using IGL but it revealed 4 times more (31 companies:
74%) using OGL. It was found that 74% of the companies were categorized at lower-
medium level using IGL but none were revealed using OGL. Both levels (IGL & OGL)
indicated 3 companies (7%) at the lowest level.
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Table 6.2.2.7: Ownership Structure - OGL & IGL
Variable Overall Governance Level Frequency Individual Frequency
(OGL) &% Governance Level (IGL) &%
Ownership Above 68%: Highest level 8(19%) Above 100%: Highest level 1 (2%)
Structure 68% to 60%: Upper-Medium 31 (74%) 83%: Upper-Medium 7 (17%)
59% to 56%: Lower-Medium 0 (0%) 67%: Lower-Medium 31 (74%)
Below 56%: Lowest Level 3 (7%) 17%: Lowest Level 3 (7%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
The mean score for ownership structures could be categorized at the upper-medium
level using OGL but it was placed at the lower-medium level using IGL (table 6.2.2.13).
In summary, this finding provided an indication of higher governance levels using the
overall approach, but was revealed at a lower level using the individual approach. This
suggested that at an individual level there was a lack of block holders holding large
numbers of shares, which indicated there was a lower level of shareholder activism in
these companies and therefore there was a need for these companies to improve in this
aspect.
Board Structure
The board structure consisted of five variables that measured the governance levels of
these companies. Companies need to be spearheaded by an effective board, which
would lead and control the company. Various opinions have been given by researchers
in terms of the appropriate board size. The findings revealed there was only 1 company
(2.4 %) that possessed a board size ranging between 1 to 6 members, which was
categorized as medium governance practice. 25 companies (59.5%) possessed a board
size ranging from 7 to 12 members considered the most ideal size and 16 companies
(38.1%) possessed a board of above 12 members (table 6.2.2.11). This showed that
more than half of the companies possessed the right board size, which was considered
to be good governance practice.
The board should consist of executive and non-executive directors who are either
independent or non-independent. Independent directors play the role of monitoring the
actions of the CEO and executive directors to ensure that the interests of shareholders
are taken care of. Companies that possessed over 50% independent non-executive
directors on the board were considered to be better governed in comparison to
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companies that possess less than 50% independent non-executive directors. The
findings revealed that 27 companies (64.3%) possessed board seats of above 50% by
independent non-executives which was considered to be good governance practice as
they were able to monitor and provide independent views about the company and 15
companies (35.7%) possessed less than 50% independent non-executive directors (table
6.2.2.11).
In addition, the existence of a senior independent non-executive director on the board
was considered important in resolving matters concerning shareholders. The Combined
Code (2003) stresses the need for companies to possess a senior independent non
executive who must to be available to shareholders if any concerns arise. The findings
indicated that 88% of the companies (37 companies) possessed a senior independent
executive on the board (table 6.2.2.11), which complied with the requirements of the
Combined Code that is classified as good governance practice.
Also, it was important for boards to meet regularly to discharge their duties more
effectively. The board that meets more often is considered to be more efficient. The
frequency of meetings would differ from one company to another. The findings
indicated that 8 companies (19%) conducted meetings ranging from 1 to 6 times per
year, 28 companies (66.7%) held between 7 to 12 meetings and 5 companies (11.9%)
met between 13 to 24 times per year, which was considered to be good governance
practice (table 6.2.2.11). This showed that more than half of the companies met
between 7 to 12 times per year, which was considered to be at the medium governance
level.
In addition, the Combined Code (July 2003) emphasised the need to provide induction
and on-going training for non-executive directors and the chairman in order to keep
them abreast with the current issues in regards to their business and the company. The
result indicated that 30 companies (71.4%) practiced this which was considered to be
good governance practice (table 6.2.2.11).
The total score for a board's structure derived from these five variables obtained an
average score of 67% with a standard deviation of 12.78% (table 6.2.2.12). This
indicated that the governance level in terms of board structure was considered to be at
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medium level. Therefore, this suggested these companies could further improvise on
their governance practices in terms of the number of independent non-executives on the
board. The range of score varied from 36% to 91%. Table 6.2.2.8 shows when IGL
was considered only 1 company (2.3%) obtained the highest level for board structure
whilst 19 companies were categorized at this level using OGL. 64% (27 companies) of
the companies were placed at the upper-medium level using IGL but only 22% (9
companies) were categorized at this level using OGL. 11 companies (26%) were
categorized at the lower-medium level using IGL but none using OGL. 3 companies
(8%) were at the lowest level using IGL and 4 times more were revealed using OGL (14
companies: 33%). The board structure on average was categorized at the upper-
medium level using both levels (IGL & OGL). In summary, this provided an indication
that the governance practices of the 42 companies in terms of board structure was at a
high level.
Table 6.2.2.8: Board Structure - IGL & OGL
Variable Overall Governance Level Frequency Individual Frequency
(OGL) &% Governance Level (IGL) &%
Board Above 68%: Highest level 19 (45%) Above 82%: Highest level 1 (2%)
Structure 68% to 60%: Upper-Medium 9 (22%) 82% to 64%: Upper-Medium 27 (64%)
59% to 56%: Lower-Medium 0 (0%) 63% to 55%: Lower-Medium 11(26%)
Below 56%: Lowest Level 14 (33%) Below 55%: Lowest Level 3 (8%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
Board Committees
The Combined Code (July 2003) stressed that the formation of three main board
committees namely remuneration, audit and nomination committees as a result of
having been identified as problematic areas in terms of governance practices. These
committees were formed with the objective of creating greater monitoring and
transparency levels in the company. This section consisted of 4 variables that evaluate
the practices of the board committees.
One of the main functions of the remuneration committee was to determine the
director's remuneration. Therefore, the higher the frequency with which this committee
met the more it was considered to be active and efficient in resolving matters
concerning remuneration. The findings indicated that 10 companies (23.8%) conducted
the least number of meetings ranging from 2 to 4 times per year. 13 companies (31%)
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conducted 5 to 7 meetings per year, which was considered to be at an average level, and
7 companies (16.7%) held the most frequent number of meetings ranging from 8 to 10
times per year (table 6.2.2.11).
On the other hand, the audit committee was formed to review the scope and outcome of
the audit and try to ensure that the objectivity of the auditors was maintained. The
Smith Report required the audit committee to meet at least 3 times in a year. The
findings indicated that 24 companies (57.1%) held the least frequent number of
meetings between 2 to 4 times per year. 11 companies (26.2%) conducted 5 to 7
meetings and only 2 companies (4.8%) had the most frequent number of meetings
ranging from 8 to 10 times per year (table 6.2.2.11).
The role of the nomination committee was to evaluate the existing balance of skills,
knowledge and experience of the board members and to prepare a candidate profile for
new appointments. The findings indicated in table 6.2.2.11 that 10 companies (23.8%)
conducted the least number of meetings between 1 to 2 times per year, 8 companies
(19%) conducted between 3 to 4 meetings and 6 companies (14.3%) held the most
frequent number of meetings between 5 to 6 times per year. However, 18 companies
(42.9%) did not reveal how often their nomination committees met (table 6.2.2.6),
which indicated that there was a continuance in the lack of transparency among the 42
companies in disclosing this type of information to the public.
In addition, the Combined Code did not encourage CEOs to attend any of the committee
meetings as a conflict of interest might arise which could potentially influence the
decision making of the committees. The results revealed that 36 companies (85.7%)
had their CEO attending board committee meetings, which was considered to be bad
governance practice (Table 6.2.2.11) as it could provide negative implications on the
decision making process of the board.
The total score for board committee was derived from the above 4 variables, which
obtained an average score of 38% with the standard deviation of 21.58% (table
6.2.2.12). This indicated that on average the governance level in terms of board
committee was considered to be at low level. This suggested the need for board
committees to meet more regularly in discussing pertinent issues relating to audit,
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remuneration and nomination. The range of score varied from 0% to 80%. The
findings in table 6.2.2.9 indicated that 5 companies (12%) were at the highest level
using Individual and Overall Governance Levels (IGL and OGL). Also, the result
revealed that 17 companies (40%) were categorized at the upper-medium level in terms
of their board committees' practices by using IGL and only 7 companies were indicated
at this level using OGL. 12 companies (29%) were placed at the lower-medium level
using IGL and none indicated using OGL. 71% of the companies (30 companies) were
categorized at the lowest level using OGL and only 19% (8 companies) were
categorized at this level using IGL. The average score for board committees was
categorized at the lower-medium level using individual level and it was placed at the
lowest level using the overall level (table 6.2.2.13). In summary, this provided an
indication that the governance practices of the 42 companies were still lacking in terms
of how frequently the committee meetings are held and their disclosure level.
Table 6.2.2.9: Board Committees - IGL & OGL
Variable Overall Governance Level Frequency Individual Frequency
(OGL) &% Governance Level (IGL) &%
Board Above 68%: Highest level 5 (12%) Above 60%: Highest level 5 (12%)
Com 68% to 60%: Upper-Medium 7 (17%) 60% to 40%: Upper-Medium 17 (29%)
59% to 56%: Lower-Medium 0 (0%) 39% to 20%: Lower-Medium 12 (29%)
Below 56%: Lowest Level 30(71%) Below 20%: Lowest Level 8 (19%)
Total 42 (100%) Total 42 (100%)
Remuneration
Recently, there have been great concerns regarding the excessive amount of salary and
benefits provided to executive directors. This section outlines the 9 variables employed
to evaluate the remuneration practices of the FTSE 100 companies.
Currently, companies are seen to be paying huge amounts of salaries to their executive
directors and this is not considered to align the interests of shareholders with
management. Using the quartile method, the executive director salary was divided into
4 levels to measure the governance practice in terms of remuneration. The results
revealed that 32 companies (76.2%) paid a salary of below £467,500 to their executive
directors, which was at the lowest level and therefore considered to be good governance
practice. This provided an indication that these companies were not over paying their
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executives in comparison to other companies. 1 company (2.4%) paid between
£467,501 to £596,000, 3 companies (9.5%) paid between £596,001 to £749,500 and 5
companies (11.9%) paid a salary above £749,500 to their executives, which was
considered to be the highest amount, and therefore may be considered to be bad
governance practice. From this finding, it was revealed that a large proportion of the 42
companies paid below £467,500, which was considered as being good governance
practice. This indicated that a large proportion ofthe directors are not being over paid.
However, the findings revealed that 57% of the companies (23 companies) had their
highest paid director earning more than 50% of the salary ofan average paid executive,
which was categorized as being bad practice. This provided an indication that the
disparity of salary between them was at a high level which can be considered as being
example of bad governance practice. This suggested that companies needed to reduce
the disparity ofsalary in order align the interest between principal and agent.
In the mid 1990s, the Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) became a popular way to
incentivise executives replacing Executive Stock Options (ESO). The emergence of
LTIP was to align managerial and shareholder interests and to develop a more robust
pay performance link. The 2 most popular criteria used in awarding LTIP were
Earnings Per Share (EPS) and Total Shareholder Return (TSR). The findings indicated
that 10 companies (23.8%) used both of these performance criteria, which was an
example of good governance practice as it showed a more rigorous approach had been
used in awarding LTIP compared to companies that used only a single type of
performance criteria. There were 6 companies (14.3%) that used EPS as the
performance criteria in awarding LTIP, which was susceptible to a degree of
manipulation in terms ofthe method ofcalculation. 22 companies (52.4%) used TSR as
the performance criteria, which were considered to be better performance criteria in
comparison to EPS.
There were 3 main comparative benchmarks used by companies in evaluating the
company's LTIP performance criteria namely; the peer group, market index and growth
based onchosen performance yardstick. Companies that used 2 or 3 combinations were
considered to practice a better way ofbenchmarking LTIP. The findings indicated that
only 2 companies (4.8%) used 1combination, 29 companies (69%) used 2 combinations
and 7 companies (16.7%) used all the 3 benchmarks which were considered to be a
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more rigorous way of evaluating LTIP. The findings indicated that a large proportion
of the companies (69%) seemed to use 2 combinations.
In addition, companies have the discretion in selecting their peer group companies,
which was rarely seen as transparent. Companies that disclosed the name of their peer
group companies were considered to be more transparent about their practices in
comparison to companies that did not. The findings indicated that 19 companies
(45.2%) revealed this information and 23 companies (54.8%) provided reasons for
selecting their peer group companies. This provided an indication that the disclosure
level of peer group companies among the FTSE 100 companies was considered to be at
an average level as nearly 50% of the companies did not disclose this information to the
public.
The share option scheme was another form used to incentivise executive directors,
which had been popular among companies since late 1980s and 1990s and was intended
to align the interest of shareholders and executives. Every year executives were being
offered options depending on the company's policy and performance. Companies that
disclosed, disaggregated details of ESO eligibility by tranche of award were considered
to be more transparent in their practices. The findings revealed that 71.4% (30
companies) of the companies disclosed this information in their annual report, which
was considered to be good governance practice (Table 6.2.2.11).
Lastly, the intention of awarding annual bonuses was a way of motivating executive
directors to perform better and to align their interests with those of the shareholders and
management. It is important for companies to link the award of bonus to performance
conditions that are relevant and designed to enhance shareholder value. Companies that
disclosed detail criteria for granting bonuses were seen to be more transparent in their
practices. Findings showed that only 14 companies (33.3%) disclosed detailed criteria
in awarding bonuses to their executives. This suggested that a large proportion of the
companies did not reveal whether the award of a bonus was based on company or
individual performance which was considered to be bad practice. Also, shareholders
raised great concerns where companies were seen to be paying substantial huge
amounts of bonuses to their directors, which were found not to align the interests of
shareholders and management. The findings revealed that only 1 company (2.4%)
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offereda maximum bonus of below 50%, 9 companies (21.5%) offered between 50% to
100% bonuses and 30 companies (71.4%) offered above 100% to their eligible
executives (Table 6.2.2.11). This would indicate that a large proportion of the 42
companies paid large bonuses annually to their executives, which would be considered
to be bad governance practice as they were being paid excessive amounts. This
suggested that there was a need to align the interests between the principal and agent.
The total score for remuneration structure was derived from the above 9 variables,
which obtained an average score of 64% with a standard deviation of 12.57% (table
6.2.2.12). This revealed thaton average the governance level for remuneration structure
was placed at medium level. The range of score varied from 26% to 79%. Also, the
findings in table 6.2.2.10 revealed that using an individual level, 7 companies (17%)
were categorizedat the highest level in terms of their remuneration structure and twice
as many were indicated using the overall level (13 companies: 31%). In addition, a
similar number of companies were categorized at the upper-medium using both levels
(14 companies: 33%). 13 companies (31%) were categorized at the lower-medium
level using IGL but only half of this figure was indicated using OGL (7 companies:
17%). Both levels indicated a similar number ofcompanies were at the lowest level (8
companies: 19%). The average score on remuneration structure was categorized at the
lower-medium level using the individual level and placed at the upper-medium level
using the overall level (table 6.2.2.13). In summary, it seemed to indicate that the
remuneration structure of the 42companies was still lacking at an individual level. This
suggested that there was a need for these companies to improvise in areas relating to
disparity of salary between highest paid executive and average paid executive,
disclosure level of peer group, disclosure of criteria in awarding bonuses to executive




Table 6.2.2.10: Remuneration Structure - IGL & OGL
Overall Governance Level
(OGL)
Above 68%: Highest level
68% to 60%: Upper-Medium
59% to 56%: Lower-Medium












Above 74%: Highest level
74% to 66%: Upper-Medium
65% to 58%: Lower-Medium









In summary, the findings revealed that a large proportion of the 42 companies possessed
an ownership structure that was dispersed rather than concentrated as only 9 companies
had their block holders owning more than 25% shares. Also, it revealed that a large
proportion of the companies had their single largest block holder owning not more than
25% of the shares, which was considered to be good governance practice. In terms of a
board structure the findings showed that more than half of the respondents possessed
the right board size with more than 50% of the board seats held by independent non
executive directors and this was considered tobe an average level. In addition, a large
proportion of these companies possessed a senior independent non-executive director on
the board, regular board meetings were held and induction and ongoing training were
conducted for their non-executives and chairman, which was again considered to be
good governance practice. The board committees' findings revealed that the audit and
remuneration committees met quite often but 42.9% of the companies did not reveal
how frequently their nomination committee met, which was considered to be bad
governance practice. Furthermore, the findings revealed that a large number of the
CEOs attended board committee meetings which was considered as bad governance
practice because their presence could influence the decision making process of these
committees. The remuneration structure of the 42 companies revealed that the
executives are paid comparatively similar salaries. However when incentives such as
LTIP, share options, and bonuses were taken into account then there was considerable
variation in the amounts executives received.
Table 6.2.2.11: Frequency: Corporate Governance Index
Variable Score Frequency %
Ownership Structure































Board Size 2 (1-6) 1 2.4
3 (7-12) 25 59.5
1>12 16 38.1
Total 42 100.0
Percentage of board seats held by 1 (< 50%) 15 35.7
independent non-executives on the board 2 (>50%) 27 64.3
Total 42 100.0
Senior independent non-executives on the 0(No) 5 11.9
board 1 (Yes) 37 88.1
Total 42 100.0
Number of board meetings per year Not disclosed 1 2.4
1 (1-6) 8 19.0
2 (7-12) 28 66.7
3(13-24) 5 11.9
Total 42 100.0
Provision for training & development for No 0 12 29.3
non-executives directors and chairman Yes 1 30 70.7
Total 42 100.0
Board Committees
Remuneration committee meetings per year Not Disclosed 12 28.6
1 (2-4) 10 23.8
2 (5-7) 13 31.0
3 (8-10) 7 16.7
Total 42 100.0
Audit committee meetings per year Not Disclosed 5 11.9
1 (2-4) 24 57.1
2 (5-7) 11 26.2
3 (8-10) 2 4.8
Total 42 100.0
Nomination committee meetings per year Not Disclosed 18 MS
1 (1-2) 10 23.8
I (3-4) 3 19.0
3 (5-6) 5 14.3
Total 12 100.0
CEO presence in boardcommittee meetings ) (Yes) 36 $5.7




Average salary paid to an executive director 4 (< 467,500) 32 76.2
3 (467,501 - 1 2.4
596,000)
2 (596,001 - 4 9.5
749,500)
1 (>749,500) 5 11.9
Total 42 100.0
Sum paid to the highest paid director 1 (>50%) 24 57.1
2 (<50%) 18 42.9
Total 42 100.0
Performance LTIP Not Disclosed 4 9.5
1 (EPS) 6 14.3
2 (TSR) 22 52.4
3 (EPS+TSR) 10 23.8
Total 42 100.0
Comparative group benchmark to evaluate Not Disclosed 4 9.5
company's LTIP performance criteria 1(1 combination) 2 4.8
2 (2 combination) 29 69.0
3 (3 combination) 7 16.7
Total 42 100.0
Peer Group Companies Disclosure 0(No) 23 54.8
1 (Yes) 19 45.2
Total 42 100.0
Reasons Stated for Selecting Peer Group 0(No) 34 81.0
Companies 1 (Yes) 8 19.0
Total 42 100.0
Different Grants of Options 0(No) 12 28.6
1 (Yes) 30 71.4
Total 42 100.0
Annual Bonus Detail Criteria Disclosure 0(No) 28 56.7
1 (Yes) 14 33.3
Total 42 100.0
Maximum bonus paid to eligible executive 3 (<50%) 1 2.4
directors 2 (50-100%) ? 21.5




Table 6.2.2.12: Descriptive Statistics: Ownership Structure/Board Structure /Board
Committees/Remuneration Structure
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Ownership Structure 42 17 100 66.8 15.91
Board Structure 42 36 91 66.7 12,78
Board Committees 42 0 80 37.8 21.58
Remuneration Strucmre 42 26 79 63.5 12.57









67% Upper-Medium Level Lower-Medium Level
Board
Structure
67% Upper-Medium Level Upper-Medium Level
Board
Committee
34% Lowest Level Lower-Medium Level
Remuneration
Structure
64% Upper-Medium Level Lower-Medium Level
6.3 RESULTS OF BIVARIATE CORRELATION ANALYSIS
In this section, the results of the independent corporate governance variables in relation
to corporate entrepreneurship are presented. The bivariate correlation analysis, a form
of analysis which is particularly appropriate to the nature of the study and its limited
sample size, is presented in Table 6.3.1.1. There were 11 variables of governance
components (independent) that were tested with corporate entrepreneurship levels
(dependent). The findings revealed that there was an insignificant correlation between
corporate governance level and the level of corporate entrepreneurship. However, there
were aspects of corporate governance that indicated a significant correlation with the
level of corporate entrepreneurship.
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Theresults revealed significance at the 5% for 3 variables: Percentage of shares held by
block holders (.011), Detail Bonus Performance Criteria (.045), Number of Board
Meetings (.026) and Board Size Method B (.017) Three variables revealed significance
at the 1% level: Board Size (.008), Number of Audit Committee Meeting (.004) and
Number of Nomination Committee Meetings (.007). The Pearson Correlation revealed 4
variables indicated a negative significant level: Board Size Method A (-.406), Number
of Board Meetings (-.344), Number of Audit Committee Meetings (-.434) and Number
of Nomination Committee Meetings (-.410). This revealed that a larger board size and a
higher number of board and sub committee meetings reduced corporate
entrepreneurship levels in an organisation. There were 4 variables that indicated
insignificant correlation: %board held by independent non-executive director (.259), %
shares held by directors (.485), % shares held by non-executive directors (.572) and
share option (.442). Further discussion on this analysis oneach of the 10propositions is
made in Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1.
Table 6.3.1.1: Bivariate Correlation Analysis Result
Non-Exec Board Size % Shares Detail Board Audit















N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Nom Shares % Shares Share Level of










N 42 42 42 42 42
** Correlationis significantat the 0.01 level(2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed)
Method A: using continuous approach
Method B: using categorical approach
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6.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCATTER GRAPH
The first part of this chapter discussed the descriptive analysis of corporate
entrepreneurship and corporate governance. The second section analysed the
relationship between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship using
bivariate correlation analysis. This section presents the development of a scatter graph
that plots the score of the 42 companies in terms of their total corporate
entrepreneurship and corporate governance score. The scatter graph is used for
selecting 4 companies that are situated at the far end and 2 at the centre of the graph.
The main objective of developing the scatter graph was to select companies for the
interview session.
As mentioned previously in the correlation analysis (section 6.3.1), there was no overall
relationship between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship. However,
there were certain aspects of governance that indicated a relationship with corporate
entrepreneurship, which needed further investigation. By developing the scatter graph
it was possible to provide deeper insight into the 42 companies in terms of which
companies to select for the interview session.
The Scatter Graph was used to select 6 companies for the case studies based on their
total score of corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship level. This can be
seen in Graph 6.4.1 where there are 6 symbols that show the selection of the companies
for the case studies. The selection was conducted by selecting four companies that were
situated furthest of the 4 corners and the other 2 situated in the centre of the graph. The
score of 6 companies in terms of corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship
level is shown in table 6.4.1.1.
Table 6.4.1.1: The Corporate Governance and Corporate Entrepreneurship Score for
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This chapter has presented the results from the quantitative analysis of the survey and
secondary data. First, the descriptive statistics and sample for corporate
entrepreneurship and corporate governance was presented. This was followed by a
detailed descriptive analysis on Corporate Entrepreneurship and the Corporate
Governance Index.
The findings indicated that on average the entrepreneurship level of the 42 companies
were at the lower-medium level which had been anticipated to be at a high level since it
was necessary for large corporations to be entrepreneurial in order to stay competitive
in the business environment. There were 8 main variables used in measuring the
corporate entrepreneurship level of the FTSE 100 companies. The first main variable
was company orientation which was divided into two subcomponents: company
characteristics and decision-making. The result of the company orientation did not
meet expectations as it was anticipated that the FTSE 100 companies would have a high
score in this aspect in order to be classified as a highly entrepreneurial company in
order to stay competitive in the business environment. Also, the second subcomponent
on decision-making had been anticipated to be high among these companies, as they
were required to be agile and possess the ability to make bold decisions in order to reap
opportunities that arose in order to stay competitive. However the results indicated to
be at lower-medium level. The combination of these two constituents developed the
variable on company orientation. The average score on company orientation was at
lower-medium level which again was anticipated to be high but the result indicated to
be at low level. In today's challenging business environment one would expect
companies to be highly entrepreneurial and possess the ability to make bold decisions in
order to stay competitive. However, the result seemed to indicate otherwise for the 42
companies.
The second variable consisted of three sub areas: product, service and process
innovation. It has been anticipated that the top 100 companies would place great
emphasis on product innovation in order to stay competitive in the business
environment which was not indicated using an overall level but revealed at an
individual level. On the other hand, the average score for service innovation was
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categorized at upper-medium level. Companies need to improve their services in order
to provide customer satisfaction and to stay competitive and the result indicated that
emphasis was given to this aspect. The sub variable on new process innovation
obtained an average score of upper-medium level. Companies need to continuously
improve their processes in order to become more efficient and productive compared to
their competitors. The result revealed that a large proportion of the 42 companies
seemed to emphasize this aspect which was to be expected among the top 100
companies.
The third variable measured the entrepreneurial level in terms of the management
support given to the employees. The findings revealed an average score of upper-
medium level using IEL but placed at lower-medium level using OEL. It is crucial for
employees to obtain continuous support from the top management in order to develop
new ideas and to stay competitive. However, the result seemed to indicate otherwise
using the overall level but it was positioned at a higher level when analysed
individually.
The fourth variable measured work discretion that obtained a mean score that was
categorized to be at the highest level using OEL and placed at upper-medium level
using TEL. The findings seemed to indicate that the 42 companies placed great
emphasis on work discretion in encouraging employees to be high performers which
was considered to be one of the crucial elements in developing an entrepreneurial
organisation. As for the fifth variable, it measured the risk taking where the findings
indicated to be at lower-medium level. It was anticipated that the FTSE 100 companies
would place great emphasis on risk taking to compete in the business environment.
However, the result seemed to reveal that these companies were lacking in this aspect.
The sixth variable measured the reward/reinforcement given to employees where on
average the findings were classified at the highest level using IEL but placed at the
lowest level using IEL. It was anticipated that the FTSE 100 companies would place
great emphasis on reward in motivating their employees. The finding at an overall level
seemed to provide an interesting indication that the 42 companies favoured
reward/reinforcement in encouraging employees to be entrepreneurial but this was not
indicated at an individual level.
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The variable on resources and time availability was considered the seventh variable in
measuring entrepreneurlism of the company and the result indicated that the mean score
for resources and time availability was categorized at the lowest level using OEL but
placed at upper-medium level using IEL. It was expected that the top 100 companies
would be able to provide sufficient resources and time to their employees due to their
size and financial stability that they possessed. However, the overall result seemed to
indicate that a large proportion of the 42 companies did not provide this to their
employees but indicated otherwise at an individual level.
The last variable measured the organisation's boundaries of the 42 companies and the
result revealed that on average it was at the lowest level using OEL but placed at upper-
medium level using IEL. Companies face great pressure to be flexible in today's
challenging business environment and there was a need to possess a lean structure in
order to stay competitive. The result seemed to indicate that a large proportion of the
companies possessed rigid operating procedure using the overall level but indicated
otherwise using an individual level.
As for the corporate governance level of the 42 companies, the findings revealed to be
at upper-medium level which indicated that the governance level of these companies
was at a rather high level. This finding seemed to meet the study's expectation that the
governance level among the FTSE 100 companies would be at a rather high level as it
was a mandatory requirement for the FTSE 100 companies to abide to the Revised
Combined Code July 2003. In measuring the governance level, 3 internal control
mechanisms were used: ownership structure; board structure & committees and
remuneration structure. The total score on ownership structure derived from 2
variables: shares held by blockholders and single largest blockholder. The findings
indicated that the governance level in terms of ownership strucmre on average was
considered to be at a medium level. Therefore, this revealed that there was more
concentrated ownership and less of blockholder which may indicate that there was less
shareholder activism and less control towards the company.
As for board structure there were five variables that measured the governance level of
the 42 companies: board size, percentage of independent non-executive directors; the
existence of a senior independent non-executive director, existence of training for non-
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executives directors and chairman and frequency of board meeting. It has been
anticipated that the board structure of the 42 companies would be at a high level but the
results indicated that the governance level in terms of board structure was considered to
be at a medium level. Therefore, this suggested that these companies could further
improvise on their governance practices in terms of the number of independent non-
executives on the board. As for board committees, 4 variables were used to evaluate the
practices of the board committees: frequency of remuneration committee meeting,
frequency of audit committee meeting, frequency of nomination committee meeting and
the presence of the CEO on board committee meetings. The findings revealed that on
average the governance level in terms of board committee was considered to be at a low
level. This suggested that there was a need for board committee to meet more regularly
in discussing pertinent issues relating to audit, remuneration and nomination.
The remuneration strucmre used 9 variables to measure the governance practices of the
FTSE 100 companies: average salary paid to an executive director, salary of the highest
paid director, performance criteria used in awarding LTIP, comparative group
benchmark used to evaluate the company's LTIP performance criteria, disclosure of the
name of peer group companies, reasons provided in selecting peer group companies,
disclosure of different grants offered to executives, disclosure of detailed criteria used
for granting annual bonuses and the maximum bonus paid to eligible executive
directors. It has been anticipated that the remuneration structure of the FTSE 100
companies will not be considered at a high level as there was growing attention from
the media/press questioning on the high levels of salary and benefits provided to the
executives. The findings indicated that on average the governance level for
remuneration structure was placed at medium level. This seemed to indicate that the
remuneration structure of the 42 companies was still lacking. Therefore, this suggested
there was a need for these companies to improvise in areas relating to disparity of salary
between highest paid executive and average paid executive, disclosure level of the peer
group, disclosure of criteria in awarding bonuses to executive and maximum amount
paid to an executive.
Subsequently, the chapter examined the bivariate correlation analysis that analysed and
tested the propositions that was developed in Chapter 4. The results indicated support
for 5 out of the 10 pairs propositions related to: large board size; dominance of
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institutional block holders, practicing performance criteria awarding annual bonus,
frequent board meetings and frequent board committee meetings.
Next, the Scatter Graph was developed to plot the score of the 42 companies in terms of
corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship level. The main objective in
developing the graph was to select 6 companies for the interview sessions to provide
deeper insights into the findings obtained from the quantitative findings that are
discussed in Chapter 8.
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7. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
QUANTITATIVE RESULT: PART II
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents additional quantitative analysis conducted for the survey and
secondary data. Chapter 6 discussed the descriptive analysis on corporate governance
and corporate entrepreneurship, correlation analysis and the development of the four
quadrants. Two additional statistical techniques that are found appropriate were
conducted to analyse further the relationship between corporate entrepreneurship and
corporate governance to determine whether there remains a possibility that some
components of each index may have an effect: Factor Analysis and Adaptive
Exploratory Regression. As outlined in chapter 4, 10 pairs of propositions were
developed to examine the four research questions related to each of these components.
The objective of conducting these two statistical analyses was to further explore the
impact of corporate governance towards entrepreneurial activities in an organisation.
This chapter summarizes the results in respect of each analysis.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 7.2 briefly outlines the conclusion of
the factor analysis result. Section 7.3 describes the six exploratory regressions and the
development of three regression models. Section 7.4 discusses the bivariate correlation
and exploratory regression in relation to the 10 pairs of research propositions. Finally,
section 7.5 presents an overview and summary.
7.2 FACTOR ANALYSIS
This section presents the factor analysis for corporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship variables. The purpose of conducting factor analysis for this study
was to take a large set of variables and look for ways in which the data could be reduced
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or summarized using a smaller setof factors or components. In conducting this analysis
two main issues were considered in determining whether a particular data set was
suitable for factor analysis: sample size and the strength of the relationship among the
variables (or items). There is little agreement among authors regarding how large a
sample size should be; the recommendation generally is the larger the better (Pallant,
2001).
In this study, the Corporate Entrepreneurship Index was comprised of 58 variables,
upon which it was not possible to conduct factor analysis because the limited sample
size consisted of only 42 companies. Therefore, the 58 variables of corporate
entrepreneurship were reduced to 19 key variables to enable the analysis to be
conducted. The criteria used in reducing the variables involved selecting variables
considered to be vital and essential in evaluating whether an organisation was
considered to be entrepreneurial or not. This involved selecting 2 key variables from
each of the 8 main variables with exceptions for the variable onproduct/service/process
innovation that consisted of three sub-sections. The two sub-sections selected an
additional 4 essential variables for product and service innovation and 1 variable for
process innovation providing a total of 19 variables. On the other hand, the Corporate
Governance Index consisted ofonly 20 variables, which was regarded as an appropriate
number to conduct the analysis.
The Steps and Result Indicated in Conducting Factor Analysis
There were several steps and procedures involved inconducting factor analysis. Firstly,
two statistical measures were generated by SPSS that helped to assess the factorability
of the data: Barlett's Test ofSphericity (Bariett, 1954) and Kaiser Meyer-Olkin (KMO)
to measure sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 1970, 1974). The results for corporate
entrepreneurship indicated the Bariett test was significant at .000 and KMO at 5.02 that
confirms factor analysis was appropriate. As for corporate governance, the Bariett test
indicated significant at .000 and KMO at.421, which confirmed factor analysis was also
appropriate (refer to appendix 7.2.1).
Next, factor extraction was conducted to determine the smallest number of factors that
can be used to best represent the inter-relations among the set of variables. Two
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The results indicated that 7 components for corporate entrepreneurship and 8
components for corporate governance had an eigenvalue of more than 1.0. Also, the
scree test conducted retained 2 components for corporate entrepreneurship and 5
components for corporate governance that were above the elbow or break in the plot.
Finally, the factors were rotated in order to represent the pattern of loading in a manner
that was easier to interpret. However, the results for corporate entrepreneurship and
corporate governance seemed confusing and did not indicate the expected positive or
negative effects with one another. Therefore, factor analysis was not successful in
reducing the factors for corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance (refer
appendix 7.2.1 for detailed results).
7.3 EXPLORATORY REGRESSION
In the previous section, factor analysis was conducted with the intention of reducing the
number of variables. The previous chapter conducted bivariate correlation analysis to
analyse the relationship between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship.
This section describes how exploratory regressions were used to explore further the
impact of corporate governance on corporate entrepreneurship. The regression analysis
was used to explore the relationship between a continuous dependent variable and a
number of independent variables or predictors (Pallant, 2001). It was based on
correlation but a more sophisticated exploration of the interrelationship among a set of
variables. This study conducted 6 exploratory regressions to analyze the relationship
between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship in terms of their
constituent elements.
Regression One
The first regression explored the relationship between the concept of corporate
governance (dependent) and the concept of corporate entrepreneurship (independent).
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The Pearson Correlation in Table 7.3.1 below indicates there was no relationship
between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship (.491). Also, the
Coefficient result in Table 7.3.2 shows there is no significant relationship between the
concept of governance and corporate entrepreneurship (.982). The Model Summary
Box in Table 7.3.3 described how much of variance in the dependent variable
(corporate governance) was explained by the model. In this case the value indicated
was 0%, which was a very weak result. In summary, the result implied there was no
relationship between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship.
Table 7.3.1: Pearson Correlation: Corporate Governance Level and Corporate
Entrepreneurship Level
Correlations
Level of Level of
Governance Entrepreneurship
Pearson Correlation Level of Governance 1.000 .004
Level of Entrepreneurship
.004 1.000




N Level of Governance 42 42
Level of Entrepreneurship 42 42







Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B
Std.












a Dependent Variable: Level of Governance
Table 7.3.3: Model Summary: Corporate Governance Level and Corporate
Entrepreneurship Level
Model Summary (b)
Model R R Square
Adjusted R
Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1
-004(a) .000 -.025 8.776
a Predictors: (Constant), Level of Entrepreneurship
b Dependent Variable: Level of Governance
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Regression Two
The second regression investigated the relationship in the opposite direction between
the concept of corporate entrepreneurship (dependent) and corporate governance
(independent). The Coefficient result in Table 7.3.4 also indicated an insignificant
relationship between corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance (.982.). In
summary, no relationship existed between entrepreneurship and governance.
Table 7.3.4: Pearson Correlation: Corporate Entrepreneurship Level and Corporate
Governance Level
Correlations
Level of Level of
Entrepreneurship Governance
Pearson Correlation Level of Entrepreneurship 1.000 .004
Level of Governance
.004 1.000




N Level of Entrepreneurship 42 42
Level of Governance 42 42




Model Coefficients Coefficients t Sis. Collinearity Statistics
Std.
B Error Beta Tolerance VIE
1 (Constant) 65.595 6.202 10.577 .000
Level of
Governance
2.342E-03 .101 .004 .023 .982 1.000 1.000
a Dependent Variable: Level of Entrepreneurship
Table 7.3.6: Model Summary: Corporate Entrepreneurship Level and Corporate
Governance Level
Model Summary(b)
Model R R Square
Adjusted R
Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1
.004(a) .000 -.025 5.595
a Predictors: (Constant), Level of Governance
b Dependent Variable: Level of Entrepreneurship
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Regression Three
The third regression was conducted to explore the relationship between corporate
entrepreneurship (dependent) and 20 components of govemance (independent) by using
the Exploratory Regression. Several continuous regressions were conducted on the 20
governance components by removing components that obtained a p value > 0.05. After
conducting this process 4 variables were retained which obtained p< .05 which is shown
in the Coefficient Table 7.3.7: i) Number of times board (.008), ii) Audit committee
(.009) iii) Nomination committee meet per year (.008) iv) CEO attended any of the
committee meetings (.025). In addition, the t test indicated there was a negative
relationship between number of times board, audit and nomination committee meet per
year and the corporate entrepreneurship level. This seemed to indicate that having more
meetings would reduce corporate entrepreneurship levels within a company as less time
would be spent towards conducting more productive tasks. The Pearson Correlation
result in Table 7.3.8 revealed that all four variables possessed correlation, which was
less than .7, which indicated multicollinearity did not exist between these variables.
Also, the Model Summary in Table 7.3.9 describes the variance in the dependent
variable (corporate entrepreneurship) 43.2% which was considered to be a relatively
robust result.
Table 7.3.7: Coefficient Table: Corporate Entrepreneurship Level and Four
Components of Corporate Governance
Coefficients (a)
Unstandardized Standardized
Model Coefficients Coefficients t SiS- Collinearity Statistics
Std.
B Error Beta Tolerance VIE
1 (Constant) 77.692 2.592 29.979 .000
Number of times
board meet per -3.114 1.116 -.356 -2.791 .008 .925 1.081
year
Number of times
audit comm meet -2.816 1.025 -.370 -2.748 .009 .832 1.202
per year
Number of times





-4.899 2.091 -.314 -2.343 .025 .840 1.190
meetings
a Dependent Variable: entr level
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Table 7.3.8: Pearson Correlation: Corporate Entrepreneurship Level and Four





Number of Number of Number of
any of
the
times board times audit times nom committe
meet per comm meet comm meet e




1.000 -.344 -.434 -.410 -.030
Number of times board
meet per year -.344 1.000 .169 .008 -.249
Number of times audit
comm meet per year -.434 .169 1.000 .290 -.325
Number of times nom
comm meet per year -.410 .008 .290 1.000 -.205
Does CEO attend any of




Number of times board







Number of times audit
comm meet per year .002 .142 .031 .018
Number of times nom
comm meet per year .004 .479 .031 .096
Does CEO attend any of
the committee meetings .425 .056 .018 .096
N Entr level 42 42 42 42 42
Number of times board
meet per year 42 42 42 42 42
Number of times audit
comm meet per year 42 42 42 42 42
Number of times nom
comm meet per year 42 42 42 42 42
Does CEO attend any of
the committee meetings 42 42 42 42 42
Table 7.3.9: Model Summary: Corporate Entrepreneurship Level and Corporate
Governance
Model Summary(b)






.665(a) .442 .382 4.34581
a Predictors: (Constant), Does CEO attend any of the committee meetings, Number of times nom comm meet per
year, Number of times board meet per year, Number of times audit comm meet per year
b Dependent Variable: entr level
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Regression Four
The fourth regression was conducted to investigate the relationship between corporate
governance level (dependent variable) and 19 components of entrepreneurship
(independent variable) using the Exploratory Regression. A similar process was
conducted as in regression 3 where continuous regressions were conducted on the 19
entrepreneurship components by removing components that obtained a significant of
P>.10 (coefficients). After conducting this process 3 variables were maintained which
obtained p< .10 (Table 7.3.10): i) High rate new products/services compared to
competitors (.073), ii) Risk taking considered as a positive attribute (.042) and iii)
Superior removes obstacles to get work done (.085). In addition, the T test indicated a
negative relationship between high rate new product/services compared to competitors
with corporate governance level. This meant a higher rate of new products and services
would reduce the corporate governance level. This may be due to the rapid growth and
complexity the company faced and which in turn may lead to difficulty in coping with,
and abiding by, governance practices. In addition, the Pearson Correlation result
indicated two variables were correlated (high rate of new products and superior remove
obstacles to get work done) as their significant level was more than .7 which revealed
that multicollinearity existed between these two variables (Table 7.3.11). Also, the
Model Summary in table 7.3.12 explained only 11.3 % (Adjusted R Square) of the
variance in the dependent variable (corporate governance), which was considered as a
weak result. In summary, the results indicated there were certain aspects of corporate
entrepreneurship that affected corporate governance levels.
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46.601 9.961 4.678 .000
products/service
s compared to -2.806 1.519 -.279 -1.847 .073 .948 1.055
competitors
Risk taking




obstacles to get 3.310 1.872 .266 1.768 .085 .956 1.046
my work done
a Dependent Variable: gov level











Risk taking considered to be
positive attribute
Superior removes obstacles to





Risk taking considered to be
positive attribute
Superior remove obstacles to





Risk taking considered to be
positive attribute
Superior remove obstacles to
















































Table 7.3.12: Model Summary: Corporate Governance Level and Three Components of
Corporate Entrepreneurship
Model Summary(b)
Model R R Square
Adjusted R
Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
1
.422(a) .178 .113 8.16485
a Predictors: (Constant), Superior remove obstacles to getmy work done, Risk taking considered tobe positive
attribute, High rate new products/services comparedto competitors
b Dependent Variable: gov level
Regression Five
The fifth regression explored the relationship between the three aspects of corporate
entrepreneurship (selected at fourth regression) (dependent variable) and four aspects of
governance (selected at third regression) (independent variable). Each aspect of
entrepreneurship was regressed with the four aspects of governance. The purpose of
conducting this analysis was to analyze whether there was any lateral relationship
between each of the three aspects of entrepreneurship with the four aspects of
governance. The findings indicated an insignificant result which showed there was no
lateral relationship between aspects of corporate entrepreneurship and corporate
governance (Table7.3.13, 7.3.16and 7.3.19). The Pearson Correlation in Table 7.3.14,
7.3.17 and 7.3.20 revealed that all the three variables of entrepreneurship with the four
variables of governance possessed correlation was less than .7 which indicated
multicollinearity did not exist between these variables. In addition, all the three Model
Summaries in Table 7.3.15, 7.3.18 and 7.3.21 indicated weak results (.048%,-.0 41%
and-.049%).
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Table 7.3.13: Coefficient Table: 4 Aspects of Corporate Governance and High Rate
New Products/Services (Corporate Entrepreneurship)
Coefficients (a)
Unstandardized Standardized
Model Coefficients Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta VIE
1 (Constant) 4.622 .502 9.213 .000
Number of
times board

















-.608 .405 -.250 -1.501 .142 .840 1.190
meetings?
a Dependent Variable: Highrate newproducts/services compared to competitors
Table 7.3.14: Pearson Correlation: 4 Aspects of Corporate Governance and High Rate




products/ser of times Does CEO
vices Number of nom attend any
compared Number of times audit comm of the
to times board comm meet meet per committee
competitors meet per year per year year meetings





1.000 -.196 -.243 -.129 -.091
board meet per year -.196 1.000 .169 .008 -.249
Number of times
audit comm meet per -.243 .169 1.000
.290 -.325
year
Number of times nom
comm meet per year -.129 .008 .290 1.000 -.205
Does CEO attend any
of the committee
-.091 -.249 -.325 -.205 1.000
meetings?
Sig. (1-tailed) High rate new
products/services
compared to .107 .060 .207 .283
competitors
Number of times
board meet per year .107 .142 .479 .056
Number of times





Number of times nom
comm meet per year .207 .479 .031 .096
Does CEO attend any
of the committee .283 .056 .018 .096
meetings
N High rate new
products/services
compared to 42 42 42 42 42
competitors
Number of times
board meet per year 42 42 42 42 42
Number of times
audit comm meet per 42 42 42 42 42
year
Number of times nom
comm meet per year 42 42 42 42 42
Does CEO attend any
of the committee 42 42 42 42 42
meetings
Table 7.3.15: Model Summary: 4 Aspects of Corporate Governance and High Rate New
Products/Services (Corporate Entrepreneurship)
Model Summary (b)






-375(a) .141 .048 .84128
a Predictors: (Constant), Does CEO attend any of thecommittee meetings, Number of times nom comm meetper
year. Number of times board meet per year, Numberof times audit comm meet per year
b Dependent Variable: High rate new products/services compared to competitors




Model Coefficients Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIE
1 (Constant)
Number of times
3.770 .447 8.435 .000
board meet per -.159 .192 -.137 -.824 .415 .925 1.081
year
Number of times
audit comm meet -.037 .177 -.037 -.211 .834 .832 1.202
per year
Number of times





-.460 .361 -.222 -1.277 .210 .840 1.190
meetings
a Dependent Variable: Risk taking considered to be positive attribute
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considere of times Number of Number of Does CEO
d to be board times audit times nom attend any of
positive meet per comm meet comm meet the committee
attribute year per year per year meetings
Pearson
Correlation
Risk taking considered to
be positive attribute 1.000 -.089 -.028 -.106 -.147
Number of times board
meet per year -.089 1.000 .169 .008 -.249
Number of times audit
comm meet per year -.028 .169 1.000 .290 -.325
Number of times nom
comm meet per year -.106 .008 .290 1.000 -.205
Does CEO attend any of
the committee meetings -.147 -.249 -.325 -.205 1.000
Sig. (1-
tailed)
Risk taking considered to
be positive attribute .288 .429 .252 .176
Number of times board
meet per year .288 .142 .479 .056
Number of times audit
comm meet per year .429 .142 .031 .018
Number of times nom
comm meet per year .252 .479 .031 .096
Does CEO attend any of
the committee meetings .176 .056 .018 .096
N Risk taking considered to
be positive attribute 42 42 42 42 42
Number of times board
meet per year 42 42 42 42 42
Number of times audit
comm meet per year 42 42 42 42 42
Number of times nom
comm meet per year 42 42 42 42 42
Does CEO attend any of
the committee meetings 42 42 42 42 42















a Predictors: (Constant), DoesCEOattend anyof thecommittee meetings, Numberof times nomcommmeetper
year, Number of times board meet per year, Number of times audit comm meet per year
b Dependent Variable: Risk taking considered to be positive attribute
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Table 7.3.19: Coefficient Table: 4 aspects of Corporate Governance Level and Superior
Remove Obstacles (Corporate Entrepreneurship)
Coefficients(a)
Unstandardized Standardized
Model Coefficients Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
Std.
B Error Beta Tolerance VIE
1 (Constant) 3.975 .426 9.339 .000
Number of times
board meet per year -.048 .183 -.043 -.260 .797 .925 1.081
Number of times
audit comm meet per -.109 .168 -.113 -.647 .522 .832 1.202
year
Number of times nom
comm meet per year -.111 .107 -.176 -1.043 .304 .898 1.114
Does CEO attend any
of the committee -.109 .343 -.056 -.318 .752 .840 1.190
meetings
a Dependent Variable: Superior remove obstacles to get my work done
Table 7.3.20: Pearson Correlation: 4 Aspects of Corporate Governance Level and
Superior Remove Obstacles (Corporate Entrepreneurship)
Correlations
Number
of times Does CEO
Number of audit Number of attend any
Superior remove times board comm times nom of the
obstacles to get meet per meet per comm meet committee
my work done year year per year meetings
Pearson Superior remove
Correlation obstacles to get my
work done
Number of times
1.000 -.050 -.154 -.198 .028
board meet per -.050 1.000 .169 .008 -.249
year
Number of times
audit comm meet -.154 .169 1.000 .290 -.325
per year
Number of times





.028 -.249 -.325 -.205 1.000
meetings
Sig.(1- Superior remove
tailed) obstacles to get my
work done
Number of times
.376 .165 .104 .430
board meet per .376 .142 .479 .056
year
Number of times
audit comm meet .165 .142 .031 .018
per year
Number of times










obstacles to get my
work done
42 42 42 42 42
Number of times
board meet per 42 42 42 42 42
year
Number of times
audit comm meet 42 42 42 42 42
per year
Number of times





42 42 42 42 42
meetings
Table7.3.21: Model Summary: 4 Aspects of Corporate Governance Level and Superior
Remove Obstacles (Corporate Entrepreneurship)
Model Summary (b)






.230(a) .053 -.049 .71380
a Predictors: (Constant), Does CEO attend any of thecommittee meetings, Number of times nom comm meet per
year, Number of times board meet per year, Numberof times audit comm meet per year
b Dependent Variable: Superior removeobstacles to get my work done
Regression Six
The sixth regression investigated witha similarpurpose as the fifth regression but in the
opposite direction between each of the four aspects of governance (dependent variable)
(selected at third regression) with three aspects of entrepreneurship (independent
variable) (selected at fourth regression). Each of the four governance aspects was
regressed with three aspects of entrepreneurship and the result also revealed similar
insignificant results which confirmed that there was no lateral relationship between
these aspects.
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Table 7.3.22: Coefficient Table: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship and Number






Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B
Std.






































a Dependent Variable: Number of times board meet per year
Table 7.3.23: Pearson Correlation: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship and




















Pearson Correlation Number of times board
















obstacles to get my
work done
-.050 .137 -.134 1.000














obstacles to get my
work done
.376 .193 .199
N Number of times board
meet per year








to be positive attribute 42 42 42 42
Superior removes
obstacles to get my 42 42 42 42
work done
Table 7.3.24: Model Summary: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship Level and
Number of Times Board Meet (Corporate Governance)
Model Summary (b)






.207(a) .043 -.033 .64283
a Predictors: (Constant), Superior removes obstacles to get my work done, Risk taking considered to be positive
attribute, High rate new products/services compared to competitors
b Dependent Variable: Number of times board meet per year
Table 7.3.25: Coefficient Table: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship & Number of






Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics





































a Dependent Variable: Number of times audit comm meet per year
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Table 7.3.26: Pearson Correlation: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship Level and
Number of Times Audit Committee Meet (Corporate Governance)
Correlations
Number of High rate new Risk taking Superior
times audit products/servic considered to remove
comm meet per es compared to be positive obstacles to get
year competitors attribute my work done
Pearson Number of times audit
Correlation comm meet per year
High rate new
1.000 -.243 -.028 -.154
products/services




to be positive attribute -.028 .163 1.000 -.134
Superior removes
obstacles to get my
-.154 .137 -.134 1.000
work done
Sig. (1-tailed) Number of times audit







to be positive attribute .429 .151 .199
Superior removes
obstacles to get my
.165 .193 .199
work done
N Number of times audit
comm meet per year 42 42 42 42
High rate new
products/services




to be positive attribute 42 42 42 42
Superior removes
obstacles to get my 42 42 42 42
work done
Table 7.3.27: Model Summary: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship and Number
of Times Audit Committee Meet (Corporate Governance
Model Summary (b)






.272(a) .074 .001 .72586
a Predictors: (Constant), Superior removes obstacles to get my work done, Risk taking considered to be positive
attribute, High rate new products/services compared to competitors
b Dependent Variable: Number of times audit comm meet per year
276
Table 7.3.28: Coefficient Table: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship & Number of






Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics






































a Dependent Variable: Number of times nom comm meet per year
Table 7.3.29: Pearson Correlation: 3 Aspects Corporate Entrepreneurship Level and
Number of Times Nomination Committee Meet (Corporate
Governance)
Correlations
Number of High rate new Risk taking
Superior
removes
times nom products/servi considered to obstacles to
comm meet ces compared be positive get my work
per year to competitors attribute done
Pearson
Correlation
Number of times nom
comm meet per year
High rate new
1.000 -.129 -.106 -.198
products/services
compared to competitors
-.129 1.000 .163 .137
Risk taking considered
to be positive attribute -.106 .163 1.000 -.134
Superior removes
obstacles to get my
work done
-.198 .137 -.134 1.000
Sig. (1-tailed) Number of times nom








to be positive attribute .252 .151 .199
Superior remove
obstacles to get my
work done
.104 .193 .199
N Number of times nom
comm meet per year





42 42 42 42
Risk taking considered
to be positive attribute 42 42 42 42
Superior remove
obstacles to get my
work done
42 42 42 42
Table 7.3.30: Model Summary: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship and Number
of Times Nomination Committee Meet (Corporate Governance)
Model Summary (b)






.252(a) .063 -.010 1.10904
a Predictors: (Constant), Superior remove obstacles togetmy work done. Risktaking considered to be positive
attribute. High rate new products/services compared to competitors
b Dependent Variable: Numberof times nom commmeet per year
Table 7.3.31: Coefficient Table: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship and Does






Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B
Std.








































a Dependent Variable: Does CEO attend any of the committeemeetings
278
Table 7.3.32: Pearson Correlation: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship and Does

























Does CEO attend any of




-.091 1.000 .163 .137
Risk taking considered to
be positive attribute -.147 .163 1.000 -.134
Superior remove obstacles
to get my work done
.028 .137 -.134 1.000
Sig-(1-
tailed)
Does CEO attend any of





Risk taking considered to
be positive attribute .176 .151 .199
Superior remove obstacles
to get my work done
.430 .193 .199
N Does CEO attend any of




42 42 42 42
Risk taking considered to
be positive attribute 42 . 42 42 42
Superior removes
obstacles to get my work
done
42 42 42 42
Table 7.3.33: Model Summary: 3 Aspects of Corporate Entrepreneurship and Does








Std. Error of the
Estimate
.36293
a Predictors: (Constant), Superior remove obstacles to get my work done. Risk taking considered to be positive
attribute, High rate new products/services compared to competitors
b Dependent Variable: Does CEO attend any of the committee meetings
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In summary, the corporate governance level was not affected by the corporate
entrepreneurship level or vice versa. However, there were four aspects of corporate
governance that affected entrepreneurial level: the number of board, audit and
nomination committee meetings and CEO attendance at any of the board committee
meetings. In addition, the results indicated three aspects of corporate entrepreneurship
which affected corporate governance levels: high rate of new product/service, risk
taking positive attribute and superior remove obstacles. Diagram 7.3.1 below shows the
overall six exploratory regressions conducted to analyze the relationship between
corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship.
Diagram 7.3.1: The Overall Six Exploratory Regressions
Significant
Insignificant
g = governance index
G = {number of times board meet, number of times audit committee meet, number of
times nomination committee meet, does CEO attend any of the committee
meetings}
e = entrepreneurship index
E = {high rate of new product/service, risk taking positive attribute, superior remove
obstacles}
7.4 RESULTS OF BIVARIATE CORRELATION AND EXPLORATORY
REGRESSION ANALYSIS IN RELATION TO THE PROPOSITIONS
The two previous sections above explored the use of factor analysis and exploratory
regressions to analyse the relationship between corporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship. This section presents the results of the bivariate correlation analysis
and exploratory regression analysis in relation to the research propositions. These two
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techniques were considered to be the two most appropriate analyses to be conducted
based upon the nature of this study and the limited sample size. Of the ten pairs of
propositions developed in Chapter 4 and tested in this chapter, two were fully
supported, three partially supported and the remaining five did not find any support.
This section discusses the results based upon each of the propositions (Table 7.4.1).
Main Proposition (a): Corporate Governance (CG) has an impact on entrepreneurial
activity in organisations.
Main Proposition (b): Corporate Governance has no impact on entrepreneurial activity
in organisations
Prior studies argued (Taylor, 2001, Short et al., 1998; 2000; O'Sullivan, 2000; Young
1995; Tricker, 1984; Keasey & Wright, 1993) that the impact of corporate
accountability could risk damaging the spirit of enterprise, which is considered crucial
for the economic and commercial success of a business. Also, it was perceived that
govemance rules that focussed too much on control would curb executive decision
making, which would ultimately lead to a negative impact on corporate performance.
However, the results failed to reveal any significant association between corporate
governance level and corporate entrepreneurship levels using the bivariate correlation
and exploratory regression analysis. Therefore, proposition (a) was rejected. This
indicated that the entrepreneurial level among the 42 companies was not being affected
by governance practices as it might be at the right level (not too rigid) i.e. not too
stringent. In order to verify the above statement, interviews were conducted to discover
if there were any underlying issues that revealed whether corporate governance impedes
orgamsations from being entrepreneurial.
Pla: There is a relationship between ratio of outsiders on the board and the level of
corporate entrepreneurship.
Plb: There is no relationship between ratio of outsiders on the board and the level of
corporate entrepreneurship.
A study conducted by Hoskisson (1990) found that outsiders were not as closely
involved in the strategy formulation process as insiders were but they were more
involved in financial control, which could ultimately lower the corporate
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entrepreneurship level in a company. Similar conclusions have been drawn by other
researchers e.g. Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hill & Snell (1988), Porter (1992) that
having a high ratio of outsiders on the company's board may have unintended costs;
such as lower entrepreneurship due to the tendency of outside directors to engage in free
riding and to use financial rather than strategic controls. However, using bivariate
correlation and exploratory regression, the results of this study indicated that there was
an insignificant relationship between independent non-executive directors and corporate
entrepreneurship. The proposition la has therefore been rejected. One of the
contributing reasons that there was an insignificant relationship between these two
variables may be due to the fact that non-executives do not hold permanent positions on
the board and therefore there was a lack of interest in matters relating to corporate
entrepreneurship. Instead, they act more as a monitoring device on corporate
governance matters rather than on corporate entrepreneurship activities.
P2a: There is a relationship between the presence of outside board of directors with
ownership and the level of corporate entrepreneurship.
P2b: There is no relationship between the presence of outside board of directors with
ownership and the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
Previous studies (e.g. Porter, 1992; Meyer, 1998; Johnson et al., 1993; Zahra, 1996)
argue that increasing outside directors' ownership makes them more actively involved
in monitoring management which would serve to ensure there was an effective
alignment between the interests of executives and shareholders and an intention to
create a greater sense of belonging towards the organisation. However, using bivariate
correlation analysis, the findings indicated that there was no apparent association
between the shares held by non-executive directors and corporate entrepreneurship.
Therefore, the proposition 2a was rejected. One of the reasons for the findings may be
that non-executives hold such a small percentage of shares in proportion to the size of
the company that ownership would not impact on them very much. Furthermore, it may
be down to the fact that they were not motivated by the amount of shares they owned,
which was considered a small amount, but were more concerned about protecting the
shareholders' interests rather than their own.
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P3a: There is a relationship between board size and corporate entrepreneurship level
in the organisation.
P3b: There is no relationship between board size and corporate entrepreneurship level
in the organisation.
Prior studies conducted by Zahra et al., 2000 and Yermack, 1996 observed that smaller
boards have the ability to increase the director's participation and promote frequent
communication with the company's senior executive. As the board size increases so too
does corporate entrepreneurship until a threshold is reached. Beyond a certain point the
increase in the board size is rendered dysfunctional and therefore reduces the corporate
entrepreneurial activities within an organisation (Zahra et al., 2000). The bivariate
correlation result indicated there was a significant association at the 5% level between
board size and corporate entrepreneurship using the categorical approach (method B)
and as a continuous variable it indicated a significant of 1% which provided a stronger
result. However, the exploratory regression analysis found an insignificant relationship
between these two variables. Therefore to further verify the above propositions
interviews were conducted to ascertain the underlying issues around whether a large
board size decreased entrepreneurial levels in an organisation.
P4a: There is a relationship between the frequency of board meetings and
entrepreneurial activities.
P4b: There is no relationship between the frequency of board meetings and
entrepreneurial activities.
Conducting meetings was considered an important way to improve the effectiveness of
the board (Conger et al., 1998). However, Vafeas (1999) argued that having too
frequent board meetings was not necessarily useful, as meetings absorbed more routine
tasks which limited opportunities for outside directors to exercise meaningful control
over management. Jensen suggested that boards were relatively inactive and normally
were forced to maintain higher activity levels in the presence of problems. In addition,
Vafeas (1999) findings indicated that a higher number of board meetings led to poor
corporate performance. Hence, this has negative implications for entrepreneurial
activities as less time is spent on more productive activities in the organisation. Also,
frequent board meetings generate additional costs, such as managerial time, travel
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expenses, administrative support and directors' meeting fees (Evan et al., 2002). The
bivariate correlation and exploratory regression analysis indicated that there was a
significant negative relationship between board meetings and corporate
entrepreneurship at 5% level. Therefore, the proposition 4a has been accepted as the
findings indicated that having more frequent board meetings reduced the corporate
entrepreneurial level of the company since frequent meetings may have led towards
reduced productivity in the company. Also, this suggested that the board should focus
more on work action matters. Interviews were conducted to obtain the underlying issues
on the effect of frequent board meetings on entrepreneurial level in companies.
P5a: There is a relationship between the frequency of board committee meetings and
entrepreneurial activities.
P5b: There is no relationship between the frequency of board committee meetings and
entrepreneurial activities.
The Combined Code (2003) emphasised the need for subcommittees to meet regularly
in performing their tasks. However, prior studies indicated that having too frequent
meetings could lead to poor corporate performance (Vafeas, 1999) and a waste of
resources (Evan et al., 2002) which would decrease entrepreneurial activities in the
organisation as resources were being channeled towards less productive activities (as
indicated in proposition 8). The bivariate correlation and exploratory regression analysis
also indicated a significant negative association at the 5% level between the frequency
of audit committee meetings and corporate entrepreneurship level. Similar results were
revealed for the nomination committee using both of these analyses. Therefore,
proposition 5a has been accepted as the findings indicated that there was a negative
relationship between frequent board committee meetings and entrepreneurship. This
provided an indication that board committees need to focus more on work operation
matters rather than having too frequent meetings. Interviews were conducted to
confirm whether having frequent subcommittee meetings would decrease
entrepreneurship.
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P6a: There is a relationship between executive ownership and the level of corporate
entrepreneurship.
P6b: There is no relationship between executive ownership and the level of corporate
entrepreneurship.
A prior study conducted by Fama & Jensen (1983) found that a lack of ownership
discouraged executives from supporting corporate entrepreneurship as in so doing they
might be putting their salaried positions in jeopardy. Also, arguments provided by other
researchers found that providing executives with ownership could encourage them to be
more long-term focused which could help to foster corporate entrepreneurship activities
in the organisation (Jones & Butler, 1992) but the effects would reduce if too high a
level of ownership was provided to them as this could cause executives to become more
risk averse. The findings of the bivariate correlation analysis indicated that there was an
insignificant relationship between executive ownership and corporate entrepreneurship.
Therefore, proposition 6a was rejected. However, to verify the above statements
interviews were conducted to obtain further details on providing large amount of
executive ownership would have an impact on enterprise activities.
Pla: There is a relationship between a predominance of institutional block holders and
the level of corporate entrepreneurship.
Plb: There is no relationship between a predominance of institutional block holders
and the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
Research conducted by Jensen & Meckling (1976) found that the presence of major
powerful shareholders would encourage the CEO to pursue risky long-term ventures
such as corporate entrepreneurship. Also, Baysinger et al (1991) findings indicated
similar results; that institutional owners could influence corporate entrepreneurship
positively because they were known to be better informed compared to other
shareholders. This would be due to the huge amount of shares held by block holders in
a company and this would create a major incentive for them to monitor the CEO's
decision and commitment towardscorporate entrepreneurship. The bivariate correlation
analysis indicated a positive significant relationship at the 5% level between dominance
of block holders and corporate entrepreneurship which supported the findings of prior
studies. However, the exploratory multiple regression analysis indicated that there was
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no relationship between these two variables. Therefore, the above proposition was
explored further using interviews in order to verify this statement and to examine the
underlying issues about whether dominance of institutional block holders has an impact
on corporate entrepreneurship.
P8a: There is a relationship between offering Executive Stock Options (ESO) and
corporate entrepreneurial activities.
P8b: There is no relationship between offering Executive Stock Options (ESO) and
corporate entrepreneurial activities.
The introduction of ESO has been the norm among companies since the 1980s with the
intention of creating a greater sense of belonging towards the company. Later, there
were concerns raised by Bruce & Buck (1997) and Short et al., (2000) that ESO has
been regarded as a standard component of the remuneration package and therefore it
may not create any impact or relationship with corporate entrepreneurship. Similarly,
Lewellen (1968) and Huntsman (1970) found that performance and pay had no effect
when incorporated as a long-term remuneration instrument. The bivariate correlation
analysis and Exploratory Regression indicated no apparent association between
Executive Stock Option (ESO) and Corporate Entrepreneurship. Therefore, proposition
8a has been rejected. However, the above propositions were explored further using
interviews in order to verify this statement and to examine the underlying issues about
whether ESO has a negative impact on corporate entrepreneurship.
P9a: There is a relationship between the use of performance criteria in awarding
annual bonuses to executives and entrepreneurial activities.
P9b: There is no relationship between the use of performance criteria in awarding
annual bonuses to executives and entrepreneurial activities.
Prior research conducted by McKnight (1990) found that a robust relationship existed
between a company size and the salaries paid and that there was a pronounced link
between annual bonus and performance. Linking bonus with performance encourages
and motivates employees to pursue entrepreneurial activities. The results, using
bivariate correlation analysis, indicated that there was a significant relationship at the
5% level between detailed bonus criteria and corporate entrepreneurship. However, the
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exploratory regression indicated that there was an insignificant relationship between
these two variables. Therefore, to verify the above statements interviews were
conducted to obtain further details about whether performance criteria in awarding
annual bonuses would be likely to increase entrepreneurial activities.
Table 7.4.1: Results of the Propositions using Bivariate Analysis and Exploratory
Regression
Propositions Results
Main Proposition (a): Corporate Governance (CG) has an
impact on entrepreneurial activity in organisations.
Main Proposition b): Corporate Governance has no impact on
entrepreneurial activity in organisations
Not Supported
Supported
Pla: There is a relationship between ratio of outsiders on the
board and the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
Plb: There is no relationship between ratio ofoutsiders on the
board and the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
Not Supported
Supported
P2a: There is a relationship between the presence of outside
board of directors with ownership and the level of
corporate entrepreneurship.
P2b: There is no relationship between the presence of outside




P3a: There is a relationship between board size and corporate
entrepreneurship level in the organisation.
P3b: There is no relationship between board size and





P4a: There is a relationship between the frequency of board
meetings and entrepreneurial activities.
P4b: There is no relationship between the frequency of board
meetings and entrepreneurial activities.
Supported
Not Supported
P5a: There is a relationship between the frequency of board
committee meetings and entrepreneurial activities.
P5b: There is no relationship between the frequency of board
committee meetings and entrepreneurial activities.
Supported
Not Supported
P6a: There is a relationship between executive ownership and
the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
P6b: There is no relationship between executive ownership and
the level ofcorporate entrepreneurship.
Not Supported
Supported
Pla: There is a relationship between a predominance of





Plb: There is no relationship between a predominance of
institutional block holders and the level of corporate
entrepreneurship.
P8a: There is a relationship between offering Executive Stock
Options (ESO) and corporate entrepreneurial activities.
P8b: There is no relationship between offering Executive Stock
Options (ESO) and corporate entrepreneurial activities.
P9a: There is a relationship between the use of performance
criteria in awarding annual bonuses to executives and
entrepreneurial activities.
P9b: There is no relationship between the use ofperformance











Two additional tests were conducted: factor analysis and adaptive exploratory
regression to analyse further the impact of corporate governance towards enterprise
activities in an organisation. The factor analysis was not able to reduce a large number
of variables for the Corporate Governance Index and Corporate Entrepreneurship Index
into a more manageable number prior to using them in other analyses.
Six exploratory regressions were conducted to analyse further the relationship between
corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship. The first regression explored the
relationship between the concept of corporate governance (dependent variable) and the
concept of corporate entrepreneurship (independent variable). It had been anticipated
that there would be a negative relationship between these two concepts as rigidity in
governance could create negative implication on enterprise activities. However, the
findings indicated that there was no apparent relationship between corporate governance
and corporate entrepreneurship. The second regression investigated the relationship in
the opposite direction and the result also implied there was no relationship between
these two concepts.
The third regression explored the relationship between corporate entrepreneurship
(dependent variable) and 20 components of governance. It has been anticipated that
288
there are aspects of governance that would have a negative implication on corporate
entrepreneurship. The findings revealed that the frequent board, audit committee and
nomination committee meetings had a negative relationship with corporate
entrepreneurship levels. This seemed to indicate that having more meetings would
reduce corporate entrepreneurship levels in a company, as less time would be spent
towards conducting more productive tasks. The fourth regression examined the
relationship between the corporate governance level (dependent variable) and 19
components of entrepreneurship (independent variable). Three variables of corporate
entrepreneurship indicated relationships with corporate governance: high rate of new
product/services; risk taking considered positive attribute and superior remove obstacles
to get work done. The results also revealed negative relationships between high rates of
new product/services compared to competitors with corporate governance level. This
means that a higher rate of new products and services would reduce corporate
governance levels, which might have been due to rapid growth and complexity that the
company faces that may have caused difficulty for the company to cope and abide with
the governance practices.
The fifth regression explored the relationship of the three aspects of entrepreneurship
with four aspects of governance. The purpose of conducting this analysis was to analyse
whether there was any lateral relationship between these three aspects of
entrepreneurship and four aspects of governance. However the findings indicated that
there was no lateral relationship between aspects of corporate entrepreneurship and
governance. The sixth regression investigated with a similar purpose but in the opposite
direction and the result indicated a similar insignificant result.
In addition, an analysis was conducted that related the results of bivariate correlation
analysis and the exploratory regression with the research propositions. The result
indicated that of the 10 pairs of propositions, 2 were fully supported: related to having
frequent board and sub-committee meetings decreasing entrepreneurial activities. Three
propositions were partially supported and 5 did not find any support.
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This chapter presents the results of the qualitative analysis of the case studies. As
explained in Chapter 5, the collection and analysis of questionnaires and secondary data
was followed by interviews of a subset of FTSE 100 companies. A set of 6 companies
from the FTSE 100 in the U.K were selected for the case studies using the Scatter
Graph approach explained in Chapter 6. The rationale underlying the selection of and a
brief overview of the sample of cases was presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Qualitative
interviews with respondents at these firms were important in order to gain insights to
the effects of corporate governance in corporate entrepreneurship activities. The key
research question this study seeks to answer is whether there is a relationship between
corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship activities. This study focuses on
the internal control mechanisms of corporate governance i.e. Ownership Structure,
Board Composition & Structure and Remuneration Structure towards the corporate
entrepreneurship activities of the organisation. Although survey data helped answer the
'what' questions and establish association through statistical techniques, follow-up
qualitative interviews were important in yielding in-depth insights into the 'why' and
'how' questions. They were also important to triangulate the findings from the
quantitative analysis.
The case study interviews were recorded and then transcribed after each interview
session to record the qualitative data in the words of the respondent. This permitted
greater flexibility in analysis and provided a better grasp of the underlying meanings.
Data was analysed in two steps: within case analysis, followed by across case analysis
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As a first step, detailed case smdy write-ups were generated.
Although primarily descriptive, they helped to cope with the high volume of data, while
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at the same time enabling familiarity with each case as a stand-alone entity. This, in
turn, allowed the unique patterns of each case to emerge by comparing the similarities
and differences across cases thus allowing the generalization of patterns across cases.
Subsequently, the information was edited according to categories based upon the
research propositions that were developed to answer the research questions. This
assisted with data reduction and, at the same time, enabled a comparative analysis of the
responses. A primitive classification system was created which was continually revised
as more data was assimilated. The data was searched for patterns, and regularities
which formed the basis of the initial categories into which units of data could be placed.
The explanation building process was iterative and based upon the propositions that
were developed. This study did not utilize the qualitative data analysis package known
as NVivo that allows rich text documents to be coded and formulates models of
underlying categories and constructs. This was because the research study involved a
relatively small number of interviews and the use of primitive classification systems
was considered to be a sufficient and convenient way of analysing the data.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 8.2 outlines the relationship between
corporate governance code and corporate entrepreneurship. Section 8.3 presents the
relationship between board structure and composition on corporate entrepreneurship.
Section 8.4 discusses the relationship between ownership structures on corporate
entrepreneurship. Section 8.5 analyses the relationship between the remuneration
structures on corporate entrepreneurship activities. Section 8.6 links the qualitative
findings with the propositions and quantitative findings. Section 8.7 creates the link
between the qualitative findings and the development of the scatter graph. Section 8.8
comprises a summary overview.
8.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES
AND CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Chapters 6 and 7 used the quantitative approach to examine the relationship between
corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship. This section analyses the same
aspect, using a qualitative approach, to ascertain whether corporate governance impacts
organisations from being entrepreneurial. The results indicated that one company
perceived that it could affect the enterprise activities within the firm, whereas another
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company indicated to the contrary and 4 companies were neutral in their views (Table
8.2.1).
Table 8.2.1: The Relationship between Corporate Governance Codes and Corporate
Entrepreneurship
In your experience do corporate governance codes inhibit





The results revealed that Companies A, D, E and F recognized the importance of
corporate governance, but perceived that it could inhibit corporate entrepreneurship to a
certain degree if individuals in the company were required to spend most of their time
complying with corporate governance rather than engaging in activities which were
considered to be more importantfor the development of business. In addition, company
F realized that it could create an additional level of bureaucracy in the organisation in
terms of processes that might slow down the response of businesses towards the market
place.
The danger of having corporate governance that is inflexible and forces compliance in
every aspect may make people become too obsessed in meeting criteria. Furthermore,
the cost to the business in the amount of time and work required for compliance
activities could increase and the decision-making process of the company may slow
down due to the heavy burden of compliance for governance practices. Therefore, it is
crucial to create the right balance between govemance and enterprise activities. The
following quotes illustrate empirical support for the foregoing argument.
Case A: "... to a certain degree it does. We are very aware that it could be doing that. I think
overall it is not having a very great effect. I think there is the risk at individual role
because they are spending so much time on complying rather than not doing what
they are supposed to be doing. It has certainly put the cost of the business up. So, it
could inhibit corporate entrepreneurship to a certain degree. It can force you to
comply on every aspect and this can inhibit corporate entrepreneurship where you
become so obsessed in meeting criteria".
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Case A: "... Corporate governance is needed but where it becomes so inflexible that it forces
you to comply everywhere and it is then going to inhibit corporate entrepreneurship
and then it is going to inhibit the progress of the business because you become so
obsessed with meeting criteria".
Case D: "... Corporate governance by nature it tends to break into several activities and I think
it is a question of balancing the requirements of governance. I think, if it is taken to
extremes then corporate entrepreneurship can go against the interest of the
shareholders because you take some outrageous risk and, by the same token, if you
have too much of constraint put on corporate governance issues then that is going to
inhibit you in being entrepreneurial. But I think it is the question of creating the right
balance".
Case E: "... it would increase the burden on overheads and the amount of work. It has been
discussed within the company where it stops us from doing something. We are
running the company and not the regulators. We decide what we think as the right
strategy to go forward, there is a whole complicated environment that we exist in,
including Sarbanes Oxley. We might run a little bit more slowly as we have to make
more disclosure".
Case E: "... Yes, I think it is an additional cost and affects the decision making process".
Case F: "... I think that corporate governance can sometime involve an additional level of
bureaucracyin terms of process, whichcan sometimeslow down the responses of the
business to the market etc".
Companies that possessed dual listing faced even greater pressure for compliance where
they are required to comply with both U.K and U.S corporate governance. As
mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, two of the companies, A and E, strongly found Sarbanes
Oxley to be too rigid as compliance was required in every aspect, in comparison to the
U.K Combined Code which is more flexible and provides a certain degree of leeway
when companies are unable to fully comply. In addition, Company A, classified as
highly entrepreneurial but low on corporate governance, stressed that section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 consisted of such detailed control that they were forced to
devote to compliance activities a huge amount of their resources in terms of cash and
time. In addition, it was believed that the stringent U.S corporate governance rules and
regulations have caused companies to de-list themselves from the U.S Stock Exchange.
The following quotes illustrate these points:
Case A: "I think that is one of the big differences with the Combined Code and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002. The Combined Code you are much more flexible on the way-how
you do your things, it provides guidance although you have to have very good
explanation on why you don't comply, and at least you have that as an alternative. I
think people have got very much in their mindsetof the spirit of the CombinedCode. In
the U.S we have to comply for better. I think people are always looking for ways
around it rather than getting into the spirit of what it is trying to do".
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Case A: "Yes, we have to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley section 404, which is practically
looking at the detail control and that is taking huge resources in terms of cash and
peoples' time. As a result of that, a lot of the U.K and European companies which have
dual-listing are trying to meet the absolute minimum requirement of Sarbanes-Oxley
act, or they are delisting themselves from the U.S as a result of that and there is a
constant pressure on the U.S to change and modify the regulation to make it less
stringent".
On the other hand, Company B perceived that the implications of corporate governance
would be more indirect towards the organisation in terms of cascading down the rules
and regulations to the organisation and may tend to build a culture that inhibits
corporate entrepreneurship activities. Employees may resent and question why they
need to abide by these rules and regulations. In addition, this company realized it had
also created unwillingness among individuals to become executive directors in
companies, as they are required to disclose their remuneration to the public and face
comments from the press. Therefore, this could lead to a worrying situation among
those companies that are expanding into the global markets and need to be able to pay
global rates but are faced with the obstacle of disclosing this information to the public.
This may cause problems with finding good and suitable employees to work for the
company. Individuals would rather work for private companies instead of public listed
companies as they would be able to earn more money and would not be required to
disclose their earnings to the public. The following quotes illustrate these points:
Case B: "... I don't think there is a direct link at all, because if you look at our company the
people who would undertake corporate governance activities and ensure that it
adheres to the rules and requirements, such as the Combined Code, are people like
myself-chairman and the board. But if you think about the people who wanting to be
entrepreneurial, that are developing new products or new customer offerings they are
quite divorced from that sort of work, it does not really impinge on them on the day-
to- day basis of their work. So, I do not think there is any direct causal effect, but
there is what I would call an indirect effect, in that the rules and regulations that we
have to abide by and to get it cascaded down in the organisation and therefore it does
involve bureaucratic tapes on the organisation. That itself could set a culture that
could itself inhibit entrepreneurialism".
Case B: "... The other issue is, which has been observed by the press as well, is that there has
been increasing unwillingness on people to become executives' directors who would
have to see their remuneration disclosed and the press make comment on it and if
they don't work in private equity companies instead in private companies they would
earn a lot more money and would not have any of that sort of impact. So, you have
got in this country quite a worrying chain, where we are not prepared to pay people
rates in this global market, where certain job demand and that may have a significant
negative impact".
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In addition, Company C classified as highly governed and entrepreneurial also found
the effects were rather indirect towards corporate entrepreneurship due to the large size
of their business, where individuals that are involved with corporate entrepreneurship
activities in the organisation are not directly involved with the corporate governance
practices. There were specific individuals who were solely responsible for dealing with
corporate governance issues. However, smaller companies were not as fortunate as the
largecompanies in terms of resources and therefore the impact of corporate governance
on them would be far greater.
On the other hand, company F viewed governance as not necessarily preventing
entrepreneurial activities. Instead, it would greatly depend upon the nature of the
organisation. This company perceived that organisations that possessed flat hierarchy
structures in terms of decision-making would not reduce their responsiveness towards
the market. Also, the level of delegation of authority given to people could help to
reduce the implications of governance. Therefore, it was crucial to create the right
balance between the level of responsibility that wasgiven to people and the requirement
that needed to be met in terms of governance. The following quotes illustrate these
points:
Case C: "... I generally don't believe this thing would get into the way of entrepreneurship in
big companies. I think the issue comes much more with regards to SMEs because,
within our company, there are a lot of different people with different aspects of the
management, where in our company there are 18 people dealing corporate
governance issues".
CaseF: ".. .1 think it depends on thenature of the organisation and I must say thathow flat it is
in terms of the decision making hierarchy whether it is relatively a flat organisation
then the impact of corporate governance doesn't necessarily reduce responsiveness to
the market. Also, the level of delegation of authority you give to people can also
reduce the impact of corporate governance. Of course there is a balance between the
level of responsibility thatyou give to people and the requirements that you have to
make to meet govemance requirements".
In summary, the findings have supported the proposition that rigidity in compliance
with corporate governance codes can have negative implications on enterprise growth.
This was strongly supported by company A which operates in a highly competitive
market and is classified as highly entrepreneurial but low on governance. Most of the
companies revealed that they spend too much time on compliance activities that could
affect building enterprise activities within the organisation. On the other hand, only one
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company classified as highly governed and entrepreneurial found that the consequences
were more indirect and did not hinder the development of their business.
8.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD STRUCTURE AND
COMPOSITION ON CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The earlier section studied the views of 6 companies in terms of the relationship of
corporate governance on corporate entrepreneurship activities. This section discusses
the consequences of board structure and its composition on corporate entrepreneurship
activities in the organisation and this covers 5 aspects: Insider vs. Outsiders Board of
Directors, Providing Ownership to Outsiders, Large Board Size and Frequency of
Board, and Subcommittee Meetings.
Insider vs. Outsider Board of Directors
The first aspect investigated was the impact on corporate entrepreneurship activities in
the organisation of a high ratio of outsiders on the board. The respondents from all 6
companies disagreed that non-executives would have a negative effect on corporate
entrepreneurship (Table 8.3.1). Instead they strongly believed that non-executives
would be able to stimulate enterprise activities within the firm.
Table 8.3.1: The Relationship between Non-Executives Directors and Corporate
Entrepreneurship
In your opinion would having a high ratio of non-executives on
the board have a negative impact on corporate
entrepreneurship? Ifyes or no why?
Case
Insignificant A, B, C, D,E&F
Companies A, B, C, E and F revealed that they believed that non-executives brought in
a wider experience to the business because these individuals came from different
industries. Therefore, they possessed vast experience since they had experiences of
different aspects of business and this enabled them to contribute towards strategizing
and innovation within the business. Furthermore, it would enable them to utilize their
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vast expertise to approach things in a different way. In addition, Company C strongly
believed that the number of non-executives on the board was not an issue but what was
more cmcial was the experience that they possessed and from which the company could
benefit.
On the other hand, Company D operated in a very autonomous way, where the board
existed to perform limited functions such as financial control, the overall strategy of the
business and to approve significant business proposals. The operation managers
themselves handle the entrepreneurial activity within their own divisions. Therefore, in
this situation, the non-executive role was there for a limited purpose. Company E found
that non-executives provided ideas and drive for change, which helped to improve the
organisation's performance.
In addition, in all the companies, it was found that non-executives did not serve on a
short-term basis butwould continuously serve the company for up to 5 to 6 years. One
of Company B's non-executives had served the company for 20 years. The argument
for this was that the longer the non-executives were with the company, the more
comprehensive their understanding of the company was. This allowed them to provide
better services to the organisation. However, the danger that mightoccurhere would be
that the independence level of the non-executives might come into question but the
respondents were confident that those non-executives who have served for a long period
of time still remained independent when performing their duties. The following quotes
illustrate these points:
Case A: ".. .We have always had a higher numberof non-executives. The non-executives could
aid the executives where they bring wide experiences to the businesses. You are not
only relying on people who do have tobacco business and experiences. They can
actually bring in suggestions from other industries, which can actually help in how we
are going".
Case A: "... I totally agree that non-executives can actually stimulate corporate
entrepreneurship and can generate great ideas. It is their combined experiences that are
vast from all kind of industries that they have been through on different aspects of
business, which they can contribute heavily to the strategizing and innovation within
the business".
Case B: "... There are two issues that could occur to this. The first one byhaving a high number
of non-executives you would have a different set of viewpoints. So, when we look for
the composition in our board we map out what kind of skills we would like our non-
executives tobring into theboard. We would likepeople who would have experience in
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marketing and IT rather than having people who just have banking competence. They
would then bring different viewpoints, which add entrepreneurship where they would
come up with ideas whether we have thought about it in this way and that is the sort of
value added we are looking for. So, actually I think they obviously bring a positive
impact".
Case B: "... I don't think the non-executives would take a short-term view. In the Combined
Code it says they should hold the position for three years. But frankly an organisation
like us, where banking organisations are much more complex and takes quite a long
while for the directors to learn what the organisation is all about, we would typically
expect them to serve for at least 6 years with a possibility of another 3 years on top of
that".
Case C: "... I don't think it really matters, I think what is important with non-executives is that
their background and knowledge and understanding on the ranges of issues that the
particular business faces. If you look at our company it is very important that one of
the non-executives has specific expertise and knowledge on CSR. Another one
should have the knowledge and understanding of pharmaceutical manufacture and
another should have understanding of retailing, because that is how our business
works. So, I don't really think it is the case the number of them is an issue but it is
much more of the experience that they have to add to our company".
Case D: "... Our non-executives tend to stick around for a quite a long time, say for about 5
years. Then only you will really get them to understand about the company. But I
would not say our non-executives are there for short term. I think the other thing
which is worth mentioning, which is a very significant point, is that our organisation
is managed in a very autonomous way. The board of directors is there for financial
control and overall strategy and approve significant business proposal. However,
most of the entrepreneurial activity goes on is within operating businesses and
division, arid they tend to be managed by the operational managers".
Case E: "... The force of change comes from people within the company, and it comes from
interactions with customers and with competitors."
Case F: "... I think a high ratio of non-executive directors would have a greater degree of
experience in terms of different business environment, different company cultures,
and different ways in approaching things, which can enhance corporate
entrepreneurship".
In summary, the findings did not confound this study's expectations since it was
expected that high levels of non-executives on the board would not be able to fully
understand the operations of the business and their positions were on a short-terms basis
in comparison to the executive directors. However, all the companies found that the
non-executives were able to bring additional knowledge and experience to the board
which was considered to be crucial and to stimulate enterprise activities.
This aspect was further investigated to ascertain whether providing ownership to non-
executives would help to reduce the negative relationship on corporate entrepreneurship
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(Table 8.3.2). Respondents from all the 6 companies found that it would not create any
difference because, in the first place, the non-executives did not inhibit corporate
entrepreneurship activities in the firm.
Table 8.3.2: The Relationship between Providing Ownership to Non-Executive and
Corporate Entrepreneurship
In your opinion does providing ownership to non-executives help
to reduce the negative impact on corporate entrepreneurship? If
yes or no what sort of impact?
Cases
Insignificant A, B, C, D, E&F
The respondent from Company A argued that providing ownership to non-executives
would onlyhave a slight effect on corporate entrepreneurship and this would depend on
the degree of ownership. Most of the non-executives in these 6 companies received part
of their fees in the form of shares. It would only make a difference if they were to own
large amounts of shares in a company where, for example as in Company A, the
Chairman and Vice Chairman own 100,000 shares that were worth £1.4 million and in
such a case the impact on them would be significant. However, it was realised that the
independence level of the non-executives could be affected by offering a large amount
of ownership. Therefore, the decision was made by the company's managementnot to
increase any further their ownership in the form of shares.
In addition, the respondent from Company B found that providing ownership to non-
executives would align their interest with shareholders and they were there to protect
the interests of shareholders. Also, the respondent from Company C argued that
providing ownership to non-executives would encourage them to have a vested interest
in the success of the business. It would act as a motivating device for the non-
executives to have a greater interest towards the company. However, the effect on them
would not be as great as most of the FTSE 100 non-executives are influential and
powerful people and they are not much driven by the amount of money on offer.
Similarly, Company F observed that non-executives were not driven by the fees but
more towards increasing their breadth of experience in the organisation. Thefollowing
quotes illustrate these points:
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Case A: "... I think in some ways it has an effect, but not a huge impact. I think a couple of
exceptions where one of it is our chairman and our vice chairman where both of them
has over than 100,000 shares which today is worth more £1.4 million and the impact
on them would be quite significant".
Case B: "... Yes, but I don't think it will have a negative impact on corporate entrepreneurship.
By tying into some shareholding with the company would be useful. We pay part of the
fees of our non-executive directors in shares. 40% of their fees are paid in shares where
it is obviously tied to the long-term success of the company".
Case B: "... Well, the debate is more around that they should be paid a flat rate and I agree to
that; they should not get any bonuses and long-term incentive awards. But then by
providing them some flat amount of shares, you do align their interest with the
shareholders and at the end of the day, they are there to protect the interest of the
shareholders".
Case C: "... But I would have to say that most non-execs of top 100 companies are reasonably
influential and powerful people and I'm not always certain that they need the money.
Our non-execs get paid £50,000 and I don't think they are driven by that amount of
money".
Case F: "... I say that because generally, normally non-executive directors are quite experienced
and have executive roles elsewhere and in terms of remunerations they aren't driven
by the fees because their fees are relatively low paid as compared to being executive
directors elsewhere. Non-executive directors in my experience are as much trying to
get experience in the organisation rather than doing it for the money, which is
relatively low".
On the other hand, respondents from Companies D and E argued that providing
ownership should not create any difference, as the non-executives were there to protect
the interests of shareholders. Therefore, non-executives should not have any vested
interest. They were there to represent the interest of the shareholders, manage risk and
ensure the board of directors made decisions in the interests of the shareholders. The
following quotes illustrate these points:
Case D: "... As I far I'm concerned I wouldn't have thought it would have made any difference.
In general I hope it would not make any difference because they are there to represent
the interest of the shareholders. If their actions and decisions change as a result of
profit drawn from shares, then they were not doing the right job. They were either too
timid before or they are being too risky afterwards. Actually, their behaviour should
not change because they represent the interest of shareholders making the right
balance of risk".
Case E: "... Yes, they do have shares in the company. That is the normal practice, if you see our
annual report that is the case. I don't think it will make very much difference. They
are, they are there to operate in the professional way rather than the sort in seeking to
make money. I think if you felt they are the there for self-interest then probably you
have got the wrong person".
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In summary, this study was again confounded by the results as it was expected that
providing some element of ownership could act as a motivating device in building
greater commitment towards the organisation which, in turn, would reduce the negative
relationship between the proportion of outsiders and corporate entrepreneurship.
Instead all the companies found that providing ownership to the non-executives did not
make any difference, as they did not inhibit enterprise activities within the firm. Some
companies found it would only have a minimal effect in stimulating and motivating
non-executives to have a vested interest in the success of the company. There were
companies that commented that it should not make any difference, as non-executives
were there to protect the interest of shareholders and they were not driven by the
amount of shares offered to them but more towards obtaining the experience of acting
as a non-executive director.
Board Size
The next aspect examines whether a larger board size would decrease corporate
entrepreneurship activities in the organisation. Respondents from Companies A, D and
E revealed that it did impact on corporate entrepreneurship but Companies B and C
indicated otherwise, whilst Company F held a neutral perspective (Table 8.3.3).
Table 8.3.3: The Relationship between Board Size and Corporate
Entrepreneurship Activities
Does board size have an impact on the entrepreneurial





Company A, categorised as highly entrepreneurial but low in govemance, perceived
that a board size that was too large would tend to become dysfunctional and unwieldy.
Their company has a board size of 12 and it was felt that this was just the right size for
their business. In addition, Company A preferred to have a smaller board size but
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realized that one of the drawbacks that it faced was difficulty in obtaining what they
would be looking for when making decisions. One of the possibilities was that the
company felt that a large board size could restrain the decision-making process as it
operated in a highly competitive market where it was crucial to make fast decisions. In
addition, Company E categorized as highly governed but lowly entrepreneurial, also
found that a board size that was too small tended to become too personal and not
challenging enough to check on the CEO. A board size that was too large would have
wider views to consider and this may cause difficulty in terms of decision-making and
create the potential for having an over-powerful CEO. The most preferred size was the
medium board that could provide the right sort of control whilst retaining the dynamics
of the meeting. This company believed that the right board size was between 8 to 10
members. Similarly Company, D situated at the centre of the scatter graph, revealed
that medium and smaller board sizes would be better for group decision-making and
their ideal size was between 5 to 10 members. Companies D&E felt that over 15
members were considered too large and it could affect the activities of the group. The
following quotes illustrate these points:
Case A: "... Yes, certainly if it is too large it could be dysfunctional".
Case A: "... Our board size is 12 and I think that is about the right size. We would go for a low
let probably for a short period but then you certainly haven't got what you are
looking for. But then if you go above than that then it will become unwieldy".
Case D: "... I guess the board being equal and the smaller is better I believe to a certain limit. I
wouldn't go as far as where all board should have an odd number and 3 are too many.
Some would say for group decision making 5 to 10 is ideal. Most boards for
operational reasons tend to be bigger than that. But I don't think so, if you had over
15 members- I don't know I'm just throwing numbers- I would imagine it would
have an impact on the activities of that group of people and therefore, the
entrepreneurial activities of the company".
Case E: "... I think when the board is too small, it will then become too personal, is like a little
group of friends working together and there isn't a challenge and check on the CEO.
I think the regulators who invent the rules would want to see larger boards in order
there are larger views to be considered. But I think when it is too big then the board
will find it too hard to make a decision and what people are actually worried about is
the over powerful CEO when you have a tiny board or a big board. The medium
board is the one that can actually provide the right sort of control, that somebody can
speak out but not too many where the voice is lost. I think a very large and very small
board would tend to lead to a situation where the CEO would have more power
proportionately but with right board size, I don't know exactly, let's say 8 to 10 but
not 15 or 3 members. I think that what would be a sensible size where people can sit
around and have a discussion. It is just that the dynamics of the meeting would lose if
you have too small or too large board size".
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On the other hand, respondents from Companies B and C had different viewpoints on
board size. Company B, categorized as low in governance and entrepreneurial found
that board size did not have any influence on corporate entrepreneurship. This
organisation strongly believed that ideas were developed out with the board but that
these ideas would then come to the board for approval. The consequence of having a
large board size was that it was less effective but that it did not impact on corporate
entrepreneurship. Similarly, Company C classified as highly governed and
entrepreneurial believed that board size was not a crucial issue. Instead, the make up of
the board in ensuring that it possessed the necessary and appropriate experts on the
board was considered to be more important. The following quotes illustrate these
points:
CaseB: "... I think once you have got aboard sizeover 17 or 18 then I think it becomes pretty
difficult to manage, but I don't think it will necessarily have an impact on corporate
entrepreneurship because in an organisation like ours, the ideas are being developed
some way below the board, but in fact it may have to come up to the board for
approval. I don't think that 17or 18 members or 20 rather than 10 would have anything
to do with that. I think the impact of a large board is that it becomes less effective".
Case C: "... I really don't believe that the size of the board is a crucial issue I think it is much
more of the make up of the board in making sure that the expertise that you have
around the table is appropriate for the business".
Company F, placed at the centre of the scatter graph, held a neutral perspective and felt
it would very much depend on the function of the board in terms of decision-making for
a particular activity. In this company, it was the practice that the board made a general
decision and authority was then delegated to the board committee that consisted of a
smaller number of executive and non-executive directors who then had the
responsibility of authorising the implementation of the decision for a particular activity.
However, this company equally admitted that having a large number of people on the
board could slow down the decision-making process of the company as a greater effort
would be required in reaching a consensus. The following quote illustrates this point:
Case F: "... In one sense yes. When there are a lot more people on theboard depending on the
board decision-making process, on what is required in order to authorize a particular
activity, then clearly having a greater number of people on the board would require
executives to bring that many people in line with their thinking in terms of decision
making and, in that sense, I think having to go through the process it can then slow
down the decision making".
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In summary, this study was again confounded by the mixed responses in that 3
companies revealed that a large board size would create negative implications towards
corporate entrepreneurship and 2 companies indicated otherwise and 1 held a neutral
perspective.
Frequency of Board and Sub Committee Meetings
The next aspect that was explored was the effect of frequent board meetings on
corporate entrepreneurship activities in the organisation (Table 8.3.4). Companies A
and F perceived that it would have an impact on entrepreneurial activities in the firm
but Company B, C, D and E indicated otherwise.
Table 8.3.4: The Relationship between Frequency of Board Meeting and
Corporate Entrepreneurship
In your opinion can having too frequent board meetings
decrease or increase entrepreneurial activities in an
organisation? Ifyes or no why?
Cases
Significant A&F
Insignificant B, C, D &E
Company A, categorized as highly entrepreneurial and low in governance, realized that
having a high frequency of board meetings could impact negatively on the
entrepreneurial activities in the organisation, as the board would start to look into the
details of the operation rather than looking at the bigger picture of the business and how
it could be driven forward. In addition, too many meetings required spending too much
time in preparing for the meetings, which was considered to be an effort. Furthermore,
directors would spend most of their time attending meetings rather than running the
business and this could limit their opportunity to be directors on other company boards.
This company might have provided these arguments based upon the competitive and
complex business market that it operated in where having too frequent meetings was
seen as waste of resources that could be better employed on other more productive
activities. Similarly Company F, situated at the centre of the Scatter Graph, revealed
that frequent meetings meant thatexecutives spent most of their time at boardmeetings
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rather than focusing on the activities in the market place. The following quotes
illustrate these points:
Case A: "... I would ... probably agree with that. We have five board meetings per year but
might have other meetings that look at specific issues. We only have 5 board
meetings, which is pretty low for FTSE standard. I think one of it, which is taken into
consideration, where there is one whole day meeting, which is purely devoted
towards looking at strategy and the way the business is driven forward where the
input would come from the non-executives. But then, if you start to do that too often,
then you start to look at the details of the operation rather than looking at the bigger
picture of what we should be doing and how can you drive things forward".
Case A: "... if you do have too many meetings then you do spend too much detail, then that
probably could impede entrepreneurship and, not only that, it can affect the progress
of projects and moving the business forward. ... you might have to find the right
balance for your own business. I think if you have too many meetings then the
directors wouldhave to spend so much of their time preparing for the board meeting
where they won't be able to run the business. Actuallypreparing the board meeting is
quite an effort. If you are doing that on a monthly basis, like I know some of the
banks where they have more than twenty meetings per year ... you would almost be
having directors not doing anything but attending board meetings... It will certainly
also limit their opportunity to be directors on the other companies' boards".
Case F: "... generally it could decrease the level of entrepreneurship because people spend all
the time on the board meeting and not in the market place".
On the other hand, Companies B and E perceived that the frequency of board meetings
would only have a marginal effect on corporate entrepreneurship activities, as
individuals involved in these activities did not attend board meetings. Furthermore, they
observed that the size of their organisation was large enough to accommodate board
meetings since each director had a big team involved in running the business project
even when they were not around, in comparison to smaller companies. However,
Company E admitted that in extreme situations it could then affect the activities of the
board. Also, they felt that with a company as large as theirs the opportunity, cost and
time involved in preparing meetings was not an issue. In addition, Company C
(categorized as highly governed and entrepreneurial) revealed that more informal
meetings were held rather than the formal board meetings. This was to avoid going
through the formal meeting procedure that involved recording and preparing minutes of
board meetings. This might be one of the ways the company avoids wasting their
executives' time. Also, this company argued that frequent meetings were not
necessarily perceived as bad since there was a whole range of issues that needed to be
discussed and properly vetted prior to investing in a particular project. Similarly,
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Company D, placed at the centre of the Scatter Graph, found that the frequency of
meetings was not seen as a critical issue, but what was more important was whether it
met sufficiently to discuss the necessary issues. The following quotes illustrate these
points:
CaseB: "... may have a marginal decrease in terms of impact. But, I don't think it will certainly
have a direct impact... the people who are setting up new businesses wouldn't be
attending board meetings. In an organisation size like ours, we have directors who
attend board meetings, who run big teams so it will not have an impact on the people
who are doing the work, but it is different for a smaller company. So, a company like
ours would not have an impact at all".
Case C: "... No I don't think so because normally you would have one proper board meeting
per year. But normally people will talk to each other regularly where they would have
their own meeting, which is not a board meeting".
CaseC: "... I'm the director of the company where we would haveinformal meetings outside of
the board. I don't think it really matters because people have board meetings as they
have a whole range of issues to be discussed. Our companyhas quite a number of board
meetings because it has a wide range of issues, and a turn over of £5 million year with
68,000 people. People need to make sure that if the company is going to invest in a
£100 million project and that it has been properly vetted. The board level makes the
decision based upon the evidences that they are provided with".
Case D: "... you can put 10 or 15 highly talented people, who are very well experienced in a
room and meet every 6 monthsandthat doesn't really matter. What really matters is the
interaction that the group of people has in the organisation of course. It is not so much
the frequencies of board meetings but is the board meeting enough, such as whether the
board has the right level of input into the activities of the group".
Case E: "... I don't thinkthat the board is really driving the corporate entrepreneurial activities
in the company and, therefore, that theboard chooses to have twice as many meetings,
I don't think it will make much difference".
Case E: "... where you haveboardmeetings all the time it will then stop thembut then that is at
a very extreme situation. But not only we have official board meetings but also phone
calls if there are any decisions to be made. I don't think it really matters in a wide
range. It doesn't matter unless in an extreme way".
The next aspect that was investigated on boardactivity was the effect of frequent board
committee meetings on corporate entrepreneurship activities in the organisation (Table
8.3.5) and whether these committees needed to have frequent meetings. Company A
and F indicated that it did have an influence towards corporate entrepreneurship
activities but Companies B, C, D and E found otherwise.
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Table 8.3.5: The Relationship between Frequency of Board Committee Meeting
and Corporate Entrepreneurship
In your opinion do board committees need to have very
frequent meetings? Ifyes or no why?
Cases
Significant A&F
Insignificant B, C, D &E
Generally, Company A (categorized as highly entrepreneurial and low in governance)
found board committees would have a lesser number of meetings compared to the board
meetings. This was due to board committees having a very specific role and only
focusing on relevant issues concerning their committees. Again, this company tried to
refrain from taking up time from committee member diaries and what was more crucial
was to make the best use of time. If there was a need to have additional meetings then
they would be held by phone. Similarly, Company F, placed at the centre of Scatter
Graph, revealed that board committees were not required to have regular meetings.
What was important was that the board committees set their agenda and ensured that the
basic requirements of their terms and references had been satisfied. Both companies
indicated that too frequent meetings would affect enterprise activities within the firm.
The following quotes illustrate these points:
Case A: "... I think generally the committees would probably have lesser meetings than the
board, but then they have very much specific roles where they would focus on what
they are doing. The remuneration committee tends to meet up three times per year
formally and, if necessary, have other meetings that tend to done by phone. But the
formal meetings are always held at the board meetings, so it could be at the
beginning of the meeting, at end of it or the following day. The amount of time taken
from ones diaries we have tried to reduce but what is important is the best use of
time".
Case F: "No, they don't need to. What they need to do is to set theiragenda andensure that they
satisfy the basic needs of their terms and reference".
On the other hand, Companies B, C, D and E perceived that board committees needed
to have frequent meetings and each committee would meet up for a specific reason. It
was essential for the audit committee to meet regularly in order to review audit issues
carefully and to protect its members from any litigation, such as in the Enron case. As
for the remuneration committee, it would be required to meet for discussing issues
pertaining to remuneration matters, such as the schedule of annual bonuses and pay
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rises. Company D revealed that more frequent informal discussions were conducted in
their company and most things were decided during lunchtime. In addition, Companies
B and E continuously stressed that the frequency of board committee meetings would
not have an impact on the entrepreneurial activities of the firm. The following quotes
illustrate these points:
Case B: "... board committees need to have frequent meetings especially in the nature of the
environment in which we operate. For example, the audit committees need to be able
to demonstrate that they have reviewed the issues carefully to protect themselves
from any litigation. We have seen that in a case like in Enron, the directors are
paying very heavy fines for not having to excise their corporate governance. But I
don't think it has a particular impact on corporate entrepreneurship. ... my answers
would be very different if I were operating in a much smaller company".
Case C: "... They need to have meetings when they need to have them. If you look at a
company like ours when it is coming towards AGM time - where you have to report
the accounts - then you have to have more meetings. Also, there would be extra
meetings at a certain time of the year".
Case D: "... our board committees meet on a monthly basis. We have the usual sort of board
committee that is the audit, remuneration and nomination and ... we also have
internal boards committees. For example, the CEO committee would have the
executive directors meet monthly. Again, the audit committee needs to meet as
frequently in order to satisfy the requirement needs of audit. Therefore, they need to
meet monthly in order to review things which has been put to them, and they meet a
lot more in the period of mnning close to disclosure of accounts for example. The
nomination committee again ... would have their schedule and they would have their
ad-hoc meetings as and when required. The samegoes for management development
and remuneration committee, they will meet as when they need to meet. The schedule
of the annual bonus and pay rise would require the remuneration committee to do
that. The particularcommittee meetsup for specific reasons. They can choose to have
the meeting if they need to.
Case D: "... So, there are very frequent informal discussions made. Things would get much
more decided during lunchtime meeting".
Case E: "... they havethe usual audit, remuneration and nomination committee I think they are
the main ones and I think they meet quarterly. I don't think the frequency of the
meetings have an impact on the productivity of the organisation".
Case E: "...I think a lot of businesses would take seriously on audit committee. I think the
Sarbanes Oxley andthe Internal Accounting Standards they got to meet; and then you
look at the agendas, they have got to meet so, they have a hell of a lot of work to do. I
can't imagine them meeting less frequently to be able to cover what is needed".
All the companies except for Companies C and E agreed that the frequency of meetings
would have an influence on the productivity level of the firm. Again Company A,
classifiedas highly entrepreneurial and low in governance, consistently emphasized that
having too frequent meetings could become less useful as their impact is diluted and a
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number of people would be indirectly affected in terms of their work. However,
Company B perceived that meetings were an efficient way to get things done, but
working individually would be a better use of their time. This company acknowledged
that individuals needed to be given responsibility; e.g. for a particular project or in
product development when they need to possess the responsibility for making the
outcome of a decision successful instead of going through various committees in order
to obtain approval, thus rendering it unclear as to who is responsible. Similarly,
Companies D and F, situated at the centre of the Scatter Graph, detected that having too
frequent meetings would create a loss in terms of resources, and the decision-making
processes would be slowed down. The following quotes illustrate these points:
Case A: "... The more meetings you have the less useful it gets, as it would become diluted.
You are not only looking at time of directors that is effected but also need to look at
huge number of peoplewho would be affectedby these numbersof meetings".
Case B: "...When we know the individuals are taking the responsibility by themselves and
making those decisions to be more successful. Say, for example, if we decide to
operate on a new product as an example of entrepreneurship, and if that decision is
taken by one person who is in charge in making the product a success or likely to be
a success compared to going through various committees to agree upon it which
would get unclear who is responsible for it".
Case D: ".... when you have too many meetings then you get absolutely lost in terms of your
resources and also when you don't have enough meetings, where you do not get
together enough, then you lose on what is going on in a particular business and
decisions would get slowed down. Yes, I think the frequency of meeting can
definitely have a negative impact on the business".
Case F: "Yes if the board meetings are there for decision-making than it can slow the business
down".
On the other hand, Companies C and E, categorized to be highly governed, perceived
that the frequency of meetings would not affect the productivity level of companies.
Company C stressed that it was important to have regular meetings to ensure that the
businesses ran effectively and efficiently. Company E believed that the productivity
level of a company would only be affected by meetings in extreme situations. The
following quotes illustrate these points:
Case C: "... it has to makesure that the business runs efficiently and effectively as well".
Case E: "Yes, only in the extremecases. The normal wide range I don't think so".
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However there is a prospective alternative interpretation of the interview results along
the following lines. The findings confounded this study's expectations, as there was no
clear consensus about whether frequent meetings would hamper entrepreneurial
activities.
It is an interesting indication that Company A, classified as highly entrepreneurial but
and a low governance, strongly believed frequent meetings were unproductive.
However, companies classified as highly governed were more supportive about having
frequent meetings as they were seen to be essential for the progress of the business. In
summary, this section explored five main aspects of Board Composition and Strucmre:
insiders vs. outsiders on the board, providing outsiders with ownership, board size,
frequency of board and board committee meetings and its repercussions on enterprise
activities in the organisation.
8.4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND
CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The previous section revealed the similarities and differences of opinion among the 6
companies in terms of board structure and board composition. This section will be
uncovering the impact of executive ownership and dominance of block holders towards
corporate entrepreneurship activities in the firm.
Executive Ownership
The first issue in this section examines whether large amounts of executive ownership
would diminish the spirit of building an entrepreneurial organisation. The respondent
from Company A confirmed that it did impact, but Companies B, C, D, E and F
indicated otherwise (Table 8.4.1).
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Table 8.4.1: The Relationship between Executive Ownership and Corporate
Entrepreneurship
In your opinion can large executive ownership diminish the spirit
ofbuilding an entrepreneurial organisation? Ifyes or no why?
Case
Significant A
Insignificant B, C, D, E & F
Company A, classified as highly entrepreneurial but with low governance, recognized
that providing a high level of executive ownership would diminish the spirit of building
an entrepreneurial organisation as it would create risk averse employees. Furthermore,
this company observed that most of the executives were towards the end of their career,
meaning that their time horizons would not be too forward looking. They would rather
protect their investment than taking unnecessary risks, which would be good for the
business. Therefore, it would be crucial to create the right balance. Company A realized
the implications of having a large amount of ownership, when a remuneration review
was conducted in 2004 where the CEO was only allowed to own shares of not more
than 3 times their salary; whereas executive directors were offered less than twice. The
following quote illustrates these points:
Case A: "... I think it has to be a significant proportion of the individuals' wealth, then I think it
will then make them be more risk averse. Generally most of the executives' directors
are towards the end of their career, so perhaps their time horizon isn't that great, so
they might be looking to protect their investment rather than taking the risk that will
be good for the business. You do need to have a balance of it. I think that is one of
the reasons why we had a remuneration review last year and we actually set the target
for executive directors and CEO. The guideline is 3 times less of the salary in terms
of shares for the CEO and for the directors it is twice".
On the other hand, Companies B, C, D, E & F revealed that a large amount of executive
ownership does not diminish the spirit of stimulating entrepreneurial activities in an
organisation. Instead, Company B perceived that it would align the executives' interest
with shareholders and would act as a motivating device.
Company C stressed that most crucially, executives need to have a sense of
responsibility regarding their key role. This company perceived that it was important
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that the executives were being controlled and checked in terms of their decision
making. It was crucial to have the right sort of controls, checks and balances towards
the CEO and executives because a large number of people relied upon the business and
if wrong decisions were made, the repercussions could affect the rest of the employees
who were left working in the organisation.
In addition, Company D indicated that providing large ownership created a greater
sense of belonging towards the organisation. Furthermore, it depended on the
underlying culture of the organisation whether the nature of the business was based on a
short or long-term focus. If it was geared more towards the short-term then it would
create a more risk averse culture within the organisation. Likewise, Company E felt it
would depend on the short or long-term view that the executives had undertaken. The
provision of a large amount of ownership would mean that the executives' shares would
be worth more money and this would focus their interest in the share price of the
company instead of monitoring the company activities and actions; this would induce
them to be more short-term focused and therefore be risk averse. On the other hand, if
the executives had taken a long-term view, then they would focus more on the benefits
to the company in the long run. However, it was argued that the amount of shares
owned by the executives in comparison to the proportion of the company would be a
very small percentage due to the large size of the business. Similarly, Company F
revealed that their executives held a relatively small amount of shares but it would
certainly contribute to their executives having a significant interest in the financial
success of the business. This would then drive towards building an entrepreneurial
culture within the firm. The following quotes illustrate these points:
Case B: "... It does align executive interest with the shareholders and act as a motivating
device".
Case C: "... I think the executivesmust have the responsibility for what is their key role".
Case C: "... Basically executives of top 100 companies have got a pretty reasonable salary
structure that will then make them very wealthy people. The argument comes down
on how do you check on it".
Case C: "... There is a need to check by the management like any board members where they
need to have check and balances to ensure they are not taking advantage of the
company funds".
Case D: "... No, I would actually say on the contrary that the owner-managed organisation
tends to be more entrepreneurial and therefore giving ownership to the executives, it
helps".
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Case D: "... It will have a positive impact because executives will have a large proportion of
their remuneration based on stock performance".
Case D: "... If you have a company which is short-term in nature, which is a risk taking
organisation and then giving them shares in the company would then make them ...
more risk averse. This is because they have some benefit to gain and that means that
in this case they shouldn't have taken the risk in the first place. If they were working
for the benefit of the shareholder then they would have been taking less risk already.
... if you start from a risky position then giving them ownership will make them ...
more risk averse. If you start from the civil service mentality then it is not. So it
depends on what the underlying culture of the company".
Case E: "... Perhaps you can argue if they take a short-term view but if they take a longer view
perhaps ... they are going to say I know it is going to penalize the share price in the
long run but it is right for the company, I'm going to be here for 5 years or more.
Perhaps if they were to say if I take a longer run then perhaps I would look the way a
private company operates where the owner of a private company they do not worry
about the stock market. You often can make longer-term investment without having
to explain too much or you can look through at the economic cycle to clear your
personal doubts where you decide to do it and you see it through. May be you would
make good money one day and perhaps you don't and of course there is risk in all
these things. So, executives owning shares I would argue that certainly to the
proportionate of the company it is only a tiny percentage they own, because the
company is so big".
Case F: ".. .because our executives own a relatively low level of shares".
Case F: "... But if you were talking about driving entrepreneurial culture you would have
executives to have a significant interest for the financial success of the business.
Then you more likely to respond entrepreneurially in that context".
In summary, the findings revealed by Company A, classified as highly entrepreneurial
but with low governance, very much supported the study's expectation that providing
high levels of executive ownership would create executives who are more risk averse
and therefore this reduced the likelihood of venturing into entrepreneurial activities.
However, most of the companies did not agree with this argument but instead felt that
providing executive ownership could act as a motivating device. Also, it would depend
on the underlying culmre of the company and the effects would not be great as
executives only receive a relatively low level of shares in comparison to the size of the
company.
Institutional Block Holders
The previous section discussed the implications of providing executive ownership. This
section will investigate the second aspect of the ownership structure as to whether the
dominance of block holders would have a relationship with corporate entrepreneurship.
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Companies C and E believed that it would create a positive effect whereas A, D and F
indicated otherwise and Company D held a neutral perspective (Table 8.4.2).
Table 8.4.2: The Relationship between Institutional Blockholders and Corporate
Entrepreneurship
Does the dominance of institutional block holders in an
organisation have a positive impact on corporate





Companies C and E, classified as being highly governed, argued that a dominance of
institutional shareholders would have a positive impact on corporate entrepreneurship.
Company E revealed that most institutional shareholders tended to take a short-term
view and were more interested in the quarterly or yearly earnings of the company.
Hence, this would place pressure on a company to perform better and become a driving
force for change. Company C also held similar views that institutional shareholders
may prevent the company from taking a particular route. This was not seen as a bad
thing, as they would want the company to be successful and it was not in their interest
to have the company fail in its business. Furthermore, Company C believed that
corporate entrepreneurship did not come from institutional shareholders but from those
people working within the company and therefore encouragement would be given to
them to generate ideas and become entrepreneurial. The following quotes illustrate
these points:
Case C: "... I don't think the institutional block holders have an impact. It might stop an
institutional holder to believe that it is taking the route that the company shouldn't be
taking but I don't think that is necessarily a bad thing. ... if they own shares they do
want the company to be successful and it is not to their interest for the company to
fail".
Case E: "... they are interestedin whatever our earnings may be bi-quarterly or bi-yearly. They
are interested obviously in the value of the company and they come and talk to the
finance director of the company. I think they do probably have a positive impact
because they are a force of pressure on the company. I think that is one of the things
that cause the executive directors to face pressure on how we can do it better. So, I
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would say no, I don't think they diminish the spirit of building an entrepreneurial
organisation. They are there as a force of change".
On the other hand, Company A (classified as highly entrepreneurial and with low
governance) argued that the dominance of block holders would create a negative impact
on corporate entrepreneurship as block holders would tend to pull the organisation in
one particular direction which would be for their own benefit and this could create a
negative impact on the business. Without block holders, the company would be free to
develop its own strategy and internal corporate entrepreneurship. This was based on
their previous experience, where another company held part of their shares and that
limited their expansion into the overseas market. But today, without having the block
holder, their company had become much more entrepreneurial and the company's profit
had increased tremendously as a result of running on their own. Similarly, Company B
revealed that it would have a negative impact because large block holders would want
to take a keen involvement in the decisions of the company, which would create
negative implications on the decision-making process and progress of the business.
Also, it tended to cause the block holders to be risk averse and to go into the detail of
the business more than was deemed necessary.
In addition, Company F observed that most institutional investors would prefer to invest
in businesses that are regarded as low-risk and high-return and which are deemed able
to provide returns quickly. This aspect would then inhibit companies from venturing
into long-term investments and this could constrain enterprising activities from taking
place within the firm, as these would require a long-term commitment. The following
quotes illustrate these points:
Case A: "... It very much depends on how they operate because I know a number of companies
that have that kind of shareholder structure, where the individual and the shareholder
itself are probably working at its own end. I think it will then be inhibiting. I think
there is a danger in all cases".
Case A: "... I would imagine any shareholding of dominance could possibly be quite negative
for the business. The large voice could pull the organisation to a particular direction.
Without it the organisation will then be free to develop its own strategy and to
develop its own internal entrepreneurship".
Case A: "... I think if you look back at 1996, where we were held by another company where
they told us what to do, limited our expansion overseas and if you look at our
business today it is very different now. The business is much more entrepreneurial
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and the profit has increasedhugely and the reason is because we are now mnning on
our own".
Case B: "... I could imagine if you have a major shareholder who owns 40% of the company
that could either have a positive impact but I think it is more likely for a negative
impact on corporate entrepreneurship because when they have large block holding
they would want to have a keen involvementin the decisions of the company, which
might have a negative impact on the decision-making".
Case F: "...They are not investing in a business which they regard as high risk and low return.
But they are investing in a business that has low risk and high-return".
Company D, positioned at the centre of the Scatter Graph, held a neutral view in terms
of the dominance of block holders and its implications towards corporate
entrepreneurship. According to this company, there were different types of institutional
shareholders and some would take a short-term view in terms of their strategy and some
tended to take, by nature, a long-term view. This would very much depend on the
strategy of the fund managers. If they tended to be short-term focused then they would
have a short-term attitude and this would serve to diminish the spirit of building long-
term goals for the company. Based on this company's observations, most institutional
shareholders tended to take a short-term view and therefore, this wouldhave a negative
repercussion on corporate entrepreneurship. However, this company equally admitted
that there were situations where institutional shareholders would press the company into
taking more risks. The following quotes illustrate these points:
Case D: "... I think in general, institutional shareholders tend to be more short term in their
strategies but then there are some that are long-term in nature. I think we have some
very short-term attitude institutional shareholders. I think it all depends on how the
fund manager is set up to and not the liability of the institution is all about.
Case D: "... If you have short-term shareholder then you will have short-term attitude and it
will then diminish the spirit of long-term goals. Most of the institutional shareholders
have a short-term view and therefore it would have a negative impact on corporate
entrepreneurship. But thenthere areoccasions where they will press for the company to
take more risk".
In summary, this section analysed two aspects of ownership structure that involved
executive ownership and the dominance of institutional block holders, and the
consequences towards stimulating entrepreneurial activities within the organisation.
There was no clear consensus on its implications that confirmed this study's
expectations as it was anticipated that an excessive level of executive ownership would
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make an organisation more risk averse which served to hamper entrepreneurial
activities. Also, dominance of institutional block holders was seen to be encouraging
for entrepreneurialism in the company as there would be a stronger voice and
shareholder activism but that view was supported by only 2 companies.
8.5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REMUNERATION STRUCTURE
AND CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The first section of this chapter examined the impact of corporate governance towards
corporate entrepreneurship activities in the organisation. This was followed by a
discussion on the board of directors and ownership structure and its relationship with
enterprise activities within the firm. Lastly, this section focuses on the 2 main aspects
of remuneration that involve offering Executive Stock Option (ESO) and Annual
Bonuses and its effect on stimulating entrepreneurial activities within the firm.
Executive Stock Option
The first aspect on the remuneration structure investigated whether offering ESO would
have a relationship with corporate entrepreneurship activities in the firm. Respondents
from Companies B, C and E confirmed that it did not have any relationship, but
Companies A, D and F were neutral in their views (Table 8.5.1).
Table 8.5.1: The Relationship between offering Executive Stock Option (ESO) and
Corporate Entrepreneurship
In your opinion do executive stock options reduce or increase




Companies B, C and E perceived that offering ESOs to executives would not reduce but
instead could stimulate corporate entrepreneurship activities within the firm. Company
B felt that most of the companies were now moving towards performance shares, which
were indicative for long-term performance rather than being offered as options. This
would result in executives becoming more long-term focused which would then
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encourage the inculcation of entrepreneurial activities within the firm. In addition,
Company C found that the existence of ESO was seen as a source of encouragement to
the individual to make the businessmore successful. Also, this company stressed that it
would very much depend upon the individual's objectives as to whether they would
want to be successful and, as such, it would be their achievements that would allow
them to reap the benefits. Similarly, Company E discovered thatESO would encourage
employees to venture into more risky activities and this would assist in stimulating
entrepreneurial activities within the firm. The following quotes illustrate these points:
CaseB: "... In theory it should nothave aneffect because stock options in many companies are
now movingtowards awarding performance shares rather than just options".
Case B: "... we have a policy of encouraging ourexecutives to own shares andthey have stock
option where they shouldbe aimed towards increasing the long-term performance of
the company, and because mostof them won't just be around for a 3 year period but
will be expected to work with the organisation a lot longer, even though their stock
options may mature in 3 years time. And they will be offeredoptions every year and
they ought to be lookingfor the success of the companies as far as 6 or 7 years out".
Case C: "... I think they are there as an encouragement to make the business successful".
Case C: "... It all depends on the objective of the person who wants to be successful. It is their
achievements that will make them get their bonuses".
Case D: "... it could cause people to go towards more risky activities and perhaps increase on
corporate entrepreneurship activities. I think there is an element change risk and
entrepreneurship going on together. So, I think, yes, it will encourage corporate
entrepreneurship".
On the other hand, Company A, D and F felt the effects of ESO would very much
depend on how it had been structured. If the stock options were offered without being
tied to performance criteria, then the company faced the risk that executives would tend
to maximize short-term gains. But if it had been well structured and based upon
performance criteria that was appropriate to the business, it could then help to drive the
business forward, which was seen as beneficial to the firm. Companies that rewarded
long-term performance would encourage corporate entrepreneurial activities, as it
tended to be on a long-term basis. The following quotes illustrate these points:
Case A: "... I think it a lot depends on how it is structured. If it is purely an option that has no
performance criteria than it will be at a risk where people will be looking to maximize
the short-term gains. But if it has been well structured, based on performance criteria
that is appropriate to the business, which is based on driving the business forward, then.
I think it will then be beneficial".
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Case D: "... The design of the stock option scheme is very important, that is the key thing. If
you reward short-term performance then you will drive people to take short-term
positions. If you reward long-term performance, then they will take long-term
positions. Since entrepreneurial activities tend to be long-term in nature then you have
to reward for long-term performance".
Case D: "... Executives' stock options have the capability to massively increase or massively
decrease entrepreneurship depending on how it is done".
Case F: "... Yes, it does increase but it depends on how it has been structured and it has to be
more for a long-term then that would encourage corporate entrepreneurship.
In summary, the findings did not meet with this study's expectation that ESO was
considered to provide negative implications towards enterprise development of the
business. Half of the companies found ESO would not create negative consequences
towards enterprise activities and the other half of the companies were neutral in their
views.
Annual Bonus
Lastly, this section uncovers the underlying details about whether practising
performance criteria in awarding annual bonuses to executives is able to increase
entrepreneurial activities in the firm. Most of the companies agreed that it would
stimulate enterprise activities except for Companies C and E (Table 8.5.2).
Table 8.5.2: The Relationship between Practising Performance Criteria in
Awarding Annual Bonus and Entrepreneurial Activities
In your opinion would applying performance criteria in awarding
annual bonuses be able to increase activities in the organisation? Ifyes
or no why?
Case
Significant A, B, D & F
Insignificant C&E
Companies A and F strongly believed it would be able to incentivise executives but it
would depend very much on how the bonus criteria had been structured. Company F
practiced individual performance criteria, where part of the annual bonus structure
evaluated whether the individual possessed the ability to be entrepreneurial. This would
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then encourage individuals to be entrepreneurial and stimulate enterprise activities
within the company. Likewise, Company B found individuals would be motivated if
they knew that they were being evaluated on certain elements and this wouldencourage
them to work towards it, which would then encourage entrepreneurial activities. In
addition, it was important how the targets had been set and they had to be linked
explicitly which would then help to enhance the value of the company.
In addition, Company D stressed that the best approach in designing bonuses would be
based on a long-term incentive plan, as this would align the long-term interests of the
shareholders. This company felt that the evaluation of an individual's performance was
considered to be judgmental and it would depend upon what approach had been used.
The company avoided using solely qualitative performance evaluation approaches. The
company stressed that there was no corporate-wide performance appraisal or categories
of people who were appraised the same way across groups, but it would change
according to the different divisions and in different countries. The following quotes
illustrate these points:
Case A: "... The way we are starting to structure is profit based 100% and it is different
compared to before, where it used to be profit based for the directors. Now we are
starting to look at the individual performance as well and a part of it looking at
his/her entrepreneurialship and it is being awarded in the bonus structure".
Case A: "... We have performance criteria built into thebonus whether you have the ability to
be entrepreneurial needs to be part of the performance criteria. So that has a
weighting in terms of the bonus, which seems to encourage. You do have to be very
careful in terms of how you structure them. I think we have one of the best
remuneration structures".
Case B: "... in terms of bonus if people knew that certain elements were going to be looked
into, and entrepreneurial activities would, then certainly increase depends on how
you define target, because you have to link the bonus with explicit targets and also it
will have to increase the value of the company".
Case D: "... If performance criteria are applied to entrepreneurial activities, then it will be able
to".
Case D: "... If you have an individual manager whose annual bonuses is solely dictated by his
managers appraisal in his performance in a year, and then that depends on how his
manager applies it and what are the factors he uses to judge".
Case D: "... based on share price then you end up in a short-term ... of situation. If you based it
on a long-term share price where you have a long incentive plan, then it is probably
the best way of aligning it towards the long-term interest of the shareholders".
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Case F: "... I guess ... the key thing is making sure the criteria. ... focuses on the economics of
profit, which means people focus on both that is the top line and assets base and the
economics of that. So, I think generally yes, but make sure you have got the right
criteria in place".
On the other hand, Companies C and E, both categorized as being highly governed,
found practising performance criteria in awarding annual bonus did not increase
enterprise activities in the firm. Company C revealed there was no link between
practising performance criteria in awarding annual bonus and corporate
entrepreneurship activities in the firm. They were seen as two separate entities. The
company believed it would very much depend on the individual's achievements in order
to obtain their bonuses.
In addition, Company E discovered that it was difficult to determine the performance
criteria for bonuses. This company believed that the annual bonus system, with a
heavier governance mechanistic approach, would not be able to increase corporate
entrepreneurship activities. This was due to governance tending to seek for audit in
everything which wouldbe relatively easy to specifybut in reality was affected in many
different ways. It was found that performance evaluation would very much depend on
the judgment of the manager/boss. The mechanistic approach of evaluating bonuses
was seen as inhibiting entrepreneurial activities as it would encourage individuals to
work within a rigidity that had been defined. The following quotes illustrate these
points:
Case C: "...It all depends on the objective of the person who wants to be successful. It is their
achievements that will make them get their bonuses".
Case E: "... I think this seems a very, very difficult area because I don't think anybody knows
the right answer to this. It is very much of the inside company measures and stock
market to consider and one of the difficulties of both of these is how the stock
options work and network".
Case E: "... the tendency of governance would want to seek for audit of rules in everything and
there are some things where it would be great, you can specify brilliant rules but if it
affects them in a different ways.
Case E: ".. .1 feel that being pushed down in a mechanistic approach, which is not theright way
to run the business, and also ultimatelyinhibits entrepreneurship".
The findings on annual bonuses largely supported this study's expectation that
practising performance criteria in awarding annual bonuses to executives would
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stimulate enterprise activities, as they would be incentivised to perform their tasks.
Also, there was an interesting indicationfrom the two companies that did not agree with
the above proposition who were categorized as being highly governed which showed
they believed awarding annual bonuses was considered to be subjective and might
encourage individuals to work within a rigidity that has been defined.
In summary, two aspects of the remuneration structure were analysed in terms of
Executive Stock Option (ESO) and Annual Bonuses and its repercussions towards
entrepreneurial activities within the firm. There were companies that perceived it would
have a positive effect on enterprise activities but some indicated otherwise.
8.6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presented the findings from the qualitative analysis of interviews with
respondents at 6 FTSE 100 companies. Most of the respondents expressed the view that
corporate governance may inhibit entrepreneurial activities if individuals were required
to spend more of their time on compliance activities rather than on the development of
the business. Companies that were required to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
2002 due to dual listing expressed their dissatisfaction, as it was considered to be too
stringent and required compliance in every aspect. This in turn took up a huge amount
of time and resources that could have been channeled towards more beneficial activities
within the firm. However, the U.K Combined Code has been regarded as being more
flexible and provided a certain degree of leeway if companies were unable to comply by
providing the necessary reasons to it. These findings have supported this study's
expectation that rigidity in compliance with corporate governance codes can have
negative implications on enterprise growth
Analysis of the interview data yielded insights into factors that influenced the answers
in 3 main areas of internal control mechanisms of corporate governance: Board
Structure and Composition, Ownership Structure and Remuneration Stmcture.
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Board Structure and Composition
There were 5 aspects covered on Board Structure and Composition: Insiders vs.
Outsiders on the Board, Providing Ownership to Outsiders, Large Board Size and
Frequency of Board, and Board Committee Meetings. All companies revealed that a
high ratio of outsiders on the board provided a positive influence in stimulating
enterprise activities within the firm because they possessed experience and expertise
that was useful for the company. This finding did not correspond to the study's
expectations because it was anticipated that high levels of non-executives on the board
would not be able to fully understand the operations of the business and their positions
were on a short-terms basis in comparison to the executive directors. Also, the results
revealed that providing ownership to non-executives did not reduce the negative
relationship between the proportion of outside directors and corporate entrepreneurship
as in the first place, the non-executives did not inhibit entrepreneurial activities in the
firm. The effect of ownership would only create a slight effect on them, as they were
not driven in terms of fees or shares but more in terms of increasing their breadth of
experience in the organisation. Furthermore, it should not make any difference, as it
was their duty to protect the shareholders interests by not having a vested self-interest in
the organisation. This finding did not correspond with the expectation of the study as it
was anticipated that providing some element of ownership could act as a motivating
device in building greater commitment towards the organization, which in turn, would
reduce the negative relationship between the proportion of outsiders and corporate
entrepreneurship.
In addition, this study obtained mixed results from respondents as to whether a large
board size would decrease entrepreneurial activities in the firm. Some of the
respondents perceived that a larger board size would tend to become dysfunctional,
unwieldy, affect the decision-making processes and the dynamics of meetings and could
get out of control. On the other hand, there were companies that revealed that the make
up of the board was seen to be more crucial than its size and, furthermore, ideas would
tend to be developed at levels below board level. This study was again confounded by
the mixed responses.
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The fourth aspect of board structure and composition covered the frequency of board
meetings where the findings also revealed mixed results from the respondents. 4
companies indicated that the frequency of board meetings would not impact negatively
on entrepreneurial activities in large firms, as individuals who were involved in
enterprise activities did not attend board meetings and also each director would have big
teams running the business project when they are not around. Furthermore, respondents
revealed there were more informal meetings conducted and it would also depend on the
function and purpose of board in performing its duties.
The study also found similar results for board committees on whether the frequency of
meetings would decrease enterprise activities within the firm. The findings revealed
that board committees had less frequent meetings than the board as they had a more
specific function and role. On the other hand, there were companies that perceived that
board committees needed to have more frequent meetings and it would depend on the
requirement and the nature of the committees. The findings confounded this study's
expectations because was no clear consensuses about whether frequent meetings would
hamper entrepreneurial activities.
Ownership Structure
The second area on internal control mechanisms examined the ownership structure that
covered 2 aspects: Executive Ownership and Institutional Block holders. Most of the
companies discovered that a large amount of executive ownership did not diminish the
spirit of building an entrepreneurial organisation. Instead it tended to encourage
enterprise activities, increased the performance of the company and the financial
success of the business. However, there was one company which was highly
entrepreneurial and low on governance that very much supported this study's
expectation that this could provide negative implications because if executives'
ownership grew too large it could render them risk averse, they may develop personal
agendas and may limit the companies' risk by protecting their own interests. However,
most of the companies did not agree with this argument but instead felt that providing
executive ownership could act as a motivating device.
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The second aspect regarding ownership structures investigated the implications for
entrepreneurial activities by the dominance of block holders in the firm. The findings
revealed mixed results; whereby 3 companies discovered it would create negative
implications towards enterprise activities because block holders had a tendency to
become more self-interestedand may pull the company in one specific direction. Also,
it could affect the decision-making process of the company, as blockholders tended to
analyse the details, tended be more risk averse should the company wish to venture into
other investments and were more focused on short-term gains. On the other hand, 2
companies found institutional blockholders wouldstimulate enterprise activities, as they
would have a keen interest in the activities of the company and may stop the company
from going down a particular route. This was not seen as a bad thing. Also, it would be
in their interests for the company to become more successful and would provide
pressure on the company to perform better. Another company perceived that it would
depend on the nature of the institutional shareholders, as there were 2 types whereby
one focused on short-term gains and the other type focused on the rewards of long-term
gains. This showed there was no clear consensus on its implications that met with this
study's expectation that dominance of institutional block holders was seen to be
encouraging for entrepreneurialism in the company as there would be a stronger voice
and shareholder activism in the company.
Remuneration Structure
In respect of the remuneration strucmre, 2 areas were covered in this study: Executive
Stock Option (ESO) and Annual Bonuses. The first area investigated whether offering
ESO to executives would reduce entrepreneurial activities in the organisation. 3
companies indicated that ESO would stimulate enterprise activities as options by
moving towards awarding performance shares and increasing the long-term
performance of the company. Also, it would encourage venturing into more risky
activities. On the otherhand, 3 companies were neutral in theirviews and they revealed
that it would very much depend on how the ESO was structured as to whether the
company rewarded short-term or long-term performances. This finding did not
correspond with this study's expectation that ESO was considered to provide negative
implications towards enterprise development of the business.
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Lastly, this study examined whether organisations practising performance criteria in
awarding annual bonuses to their executives would have an increase in their
entrepreneurial activities. The findings revealed that 4 companies were confident that it
would stimulate enterprise activities if the individuals knew the elements that they were
being evaluated on, but it had to be based on long-term incentives and making sure the
right criteria was in place. However, 2 companies indicated otherwise, as it was found
that there is no linkage between awarding annual bonuses and entrepreneurship and it
was perceived that heavier governance mechanistic approaches on remuneration would
not encourage entrepreneurship. Also, there were difficulties in developing proper
measurements to evaluate an individual's performance as that tended to be very
subjective. This finding largely supported this study's expectation that practicing
performance criteria in awarding annual bonuses to executives would stimulate
enterprise activities, as they would be incentivised to perform their tasks.
In summary, the interview findings did not provide a clear consensus on the
implications of corporate governance practices on enterprise activities within a firm.
This provided an indication that there was no one definite way of practising corporate
governance and the practice varied according to the industry the company belonged to,
size of the company and the complexity of the business market in which the company
operated.
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9. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
LINKING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
RESULTS
9.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets forth the links created in this study between the quantitative and
qualitative findings and the development of the scatter graph. The quantitative findings
that contributed to the descriptive analysis on corporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship are presented in Chapter 6 together with the results of the correlation
analysis and the development of the Scatter Graph. The additional statistical
techniques: factor analysis and adaptive exploratory regression, conducted to analyse
further the relationship between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship,
is covered in Chapter 7. This was followed in Chapter 8 by a discussion on the results
of the qualitative analysis of the case studies.
In this chapter the findings of the quantitative and qualitative are drawn together to
show the advantages of utilising a mixed method approach. This approach is
considered to be an efficientmethod for analysis when compared to the quantitative and
qualitative approach used in isolation (Creswell, 2003). Also, the results from one
method can help to develop or inform the other method (Greene et al., 1989).
The structure of thischapter is as follows: Section 9.2 links the qualitative findings with
the proposition development and quantitative results and Section 9.3 links the
qualitative findings with the development of the scatter graph. Finally, section 9.4
presents an overview and summary.
327
9.2 LINKING QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS IN
RELATION TO THE PROPOSITION DEVELOPMENT
Chapter 8 examined the relationship between corporate governance codes and corporate
entrepreneurship. This was followed by an analysis of corporate governance internal
control mechanisms: Board Structure and Composition, Ownership Structure and
Remuneration Structure and its relationship with enterprise activities. This section now
links the qualitative results to the proposition development and the quantitative findings.
Relationship of Corporate Governance Codes on Corporate Entrepreneurship
Generally, the qualitative findings confirmed that corporate governance that focused
extensively on control and accountability and which contained detailed perspective
monitoring mechanisms might hinder enterprise activities within a firm. This was
because companies would be required to spend more time and resources on compliance
based activities rather than on the progression of the company. This finding was in line
with the arguments made by Taylor, 2001; Short et al., 1998; 2000; O'Sullivan, 2000;
Young, 1995, Tricker, 1984; Keasey & Wright, 1993 who voiced concerns about the
potential negative impact of excessive controls via governance rules on entrepreneurial
activities.
In addition, the findings confirmed that there was a need to create the right balance
between governance and enterprise activities. This was in line with the argument made
by Short et al. (2000) on the importance ofensuring that the twin goals ofaccountability
and enterprise were viewed as equally important. Similar arguments on creating a
balance between accountability and enterprise activities whereby corporate governance
systems should have two broad dimensions covering both of these aspects in the
organisation were made by Tricker, 1984; Keasey and Wright, 1993. However, the
quantitative findings did not indicate a significant relationship between corporate
governance and corporate entrepreneurship.
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Board Structure & Composition
Ratio of Outsiders on the Board
In respect of the ratio of non-executives on the board, the qualitative findings revealed
unexpected results indicating that a high ratio of outsiders would stimulate enterprise
activities within the firm. This was in line with the findings of Daily & Dalton (1992)
in that increasing the ratio of outside directors on the board expanded the base of
expertise whereby the CEO would benefit, strengthen the system and create corporate
checks and balances. Similar arguments put forward by Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Monks
& Minow, 1995; Parkinson, 1993; Jensen, 1993 state that a higher ratio of non-
executives improves the board's ability to effectively perform its control function,
encounter a lower conflict of interest and objectively assess managers' performance.
Since they were not closely involved in the operations of the organisation, non-
executives were able to prevent managerial abuse and to provide constraints over
investment in unproductive R&D projects. Also, the quantitative findings revealed
similar results in that that having a high ratio of outsiders on the board did not have a
negative impact on corporate entrepreneurship.
Providing Outsiders with Ownership
In addition, the qualitative and quantitative findings revealed that providing outside
directors with ownership did not reduce the negative relationship between the
proportion of outside directors and corporate entrepreneurship; as, in the first place,
non-executives did not inhibit enterprise activities within the firm. Increasing non
executive ownership tended to make non-executives become less independent as they
were more interested in wealth accumulation rather than acting in the interests of the
shareholders and were therefore more focused on increasing the short-term performance
of the organisation to obtain higher dividends rather than focusing on inculcating the
entrepreneurial spirit within the organisation, which was considered to be a long-term
effort. Furthermore, the amount of shares given to non-executives was very minimal
and was not significant enough to impact on them. As mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7,
the quantitative findings indicated similar results to the qualitative results in respect of
theratio of outsiders andthe effect of providing them with ownership.
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Board Size
The third aspect on board structure and composition investigated the effects of a large
board size on corporate entrepreneurship. The qualitative results indicated that there
was no clear consensus as to whether a larger board size would decrease
entrepreneurship activities in an organisation. However, most of the companies
surveyed revealed that a board size that was too large would become dysfunctional, too
unwieldy, would create difficulty in making decisions, the dynamics of the meeting
would be lost, and become less effective. This is in line with the arguments made by
Zahra et al., 2000, Pfeffer, 1972; O'Reilly et al., 1989; Lipton & Lorsh, 1992; Yermack,
1996; Jensen, 1993; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Canyon & Peck, 1998 that a large board size
could become dysfunctional, cause a communication break down, create decline in
coordination among directors, slow down the decision-making processes, reduce agility
and speed of response in the face of complex business situations; all of which serve to
reduce the level of corporate entrepreneurship in the organisation. As in Chapters 6 &7
the quantitative findings, using bivariate correlation analysis, also indicated negative
implications of larger board size.
Frequent board and subcommittee Meetings
The last two aspects of board structure and composition revealed the consequences of
having frequent board and subcommittee meetings. The qualitative findings showed
that there was no clear consensus as to whether having frequent board and
subcommittee meetings decreased entrepreneurial activities within an organisation.
Three of the companies surveyed revealed that having too frequent board meetings
would result in the board spending too much of its time on board meetings, looking at
the detail of the business rather than the bigger picture and this might in turn limit
opportunities for board members to serve as directors on other boards. Similar
arguments made by Lipton & Lorsh (1993) and Vafeas (1999) showed that frequent
meetings caused directors to have insufficient time to carry out their duties. The
quantitative findings of this study also supported this argument (see Chapter 7).
However, Vafeas (1999) equally argued that the consequences of a higher frequency
and number of board meetings were still unclear. The findings of this study also
revealed that frequent board meetings did not decrease entrepreneurial activities since
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those individuals that were involved in these activities did not attend board meetings.
Frequent meetings were not seen as a problem but what was more crucial was whether
the right level of input was received from the board and this in turn depended on the
role and function of the board. This finding was in line with Conger et al, (1998)
argument that conducting frequent board meetings was an important resource in
improving the effectiveness of the board and might lead to a higher-level of
entrepreneurial activities within the organisation and the performance of duties in
accordance with the shareholder's interest.
The impact of frequent meetings on board committees also indicated similar unclear
results from the quantitative and qualitative findings. There were companies that
revealed that board committees could have a much more specific role and therefore
have fewer meetings than the board. On the other hand, there were companies who
argued that board committees needed to have more regular board meetings, especially
the audit committees, to fulfill the audit requirements. Furthermore, the interview
results confirmed that frequent meetings could lead to a decrease in the productivity
level of the company as meetings could become less useful and people would be
indirectly affected in terms of their work. However, the findings appeared to provide
an indication that there was no one best way in particular of practicing corporate
governance as this varied according to the size of the business, the industry the
company belonged to and the complexity of the business.
Ownership Structure
Analysis of the interviews yielded insights into ownership structures in terms of the
repercussions of providing high levels of executive ownership and dominance of
institutional block holders on entrepreneurial activities within the firm.
Executive Ownership
The interview results indicated thatmost companies found that a high levelof executive
ownership did not diminish the spirit of building an entrepreneurial organisation.
Similar results were also revealed using the quantitative findings. This seemed to
indicate that providing high levels of ownership to executives would tend to align
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executives' interests with shareholders, act as a motivating device, encourage
executives to be more interested in activities of the business and the share price,
increase the financial success of the business and motivate them to respond
entrepreneurally. This conformed with the arguments made in previous research studies
cited that a lack of ownership would discourage executives from corporate
entrepreneurship activities as they might have had to put their salaried position in
jeopardy, increased personal costs to master new skills and so to avoid risk, executives
would focus on maintaining an acceptable level of short-term performance (Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Zahra, 2000). Therefore, providing executives with ownership tended to
encourage executives to be more long-term focused and helped to build corporate
entrepreneurship activities (Jones & Butler, 1992) within the firm.
Institutional Block holders
Moving on now to the dominance of institutional block holders, the analysis, using both
the qualitative and quantitative approach, revealed no clear consensus as to the nature of
the influence of block holders on entrepreneurial activities. The conflicting results
might have arisen from the tendency to view this type of investor as a 'monolithic
group'. This result indicated that the impact depended on the type of institutional block
holders, i.e. whether they were short-term and long-term holders. Different groups of
institutional investors might pursue different goals and emphasise different objectives
and investment horizons (Kochhar & David, 1996; Roe, 1994). The short-term
institutional holders would be more interested in making a quick profit and would tend
to be more risk averse should the company wish to invest and, furthermore, they were
inclined to go into great detail about the business which could slow down the decision
making process of thecompany (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991). Fund managers would
usually focus on maximizing their portfolio's annual performance (Jacob, 1991). If the
value of stock declined, they might discontinue their investment in the company and
this would pressure executives to overlook those corporate entrepreneurship projects
with long pay-back periods (Graves, 1988; Porter, 1992; Hill et al., 1988). On the other
hand, long-term institutional holders would tend to encourage corporate




Analysis of the interview data yielded insights on the remuneration structure in terms of
the impact of offering Executive StockOptions (ESO) and awardingAnnual Bonuses to
executives on entrepreneurial activities within the firm.
Executive Stock Option (ESO)
The interview findings on ESO did not indicate a clear consensus since half of the
respondents found that it would not reduce corporate entrepreneurship activities and the
other halfwere neutral in their views. The findings indicated that the impact of offering
ESO would very much depend on how it had been structured. If it was structured on a
short-term basis then executives would tend to maximize short-term gains and this
would encourage them to take short-term positions (Jacob, 1991). On the other hand,
ESO that was designed for long-term performance would encourage those corporate
entrepreneurship activities that tended to have a long-term pay back period. Also, the
quantitative result did not indicate any significant result as to whether offering ESO to
executives would reduce corporate entrepreneurship.
Annual Bonus
In respect of annual bonuses, the interview results indicated that most of the
respondents found that practising performance criteria in awarding annual bonuses to
executives increased entrepreneurial activities. This result conformed to this study's
proposition that linking performance criteria to the awarding of an annual bonus would
motivate executives to venture into entrepreneurial activities (Mc Knight, 1996;
Aggarwal & Samwick, 1996). In addition, the quantitative findings revealed similar
results.
In summary, the qualitative findings were not able to indicate any definite clear
consensus on the propositions since most of the respondents revealed mixed responses,
except on aspects relating to the ratio of outsiders on the board, providing non-
executives with ownership, providing executive ownership and awarding annual
bonuses to executives. These four aspects also revealed similar results with the
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quantitative findings (Table 9.2.1). However, none of the quantitative findings that
indicated significant results showed any similar findings with the qualitative results
except for practising performance criteria in awarding annual bonuses to executives.
These results seemed to indicate that practising corporate governance tended to be very
subjective and would vary according to the organisation's practices, size and the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9.3 LINKING QUALITATIVE FINDINGS WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE SCATTER GRAPH
The previous section linked the qualitative results with the proposition development and
the quantitative findings. In this section the qualitative findings are linked with the
Scatter Graph that was formulated in Chapter 6.
The findings revealed that in Case A, classified as possessing low governance and high
entrepreneurship level, supported 6 of the 10 propositions (Table 9.3.1). This revealed
an interesting indication in that a company possessed of high internal entrepreneurial
practices and scoring low in their governance practices would support a large proportion
of thepropositions. This company found thatrigidity in corporate governance practices
could create a stumbling block in the progress of the business since it operated in an
industry that faced fierce competition and complexity in the business market.
Therefore, this may cause the firm to supporta large numberof the propositions.
On the other hand, Case B, classified as having a low governance and low
entrepreneurship level, supported only 1 one of the 10 propositions. This seemed to
indicate that a company that had low entrepreneurial and govemance practices in their
firm might not find that governance created a hindrance for the progress of their
business. This company may be complacent with its present situation andmay not face
intense competition from its competitors.
In addition, Case C scored highly in governance and entrepreneurship practices and also
supported 1 of the 10 propositions. This indicated that a company, which had high
governance and entrepreneurial practices in their firm, may be one that did not find that
governance inhibited the success of their business as they were able to work effectively
with it and find that it stimulated the performance of the company.
Case E, classified as possessing high governance and low entrepreneurial levels,
supported only 2 of the 10 propositions. This indicated that the company placed great
emphasis on compliance towards governance practices rather than on enterprise
activities. This was because the company operated in an industry that was relatively
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monopolistic in nature and therefore, enterprise activities were not seen to be crucial
since the organisation did not face intense competitionin the business market.
Cases D and F were situated closest to the centre point of the Scatter Graph also
supported relatively low on the propositions. Case D supported only 2 of the
propositions whilst Case F supported 3of the 10 propositions. Both of these companies
were neutral in their views in comparison to the other companies. These companies
indicated that corporate governance might inhibit entrepreneurial activities depending
on the situation and how it had been structured.
In summary, there was no one particular consensus given by the respondents on the
impactof corporate govemance on corporate entrepreneurship activities. However, the
findings indicated results according to what has been expected. This was due to two
assumptions: (a) answers given in interviews reflected the interviewee's own experience
and (b) respondents provided answers that showed their own actions in a good light.
Therefore, we could expect Case A categorized as being highly entrepreneurial but low
in governance to give strong support to the propositions. This confirmed that a
company which was highly geared towards entrepreneurial activities and faced tough
competition in the business market would find that the rigidity inherent with govemance
may tend tostifle the progress oftheir business. On the other hand, it was expected that
the respondent from Case C, categorized as being high in entrepreneurship and
governance, did not indicate strongly that govemance would prevent them from
stimulating enterprise activities within the firm and therefore did not agree with the
above propositions. Also, it was expected that respondents from the middle to give
mixed responses and that was bom out in the findings. Table 9.3.1 provides the link
between qualitative findings andScatter Graph.
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This chapter establishes the link between the qualitative and quantitative results in
relation to the propositions development where the findings did not indicate a definite
clear consensus except on four aspects relating to the ratio of outsiders on the board,
providing non-executive with ownership, providing executive with ownership and
awarding annual bonuses to executives. However, these four aspects failed to indicate
any significant results in both of the analyses (quantitative and qualitative) and this did
not meet with the study's expectation. Also, the findings indicated that none of the
quantitative findings that obtained significant results showed any similar findings with
the qualitative results except for practising performance criteria in awarding annual
bonuses to executives. These results seemed to indicate that practising corporate
governance tended to be very subjective and varied according to the organisation's
practices, size and the industry to which it belonged.
In addition, this chapter linked the qualitative findings to the development of the Scatter
Graph. The interview findings did not provide any particular consensus by the
respondents on the impact of corporate governance on corporate entrepreneurship
activities. The findings showed that only company A, classified as low in governance
but with high entrepreneurial activities, supported a large number of the propositions
which appeared to indicate that a company which was highly geared towards
entrepreneurial activities in a highly competitive market would tend to find that rigidity
in governance may stifle the progress of their business. On the contrary, companies
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categorised as having low governance and low entrepreneurship; high governance and
high entrepreneurship; high governance and low entrepreneurship and situated closest to
the centre point of the graph, did not find that governance would prevent them from




Corporate governance plays an important role in ensuring greater transparency and
disclosure levels in companies so as to prevent any recurrence of corporate collapse e.g.
Enron, and WorldCom. However, the question arises as to whether rigidity in
governance rules and regulations constrain enterprise activity in a firm and this is the
main theme of this thesis. Specifically, it is argued that internal control mechanisms
e.g. board of directors, ownership and remuneration structure can impact on the
entrepreneurial activities in an organisation. Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 presented the
findings of this study undertaken usinga quantitative and qualitative approach.
Briefly, Chapter 1 provided an overview, motivation for and the structure of this smdy.
Chapter 2 examined the reasons why corporations were turning to corporate
entrepreneurship. A holistic approach was used when discussing those factors that
contributed to the creation of an entrepreneurial organisation. Chapter 3 documented a
summary of U.K corporate governance and provided a comparison of its practices with
other European countries and the U.S. Also, Chapter 3 analysed the previous literature
related to the corporate governance internal control mechanisms i.e.: board of directors,
ownership and remuneration structure with the firm's performance. Chapter 4 drew the
literature of corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship together and the
research propositions were subsequently developed. The research methodology of this
study used the mixed method approach, and the development of the survey and
secondary data questionnaire was discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, Chapter 5
discussed the sample selection and the data collection process involved in this thesis.
The findings in relation to the impact of corporate governance on corporate
entrepreneurship were discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 6 provided the
descriptive statistics of the sample companies, corporate entrepreneurship and corporate
governance index. Also, an analysis of the bivariate correlation and the development of
the scatter graph were discussed. Additional analysis using factor analysis and
regression was examined in Chapter 7 and this included a discussion of the results
pertaining to the propositions. Chapter 8 presented the findings of the 6 case studies
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undertaken using face-to face interviews and provided a discussion of the results in
relation to the propositions and the Scatter Graph. Chapter 9 created the link between
the quantitative and qualitative findings and the Scatter Graph.
The objective of this Chapter is to draw together Chapters 1 to 9 to synthesise the
contribution of this study by discussing and providing a summary of the research issues
investigated. Section 10.2 recapitulates the key objectives of the study as outlined in
Chapter 1. It also briefly reviews the research methodology and its appropriateness for
examining the research questions. Section 10.3 summarises the key findings. Section
10.4 discusses the implications of these findings for academics, practitioners and
governments. Section 10.5 explores the limitations of the study. A discussion on future
areas of research appears in section 10.6and Section 10.7 presents concluding remarks.
10.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW
This smdy focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and enterprise
activities in large corporations. As outlined in Chapter 1 the topic, corporate
entrepreneurship, was deemed to be important when examined in the context of the
global market where companies were continually forced to seek greater efficiency and
improvements. Nevertheless, with recent corporate scandals, organisations have also
been required to abide by the mandatory requirements of the corporate governance code
to ensure a greater transparency and accountability and, it has been argued by
researchers (Taylor, 2001; Short et al., 1998; 2000; O'Sullivan, 2000; Young, 1995;
Tricker, 1984; Keasey & Wright; 1993), that this couldcurb executive decision-making
and the progress of the business. Although examining corporate entrepreneurship in
general and the impact of governance on enterprise activities, in particular extant
literature identified a gap in respectof linking these two areas together.
Corporate entrepreneurship as an area of study is particularly pertinent in the current
business situation because, as a result of intense global competition, organisations are
seeking greater efficiencies in order to improve their market position. Corporate
entrepreneurship requires theorganisation to be agile and flexible enough to capture any
opportunities that may arise. In building an entrepreneurial organization, it has been
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emphasised that a holistic approach that examines the issue at the individual, job and
organisation level needs to be adopted.
On the other hand, corporate governance is considered to be essential for creating
greater transparency and accountability in a firm. Nevertheless, stringent mles and
regulations (Taylor, 2001; Short; 2000) could hamper enterprise activities that are
considered crucial for today's businesses to compete successfully in the existing local
and global markets. It is argued by some researchers (Ticker, 1984; Keasey andWright,
1993) albeit with little evidence, that there is a need to create a balance between control
and enterprise activities as too much control could inhibit entrepreneurilism.
Drawing upon extant evidence in corporate entrepreneurship andcorporate govemance,
four research questions (RQs) relevant tothese two areas were identified inChapter 1.
RQl: Docorporate governance codes have an impact on theentrepreneurial character of
the organisations?
The U.K government consecutively introduced three reports in the year 2003 starting
with the Higgs Report and this was followed by the Smith Report which addressed the
role of non-executive directors, audit committees and auditors. In the same year, a
revision was made to the Combined Code (July 2003) and it is argued that corporations
now have more mles and regulations to abide by. This has raised concern over whether
the Code could impact upon enterprise activities. Researchers found that there was a
cmcial need to ensure that the twin goals of accountability and enterprise were viewed
as being of equal importance (Taylor, 2001; Young, 1995; Short, 1998; 2000; Ticker,
1984; Keasey & Wright, 1993) in ensuring the continual progress and development of
the business.
RQ2: Does board structure have an impact on corporate entrepreneurship?
The role of the board is to promote the interests of shareholders and it is considered to
be the highest internal control unit (Jensen, 1993) covering aspects such as insiders vs.
outsiders, boardsize and frequency of board meeting.
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Prior studies have not demonstrated any clear evidence as to whether having more
insiders or outsiders on the board enhances shareholder wealth. There are studies that
indicated a higher representation of outsiders would create a more active, independent
board (Parkinson, 1993; Blair; 1995), provide a mechanism for corporate checks and
balances and expand the base of expertise whereby the CEO could benefit (Daily &
Dalton, 1992; Monks and Minow, 1995). On the other hand, some researchers argue
that insider dominance increases R&D and this stimulates innovation and
entrepreneurial activities within the firm (Baysinger et al., 1991; Hill & Snell, 1988).
Apart from board composition, an examination of board size has also not indicated any
conclusive results about whether large or small board size inhibits or stimulates
enterprise activities. Small boards were found to increase directors' participation and
promote communication among board members thereby encouraging cohesion in
monitoring and evaluating the CEO (Yermack, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000). However,
there are contrary arguments that find small boards lack the expertise and diverse skills
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) that are crucial forentrepreneurship (Zahra et al., 2000).
Instead large boards are seen to possess directors from various functional backgrounds,
education and experience that the company could benefit from in the competitive
business environment. However, it has been equally argued that as the board size
increases it will encourage enterprise activities until a threshold is reached and beyond a
certain point it will become dysfunctional and this has negative implications for
corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra et al., 2000).
In respect ofboard/sub committee meetings, having regular meetings to discharge duties
is a requirement of the Combined Code (2003). Prior research in respect to frequent
meetings usually focuses on the firm's performance but does not cover enterprise
activities. Frequent board meetings are considered an important way of improving the
effectiveness of the board (Conger et al., 1998). On the other hand, researchers
considered that frequent board meetings were not useful and the time could be better
utilised through a more meaningful exchange of ideas with the management (Vafeas,
1999). Also, frequent meetings lead to increased costs through travel expenses;
administrative support and meeting fees (Evan et al., 2000) and this may impact
negatively on enterprise activities.
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RQ3: Does ownership structure have an impact on corporate entrepreneurship?
Agency theory suggests that corporate ownership can affect a manager's willingness to
take on risk (Jones & Butler, 1992) i.e. ownership held by the firm's executives and
powerful vigilant institutional block holders could affect enterprise activities. There is
still no clear evidence that shows whether providing ownership to executives and
institutional block holders stimulates corporate entrepreneurship activities within the
firm. Studies have indicated that providing executives with ownership creates greater
commitment for long-term value creation i.e. corporate entrepreneurship (Jones &
Butler, 1992). On the other hand, there are researchers that find that a large amount of
ownership ties a large amount of the executive's job performance to the performance of
the company and this creates uncertainty in terms of income and makes the executive
likely to be risk averse (Lewellen et al., 1987; Brace & Buck, 1997) which has negative
repercussions on corporate entrepreneurship. In respect of institutional shareholders,
some researchers found that their presence encouraged the CEO to pursue risky long-
term ventures (Meckling, 1976), enabled the monitoring of the CEO decision and
commitment on corporate entrepreneurship (Baysinger et al., 1991) and increased the
shareholder activism that stimulated entrepreneurial activities within a firm. However,
researchers have also indicated that there is a negative association between institutional
investors and R&D spending (Graves, 1998), as the main emphasis is placed on the
short-term, bottom line and on serving self-interest rather than the interests of other
shareholders.
RQ4: Does remuneration structure have an impact on corporate entrepreneurship?
Employees are considered to be an important asset as they play a vital role in the
progress and success of the business. It is crucial to design a remuneration structure that
motivates employee commitment towards the organisation i.e. Executive Stock Option
(ESO) and Annual Bonus. However, there was no clearevidence that indicated the type
of remuneration structure that was able to stimulate enterprise activities in a firm. In the
1990s offering ESO had become the norm among companies as it was widely believed
to increase an organisation's performance (Murphy, 1985; Main et al., 1996). On the
other hand, researchers have indicated that there is a negative impact of ESO on the
level of corporate dividends (Lambert et al., 1989). Furthermore, it was offered without
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being related toany performance criteria (Bmce & Buck, 1997) and this discouraged the
innovative effort that is so crucial for enterprise activities (Short et al., 2000). Also, in
respect of annual bonuses, early studies have not indicated any clear link between pay
and performance (Lewellen, 1968; Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970). Later studies
indicated there is a link between the annual bonus and the firm's performance by
subdividing total pay into salary and annual bonus (Mc Knight, 1996). However,
researchers are doubtful when looking at the annual bonus about whether there is any
link between pay and performance (Conyon & Leech) since it is awarded on a yearly
basis and is thus considered as a short-term pay component that affects long-term
investments (Kaplan & Norton, 1992; Bushman et al., 1996) such as entrepreneurial
activities.
The 10 pairs of propositions related to the four research questions set out in Chapter 1
and briefly reviewed above, were developed in Chapter 4. The corporate governance
internal control mechanisms were identified as the key influences on corporate
entrepreneurship activities in a firm. The construct of the corporate entrepreneurship
and corporate governance indexes was developed to measure the entrepreneurship and
governance level in firms was operationalised in Chapter 5. A mixed method approach
was utilised for testing the propositions, combining quantitative surveys (through e-mail
and secondary data) and qualitative case studies (through semi stmctured face-to-face
interviews) for collecting and analysing data. The use of multiple methods was
important primarily for the purpose of triangulating (Creswell, 2003; Oppenhiem, 1992;
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The qualitative approach was considered to be the main
domain of the research and it was vital in answering the 'why' and 'how' questions and
providing insights into the depth and complexity ofcorporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship which was considered to be a nascent area. A mixed method design
enabled complementary (observing overlapping and different facets of the impact of
corporate governance on corporate entrepreneurship) and expansions (adding breadth
and scope to the project and elaborating upon the findings of the quantitative results).
The survey obtained a 42% response rate from the FTSE 100 companies. 62 % of the
responses were from service companies and 38% from non-service companies. Three
statistical techniques were used for testing the propositions developed in Chapter 4:
bivariate correlation analysis, factor analysis and exploratory regression analyses.
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A total of 6 interviews were conducted using the Scatter Graph method developed in
Chapter 6 in selecting companies that possessed high or low governance and
entrepreneurial level. 4 companies were selected situated at the furthest four ends and 2
that were situated closest to the centre point were also selected. Qualitative data were
analysed by collating information into different categories based on the research
questions, with particular attention paid to distilling the reasons underlying the impact
of corporate governance on enterprise activities within a firm. The following section
summarises the key findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses in Chapters
6, 7 and 8 respectively.
10.3 KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS
This section synthesises the key results from the two quantitative chapters and the
qualitative findings. A detailed discussion was made linking the quantitative findings in
relation to the proposition development, quantitative results and with the scatter graph
and this was presented in Chapter 9 (Sections 9.2 and 9.3).
The findings suggest that some aspects of corporate governance inhibit corporate
entrepreneurship activities. This conformed to the study's expectation that corporate
governance which focused extensively on control and accountability and contained
detailed perspective monitoring mechanisms may hinder enterprise activities from
taking place in an organisation.
Also, other measured aspects of corporate governance have an empirically confirmed
negative impact on corporate entrepreneurship i.e. larger board size decreases
entrepreneurship activities in an organisation and frequent board and sub committee
meetings decrease entrepreneurial activities. These two aspects conformed to the study
expectation. However, it should be noted that these two aspects conform with only
some of the qualitative findings as evidenced through the interviews.
In addition, there are aspects of corporate governance that stimulate corporate
entrepreneurship activities i.e. dominance of institutional block holders impact
positively on corporate entrepreneurship and practising performance criteria in
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awarding annual bonus increases entrepreneurial activities. These findings met the
study expectation and part of the qualitative results.
On the other hand, there are four aspects of corporate governance where findings failed
to indicate any significant results in both the quantitative and qualitative analyses: high
ratio of outsiders on the board has a negative impact on corporate entrepreneurship;
providing ownership to outside board of directors reduces the negative relationship
between the proportion of outside directors and corporate entrepreneurship; offering
ESO to executives reduces corporate entrepreneurship and high levels of executive
ownership diminishes the spirit of building an entrepreneurial organisation. These four
aspects did not meet with the study expectation and this was discussed in detail in
Chapter 9.
These findings serve to provide an indication to policy makers that when formulating
corporate governance mles and regulations, they need to be aware that rigidity and
stringent rules will have negative implications on entrepreneurial activities. However
policy makers also need to be aware that some aspects of corporate governance may
have a positive effecton entrepreneurship. Both of these aspects are discussed belowin
section 10.4.
10.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS, ACADEMICS, AND
GOVERNMENTS
The findings of this study need to be viewed as preliminary in investigating the impact
of corporate govemance code on entrepreneurial activities. For large corporations in
the U.K, aspiring to be entrepreneurial in order to remain competitive in the business
environment, the results suggest that the current corporate governance code is
considered to be at the right level whereby it is flexible and not too prescriptive since it
provides a certain degree of leeway if organisations are unable to comply. Therefore,
this does notinhibit the progress of the business in terms of its enterprise activities. On
the contrary those U.K companies that are listed in the New York Stock Exchange
found the U.S Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 to be too rigid since compliance is required in
every aspect when compared to the U.K code of governance. The findings also
suggested that section 404 of the U.S code requires that companies comply with such an
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extent that compliance takes up a substantial amount of their resources in terms of cash
and time and has caused companies to consider de-listing from the New York Stock
Exchange.
At the same time, as firms increase their competitiveness, they also need to possess
additional knowledge and information about outside markets and this is a contribution
that the non-executives could provide to the board. Once again, the results suggest that
non-executives possess vast experience and knowledge as they come from different
sections of the business community and this enables them to contribute to developing
strategy and stimulating innovation within the business and this is beneficial for the
progress of the company.
Likewise, large corporations need to strengthen their productivity level. The findings
suggest to practitioners that having too frequent meetings could exert a negative impact
on the productivity level of the firms. It becomes less useful as the impactgets diluted,
a number of people will be affected in terms of their work, loss in terms of resources
and the decision-making process may be slowed down.
At the same time practitioners could motivate enterprise activities in the firm by
practising performance criteria on annual bonuses that is able to incentivise executives
towards enterprise activities. However, this very much depends on the performance
criteria that have been designed in awarding annual bonuses.
In addition, the findings of this research have contributed towards broadening the
knowledge of corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship that has not been
previously explored by researchers. The research has opened up fresh avenues for
scholars across a spectmm of areas ranging from corporate strategy, corporate
entrepreneurship through to corporate governance.
Also, the results of this research contribute towards developing governance policies in
the near future. It is important for the policy makers to be aware that rigidity and
stringent compliance could inhibit companies from moving ahead in today's
competitive environment.
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10.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
As a first attempt at linking the corporate governance code of compliance in the U.K
context with corporate entrepreneurship, the findings of this study need to be viewed as
preliminary. As discussed below, despite its contributions, the research has several
limitations, from both a conceptual and methodological point of view.
This study draws upon the conceptual framework of the corporate governance internal
control mechanisms withcorporate entrepreneurship. As mentioned in Chapter 4 there
are other aspects of corporate governance that could be included such as those
stakeholders that are directly related to the company and could affect corporate
entrepreneurship and this includes employees, providers of credit, suppliers and
customers. There are also other stakeholders that are more indirectly related to the
company such as the local communities in which the company operates, environmental
groups and the government and these could also be included to provide a more
comprehensive coverage in the study.
The present research attempts to probe into the effects of the internal control
mechanisms i.e.: board of directors, ownership and remuneration structure towards
enterprise activities through providing an insight into the underlying factors. Future
research needs to adopt a dynamic approach, with in-depth, longitudinal report case
studies and secondary data using annual reports into the process of decision-making in
respect of the impact of corporate governance towards enterprise activities. Time series
analysis may be useful for comparing and contrasting the impact of corporate
governance before and after the introduction of the three corporate governance reports
in 2003. This will enable a comparisonof the pre- and post implications of the code on
enterprise activities.
The present research attempts to develop a Corporate Governance Index to measure the
governance level. However, there are other aspects of corporate governance
mechanisms that could be included here such as the stakeholders group in order to
develop a more comprehensive measurement.
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As mentioned in Chapter 5, although the survey captured a high response rate, an
analysis of only 42 companies could be conducted. The total population size of the
FTSE 100 is relatively small and it was only possible to capture a small number of
observations. Owing to the small sample size only a limited analysis could be
conducted i.e. correlation, factor and exploratory regression analysis.
10.6 FUTURE RESEARCH AREA
This study focused on the impact of corporate governance on corporate
entrepreneurship. Several worthwhile avenues for future research were identified in the
course of researching the questions relevant to this study. This section outlines three
potentially interesting areas worthy of future scholarly attention.
Despite selecting the FTSE 100 companies from service and non-service sectors where
enterprise activities are crucial for sustaining a competitive edge, further research into
more varied sized companies may provide a wider understanding of the consequent
impact of the corporate govemance code on their entrepreneurial activities. This may
help to gain a deeper insight into the different implications that large corporations face
in comparison to smaller sized companies.
Further research into the extent of the impact on entrepreneurial activities of stakeholder
groups such as the employees, providers of credit, suppliers and customers could also be
usefully undertaken. This is seen to be cmcial, as it will add a more comprehensive
way of analysing the impact of corporate governance on enterprise activities.
There are other additional areas within the internal control mechanisms area that could
be further explored particularly concerning its implication towards enterprise activities
i.e. the role of Long Term Incentive Plan on enterprise activities; the different
classification of institutional shareholders and the implications for entrepreneurilism.
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10.7 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarises the key findings of the study that were discussed earlier in
Chapter 8. The results provide insights into the implications of corporate governance
for enterprise activities within firms concentrating particularly on the corporate
governance internal control mechanisms. The results of this study provide useful
insights for practitioners, academics and policy makers about the consequences of
corporate governance practice on corporate entrepreneurship activities within
corporations. In view of the limitations of the research, these findings need to be
viewed as preliminary. The area merits future research to expand the scope of study in
a more comprehensive way.
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